Written questions by Obese-Jecty.

With reference to page 90 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on devising a strategy for the protection of critical national infrastructure by the (a) MOD Guard Service and (b) UK intelligence community.

The protection of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is an important pillar of work in the Home Defence Programme. This work is led by the Cabinet Office and aims to develop a cross-Government plan to strengthen the nation’s security, preparedness, and resilience in order to deter threats to and defend the UK homeland. Defence continues to play a significant contributory role with partners and the private sector to protect CNI from a full spectrum of threats. The UK already has an existing strategy for protecting CNI which includes a partnership between intelligence agencies, and components of the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC), such as the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). The Ministry of Defence (MOD) Guard Service (MGS) provides unarmed security services for MOD sites. The MGS are just one of the MOD policing and guarding organisations that could contribute to the protection of CNI under the cross-Government plan.

With reference to page 90 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a programme of exercises to test plans for response to an armed attack on (a) the UK and (b) NATO allies.

The Government regularly performs exercises on its ability to respond to an armed attack on the United Kingdom and our NATO Allies. The Ministry of Defence works closely with the Cabinet Office and the Home Office to test and strengthen national resilience and home defence arrangements. These exercises enhance coordination between the Armed Forces, civil authorities and emergency services, ensuring the UK remains prepared to respond swiftly and effectively to any armed threat. In addition, NATO has an extensive set of plans outlining how to respond to an armed attack on any Ally, including the UK. These exercises enhance Allied interoperability, validate defence and deterrence strategies, and reinforce the credibility of NATO's collective defence posture. The largest of these exercises is the STEADFAST series, NATO's most extensive and comprehensive exercise programme. Last year, Exercise STEADFAST DEFENDER 2024, the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War, involved around 20,000 UK personnel.

Under what agreement the UK operates the Naval Support Facility in Bahrain.

The Naval Support Facility in Bahrain operates under an arrangement reached with the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain in 2014.

With reference to page 120 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what proportion of the National Cyber Force’s capability is dedicated to (a) defence and (b) other national security priorities.

We do not routinely comment on operational matters or the operational prioritisation of the National Cyber Force due to reasons of national security.

With reference to page 109 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing an enhanced Standing Joint Command.

Since the publication of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the Standing Joint Command (SJC) has undertaken a series of workstreams to begin delivery against SDR intent. This includes the publication of a new operational framework, the delivery of a series of table-top exercise with Government partners and a review of future workforce requirements. The work to establish an enhanced SJC remains ongoing but has already made tangible progress.

With reference to page 110 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on ensuring the Army’s contribution has kept pace with innovation in electromagnetic warfare.

For reasons of safeguarding operational security, I am unable to provide details relating to electromagnetic warfare.

With reference to page 120 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what change is required within the CyberEM domain to achieve a tech-enabled Integrated Force.

The aim to achieve a tech-enabled Integrated Force was a central tenet of the SDR and will require change across all domains. The Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ) will drive the change, with the National Armaments Director Group (NADG) responsible for delivering a strong and secure digital backbone. Cyber and Specialist Operations Command (CSOC) will continue to be the 4 star Command responsible for the protection of Defence networks, platforms and infrastructure, in partnership with the Single Services, industry and partners across government. The newly established 2 star Defence Cyber and Electromagnetic Force, as part of CSOC, will ensure the authorities are in place to respond rapidly to both threats and opportunities in the CyberEM domain.

With reference to page 120 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a new CyberEM Command.

The design and implementation planning process is well underway. The 4 star Cyber ans Specialist Operations Command (CSOC) was officially launched on 1 September 2025. The 2 star Defence Cyber and Electromagnetic Force, previously referred to as the CyberEM Command, which operates within CSOC, is set to be established by the end of the year.

With reference to page 120 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, how enterprise-wide operational defence priorities for activities in the cyber domain will be deconflicted with the National Cyber Force’s priorities.

We do not routinely comment on operational matters or the operational prioritisation of the National Cyber Force (NCF) due to reasons of national security.

With reference to page 122 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on empowering each of the services to develop their own electromagnetic warfare capabilities.

The capacity to operate within the electromagnetic spectrum is a critical component of contemporary warfare, as evidenced by ongoing events in Ukraine. By the end of the year, the newly established 2 star Defence Cyber and Electromagnetic Force will assume responsibility for developing and coordinating Electromagnetic Operations strategy and force development, including setting standards and architectures. Meanwhile, each Single Service will continue to advance their own tactical capabilities to ensure preparedness against emerging threats and effective operation within their respective domain.

