Written questions by Morton.

Representing the Restoration and Renewal Client Board, with reference to the stated annual cost of delay of £70 million and the estimated additional £250–350 million annual inflationary impact, what methodology was used to calculate those figures; what assumptions were made regarding construction market conditions; whether independent validation of those delay cost estimates was commissioned; what sensitivity analysis was undertaken to model lower inflation scenarios; and whether those delay figures include all ongoing maintenance expenditure irrespective of the R&R Programme.

It is estimated that the cost of delaying starting the delivery phase of the Restoration and Renewal (R&R) Programme is around £70m per year at current prices. It is estimated that there would be a further £250m to £350m in the inflationary impact on construction costs across the whole of the Programme for each year of delay, based on current information.The methodology underpinning the cost of delay is set out on page 124 in Annex 2 of the R&R Client Board’s recent report, Delivering restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster: the costed proposals (HC Paper 1576). This consists of: the compound impact of inflation over the Programme’s life (the £250m-£350m figure above); nugatory options development costs from this point; and additional reactive maintenance costs (above the current baseline).The cost of delay was considered as part of the Independent Advice and Assurance Panel’s (IAAP) review, which was published alongside the report. The IAAP has advised that the calculation of the costs of delay is likely to be an underestimate because it is based on accepted figures where robust estimates are available – most notably for the inflationary increase in construction costs that arise from delayed implementation, which the IAAP considered to be reasonable, and realistic. While those specific figures were reasonable the IAAP advised that, in major asset management, it is well established that remediation costs often grow in real terms relative to avoided maintenance costs (when essential investments are postponed): they also advised that the likelihood of extreme events rises when complicated, interconnected systems are operated beyond their intended design life or usage parameters.Separately to the cost of delay calculations, sensitivity analysis looking at the impact of construction inflation outstripping Bank of England forecasts was considered.The cost of delay figures were estimated with regard specifically to the R&R Programme and do not include all ongoing maintenance within the Palace of Westminster, only the growth in reactive maintenance costs above the current annual baseline.

Representing the Restoration and Renewal Client Board, with reference to the cost ranges set out in Table 1 of the costed proposals report, what assessment the Client Board has made of the historical accuracy of P50 and P80 estimates in comparable UK major projects; whether the inflation-adjusted cost ranges for Full Decant and EMI+ adequately reflect recent construction inflation volatility; whether the optimism bias applied sufficiently accounts for heritage, asbestos and live-estate risks; and what estimate it has made of the potential fiscal exposure to the taxpayer should cost escalation exceed the upper P80 range.

The recent report from the Restoration and Renewal (R&R) Client Board, Delivering restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster: the costed proposals (HC Paper 1576), provides costs and schedules as ranges at different confidence levels (P50 and P80). This is in line with major programme best practice and guidance from the National Audit Office (NAO).In addition, the R&R Programme carries out benchmarking against UK and international comparators.The R&R works and construction costs have been benchmarked against 14 international Parliamentary projects and 18 heritage building projects, including Kings Cross Station regeneration, Manchester Town Hall, London Olympics, Crossrail (the Elizabeth Line) and others.Benchmarking of cost estimates has also included benchmarking against other comparable types of work, for example asbestos removal (including in heritage sites), hospital mechanical and electrical work, or Salisbury cathedral stonework where appropriate; the types of cost and levels of risk allowed for in estimates against the Canadian Parliament and other comparable Parliamentary projects (including UK Parliament projects) and complex restoration projects; and management costs against other major programmes. Risk has been calculated and incorporated into estimates in line with Infrastructure and Projects Authority (now the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority) and NAO guidance for programmes.The inflation profile follows the Bank of England Monetary Report (November 2024) which remains constant at 2% from 2028/29 onwards in line with Bank of England targets. Sensitivity analysis looking at the impact of construction inflation outstripping Bank of England targets was also considered.The R&R Programme has recognised the heritage, asbestos and live‑estate challenges inherent in the Palace, and elements of these risks have been incorporated into its contingency planning. However, the independent assurance findings indicate that some of these factors are not yet fully reflected in the quantitative modelling, and a portion of the remaining exposure is currently covered through Optimism Bias. As the design matures and further survey data becomes available in the proposed next stage of the works, the Programme will refine these allowances to ensure they are fully and accurately captured.Under section 7 of the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act 2019, the two Houses are required to approve both the Delivery Authority’s proposals for the Palace restoration and a total funding envelope before the Programme can move to phase two. Furthermore, under section 7(4), once that approval has been obtained, any significant subsequent changes to the design, timing or funding of the works would require further approval from the Houses.Costs will be monitored closely throughout the delivery of the R&R Programme. Wider funding for the R&R Programme is subject to formal scrutiny from the Parliamentary Works Estimates Commission with input from HM Treasury, and audits by the NAO. The Public Accounts Committee can and has scrutinised R&R including its current inquiry announced in December 2025. The R&R Client Board, R&R Programme Board and R&R Delivery Authority Board also scrutinise costs to ensure value for money. Reports relating to R&R delivery and costs will continue to be publicly available, and there will be regular ongoing scrutiny by Members and Member-led Boards.

