Written questions by Francois.

Whether he has plans to purchase additional E-7 Wedgetail aircrafts.

I refer the right hon. Member to the answer I gave on the 25 July 2024 to Question UIN 432 to the hon. Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst).

What the latest estimated IOC date is for the last of class of the Type 26 frigates for the Royal Navy.

On current plans the construction of all eight Type 26 frigates is expected to be complete by the mid-2030s. HMS Glasgow's Initial Operating Capability date remains October 2028.

What his planned timetable is for when the Crowsnest airbone early warning system will achieve Full Operating Capability.

The Royal Navy’s Merlin Mk2 Airborne Surveillance and Control helicopter, as delivered by the CROWSNEST programme, has been in service since March 2021. The Programme is in the final stages of delivery for Full Operating Capability - expected by 28 March 2025, which is within its approved date.

How many Type 31 frigates his Department plans to order from Babcock; and whether this number is still subject to the outcome of the Strategic Defence Review.

The Strategic Defence Review will consider all Defence capability requirements in the context of current and future threats. The T26 programme remains on track to meet all user requirements and deliver eight world-class anti-submarine warfare frigates. All ships are expected to enter service between 2028 and 2035.HMS Venturer will be the first in Class of the Type 31 and is scheduled to be In service and ready for operations by the end of the decade. All five Type 31 ships are planned to be in service by the early 2030s.

What his planned timetable is to publish the outcome of the Strategic Defence Review.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) is well underway, and the Reviewers are reporting regularly on progress to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Secretary of State for Defence. The Reviewers will make their final report in the Spring and the Defence Secretary will subsequently report to Parliament. The SDR will feed into the national security strategy which brings together the reviews already commissioned across Government.

How many Type 26 frigates the his Department plans to order from BAE Systems; and whether this number is still subject to the outcome of the Strategic Defence Review.

The Strategic Defence Review will consider all Defence capability requirements in the context of current and future threats. The T26 programme remains on track to meet all user requirements and deliver eight world-class anti-submarine warfare frigates. All ships are expected to enter service between 2028 and 2035.HMS Venturer will be the first in Class of the Type 31 and is scheduled to be In service and ready for operations by the end of the decade. All five Type 31 ships are planned to be in service by the early 2030s.

What discussions he has had with his international counterparts on the sale of (a) HMS Albion and (b) HMS Bulwark; and what the estimated market value of each vessel was at the time of decommissioning.

Due to commercial sensitivities, we are unable to disclose progress regarding the sale of HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark.

How many and what proportion of UK Regular Forces personnel were classified as (a) Medically Fully Deployable, (b) Medically Limited Deployable and (c) Medically Not Deployable as of 1 January 2025.

The table below presents the Medical Deployability Standard of UK Armed Forces personnel, broken down by Service, as at 1 January 2025. Medically Fully Deployable (MFD)Medically Limited Deployable (MLD)Medically Not Deployable (MND) n%n%n%All99,16278.1%14,36111.3%13,50310.6%Royal Navy17,85879.9%1,9948.9%2,49511.2%Royal Marines4,98987.0%3566.2%3896.8%Army54,69576.9%9,47813.3%6,9739.8%RAF21,62077.8%2,5339.1%3,64613.1%Source: DMICP & JPA.1. MDS was missing for 10 personnel.2.The figures provided are for full time trained (Royal Navy and RAF)/trade trained (army) and serving againstrequirement personnel in service.3. Percentages may not sum to 100% due to MDS being missing for a small number of personnel. Personnel with a grade of MLD are medically fit for duty with minor employment limitations. A grade of MLD requires a medical risk assessment to be carried out for deployment. The decision on that deployment will depend on the medical condition, individual function, the proposed employment, length of the deployment and the medical support available. Personnel graded as Medically Non-Deployable are not fit to deploy on Operations; however, they may be deployable on UK based exercises and should be able to work effectively for at least 32.5 hours per week. Personnel graded Medically Non-Deployable may require continued medical care, long term medication and access to secondary care facilities. This new Government is committed to providing world-class medical treatment to ensure personnel can return to duty where possible, or to support their transition to civilian life.

How many and what proportion of (a) Royal Navy and (b) Royal Marines personnel were classified as (i) Medically Fully Deployable, (ii) Medically Limited Deployable and (iii) Medically Not Deployable as of 1 January 2025.

