Written questions by Cartlidge.

With reference to his Oral Statement of 1 September on Ukraine, Official Report columns 93-94, how many of the 200 electronic warfare and air defence systems delivered to Ukraine were manufactured in the UK.

Where the UK’s manufacturing industry can meet Ukraine’s electronic warfare and air defence systems requirements, the Ministry of Defence sources from UK industry. The UK’s military support to Ukraine is based upon Ukraine’s needs, prioritising speed of delivery for equipment. For operational security reasons we are unable to give a breakdown of exactly how many have been manufactured in the UK.

If he will list of all orders placed by each FLC on an Urgent Operational Requirements basis in relation to planning for potential Coalition of the Willing operations in Ukraine since such planning commenced by his Department.

Operational planning continues, but we will not be drawn into detail on the procurement of specific capabilities and requirements for UK Armed Forces deployments at the risk of operational security.

With reference to his Oral Statement of 01 September on Ukraine, Official Report columns 93-94, how many of 2,500 uncrewed platforms delivered to Ukraine were manufactured in the UK.

Where the UK’s manufacturing industry can meet Ukraine’s uncrewed platform requirements, the Ministry of Defence sources from UK industry. The UK’s military support to Ukraine is based upon Ukraine’s needs, prioritising speed of delivery for equipment. A significant number of these drones were manufactured in the drone. For operational security reasons we are unable to give a more detailed breakdown of exactly how many have been manufactured in the UK.

With reference to page 78 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, whether he has consulted external sources on the new Defence Diplomacy Strategy.

To support the development of the Defence Diplomacy Strategy, the Ministry of Defence is consulting a range of sources. To ensure a diverse range of views are reflected in the development of the strategy, this will include exploring options to formally consult external defence and foreign policy think tanks and institutions, as well as the use of existing external open-source research published by UK-based think tanks. The Defence Diplomacy Strategy will prioritise the use of the Defence instrument in support of UK defence and wider foreign policy objectives. It will ensure that we are taking a coordinated, strategic and deliberate approach to protect and promote UK interests and enhance UK influence.

With reference to recommendation 38 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, if he will list the (a)Governments and (b) private financial institutions that his Department will engage with to deliver an integrated frigate force for anti-submarine warfare.

The Royal Navy’s primary relationship for anti-submarine warfare is with NATO and the NATO nations that the Navy routinely operates alongside. As the recent announcement by Norway to select the UK’s Type 26 frigate for their own fleet shows, the number of participants in the integrated frigate force continues to grow. To ensure the UK builds future-proof capabilities to counter the underwater threat to UK and NATO interests, the Royal Navy continues to develop the Atlantic Bastion programme. To support this the Ministry of Defence are actively engaging with a variety of international and domestic stakeholders, across NATO, AUKUS and industry on this subject. However, the details of these engagements are commercially sensitive, and it is therefore inappropriate comment further at this time.

With reference to his Oral Statement of 1 September on Ukraine, Official Report columns 93-94, how many of the 30 vehicles and engineering equipment delivered to Ukraine were manufactured in the UK.

Where the UK’s manufacturing industry can meet Ukraine’s vehicle and engineering equipment requirements, the Ministry of Defence sources from UK industry. The UK’s military support to Ukraine is based upon Ukraine’s needs, prioritising speed of delivery for equipment. For operational security reasons we are unable to give a breakdown of exactly how many have been manufactured in the UK.

With reference to his Oral Statement of 1 September on Ukraine, Official Report, columns 93-94, what his timeline is for the review into armed forces readiness levels.

As a matter of longstanding policy we do not publicly comment on the readiness levels of His Majesty's Armed Forces. This is to safeguard operational security, and that of our Service people. Planning continues at pace within the framework of the Coalition of the Willing, including at the Defence Minister and Leader-level meetings last week, to ensure the UK and Ukraine's partners are ready to deploy quickly post cessation of hostilities in Ukraine.

With reference to his Oral Statement of 1 September on Ukraine, Official Report columns 93-94, when he expects to publish his review into armed forces readiness levels.

As a matter of longstanding policy we do not publicly comment on the readiness levels of His Majesty's Armed Forces. This is to safeguard operational security, and that of our Service people. Planning continues at pace within the framework of the Coalition of the Willing, including at the Defence Minister and Leader-level meetings last week, to ensure the UK and Ukraine's partners are ready to deploy quickly post cessation of hostilities in Ukraine.

With reference to his Oral Statement of 1 September on Ukraine, Official Report columns 93-94, how many of the 60,000 (a) artillery shells, (b) rockets and (c) missiles delivered to Ukraine were manufactured in the UK.