Communities and Local Government, what oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure that funding allocated to mayoral combined authorities is delivering value for money; how often such authorities are subject to independent audit or review; and whether he will publish all recent evaluations of programme delivery, including those relating to skills, infrastructure and housing investment.

Mayoral Strategic Authorities are expected to follow the existing principles and processes described in the English Devolution Accountability Framework and Scrutiny Protocol, which sets out how Mayors will be held to account by central government, at local level and by the public. This includes a duty to ensure value for money. All relevant local bodies defined by the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 are required to have their accounts independently audited.

Communities and Local Government, what assessment he has made of the effectiveness of mayoral combined authorities in delivering regional growth plans; what metrics his Department uses to evaluate performance against investment commitments, job creation and housing delivery; and whether he will publish comparative performance data across combined authorities, including the West Midlands Combined Authority.

Local Growth Plans are a key pillar of our regional growth agenda, and government continues to work with Mayoral Strategic Authorities to co-agree regional growth priorities.Mayoral Strategic Authority delivery, including on investment commitments and job creation, is monitored through relevant programme governance arrangements. For areas with an Integrated Settlement, delivery will be overseen via a single Outcomes Framework agreed with all relevant departments, HMT, and the Mayoral Strategic Authority. The outcome and targets that the Mayoral Strategic Authorities agree with central government may be different to reflect their priorities for local growth.Progress on housing will also be measured through the number of net additional dwellings (published on an England-wide, regional and local authority basis) and we will update Parliament in the usual manner.

Communities and Local Government, whether affordable housing starts that remain uncompleted for multiple years are included in published figures cited as evidence of housing delivery; and whether official publications distinguish starts from completed homes when reporting delivery outcomes.

Published statistics on new affordable housing supply in England, which can be found on gov.uk here, are broken down into starts and completions. Individual units are not tracked from start-on-site to completion. This is because the data provided directly by local planning authorities is collected on an aggregate basis to reduce burden while providing sufficient detail for use. The integrity of the data is maintained through thorough quality assurance checks, including cross checking with other data sources, while consistency and comparability are ensured through the detailed published guidance for each question. The affordable housing supply statistics have been assessed by the Office for Statistics Regulation and at the last assessment their continued Accredited Official Statistics status was confirmed.

Communities and Local Government, what powers his Department has to recover, suspend, or reallocate affordable housing grant funding where homes recorded as started under the Greater London Authority’s 2016 to 2023 Affordable Homes Programme are not progressed to completion.

Published statistics on new affordable housing supply in England, which can be found on gov.uk here, are broken down into starts and completions. Individual units are not tracked from start-on-site to completion. This is because the data provided directly by local planning authorities is collected on an aggregate basis to reduce burden while providing sufficient detail for use. The integrity of the data is maintained through thorough quality assurance checks, including cross checking with other data sources, while consistency and comparability are ensured through the detailed published guidance for each question. The affordable housing supply statistics have been assessed by the Office for Statistics Regulation and at the last assessment their continued Accredited Official Statistics status was confirmed.