The table below presents the Medical Deployability Standard of UK Armed Forces personnel, broken down by Service, as at 1 January 2025. Medically Fully Deployable (MFD)Medically Limited Deployable (MLD)Medically Not Deployable (MND) n%n%n%All99,16278.1%14,36111.3%13,50310.6%Royal Navy17,85879.9%1,9948.9%2,49511.2%Royal Marines4,98987.0%3566.2%3896.8%Army54,69576.9%9,47813.3%6,9739.8%RAF21,62077.8%2,5339.1%3,64613.1%Source: DMICP & JPA.1. MDS was missing for 10 personnel.2.The figures provided are for full time trained (Royal Navy and RAF)/trade trained (army) and serving againstrequirement personnel in service.3. Percentages may not sum to 100% due to MDS being missing for a small number of personnel. Personnel with a grade of MLD are medically fit for duty with minor employment limitations. A grade of MLD requires a medical risk assessment to be carried out for deployment. The decision on that deployment will depend on the medical condition, individual function, the proposed employment, length of the deployment and the medical support available. Personnel graded as Medically Non-Deployable are not fit to deploy on Operations; however, they may be deployable on UK based exercises and should be able to work effectively for at least 32.5 hours per week. Personnel graded Medically Non-Deployable may require continued medical care, long term medication and access to secondary care facilities. This new Government is committed to providing world-class medical treatment to ensure personnel can return to duty where possible, or to support their transition to civilian life.

How many and what proportion of Royal Air Force personnel were classified as (a) Medically Fully Deployable, (b) Medically Limited Deployable and (c) Medically Not Deployable as of 1 January 2025.

The table below presents the Medical Deployability Standard of UK Armed Forces personnel, broken down by Service, as at 1 January 2025. Medically Fully Deployable (MFD)Medically Limited Deployable (MLD)Medically Not Deployable (MND) n%n%n%All99,16278.1%14,36111.3%13,50310.6%Royal Navy17,85879.9%1,9948.9%2,49511.2%Royal Marines4,98987.0%3566.2%3896.8%Army54,69576.9%9,47813.3%6,9739.8%RAF21,62077.8%2,5339.1%3,64613.1%Source: DMICP & JPA.1. MDS was missing for 10 personnel.2.The figures provided are for full time trained (Royal Navy and RAF)/trade trained (army) and serving againstrequirement personnel in service.3. Percentages may not sum to 100% due to MDS being missing for a small number of personnel. Personnel with a grade of MLD are medically fit for duty with minor employment limitations. A grade of MLD requires a medical risk assessment to be carried out for deployment. The decision on that deployment will depend on the medical condition, individual function, the proposed employment, length of the deployment and the medical support available. Personnel graded as Medically Non-Deployable are not fit to deploy on Operations; however, they may be deployable on UK based exercises and should be able to work effectively for at least 32.5 hours per week. Personnel graded Medically Non-Deployable may require continued medical care, long term medication and access to secondary care facilities. This new Government is committed to providing world-class medical treatment to ensure personnel can return to duty where possible, or to support their transition to civilian life.

How many and what proportion of Army personnel were classified as (a) Medically Fully Deployable, (b) Medically Limited Deployable and (c) Medically Not Deployable as of 1 January 2025.

The table below presents the Medical Deployability Standard of UK Armed Forces personnel, broken down by Service, as at 1 January 2025. Medically Fully Deployable (MFD)Medically Limited Deployable (MLD)Medically Not Deployable (MND) n%n%n%All99,16278.1%14,36111.3%13,50310.6%Royal Navy17,85879.9%1,9948.9%2,49511.2%Royal Marines4,98987.0%3566.2%3896.8%Army54,69576.9%9,47813.3%6,9739.8%RAF21,62077.8%2,5339.1%3,64613.1%Source: DMICP & JPA.1. MDS was missing for 10 personnel.2.The figures provided are for full time trained (Royal Navy and RAF)/trade trained (army) and serving againstrequirement personnel in service.3. Percentages may not sum to 100% due to MDS being missing for a small number of personnel. Personnel with a grade of MLD are medically fit for duty with minor employment limitations. A grade of MLD requires a medical risk assessment to be carried out for deployment. The decision on that deployment will depend on the medical condition, individual function, the proposed employment, length of the deployment and the medical support available. Personnel graded as Medically Non-Deployable are not fit to deploy on Operations; however, they may be deployable on UK based exercises and should be able to work effectively for at least 32.5 hours per week. Personnel graded Medically Non-Deployable may require continued medical care, long term medication and access to secondary care facilities. This new Government is committed to providing world-class medical treatment to ensure personnel can return to duty where possible, or to support their transition to civilian life.

What assessment his Department has made of the impact of decommissioning HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark on the UK’s amphibious warfare capability; and whether a replacement capability will be procured before their disposal.

