Written questions by Obese-Jecty.

What assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of recent Nuclear Site Event Reports on (a) equipment failures, (b) human error, (c) procedural shortcomings and (d) near-misses.

I cannot provide specific detail for the events as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces. However, I can assure the hon. Member that none of the events listed caused harm to the health of any member of staff or to any member of the public and none have resulted in any radiological impact to the environment. The table below shows the number of Nuclear Site Event Reports (NSERs) at Coulport recorded between for the most recent financial year. These are shown according to agreed categorisation: Nuclear Site Events- 2024, 22 April 2024 - 31 December 2024Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport009251 Nuclear Site Events- 2025, 01 January 2025 - 22 April 2025Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport00490 In line with Industry Good Practice and in common with other defence and civil nuclear sites, His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde has a well-established system for raising NSERs. NSERs are raised to foster a robust safety culture that learns from experience, whether that is of equipment failures, human error, procedural failings, documentation shortcomings or near-misses.

With reference to page 91 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, by when he will enable the annual publication of schedule data of (a) in-development and (b) upgrade programmes.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) set out the need for external scrutiny of UK warfighting readiness through annual reporting of key data, as one of a number of possible measures in a wider Defence Readiness Bill. Given its potentially broad scope, a Defence Readiness Bill may be a legislative vehicle for wider Government, not just Defence. We are therefore working closely across Government through the Cabinet Office-led Home Defence programme to shape key requirements, and understand and identify the measures needed. This preliminary work will allow us introduce legislation when parliamentary time allows.

With reference to page 34 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, what the scope is of mechanisms within the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership to help improve maritime security.

The Government pledged in its manifesto to pursue a new relationship with the EU to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. The recently released Strategic Defence Review (SDR) further reiterates this commitment and recognises that international partnerships are crucial for the UK’s security and prosperity. The Government delivered on this commitment at the UK-EU Summit on 19 May where we agreed a new and ambitious Security and Defence Partnership (SDP). Implementation of the SDP is a joint effort with the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and is progressing. Since May, my Rt Hon Friend, Defence Secretary John Healey has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed their ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. In October, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary will both meet with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, for the first UK/EU foreign and security policy dialogue under the SDP. In addition, Ministers and officials from across Government have held consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to, tackling irregular migration and hybrid threats. We continue to work with EU counterparts to strengthen dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation across the range of issues covered in the SDP, including maritime and space security. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, this Government will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – will provide value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy.

How many category (a) A, (b) B, (c) C and (d) D incidents have taken place at RNAD Coulport since 5 July 2024.

I cannot provide specific detail for the events as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces. However, I can assure the hon. Member that none of the events listed caused harm to the health of any member of staff or to any member of the public and none have resulted in any radiological impact to the environment. The table below shows the number of Nuclear Site Event Reports (NSERs) at Coulport recorded between for the most recent financial year. These are shown according to agreed categorisation: Nuclear Site Events- 2024, 22 April 2024 - 31 December 2024Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport009251 Nuclear Site Events- 2025, 01 January 2025 - 22 April 2025Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport00490 In line with Industry Good Practice and in common with other defence and civil nuclear sites, His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde has a well-established system for raising NSERs. NSERs are raised to foster a robust safety culture that learns from experience, whether that is of equipment failures, human error, procedural failings, documentation shortcomings or near-misses.

With reference to recommendation 48 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what assessment he has made of the potential merits of (a) investment and (b) improvement of RAF Brize Norton in partnership with private finance.

RAF Brize Norton has secured multiple strategic investments that will deliver long term improvements to capability and the lived experience of the personnel based there. These improvements include Baggage Handling and Passenger Check-In Infrastructure, Airfield Operating Surfaces Project and a new Freight Handling Facility. In line with our standard processes, all investment decisions are carefully scrutinised to ensure they offer value for money.

With reference to page 117 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made on building on UK membership of the US-led space coalition under Operation Olympic Defender to help ensure that NATO has an effective space policy.

The UK remains firmly committed to working with international partners and Allies through a range of international fora, including the US-led Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER. Through these partnerships we are building a shared understanding of the evolving space threats, integrating space more effectively into defence operations, and pursuing interoperability and resilience across our defence space capabilities.

With reference to page 4106 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what recent progress he has made in improving the Royal Navy’s detection capacity.

The Royal Navy is integrating existing, novel and commercial sources of data to detect activity at sea into a new Global Decision Support System (GDSS) that will transform the Royal Navy’s world leading Maritime Domain Awareness capability. These streams of activity when drawn together will deliver decision advantage to Operational Commanders, and front-line units.

With reference to page 88 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what progress he has made on inviting leaders of FTSE100 companies to attend defence courses.

The Ministry of Defence, in collaboration with the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, has initiated the implementation of the commitment outlined on page 88 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025. As part of this initiative, senior executives from FTSE100 companies are being invited to participate in defence education courses, as part of an initial offer to industry partners.

With reference to page 110 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what collaboration he has sought with NATO allies on the acquisition of key armoured land platforms.

