Written questions by McMurdock.

Whether her Department plans to increase the proportion of containers inspected.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What information is provided to importers on the expected timeframe for inspection of their containers.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

How containers awaiting inspection are prioritised, including whether perishable or time-sensitive goods are given priority.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What the longest recorded waiting time for a container awaiting inspection was at UK ports in the last 12 months.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

How many containers are awaiting inspection at London Gateway Port.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What targets have been set for improving the speed and accuracy of container inspections over the next three years.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What assessment she has made of the effectiveness of risk-based targeting in identifying non-compliant or high-risk shipments.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What information her Department holds on the average length of time taken to complete security and background checks on border force applicants.

BPSS (Baseline Personnel Security Standard) checks are required for Home Office roles. Checks for external applicants include the following:Civil Service eligibility;right to work / ID / address checks;employment history verification;health checks (where required); and,checks relating to security and integrity, including some role-specific checks for Border Force Officers.Due to the highly contextual, case-by-case nature of recruitment, it would be neither feasible nor instructive to provide an average timespan.

What proportion of containers inspected were found to be in breach of customs, safety or import regulations in each of the last three years.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What proportion of all shipping containers entering the UK were physically inspected in each of the last three years.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What assessment she has made of the impact of container inspections on port congestion and processing times.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

How many shipping containers entering the UK were subject to physical inspection in each of the last three years.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What the average time taken to complete a physical inspection of a shipping container was in each of the three most recent years for which data is available.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What steps her Department is taking to reduce the time taken to inspect shipping containers at ports while maintaining accuracy.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What assessment she has made of whether current staffing levels are sufficient to maintain effective inspection coverage.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What technologies are currently used to support container inspections, including non-intrusive scanning and risk-based targeting systems.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

With reference to her Department’s press release entitled UK crackdown on vile scam centres steps up with sanctions on illicit crypto network, published 26 March 2026, what cooperation has taken place with authorities in host countries to trace and recover proceeds of fraud linked to scam centres.

Fraud is increasingly industrialised, transnational and technologically advanced. Methods used to contact and target victims in the UK also include measures to obscure offenders’ true identities and locations. This represents significant challenges for law enforcement in disrupting and bringing perpetrators to justice.Scam centre activities typically involve actors, infrastructure, victims and financial flows across several jurisdictions. Proceeds of crime are also often transferred and laundered through multiple countries. This creates operational complexity which can prolong investigations.The NCA, through the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC), works with international partners to identify and recover the proceeds of fraud affecting victims in the UK and overseas. For example, recent collaboration between the NCA and the Ghanaian authorities resulted in Ghana’s first cryptocurrency seizure, valued at approximately US$15 million.The UK has also announced support for INTERPOL’s Global Fraud Task Force (Operation Shadow Storm), aimed at strengthening international coordination against scam centres and associated criminal financeAs a matter of long-standing policy and practice, the UK neither confirms nor denies that an extradition request has been made or received where no arrest has taken place, however the government attaches significant importance to ensuring that our extradition arrangements provide a path to justice for victims of crime and their families.The decision to make a request for extradition is taken by the prosecuting authorities in each UK jurisdiction.

With reference to her Department’s press release entitled UK crackdown on vile scam centres steps up with sanctions on illicit crypto network, published 26 March 2026, what barriers exist to prosecuting individuals involved in scam centres operating overseas.

Fraud is increasingly industrialised, transnational and technologically advanced. Methods used to contact and target victims in the UK also include measures to obscure offenders’ true identities and locations. This represents significant challenges for law enforcement in disrupting and bringing perpetrators to justice.Scam centre activities typically involve actors, infrastructure, victims and financial flows across several jurisdictions. Proceeds of crime are also often transferred and laundered through multiple countries. This creates operational complexity which can prolong investigations.The NCA, through the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC), works with international partners to identify and recover the proceeds of fraud affecting victims in the UK and overseas. For example, recent collaboration between the NCA and the Ghanaian authorities resulted in Ghana’s first cryptocurrency seizure, valued at approximately US$15 million.The UK has also announced support for INTERPOL’s Global Fraud Task Force (Operation Shadow Storm), aimed at strengthening international coordination against scam centres and associated criminal financeAs a matter of long-standing policy and practice, the UK neither confirms nor denies that an extradition request has been made or received where no arrest has taken place, however the government attaches significant importance to ensuring that our extradition arrangements provide a path to justice for victims of crime and their families.The decision to make a request for extradition is taken by the prosecuting authorities in each UK jurisdiction.

With reference to her Department’s press release entitled UK crackdown on vile scam centres steps up with sanctions on illicit crypto network, published 26 March 2026, whether the UK has sought the extradition of any individuals linked to scam centres targeted by the sanctions.

Fraud is increasingly industrialised, transnational and technologically advanced. Methods used to contact and target victims in the UK also include measures to obscure offenders’ true identities and locations. This represents significant challenges for law enforcement in disrupting and bringing perpetrators to justice.Scam centre activities typically involve actors, infrastructure, victims and financial flows across several jurisdictions. Proceeds of crime are also often transferred and laundered through multiple countries. This creates operational complexity which can prolong investigations.The NCA, through the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC), works with international partners to identify and recover the proceeds of fraud affecting victims in the UK and overseas. For example, recent collaboration between the NCA and the Ghanaian authorities resulted in Ghana’s first cryptocurrency seizure, valued at approximately US$15 million.The UK has also announced support for INTERPOL’s Global Fraud Task Force (Operation Shadow Storm), aimed at strengthening international coordination against scam centres and associated criminal financeAs a matter of long-standing policy and practice, the UK neither confirms nor denies that an extradition request has been made or received where no arrest has taken place, however the government attaches significant importance to ensuring that our extradition arrangements provide a path to justice for victims of crime and their families.The decision to make a request for extradition is taken by the prosecuting authorities in each UK jurisdiction.

With reference to her Department’s press release entitled UK crackdown on vile scam centres steps up with sanctions on illicit crypto network, published 26 March 2026, how many joint investigations since 2020 have been conducted with international partners into scam centres linked to fraud affecting UK citizens.

Fraud is increasingly industrialised, transnational and technologically advanced. Methods used to contact and target victims in the UK also include measures to obscure offenders’ true identities and locations. This represents significant challenges for law enforcement in disrupting and bringing perpetrators to justice.Scam centre activities typically involve actors, infrastructure, victims and financial flows across several jurisdictions. Proceeds of crime are also often transferred and laundered through multiple countries. This creates operational complexity which can prolong investigations.The NCA, through the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC), works with international partners to identify and recover the proceeds of fraud affecting victims in the UK and overseas. For example, recent collaboration between the NCA and the Ghanaian authorities resulted in Ghana’s first cryptocurrency seizure, valued at approximately US$15 million.The UK has also announced support for INTERPOL’s Global Fraud Task Force (Operation Shadow Storm), aimed at strengthening international coordination against scam centres and associated criminal financeAs a matter of long-standing policy and practice, the UK neither confirms nor denies that an extradition request has been made or received where no arrest has taken place, however the government attaches significant importance to ensuring that our extradition arrangements provide a path to justice for victims of crime and their families.The decision to make a request for extradition is taken by the prosecuting authorities in each UK jurisdiction.