With reference to page 118 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made on re-establishing a Cabinet sub‑Committee or equivalent ministerial group to set the UK’s strategic approach to space.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer given by my hon. Friend the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry (Luke Pollard) on 6 September 2025 to Questions 70660, 70661, 70682 and 70659 to the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) and on 23 July 2025 to Question 68516 to the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst).

With reference to page 127 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, which aspects of defence intelligence capabilities his Department has assessed as (a) underpowered and (b) fragmented.

The Ministry of Defence keeps all areas of its capability under review to ensure we are ready to meet the threat posed by adversaries and to protect the UK, but we do not comment in detail on aspects of Defence capability that could be useful to adversaries.

With reference to page 22 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, what changes have been made to Royal Navy rules of engagement to track vessels suspected of (a) spying and (b) sabotage.

The Royal Navy and the Ministry of Defence continuously assess its Rules of Engagement to ensure our Armed Forces can act appropriately against malign activities and future threats. For reasons of national security, I am not able to disclose specific rules of engagement, nor can I indicate when a review of our profiles was conducted and any potential changes that followed.

With reference to recommendation 53 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a strong training offer that nurtures critical specialist skills.

The Defence Intelligence Academy was established in October 2025 by Commander Cyber and Specialist Operations Command and the Chief of Defence Intelligence as part of Defence’s efforts to ensure a strong training offer. The programme to do so has focussed on the higher-level Command structures, while delivering several new and innovative training courses focussed on enhancing critical specialist skills. It will cohere delivery across the Military Intelligence Services. The Defence Intelligence Academy is also optimising its courses for future intelligence requirements and technology, improve training delivery methods, and emphasising career-long education.

With reference to page 106 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what recent progress he has made in exploring alternative approaches for the Royal Navy to deliver a (a) balanced and (b) cost-effective fleet.

The First Sea Lord has outlined a bold new vision for a ‘Hybrid Navy’ as demanded by the Strategic Defence Review. This paradigm shift proposes far greater use of autonomous systems, digitisation, and Artificial Intelligence to create a fleet of crewed and uncrewed systems, increasing the mass and lethality of future Naval Task Groups. The plan also includes a re-imagined industrial and organisational model to accelerate delivery of cutting-edge technology to the frontline, supporting both operational advantage and UK industry. These proposals are being considered alongside other requirements as part of the Defence Investment Plan.

With reference to recommendation 41 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what progress he has made in modernising the (a) two divisions and (b) Corps HQ that the British Army provides to NATO’s strategic reserve corps.

The delivery of the Army’s modernisation programme is ongoing and subject to review as part of the Defence Investment Plan. Early steps that have already been made include: the elevation of key capabilities to the Corps level (Engineers, Air Defence, Aviation, Medical, Military Policing); the re-establishment of Armoured Infantry capability for 3 (UK) Division; the establishment of a new Reconnaissance Strike Brigade for 1 (UK) Division. We have also grown capabilities in a number of areas including Counter-Intelligence, Close Support Engineering, and Land Targeting. The headmark for the delivery of the associated capability modernisation and transformation programmes remains 2035.

With reference to recommendation 45 of his Department's Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, which battalion group of the Parachute Regiment will airborne parachute (a) capability and (b) capacity be focused on.

Recommendation 45 of the Strategic Defence Review is a planning assumption to inform equipment, training, and workforce readiness. The Battalion Group will be formed from across 16 Air Assault Brigade – predominantly 2 PARA and 3 PARA.

How many fully deployable divisional headquarters does the British Army have.

The British Army has two deployable divisions: 1 (UK) Division and 3 (UK) Division. Both have their own divisional headquarters.

With reference to his Department's press release entitled UK and Türkiye agree big step towards multi-billion-pound export of Typhoon fighter jets, published on 23 July 2025. what progress he has made on negotiations on a potential deal with Turkey.

We are pleased with the progress that is being made on strengthening our partnership with Türkiye, a valued NATO ally. Negotiations are ongoing and we hope to conclude soon.

With reference to page 117 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what assessment he has made of the potential merits of supplanting the SKYNET (a) 6A and (b) 6EC satellite communications programmes with alternatives.

The Ministry of Defence is continually assessing SKYNET’s capabilities against demand and potential threats. SKYNET 6A and the Enduring Capability solutions are considered operationally relevant and will form part of a resilient satellite communications enterprise out to 2040.