Where the UK’s manufacturing industry can meet Ukraine’s artillery and air defence requirements, the Ministry of Defence sources from UK industry. The UK’s military support to Ukraine is based upon Ukraine’s needs, prioritising speed of delivery for equipment. For operational security reasons we are unable to give a breakdown of exactly how many have been manufactured in the UK.

With reference to his Oral Statement of 1 September on Ukraine, Official Report columns 93-94, whether urgent operational requirements are being considered as part of his review into armed forces readiness levels.

We are committed to ensuring our Armed Forces are appropriately equipped to respond to all challenges. As part of this commitment, urgent operational requirements are considered in our assessments and reviews. As a matter of longstanding policy we do not publicly comment on the readiness levels of His Majesty’s Armed Forces. This is to safeguard operational security, and that of our Serving people.

How much money attributed to the Single Intelligence Account was included in UK NATO qualifying defence expenditure in (a) 2022-23 and (b) 2023-24.

In line with all other NATO members, it is UK Government policy that we do not release individual elements of our NATO return publicly.

With reference to the letter from the Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry to the hon. Member for South Suffolk of 29 July 2025, how much of the stated NATO-qualifying expenditure will be spent on supporting modern deterrence in the (a) 2027-28 and (b) 2028-29 financial years.

The Department’s spending plans will be set out in the Defence Investment Plan, which will be published in the autumn. The share of this spending that relates to individual categories of spend will be considered as part of future returns to NATO.

With reference to the letter from the Right Hon. Member for Liverpool Garston to the Hon. Member for South Suffolk dated 29 July 2025, how much of the stated NATO-qualifying expenditure will be spent on the sustained investment for (a) maintenance and (b) security upgrades across the overseas estate.

The Department’s spending plans will be set out in the Defence Investment Plan, which will be published in the autumn. The share of this spending that relates to individual categories of spend will be considered as part of future returns to NATO.

With reference to the letter from the Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry to the hon. Member for South Suffolk of 29 July 2025, how much of the stated NATO-qualifying expenditure will be spent on strategic stability in the (a) 2027-28 and (b) 2028-29 financial years.

The Department’s spending plans will be set out in the Defence Investment Plan, which will be published in the autumn. The share of this spending that relates to individual categories of spend will be considered as part of future returns to NATO.

With reference to the letter from the Right Hon. Member for Liverpool Garston to the Hon. Member for South Suffolk dated 29 July 2025, how much of the stated NATO-qualifying expenditure will be spent on the implementation of the UK – EU Security and Defence Partnership.

The Department’s spending plans will be set out in the Defence Investment Plan, which will be published in the autumn. The share of this spending that relates to individual categories of spend will be considered as part of future returns to NATO.

With reference to the letter from the Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry to the hon. Member for South Suffolk of 29 July 2025, how much of the stated NATO-qualifying expenditure will be spent on hybrid threat responses in the (a) 2027-28 and (b) 2028-29 financial years.

The Department’s spending plans will be set out in the Defence Investment Plan, which will be published in the autumn. The share of this spending that relates to individual categories of spend will be considered as part of future returns to NATO.

With reference to the Prime Minister's Oral Statement of 25 February 2025 on Defence and Security, Official Report, column 633, whether the annual increase in defence spending will include the Single Intelligence Account.

The Prime Minister has been clear about the contribution our intelligence and security services make to the defence of our nation. The commitment to spend 2.6% on defence from 2027 will include all spend relating the Single Intelligence Account.

Whether the Defence Investment Plan will report based on a cost envelope of (a) 2.5%, (b) 3% or (c) 3.5% of GDP on defence expenditure.

The Defence Investment Plan will set out how the MOD will deliver the vision of the Strategic Defence Review within the MOD's share of the Government's commitment to spending 2.6% of GDP on defence by 2027, and 3% of GDP in the next Parliament as fiscal and economic conditions allow.

With reference to recommendation 34 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what discussions he has had with stakeholders on the successor to the Dreadnought class submarine since 2 June 2025.

This Government is fully committed to the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear deterrent, underpinned by our triple lock commitment to continue to build the four new Dreadnought Class submarines, maintain our continuous at sea deterrent and deliver all the required upgrades, including the replacement warhead. The Government has accepted all of the Strategic Defence Review’s recommendations. We routinely hold discussions on possible future national security and defence capabilities with our industry and international partners.

With reference to recommendation 33 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, whether he plans to make any amendments to the Single Source Contract Regulations regarding the delivery of the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

In accordance with recommendation 33b (Nuclear Industry Flexibility - Ensuring it has the flexibility to incentivise industry investment in infrastructure and asset management) of the Strategic Defence Review, the Department will be conducting a review of the Single Source Contracting Regulations (SSCRs). The review will commence by the end of September 2025 and will conclude within the current financial year in readiness for any necessary legislative changes following ministerial and parliamentary approval.