Communities and Local Government, what the total value of affordable housing grant funding allocated to homes recorded as started by the Greater London Authority under the 2016 to 2023 Affordable Homes Programme but not yet completed is; and how much of that funding has been (a) drawn down and (b) remains unspent.

Published statistics on new affordable housing supply in England, which can be found on gov.uk here, are broken down into starts and completions. Individual units are not tracked from start-on-site to completion. This is because the data provided directly by local planning authorities is collected on an aggregate basis to reduce burden while providing sufficient detail for use. The integrity of the data is maintained through thorough quality assurance checks, including cross checking with other data sources, while consistency and comparability are ensured through the detailed published guidance for each question. The affordable housing supply statistics have been assessed by the Office for Statistics Regulation and at the last assessment their continued Accredited Official Statistics status was confirmed.

Communities and Local Government, whether there is a maximum period for which an affordable housing start may remain uncompleted while continuing to be treated as a valid start for statistical purposes; and if there is no such limit, how the integrity of the affordable housing starts series is maintained.

Published statistics on new affordable housing supply in England, which can be found on gov.uk here, are broken down into starts and completions. Individual units are not tracked from start-on-site to completion. This is because the data provided directly by local planning authorities is collected on an aggregate basis to reduce burden while providing sufficient detail for use. The integrity of the data is maintained through thorough quality assurance checks, including cross checking with other data sources, while consistency and comparability are ensured through the detailed published guidance for each question. The affordable housing supply statistics have been assessed by the Office for Statistics Regulation and at the last assessment their continued Accredited Official Statistics status was confirmed.

Communities and Local Government, under what circumstances affordable homes recorded by the Greater London Authority as started under the 2016 to 2023 Affordable Homes Programme may be reclassified, adjusted, or removed from official affordable housing starts statistics; and whether any such cases have occurred to date.

Published statistics on new affordable housing supply in England, which can be found on gov.uk here, are broken down into starts and completions. Individual units are not tracked from start-on-site to completion. This is because the data provided directly by local planning authorities is collected on an aggregate basis to reduce burden while providing sufficient detail for use. The integrity of the data is maintained through thorough quality assurance checks, including cross checking with other data sources, while consistency and comparability are ensured through the detailed published guidance for each question. The affordable housing supply statistics have been assessed by the Office for Statistics Regulation and at the last assessment their continued Accredited Official Statistics status was confirmed.

Communities and Local Government, how many affordable homes recorded as started by the Greater London Authority under the 2016 to 2023 Affordable Homes Programme remained uncompleted at the end of the most recent reporting period; and of those, how many had recorded no further construction activity in that period.

Published statistics on new affordable housing supply in England, which can be found on gov.uk here, are broken down into starts and completions. Individual units are not tracked from start-on-site to completion. This is because the data provided directly by local planning authorities is collected on an aggregate basis to reduce burden while providing sufficient detail for use. The integrity of the data is maintained through thorough quality assurance checks, including cross checking with other data sources, while consistency and comparability are ensured through the detailed published guidance for each question. The affordable housing supply statistics have been assessed by the Office for Statistics Regulation and at the last assessment their continued Accredited Official Statistics status was confirmed.

Communities and Local Government, what assessment he has made of the adequacy of the transparency of local authority budget-setting processes in instances where increases in council tax are accompanied by reductions in discretionary services and increases in fees and charges; and if he will require councils to publish a standardised breakdown of the household-level financial impact of such combined measures.

The Department has not made an assessment of the adequacy of the transparency of local authority budget-setting processes. It is for individual councils to decide their level of council tax, the discretionary services they deliver, and their fees and charges. In doing this they should take into consideration a range of factors including the impact on taxpayers. Councils are required to publicise their decisions with their residents in accordance with legislation.

What statutory role combined authorities will have under the Railways Bill in relation to service levels, timetabling and rolling stock deployment; what mechanisms will exist for regional leaders to challenge or appeal operational decisions made by Great British Railways; whether she expects the creation of a nationally managed rail body to increase central control over decisions previously taken at operator level; and what assessment she has made of the potential impact of nationalisation on rail devolution in mayoral combined authority areas.

