Business and Trade Sub-Committee on Economic Security, Arms and Export Controls — Oral Evidence (HC 560)
1/26Welcome to this morning’s meeting of the Business and Trade Sub-Committee on Economic Security, Arms and Export Control. Thank you very much indeed, Lord Coaker, Sir Chris Bryant and Stephen Doughty, together with your officials, for joining us today for one of our regular hearings on arms control. Charlie Maynard will open the questioning.
Good morning, everyone, and thank you for being here. Minister, following on from our 9 June conversation, the Committee was very heartened by your commitment to transparency, particularly around delivery information. We understand that there are some IT issues, but where are you with regard to the commitment to implementing a policy of releasing data on actual usage and deliveries under export licences?
I fully understand the concern that the Committee has had. It is preposterous, really, that we have this issue, and there are understandable reasons why it is difficult to get to the right statistics. I will not bore Committee members with all that. We have now found a way to do this properly for the first quarter of 2027. That means that it will come out a bit later than that, because we have to put all that data together. However, I can make the commitment that we will produce all that data as effectively as we possibly can for the first quarter of 2027. That requires a chunk of work between ourselves and HMRC, but it is important that the public should have the proper information rather than a kind of guesstimate.
On behalf of the Committee, you have made our day.
We would like to record our thanks to you, Sir Chris, for driving that through. As you acknowledged in the report published this morning, this has been a long-standing ambition of yours, and it has been a long-standing ambition of this Committee to secure that data. We appreciate you making that progress.
I want to issue everything with a slight caveat: this is not easy. Again, I do not want to bore you with the reasons, but many of our licences, such as an open general licence, only show the maximum amount that somebody is allowed to export. You want to know what the actual amount is that is exported and, as I say, that is a relationship between us and HMRC. I really want to pay tribute to the team under Rosemary who have made sure that we have all those ducks pretty much lined up in a way that enables us to deliver that for next year.
Minister, just so I am clear what we are talking about, is that with regard to the data for the first quarter of 2027, or data for 2026 that you are reporting in 2027?
It is data for the first quarter of 2027. We have some legacy issues in relation to some licences that we have to sort out, and I do not want to over-promise. That would be the worst outcome of all.
That is no problem at all; it is clear. Lord Coaker, let me follow up on that transparency trend. There is a Crown exemption: “Where the Crown owns the controlled military goods, technology or software being exported, and has similar rights over disposal, then an exporter acting on the Crown’s behalf may carry out the export without a licence.” If we are being transparent about this—I really appreciate your approach to transparency—would you please give a view on whether we actually are now willing to report that information on what data is being exported, and do you think a licence should be exempt?
Under Crown exemption, it is MOD-owned equipment, data or technology, and it is for UK MOD purposes. That is the context for the Crown exemption, and it takes you to gifting, but we will come on to that later. Let me say that we are always keen to be as transparent as we can be. For example, everybody who applies for that or wants to operate under Crown exemption must have a letter of exemption. There were 106 of those issued in 2025. If you are asking whether the Department should look into whether it can publish more with respect to any of that—whether it be the data or anything—of course we will always look at that. It is in all our interests, recognising from an MOD perspective that there are operational requirements that everybody on the Committee will appreciate and accept. Alongside that, we have a responsibility to be as open and transparent as we can be.
As I understand it, gifts exceeding £300,000 in value are notified to Parliament before the gift is made. What other information is made available? If there were a whole load of £295,000 gifts that were under that bar, what information would be provided for the public to get a sense of what had been going on inside that bracket?
That is why the report that has been published today, which the Committee was given yesterday, is important. As you say, amounts over £300,000 have to be reported to Parliament. But in the report, if we look at controlled equipment and gifting, amounts under that are also outlined.
But not by country. Is that right?
Yes, by country. For example, on pages 33 and 34, there are exemptions under £300,000. I will not go through all of this because of time, but they are outlined there, and I hope that that meets some of the concern that you may have. I appreciate that the Committee may have other views when it considers all the evidence, and if there are suggestions we are always willing to consider them.
The annual report was released last night.
Yes.
It would have been ideal to have it a day or two earlier so we had a chance to read it, as opposed to getting a 66-page report the night before we all meet.
Yes.
Next time, could we just make sure we have a window so that that is not the case?
Mr Maynard, I have been a member of a Select Committee and I know how frustrating it is sometimes to receive information a day or two after it should have been received. Let me be candid and open about it: it would have been ideal for the Chair and the Committee to have received it before that. We got it to you as soon as it was agreed across Government, and as soon as we could. We were absolutely certain that we had to publish at least before the Committee met, but I take your point.
