Written questions by Cartlidge.

How many and what proportion of the drones that have been supplied to Ukraine were manufactured in the UK.

Where the UK's drone industry can meet Ukraine's drone requirements, the Ministry of Defence sources from UK industry, and this is true of the majority of the spend on drone procurements for Ukraine. As stated by the Defence Secretary at the Ukraine Defence Contact Group on 4 June, where he pledged £350 million investment into drones this financial year, the majority of the spend is with British companies. The proportion of drone spending spent with UK suppliers has varied year on year but this financial year we are on track to spend over 70% through UK suppliers.

How many service personnel have received the tax free operational allowance in each of the last five financial years.

The number of Service personnel who have received tax free operational allowance in each of the last five financial years including the financial year 2025-26 to date, can be found in the table below. Financial YearNumber of Employees2020-2153362021-2252832022-2330152023-2421082024-2525252025-26 to date435 Service personnel on deployed operations in the following Specified Operational Locations (SOL) qualify for the payment of Operational Allowance: Chad (all locations)Egypt (Sinai only)Iraq (all locations)Mali (all locations)Somalia (all locations)South Sudan (all locations)Democratic Republic of Congo (Goma only)Lebanon (Naquora only) – backdated to 7 Oct 23Red Sea (within operational areas) – backdated to 19 Oct 23 I am withholding the names of some locations for the purpose of safeguarding national security, as disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.

Pursuant to the Answer of 17 July to Question 67413 on France: Military Alliances, whether his Department recognises any distinction between strategic and sub-strategic nuclear capabilities.

The UK does not categorise nuclear weapon capabilities as either strategic or sub-strategic. The UK and NATO have said that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict.

If he will quantify his Department’s (a) underspend and (b) overspend in financial year 2024-2025.

The Department's performance against its control totals for financial year 20245-25 will be set out in its Annual Report and Accounts, which will be published shortly.

With reference to his oral statement of 17 July 2025 on Ukraine, Official Report, col 475, whether the three star military officer who commands the multi-national command headquarters for the Multinational Force Ukraine will change when the headquarters moves from Paris to London.

The intent is for the three star command of the Multinational Force Ukraine to remain joint between UK and France. This will be reviewed once the detail of any ceasefire is known.

What the primary language will be in the three-star multi-national command headquarters for the Multinational Force Ukraine.

Over 30 nations are working together to provide support for MNF-U. We will be working using usual protocols for international collaboration. The planned working language is English.

What the (a) role and (b) size is of the Army's General Service Corps.

The General Service Corps (GSC) is an administrative grouping for Service personnel with no other assigned Regiment or Corps, such as those who are recruited directly into limited specialist roles. As at 28 July 2025, there were c800 Service personnel in the GSC.

With reference to his oral statement of 17 July 2025 on Ukraine, Official Report, col 475, whether (a) the UK, (b) France, (c) another country will provide the three star military officer to command the multi-national command headquarters for the Multinational Force Ukraine.

It is currently planned that France and the UK will jointly provide the three star commanders. This will be reviewed once the detail of any ceasefire is known.

With reference to his oral statement of 17 July 2025 on Ukraine, Official Report, col 475, whether the two star military officer who will deploy to Kyiv to lead the Multinational Force Ukraine headquarters will be a (a) British Army, (b) Royal Navy, (c) Royal Air Force officer.

Under current plans, the two star military commander in Kyiv will be an Army officer. Further details will be announced in the usual way in due course.

With reference to his oral statement of 17 July 2025 on Ukraine, Official Report, col 475, whether the two-star military officer who will deploy to Kyiv to lead the Multinational Force Ukraine headquarters has been selected.

Yes, the two-star military officer to lead the Multinational Force Ukraine headquarters in Kyiv has now been selected. For security reasons we are not publishing further details about this role at this time.

With reference to his oral statement of 17 July 2025 on Ukraine, Official Report, col 475, what (a) British Army, (b) Royal Navy, (c) Royal Air Force and (d) other units are being held readiness to deploy as part of the Multinational Force Ukraine.

Defence holds forces from across the single Services at readiness for a broad range of contingencies and operations, including the Multinational Force Ukraine. Further information will be published in due course in the usual way.

When the Minister for Defence Procurement plans to respond to the hon. Member for South Suffolk's letter dated 1 July 2025.

I responded to the hon. Member’s letter of 1 July 2025 on 29 July 2025. This was within 20 working days of receipt, in accordance with longstanding policy.

Whether the Defence Investment Plan will be published before the rise of the House on 18 December 2025.

We expect to publish the Defence Investment Plan this autumn, before the Christmas recess period.

Pursuant to the Answer of 8 July 2025 to Question 64478 on Unmanned Air Systems: Procurement, and with reference to the 50,000 drones to Ukraine announced in his oral statement of 17 July 2025 on Ukraine, col 476, in which circumstances it is his Department's policy to provide information on military drone procurement.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) considers each parliamentary question (PQ) and oral statement on their own merits and responds accordingly. An important factor in our consideration of PQ responses is the impact of the response on operational security, including the effect of the aggregation of several such answers over a period of time.

With reference to his oral contribution in response to an Urgent Question from the Hon. Member for South Suffolk on 10 July 2025, Official Report, column 1117, whether his Department classifies the gravity bomb that will be dropped by the F-35A aircraft as a (a) strategic or (b) tactical weapon.

The UK and NATO have said that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. The UK therefore does not support the classification of nuclear weapons as either strategic or tactical.

With reference to his Department's joint press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, what assessment he has made of the potential impact of the principle of co-ordination of the UK-French nuclear deterrents on the effectiveness of the UK’s independent continuous at sea deterrent.

The possibility of coordinating UK and French independent nuclear deterrents adds a further level of strategic ambiguity, complicating the calculations of potential aggressors. Any adversary threatening the vital interests of our nations should know that they could be confronted by the strength of the nuclear forces of both the UK and France.

What recent progress he has made on conventional weapons cooperation through thematic dialogues within the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across Government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.

With reference to paragraph 15 of his Department's policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, what recent progress he has made on establishing a dialogue with the EU on crisis management.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across Government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.

What recent progress his Department has made on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through thematic dialogues within the UK-EU Security and Defence partnership.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across Government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.

With reference to his Department's joint press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, what discussions he had with his French counterpart on the participation of France in the consultative process of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

France does not participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. This is a matter for the French Government.