Every parliamentary written question tabled by Esther McVey this session, with the full answer and department. See how every department answers, or back to the MP page.
Showing 21–40 of 116 · Department of Health and Social Care
With reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, what type of pathogens the strategy is concerned with.
A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of tra...
Whether he considered including hospital-acquired infections in his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026.
A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of tra...
When his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, was written.
A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of tra...
With reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, for what reason the strategy does not include modelling.
A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of tra...
With reference to FOI 903 to the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), whether the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has a copy of the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authori
The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has conducted searches and does not believe we hold a copy of the report referenced in FOI 903 from the UK Health Security Agency.The nature of the complaint in the report is outside the scope of wha...
That based on the latest consultation from the DHSC on the Nutrient Profile Model (NPM), and given that most fruit yogurts are low in fat and much lower in calories than many alternative desserts a
The Government has committed to updating the standards behind the advertising and promotions restrictions on ‘less healthy’ food and drink by applying the new Nutrient Profiling Model (NPM).United Kingdom dietary advice is clear, that children should be e...
With reference to FOI 903 to the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), whether a copy of the Moderna audit has been requested from the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority (PMCPA).
Awaiting answer.
With reference to FOI 903 to the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), what assessment he has made of the implications for trust and confidence in the pharmaceutical industry’s self-regulatory system, and in the Moderna-UK Strategic Partnership, if audit documents such as this one are not shared with government agencies for scrutiny.
Awaiting answer.
With reference to FOI 903 to the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), whether the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has a copy of the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority's audit of Moderna.
Awaiting answer.
Whether he considered including hospital-acquired infections in his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026.
Awaiting answer.
When the Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, was written.
It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.
With reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, (a) who wrote the document and (b) whether AI technology was involved.
It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.
With reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, for what reason the strategy does not include modelling.
It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.
With reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, how the word pandemic is defined.
It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.
With reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, what type of pathogens the strategy is concerned with.
Awaiting answer.
For what reason the new biosecurity centre in Harlow will not be operational until 2038.
Awaiting answer.
What assessment he has made of the potential implications for his Department's policies of the increasing percentage of funding for the World Health Organization coming from (a) specified and (b) non-State donor funding.
The Department remains committed to ensuring investments in World Health Organization (WHO) and other multilateral health initiatives deliver strong value for money. Flexible funding supports WHO to direct resources to greatest need and Member States-agreed priorities, improving efficiency and independence whereas specified, or earmarked, funding constrains effectiveness and fragments delivery. The United Kingdom remains one of WHO’s most significant donors and the top provider of flexible funding.WHO gets the largest proportion of its funding from Member States. WHO’s reporting shows that the share of flexible funding has increased in recent years. The Department’s contribution to WHO consists of the annual mandatory membership fee, which is fully flexible and based on gross national income. WHO funding is available to view publicly on their programme budget portal, with further information available at the following two links:https://www.who.int/about/accountability/budget/programme-budget-digital-platform-2026-2027https://open.who.int/2024-25/homeWHO priorities are agreed by all Member States, including the UK through the negotiation of a general programme of work and programme budgets. Then donors, including Member States and others, fund those agreed priorities. WHO’s General Programme of Work 2025 to 2028 was agreed by Member States at the World Health Assembly in 2024.WHO engagement with the private sector is guided by WHO’s Framework for Engagement with Non-state Actors which was negotiated and agreed by WHO Member States, including the UK, in 2016. The framework seeks to ensure WHO’s engagement with non-state actors, including the private sector, are managed transparently and supports implementation of the organisation’s policies and recommendations as decided by Member States through the governing bodies. It is publicly available to view on WHO’s website, or at the following link:https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/Framework_Engagement_non-State_Actors.pdf
If he will publish any of the pre-clinical data, study reports or assessments made by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) that the MHRA’s Chief Safety Officer relied upon when quoted in a GB News online article, dated 27 March 2026, that the available evidence does not support an association between COVID-19 vaccination and an increased risk of cancer.
The GB News article in question, dated 27 March 2026, does not appear to reference any specific pre-clinical data, safety reports, or assessments. As part of its statutory functions, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) is responsible for continuously monitoring all medicines, including vaccines, post-authorisation to ensure their benefits continue to outweigh any risks. This continuous, proactive safety surveillance draws upon a wide range of sources of safety data, including analysis of large healthcare datasets, review of international safety data, emerging research, data provided by academia, Yellow Card reports, and ongoing review by independent scientific experts.There are currently no plans to publish any additional pre-clinical data, study reports, or assessments, beyond what is routinely published. For suspected side effects being reported for medicines and vaccines, the MHRA publishes Yellow card data which can be accessed at the following link:https://yellowcard.mhra.gov.uk/idapsThe MHRA also published a summary of Yellow Card reporting, which can be accessed at the following link:https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-vaccine-adverse-reactions/coronavirus-vaccine-summary-of-yellow-card-reporting
If he will publish the most recent Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) pharmacovigilance assessment or signal evaluation report that specifically addresses potential cancer/neoplasm signals in relation to COVID-19 vaccines.
The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) has not performed a signal assessment of ‘potential cancer/neoplasm’ in relation to COVID-19 vaccines authorised for use in the United Kingdom as there have not been any signals of this nature. The MHRA keeps emerging safety information under close review and will take appropriate actions should any new safety concerns be confirmed, communicating to healthcare professionals and the public as appropriate.
If he will publish full citations for the peer-reviewed population-level studies from the UK, France, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden mentioned by the MHRA’s Chief Safety Officer in the quote that appeared on GB News online, dated 27 March 2026.
The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) considers a wide range of safety data as part of post-authorisation safety monitoring. One source of this data is academic literature. References for the studies mentioned by the MHRA’s Chief Safety Officer in the article in question, namely for France and for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, are available, respectively, at the following two links:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12679329/https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39935358/Whilst there have been no United Kingdom based, population wide studies performed that investigate COVID-19 vaccines and cancer incidence rates specifically, the MHRA’s Chief Safety Officer was referencing a population-based study reviewing COVID-19 vaccine uptake in individuals with haematological malignancy, as well as a population-based study reviewing COVID-19 vaccine efficacy in patients with cancer. These studies are accessible, respectively, via the following links:https://www.ejcancer.com/article/S0959-8049(23)00059-X/fulltexthttps://europepmc.org/article/MED/35617989Neither of these studies identified any adverse safety signals, and both suggest vaccination is in the interest of individuals with cancer.