Next year, could we have a 48-hour window for the report, please?
If I am still here, yes, but the serious point, of course, is that you should: annual reports should be made available to Committees sooner than they were with respect to this matter. Mr Bryant started with a very open and transparent comment about what was happening from a DBT point of view. Certainly, from an MOD and, I know, from an FCDO perspective, our intention is to be as open as possible. From an MOD perspective, there is sometimes a tension about openness and operational security, but our aim is to be as open as possible. I take the point that you have made.
Lord Coaker, when Crown exemption exports are made, are they tested against the strategic export licensing criteria?
If you look at Crown exemption as a whole, you have a Crown exemption where, to give an example, MOD-owned goods or equipment are used for MOD purposes. The end user is the UK’s own MOD. For that, you do not require it. However, gifting also operates under Crown exemption. Gifting is tested against the strategic export licensing criteria and much of the discussion takes place before a formal decision is made. For gifting, it is a different process from the one for our own armed forces and our own equipment, but it is all under Crown exemption.
Are any other tests applied?
Financial tests are carried out, along with the various checks that you would expect for gifting: according to the criteria, who it is going to and whether you can be certain that the gifting will operate in the way that you would want. You will see in the report that although we gift to Ukraine, it is outwith some of the more general points that are made about gifting, because of the often urgent operational requirements, the need for operational security and the need to act as promptly and quickly as possible. As I say, certainly against the criteria, there are financial tests and an assessment by ourselves and others across Government as to whether these are fit and proper things to happen.
In essence, the gifting system is governed by the strategic export licensing criteria regime.
It is judged against those criteria to see whether it is appropriate. Again, for transparency, as far as I am aware—Roger will correct me if I am wrong—we have not refused any gifting requests. Our argument is that much of the discussion takes place prior to anybody actually making a request and in doing that, we would expect to avoid requests that are just going to be refused.
We would like to move on to arms to Israel now, but it is probably best if I start with the wider question of the ban on goods and services from the Occupied Palestinian Territories. We know that in July 2024 the ICJ issued an advisory opinion advising states to take steps to prevent trade or investment that supports illegal Israeli settlements. On 25 February, I wrote to you to ask what you were doing about that ban; you said that you were continuing to consider a range of options. I then asked the Prime Minister about it on 23 March; he replied that Government would keep the matter under review. I wrote to you again in April 2026, and the position remained unchanged. In the meantime, a number of our European allies have made progress: Spain, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and the EU Foreign Ministers considered this question on Monday. Our colleagues in Ireland actually passed the Illegal Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Prohibition of Importation of Goods) Bill through the Dáil on 7 July. Last week, the incoming Prime Minister said, “We’ve got to do more to put pressure on the Israeli Government. Netanyahu’s Government are clearly attempting to make a two-state solution impossible. That is why we need to do more, also looking at measures to ban trade in goods with illegal settlements.” Mr Doughty, before we get to the meat of the policy, could I ask you to give us your assessment of the situation on the ground now? What is the Government’s current assessment of the level of settler violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories? What is your assessment of the continued expansion of illegal settlements? What threat does that activity pose to the integrity of the Palestinian state, which we have now recognised?
Well, the threat is very severe, as you point out, Chair. Let us be clear: these settlements are illegal and they should not be taking place. They are not only wrong in themselves, but they threaten that progress towards a two-state solution. We have been very clear about that in our condemnation and in the actions we have taken. That includes, of course, sanctioning individuals and entities, and we recently took further action on those involved in this. We have been very clear that this violence is completely unacceptable and must stop, and we raise that at every possible opportunity. As you know, we have also sanctioned two individuals in the Israeli Government who have been directly involved in some most heinous comments and actions in relation to this. I will be absolutely clear: you are absolutely right that we need to go further. That is why we are considering a range of options. I do not want to get ahead of those, and you have rightly pointed to the transition in Government and the ability to make new policy. I will bring in my colleague in a moment to respond, but we have particularly led on issues in relation to sanctions. As the Foreign Secretary said, we are currently looking at how we can expand our sanctions regime in a targeted way against those facilitating settlements. At the moment, you will know that we can sanction where there is evidence of it being linked to settler violence, but not, for example, in relation to a contractor working on the settlements. We need to expand our sanctions powers. I and others have commissioned important work on this over some time. You will understand that our sanction team work incredibly hard across a range of regimes around the world. We need to get this right. We need to make sure it is legally sound. We need to make sure it is impactful, as the rest of our sanctions regimes have been. I am strongly in favour of us expanding our powers in this area, including in relation to IHL abuses. Hopefully, with that new regime and those new measures in place, we would then be able to further target businesses to ensure they are not contracted to help build those settlements. We all look in horror at what has been going on, and there has been a distinct change. We were more hopeful back in December that things were moving; instead, we have seen a completely different approach from the Government of Israel in relation to this and a worsening of the situation on the ground. We are very clear about the level of violence, the complete illegality of what is going on and the peril that this puts a two-state solution in. Therefore, we need to look to expand our powers and ability to take action. As you will know, we have issued very clear advice to businesses and very clear statements and, crucially, we have used the powers that we have to take targeted action against individuals and entities.
