Every parliamentary written question tabled by Ben Obese-Jecty this session, with the full answer and department. See how every department answers, or back to the MP page.
Showing 1,401–1,420 of 2,264 · Ministry of Defence
With reference to page 114 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what the full scope is of Typhoon upgrades for (a) radar, (b) defensive aids, (c) avionics and (d) weapons.
An assessment of the planned Typhoon upgrades is currently underway. Further information regarding upgrades to the Typhoon's systems and equipment will be communicated in the forthcoming Defence Investment Plan.
With reference to page 114 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what progress he has made in planning for the use of UK commercial airfields in times of crisis.
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has robust plans for mobilising and deploying the Armed Forces in response to any number of events and crises, whether they take place at home and abroad. These plans are regularly reviewed, tested and exercised. As part of the planning process the MOD will identify civilian infrastructure which is deemed critical to enable and support military activity. This includes civilian airfields. The MOD routinely engages with commercial transport operators and industry associations and works closely with other Government Departments including the Department for Transport.
What progress has he made on exploring the use of the stratosphere with vehicles capable of carrying higher payloads for missions lasting over 6 months.
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 19 September, to Question 76405. Options for exploring the use of the stratosphere with vehicles capable of carrying high payloads for extended period are being pursued through Project AETHER, which is in its trial phase. Following the completion of two initial trials, in September 2024 and March 2025, further opportunities in this area are subject to further trials and the continuation of planned funding for Project AETHER.
What assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of recent Nuclear Site Event Reports on (a) equipment failures, (b) human error, (c) procedural shortcomings and (d) near-misses.
I cannot provide specific detail for the events as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces. However, I can assure the hon. Member that none of the events listed caused harm to the health of any member of staff or to any member of the public and none have resulted in any radiological impact to the environment. The table below shows the number of Nuclear Site Event Reports (NSERs) at Coulport recorded between for the most recent financial year. These are shown according to agreed categorisation: Nuclear Site Events- 2024, 22 April 2024 - 31 December 2024Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport009251 Nuclear Site Events- 2025, 01 January 2025 - 22 April 2025Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport00490 In line with Industry Good Practice and in common with other defence and civil nuclear sites, His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde has a well-established system for raising NSERs. NSERs are raised to foster a robust safety culture that learns from experience, whether that is of equipment failures, human error, procedural failings, documentation shortcomings or near-misses.
How many category (a) A, (b) B, (c) C and (d) D incidents have taken place at RNAD Coulport since 5 July 2024.
I cannot provide specific detail for the events as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces. However, I can assure the hon. Member that none of the events listed caused harm to the health of any member of staff or to any member of the public and none have resulted in any radiological impact to the environment. The table below shows the number of Nuclear Site Event Reports (NSERs) at Coulport recorded between for the most recent financial year. These are shown according to agreed categorisation: Nuclear Site Events- 2024, 22 April 2024 - 31 December 2024Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport009251 Nuclear Site Events- 2025, 01 January 2025 - 22 April 2025Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport00490 In line with Industry Good Practice and in common with other defence and civil nuclear sites, His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde has a well-established system for raising NSERs. NSERs are raised to foster a robust safety culture that learns from experience, whether that is of equipment failures, human error, procedural failings, documentation shortcomings or near-misses.
With reference to recommendation 48 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what assessment he has made of the potential merits of (a) investment and (b) improvement of RAF Brize Norton in partnership with private finance.
RAF Brize Norton has secured multiple strategic investments that will deliver long term improvements to capability and the lived experience of the personnel based there. These improvements include Baggage Handling and Passenger Check-In Infrastructure, Airfield Operating Surfaces Project and a new Freight Handling Facility. In line with our standard processes, all investment decisions are carefully scrutinised to ensure they offer value for money.
With reference to page 4106 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what recent progress he has made in improving the Royal Navy’s detection capacity.
The Royal Navy is integrating existing, novel and commercial sources of data to detect activity at sea into a new Global Decision Support System (GDSS) that will transform the Royal Navy’s world leading Maritime Domain Awareness capability. These streams of activity when drawn together will deliver decision advantage to Operational Commanders, and front-line units.
With reference to page 88 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what progress he has made on inviting leaders of FTSE100 companies to attend defence courses.
The Ministry of Defence, in collaboration with the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, has initiated the implementation of the commitment outlined on page 88 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025. As part of this initiative, senior executives from FTSE100 companies are being invited to participate in defence education courses, as part of an initial offer to industry partners.
With reference to page 131 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a Sponsored Reserve model.
The Defence Medical Services (DMS) is exploring the potential for a ‘Sponsored Reserve’ model or equivalent to increase medical Reserve numbers, with more personnel held at readiness. The DMS is engaging with industry providers to inform this work and will assess the benefits of employing Sponsored Reserves to DMS and consider options for capability and specialty-based contracts.
How many days HMS Daring has spent (a) at sea and (b) under repair since coming into service in 2006.