GBR will be required to consult Mayoral Strategic Authorities (MSAs) where decisions on passenger services or rail infrastructure could have a significant impact on their areas. GBR will also have regard to the Local Transport Plans of MSAs to ensure local priorities are considered. The Bill enables cooperation between GBR and MSAs, allowing for information sharing and the ability to enter into arrangements regarding railway functions. This will enable close partnership working, providing opportunities for MSAs to shape local services and integrate rail with other modes. In addition, the Bill establishes the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) as a robust and independent appeals body, providing a clear route for appeal of GBR’s access and charging decisions. GBR will offer single-point local accountability for Mayors, with empowered local management as part of Business Units responsible for track and train. Local influence and control will need to be balanced with GBR taking decisions in the interest of the wider regional and national network.

What empirical evidence her Department relied upon in concluding that public ownership of train operations would improve punctuality and reliability; what modelling has been undertaken on the expected impact of public ownership on cancellation rates and passenger satisfaction over the next five years; what international comparators were used in developing the Government’s policy; and what measurable performance targets have been set for Great British Railways during its first three years of operation.

Great British Railways (GBR) will be a directing mind for Britain’s railway. The Impact Assessments for the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill and the Railways Bill set out the rationale for reform. We continue to look at international best practice and work with industry on targets.

What assessment she has made of the likely impact of public ownership on fare levels in the West Midlands over the next five years; whether fare-setting powers will change substantively under Great British Railways compared with the previous franchising model; what analysis has been undertaken of the relationship between ownership model and passenger satisfaction; and what steps she is taking to ensure that passengers in the West Midlands will not experience a reduction in service frequency or capacity as a result of asset reallocation decisions.

Passenger affordability is a top priority for this government when setting rail fares. That is why this year we have taken the historic step of freezing regulated rail fares for the first time in 30 years, putting money back in hard working people’s pockets and delivering savings for passengers across billions of journeys. It is important that we strike the right balance between affordability for passengers and reducing the burden on taxpayers. As set out in the Government’s response to the consultation on the Railways Bill, future fares policy under Great British Railway (GBR) will be guided by strategic parameters and guardrails, set by the Secretary of State and aligned to GBR’s financial settlement, providing GBR with greater autonomy and flexibility compared to today. These will reassure passengers that their fares will remain affordable, while ensuring sustainable use of taxpayer money on the network.

What safeguards are in place to help ensure that rolling stock currently allocated to services operated by West Midlands Trains remains allocated to those routes following transfer into public ownership; and what criteria will be used by Great British Railways when determining the geographic allocation or reallocation of rolling stock.

The Department for Transport (DfT), and the Department’s Rail Operator (DFTO) currently have no plans to reallocate rolling stock in use by West Midlands Trains and, as part of the recent transfer into public ownership, all leases have been extended until at least 2028.Under Great British Railways (GBR) we expect it to be easier to move rolling stock in response to changed circumstances than it is today. The criteria for such decisions will be developed in due course ahead of GBR’s establishment.

Communities and Local Government, what assessment he has made of the cumulative infrastructure impact of developments approved on appeal on former green belt land, including pressures on local roads, GP provision, school places and drainage; whether inspectors are required to quantify those impacts against existing local capacity; and what steps his Department is taking to ensure that local objections, including those submitted through statutory consultation processes, are given material weight in appeal decisions.

I refer the Rt Hon. Member to the answers given to Questions UIN 26508 on 05 February 2025 and UIN 90834 on 21 November 2025.

Whether any minimum allocation guarantees have been provided to regional authorities; whether combined authorities or mayors will have any formal consent or veto role in decisions relating to the permanent reassignment of trains; and what assessment she has made of the potential economic impact on the West Midlands should rolling stock procured for that region be reassigned elsewhere.