You are being very clear with us today, in what sounds to me like a bit of a breakthrough: you are actively looking at the powers that you need in order to expand sanctions against those who are basically building and operating these illegal settlements. Do you think that you actually have the powers that you need in order to move further, or do you need new powers?
I do not think we have all the powers that we need at the moment. I have to say, as the sanctions Minister, that this has been a frustration not just in relation to the issue of settlements, but also in a number of other contexts around the world where we want to take further action. You will understand that it is also crucially important that we get the legal frameworks and the sanctions regimes right, as well as individual designations. We have been very successful in defending our sanctions regimes and actions in the courts. It is important that that continues; we do not want to see that fall apart in any way. I am sure the Committee would want to ensure that when we are designating, we are doing so legally, effectively and without unintended consequences. We need to get that right. We are working at pace to do that, and we have been looking at a series of options to do so.
That is very helpful—thank you. Let me just cover your assessment of breaches—or potential breaches or risks of breaches—of international humanitarian law. The Foreign Office has undergone a number of reorganisations recently, and some concern was raised that the IHL assessment cell had been, if not disbanded, certainly moved around within the Department. Can you just put our minds at rest that this is a team that continues to do the critical work that it is undertaking?
I certainly can. I will bring Tom in to confirm this from the official side, but the IHL cell and capability has simply moved. It continues to exist within the ECJU, within the FCDO. It is obviously a crucially important function for assessing UK export licensing decisions, and we continue that work. There was some quite misleading reporting around this, but the Foreign Office has been going through a number of reorganisations recently and that context was lost in the noise, so to speak. I can assure you that this function continues, and I am sure Tom can confirm that, as one of the key figures in our team.
That is right, Minister. We have been going through an ongoing reorganisation within the FCDO: the IHL team has been moved into ECJU and reports into me as the national economic security director.
Mr Doughty, what is your latest assessment of either Israel’s breaches of international humanitarian law, or the risk of breaches of international humanitarian law?
Well, we are very clear that our IHL assessments continue to find that Israel is not committed to upholding IHL in relation to Gaza. We have been very clear about that.
Israel is not committed to upholding international humanitarian law in Gaza?
Correct. We have raised and continue to raise that with Israeli counterparts at all levels. Obviously that has influenced the decisions that this Government have taken in relation to, for example, advice on the suspension of licences that were extant at the time that we came into office. Those were the assessments that we undertook, and we are very clear about our position on it.
Mr Barry, do you have anything to add?
No.
Mr Doughty, when was the last assessment undertaken?
We undertake continual assessments and reviews. This is a rolling, ongoing process that looks at a whole range of other contexts as well, and indeed in relation to issues outside the middle east as well. Tom can probably explain a little more about how that process works practically within the team.
The latest assessment was completed this month.
That is very recent. Sir Chris, this morning Stephen Doughty and Tom Barry have laid out a very clear picture that the settler violence is intense and threatens the integrity of the state of Palestine. A very recent IHL assessment continues to show that Israel is not committed to upholding international humanitarian law in Gaza. You will have heard the remarks of the new Prime Minister that we have to put more pressure on the Israeli Government. That is why we need to do more, also looking at measures to ban goods with illegal settlements. A number of our allies are moving very quickly on this. Is it now time to move from simply labelling goods from illegal settlements to banning goods from illegal settlements?