The UK’s new Defence Industrial Strategy puts international collaboration at the start, and at the heart, of procurement. Under Defence Reform, a new Director General International Collaboration and Exports has been created to help deliver this. The UK is collaborating with NATO allies on three of the British Army’s armoured land platforms: Ajax, Boxer and Challenger 3, which are all at different stages of delivery. As well as this, earlier this year the UK reaffirmed plans to partner with Germany to deliver new artillery and bridging systems under the auspices of the Trinty House Agreement. Looking further ahead, the Land Mobility Programme, which is still in its concept phase, is already actively considering options for collaboration. For example, at DSEI 25 it was announced that the UK joined the Common Armoured Vehicle System programme alongside Norway, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Latvia, and Sweden to scope the benefits of this multinational programme. These collaborations also contribute significantly to Growth, generating billions of pounds worth of export opportunity and supporting thousands of skilled jobs at key sites across the UK.

With reference to page 106 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, updated on 8 July 2025, what progress he has made in establishing hybrid carrier airwings.

Hybrid Air Wings, underpinned by the Royal Navy’s approach to Maritime Aviation Transformation, represents the evolution of the Fleet Air Arm to a crewed-uncrewed mix of drones, fast jets, helicopters and one-way effectors that will deliver enhanced lethality and combat mass for North Atlantic Sea Control, Homeland Defence and Carrier and Littoral Strike. During the ongoing deployment of the UK Carrier Strike Group (Operation HIGHMAST), Malloy T150 and Puma uncrewed air systems are operating alongside crewed helicopters and F-35B strike fighters, providing logistics and surveillance capabilities which release capacity of crewed aircraft to undertake more complex operational tasks. The investment decisions to support Strategic Defence Review recommendations are being developed by the Ministry of Defence and will be published in the Defence Investment Plan.

With reference to page 91 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a refreshed veterans’ communications strategy.

A new cross-Government Veterans’ Strategy is due to be published later this year.

What assessment he has made of the potential merits of changing the UK’s F-35B Lightning II force to use the AN/APG-85 radar.

All UK F-35 aircraft are fitted with the APG-81 radar. There is currently no plan to change to an alternative radar.

With reference to recommendation 35 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, when he will confirm the intended number of SSN attack submarines.

The final decision will be based on analysis of defence requirements through the Defence Investment Plan.

With reference to recommendation 29 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a protected Defence AI Investment Fund.

Good progress has been made in establishing the AI components which will form the basis of the Defence AI Investment Fund. Working in close collaboration with other Government Departments and the Cabinet Office to ensure a joined-up approach, the scope of the Defence AI Investment Fund will be confirmed and announced as part of the Defence Investment Plan in Autumn 2025.

He will list the Ministry of Defence sites that have been released for disposal under the Defence Estate Optimisation programme since 5 July 2024 and (a) have been sold and (b) remain unsold.

All Ministry of Defence disposals, and the planned disposal dates, are already listed on the House of Commons Defence Disposal Database. This includes three Defence Estate Optimisation disposals since July 2024, and the remaining phases of a further two sites.

With reference to page 134 of his Department's Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made in identifying where operational infrastructure does not meet requirements under force development plans.

Defence maintains risk registers and capability assessments across all defence lines of development, this includes infrastructure. The defence investment plan will cohere current capabilities and future Strategic Defence Review deliverables, Those capabilities and deliverables will be prioritised against force plans the prioritisation of the above includes examination of both risk and capability assessments.

Which units fall under the umbrella of Special Operations Forces.

The Strategic Defence Review was clear that the current threat environment means Defence needs greater choice and resilience across the spectrum of military effects. Units such as the Army Rangers and the Commando Force will provide the special operations-capable forces required to improve the UK’s warfighting capabilities as well as helping fulfil our contribution to NATO’s Special Operations Taskforce 2026.

With reference to page 136 of his Department's document entitled Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress his Department has made in appointing a board member with responsibility for infrastructure to all Front Line Command boards.

Each Front-Line Command contains a director level post who represents infrastructure both on their board, and within the central Ministry of Defence senior infrastructure board. As part of defence reform, the infrastructure operating model and senior boards composition, will be examined to ensure they meet the Strategic Defence Review commitments.

With reference to his Department's press notice entitled UK and Türkiye agree big step towards multi-billion-pound export of Typhoon fighter jets, published on 23 July 2025, what the timeline is for the Typhoon upgrade programme over the next 15 years.

Information regarding upgrades to the Typhoon's systems and equipment will be communicated in the forthcoming Defence Investment Plan.

With reference to page 27 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, what recent progress he has made on meeting NATO's seven baseline requirements for resilience.

The UK sees national and collective resilience as an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and is committed to NATO Article 3, which requires Allies to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. The Government's work to deliver against NATO's seven baseline requirements for resilience is being delivered through the Cabinet Office-led Home Defence Programme, in which Defence has a leading role. As set out in the National Security Strategy and the Resilience Action Plan, this coordinates civil and military preparations across the whole of government to ensure that all sectors are prepared for and able to respond to the most catastrophic risks.