HMS Albion and Bulwark have been alongside since 2023 and 2017 respectively with no plans for them to return to sea before their out of service dates. Amphibious operations will continue to delivered by the Bay Class and RFA Argus until the introduction of the Multi Role Support Ship, which will succeed the amphibious fleet in the 2030s.

Whether it remains his policy to implement the Multi-Role Support Ship programme; and what the timeline is for (a) its development and (b) the procurement of vessels.

The Multi-Role Support Ship programme is progressing through the Concept Phase. The Royal Navy and Defence Equipment & Support are conducting detailed work on key user requirements, conceptual designs, affordability, and exportability assessments. Alongside other shipbuilding programmes, they are maintaining engagement with all leading UK shipbuilding entities and the National Shipbuilding Office on the best commercial approach to deliver for the Navy and the Nation. The Outline Business Case is due for submission mid-2025 which will detail the schedule for future contract award milestones.

How much his Department has spent on diversity and inclusion programmes relating to (a) employment, (b) pensions, (c) recruitment and (d) other matters since 4 July 2024.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) remains committed to making the step changes required to create a more inclusive Defence environment. We continue to work hard to broaden the diversity of our workforce through actively engaging with employees to attract the best talent, drive an inclusive culture at work, and better reflect the society we serve. The requested information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. Information on spending can be found in the Department's annual report and accounts: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministry-of-defence-annual-report-and-accounts-2023-to-2024

What the total expenditure was on the refit of HMS Bulwark prior to its decommissioning; and what specific refit work remained incomplete at the time of HMS Albion’s decommissioning in July 2023.

The decision to decommission both HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark was announced in November 2024. As of that date, a considerable amount of refit work was still outstanding to materially prepare HMS Bulwark for her return to sea. In the period from 2022 to 2024, a total of £72.1 million had been spent on refitting HMS Bulwark. Neither HMS Albion nor HMS Bulwark were due to go to sea ahead of their out-of-service dates in 2033 and 2034. Their disposal shows that we are delivering for defence by divesting ourselves of old capabilities to make way for the future. These ships were effectively mothballed by the previous Government.

What outstanding refit work remained on HMS Bulwark at the time of HMS Albion’s decommissioning in July 2023; and whether this work was completed before the decision to decommission Bulwark was taken.

The decision to decommission both HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark was announced in November 2024. As of that date, a considerable amount of refit work was still outstanding to materially prepare HMS Bulwark for her return to sea. In the period from 2022 to 2024, a total of £72.1 million had been spent on refitting HMS Bulwark. Neither HMS Albion nor HMS Bulwark were due to go to sea ahead of their out-of-service dates in 2033 and 2034. Their disposal shows that we are delivering for defence by divesting ourselves of old capabilities to make way for the future. These ships were effectively mothballed by the previous Government.

Whether it remains his Department's policy to deploy the Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific this year.

Defence is planning to deploy the Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific where it will be the focal point for numerous exercises, operations, and engagements in the region.

Pursuant to the Answer of 11 February 2025 to Question 28893 on British Indian Ocean Territory: Sovereignty, whether he has made an assessment with the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs of the value for money of the proposed Chagos Island deal.

The treaty is not finalised yet, when the deal is finalised, the Government will put it before the House.

Pursuant to the Answer of 5 February 2025 to Question 27513 on Defence: Bank Services, how many smaller defence suppliers have raised concerns with his Department on difficulties in (a) opening a bank account and (b) otherwise accessing finance since 1 January 2020.

The issues that smaller defence suppliers can face in opening a bank account and accessing finance have been raised with the Ministry of Defence (MOD) on multiple occasions since 1 January 2020, both directly and via trade associations and higher tier partners. It is not possible to quantify the number of companies who have relayed these concerns. This Government recognised these issues in the Defence Industrial Strategy’s Statement of Intent and the MOD continues to consult widely with defence and financial services stakeholders on tackling these barriers, so that we have a better, more integrated, more innovative and more resilient defence sector.

What security assessment his Department has conducted on the potential risks associated with Mingyang Smart Energy supplying turbines for the Green Volt North Sea wind farm.

Defence works in close collaboration with other Departments as part of the Government’s process to assess and mitigate national security risks to UK interests at home and abroad. It would be inappropriate to comment on individual cases, but any investment in the energy sector or other parts of our Critical National Infrastructure is subject to the highest levels of scrutiny. The Government continues to welcome investment, but we will not hesitate to protect national security wherever we identify specific areas of concern.