The Ministry of Defence provides Royal Navy Surface Fleet readiness data to the House of Commons Defence Committee on a six-monthly basis. The most recent release of readiness information can be found at the following website: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49270/documents/262458/default/ HMS Daring entered service on 31 July 2010 and has delivered effect on operations since. As with all Royal Navy vessels, during her in service period there have been periods of “planned” unavailability including DARING’s Propulsion Improvement Programme (PIP) which commenced in October 2021, completing in January 2023. Since her return to His Majesty’s Naval Base Portsmouth, HMS DARING has been re-generating and has received several capability upgrades.
He will list the Ministry of Defence sites that have been released for disposal under the Defence Estate Optimisation programme since 5 July 2024 and (a) have been sold and (b) remain unsold.
All Ministry of Defence disposals, and the planned disposal dates, are already listed on the House of Commons Defence Disposal Database. This includes three Defence Estate Optimisation disposals since July 2024, and the remaining phases of a further two sites.
What assessment he has made of the scale of the damage to Loch Long caused by radioactive water from the burst pipework at HMNB Clyde.
There has been no unsafe radioactive material released into the environment of Loch Long at any stage. The Royal Navy frequently engages with regulators who report there is no significant impact on the environment or public health. Appropriate preventative measures are in place to reduce safety risk, and the events reported reflect the rigorous monitoring that is carried out to ensure that any issues are identified and dealt with. His Majesty’s Navy Base (HMNB) Clyde complies with international best practice as recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nuclear safety at these sites is independently overseen by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) and the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), who have robust powers to address concerns and recommend changes where necessary. These structures ensure that nuclear safety is treated with the seriousness that it requires.
By when the (a) Defence Support and (b) Defence Digital will move to the National Armaments Director group.
Defence Support was integrated into the National Armament Director (NAD) Group as of 1 April 2025. Defence Digital moved into the (NAD) Group on 1 July 2025.
With reference to page 133 of his Department's Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made in conducting a holistic assessment of defence infrastructure requirements.
As part of the Defence Investment Plan Defence has cohered the totality of the Defence Lines of Development for current capabilities and future Strategic Defence Review deliverables. This includes infrastructure for which the front-line commands and delivery agents have made a holistic assessment. Those capabilities and deliverables will be prioritised against force plans.
With reference to page 43 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, what progress he has made on building at least six new (a) munitions and (b) energetics factories.
The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) committed to invest £1.5 billion in an 'always on' pipeline for munitions and to build at least six new energetics and munitions factories in the UK this parliament. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is currently developing a plan to deliver this commitment alongside our wider Defence Industrial Strategy, delivering long-term investment to boost UK growth and generating skilled UK jobs and export opportunities. The MOD is carefully considering arrangements for 'always on' and for new energetics and munitions factories including their potential locations, and more detail will be set out in due course. Work is ongoing in respect to the new factories and further announcements will be made in due course.
With reference to page 109 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, when the enhanced recce-strike capability via Project ASGARD will be (a) operational and (b) shared across defence.
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 8 September 2025, to Question 73577, which remains extant and explains the current position for the Army’s project ASGARD. The next iteration of ASGARD, focused at Corps level operations, will be tested in Quarter 2 2026.
With reference to page 41 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, what progress he has made on (a) identifying, (b) protecting and (c) cultivating other sovereign capabilities that are foundational to the UK’s (i) industrial base and (ii) long-term competitiveness.
The Defence Industrial Strategy (published on 8 September 2025) outlines a dynamic, defence and innovation-focused industrial base, emphasising the growing importance of ensuring UK sovereignty, operational advantage, and freedom of action. It sets out the Government’s commitment to strengthen the defence sectors that are essential for national security and supply chain resilience, as well as those with the greatest economic growth potential. The detail of these sectors is set out in section 1.3.3 of the Defence Industrial Strategy. The Defence Investment Plan will set out in more detail how we will support the UK’s long-term economic growth and competitiveness through our investment choices.
With reference to page 42 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, in what ways the defence industrial base will be redefined to include (a) academia, (b) dual-use civilian-military companies, (c) financial services, (d) technologists and (e) trade unions.
The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) (published on 8 September 2025) sets out our approach to redefining the defence industrial base. In order to adopt a whole of society approach to keeping the UK safe and boosting economic growth, our definition must reflect the deep range of partners and expertise both within our traditional defence sector and those in adjacent sectors. The DIS (section 1.3.2) therefore redefines the UK defence industrial base to include academic institutions (including dual-use civilian-military companies), UK-based companies, banks and other financial services companies, goods and services firms, technologists and technology firms, and trade unions and their members.
With reference to page 46 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, what progress he has made on increasing the ability of the UK to pool defence capital with allies.
We are working with partners on a series of potential opportunities to pool defence capital with allies, including through multilateral initiatives, aggregating defence demand, increasing European interoperability and standardisation, enhancing cooperation through the EU's Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and exploring other international mechanisms.
With reference to page 126 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on enhancing Special Forces.
It is the longstanding policy of successive Governments not to comment on the details of the activity, personnel or capabilities of the UK Special Forces.