There are no minimum allocation guarantees in place. Mayors currently have varying roles in rail matters affecting their areas, and the detail of future arrangements has not yet been decided.No assessment of the potential economic impact of moving trains away from the West Midlands has been made because the Department for Transport, and the Department’s Rail Operator (DFTO Ltd), currently have no plans to reallocate rolling stock in use by West Midlands Trains and, as part of the recent transfer into public ownership, all leases have been extended until at least 2028.

Representing the Restoration and Renewal Client Board, what assessment it has made of the cumulative cost impact of scope additions relating to visitor experience, public engagement and new-build interventions; whether these elements materially increase the risk of programme delay; and whether removal or deferral of such elements could materially reduce the headline cost range and decant duration.

In 2024 the Restoration and Renewal (R&R) Client Board (the two House Commissions meeting jointly) considered the scope of the R&R Programme: that is, the improvements and benefits to be achieved in the end-state Palace, to which both Houses of Parliament will return. Having considered various scope levels, the R&R Client Board decided against the most "transformational" scope but selected a scope which it agreed would deliver improvements while maintaining value-for-money.The majority of the construction costs for the Palace relate to the priority areas which both Houses agreed for the R&R Programme in 2022 – namely, fire safety and protection, building services, asbestos, and building fabric conservation. 84% of the Palace construction costs for the full decant option and 86% of the Palace construction costs for the EMI+ option relate to these priority works. This is set out in Annex B of the R&R Client Board’s recent report, Delivering restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster: the costed proposals (HC Paper 1576).The proposed education centre and works to improve public participation account for less than 1% of Palace construction costs under full decant and less than 3% under EMI+.These works would largely be delivered through adaptations to existing spaces rather than wholly new construction, repurposing existing office space as an education centre for example. Overall, while these scope elements do introduce some additional complexity and cost, they do not fundamentally change the critical works required for programme or the associated risk. The removal or deferral of these elements is unlikely to deliver a material reduction in the headline cost range or decant duration as the underlying refurbishment and mechanical and electrical works would still be required in the areas being utilised.

Representing the Restoration and Renewal Client Board, with reference to the costed proposals report and in particular the proposed new main security entrance and enhanced search and screening facilities, what assessment it has made of whether existing security infrastructure could be upgraded without major structural reconfiguration; what proportion of total Programme cost is attributable to the creation of new security entrance infrastructure; whether security services formally requested this as an operational requirement; and whether a staged upgrade to current screening arrangements was evaluated as a lower-cost alternative.

The preferred scope for all options under the Restoration and Renewal (R&R) Programme will deliver a fit-for-purpose and accessible visitor arrival space, including higher capacity security search and screen areas that will reduce the likelihood of queuing outside, A wide range of potential locations within the Palace were assessed for the search and screening facility, including enhancing the current arrangements. The search and screening facility is proposed within a structure that is already part of the broader programme of works to create new plant space. The location has been selected to improve secure routes through the Palace and support new accessible visitor routes. Because of this it would be difficult to construct in stages or to retain the current search and screening location for now and relocate it in future without significant disruption, inefficiency, or duplicated cost.Overall security measures account for 3% of Palace construction costs across all options. This is set out in Annex B of the Restoration and Renewal (R&R) Client Board’s recent report, Delivering restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster: the costed proposals (HC Paper 1576).

What operational and financial risks were identified ahead of the transfer of West Midlands Trains into public ownership; what additional costs are expected to arise in the 2025–26 and 2026–27 financial years as a result of that transfer; whether any contingency arrangements have been put in place in the event of performance deterioration following transfer; and whether staffing arrangements, industrial relations frameworks or pension liabilities will change as a consequence of the move.

The Department considered all relevant circumstances of West Midlands Trains’ (WMT) position prior to transferring its services into public ownership on 1 February 2026. The Department does not expect WMT’s cost base to rise as a result of the transfer. With any change in operator, private or public, there are always some implementation costs, which will be determined in due course. However, these are expected to be offset by future payments to outgoing private sector operators falling away. The Department does not expect performance to deteriorate and WMT will be required to meet agreed performance targets included in a Services Agreement. There are no changes to contracted staff terms and conditions including pension arrangements because as part of the transfer into Public Ownership, a full TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment) process was undertaken.