If you do not mind me unpacking it a little, it is important to get the granular detail of this right. First, obviously, these are illegal settlements. That has been the settled view of Government for a long time. Expanding and sustaining them is an illegal act. We have recognised the state of Palestine and, as Stephen has just laid out, there is an ineluctable logic to that: no British business, in any shape or form, should be involved in the sustenance or expansion of any of the illegal settlements. I am just as worried about services as I am about goods in relation to that. In fact, you could argue that British businesses engaged in service industries exports into the illegal settlements are just as problematic, if not more problematic. For instance, are there companies in the UK that are providing mortgages or financial support for people who are building in the illegal settlements? Might there be people who are acting as estate agents for properties there, or people providing accountancy or legal services? All these areas are just as important as the goods issues that lots of people have been most focused on, such as goods arriving from the illegal settlements into the UK. There is an ineluctable logic to our having to address all four issues: imports and exports of both goods and services. What I am about to say is not an excuse, but there are complexities in each of these different elements. The most important one is that even under the present rules that apply both to the EU and to us, there is no preferential tariff arrangement for goods that have come from the illegal settlements. However, we all know perfectly well that it is very difficult to enforce because goods—heavy machinery, foodstuffs and so on—travel in and out of the settlement areas and green-line Israel very easily. Often things can just be labelled as products of Israel, whereas in actual fact—as some wine people have said, for instance—they have clearly come from the settlement areas. That is a difficult enforcement issue now, and it will be a difficult enforcement issue whatever route we go down. I have not been engaged in the conversations with Spain and other countries, but I have heard from my colleagues that they worry about the actual effectiveness of the measures they are taking. We want to make sure that we do this correctly. The question is whether there is a DBT route for doing these, or an FCDO route for doing all these things. What I and Hamish Falconer in the Foreign Office have been doing for the last few months is try to look through all the details of this, to get a serious plan of action in place.
Let me just crystallise that. DBT and the Foreign Office are now actively working on a plan to bring forward a comprehensive ban on the import and the export of goods and services to illegal settlements?
Yes. Obviously it will be for others to decide, because there will be a continuation or a new Government—however you want to interpret it—next week. However, we have been doing work on precisely how this would work. I just want to underline that there is a very strong moral argument for all this. There is probably also a strong legal argument for doing all this, although that would be advice from the Foreign Office. However, actually making it effective is not simple. I always think that when there are problems, you have to overcome them rather than just saying, “Oh, well, there are problems, so we can’t do anything,” as I said in the debate last Thursday afternoon. I am just slightly nervous of declaratory action that has no actual effect. Most people in the United Kingdom would be absolutely scandalised if they thought that British financial or legal institutions were providing services that were effectively allowing the further roll-out of illegal settlements in Israel.
I would completely agree with what has said. As I said, there is a wider question here. As a Minister, I have certainly been frustrated about the capabilities and powers that we have to respond to issues in relation to IHL and more generally in relation to our sanctions regimes. I am regularly having cases raised by colleagues, by human rights groups and by others. I want to make sure that we have the full set of tools in our armoury to be able to respond.
I will just say one other thing about timelines. Of course, if we are able to use the sanctions regime that already exists, or potential DBT solutions, that is better than having to rely on primary legislation. Legislation could take some considerable time and might get delayed in the House of Lords, for all sorts of perfectly legitimate reasons. That is why we are working, in granular detail, on what this would look like.
Could it be that the sanctions legislation is the legal basis for the ban?
That is really Stephen’s answer to give, but yes.
SAMLA is the overall framework, but within that we have the individual regimes and, below that, designations on individuals and entities. One of the challenges we have is that we do not necessarily have all the regimes in place that we would like to have. I want to pay tribute to our sanctions team: as Chris said, they do incredible work to develop legally sound and effective regimes and to ensure that we do not have unintended consequences. In any of these circumstances, we want something that actually has an impact and has bite. That applies to any of our sanctions regimes.
It might be worth saying something about other countries. Spain, for instance, has a system that is similar to our secondary legislation, whereby basically the Cabinet makes a pronouncement and then it has to go to both Houses within 30 days. There has been a bit of a dispute within the European Union about whether individual countries can proceed down this route. Actually, the UK is in a very different position from most other European countries—well, from Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands—because of our particular exposure and our relationship with Israel. That means that there is more of an onus on us to take this seriously, but it also means that it is a bit more complicated for us. Of course, the EU did not manage to come to a conclusion earlier this week although it had three or four different options before it.
Kaja Kallas said that the overwhelming majority within the Foreign Affairs Council was for an outright ban, and it is now satisfied that it can do that through qualified majority voting. I have spent time with Spanish officials, understanding the implementation of the ban in Spain. Their view was that actually getting the ban in place gave them the momentum to then work it through in detail. What I am hearing you both say today is that there is a moral case for a ban and you think you have most of the legal basis for a ban; it is now just a question of getting a detailed implementation plan in place, and that is something that you have already begun working through in detail.
Yes to all of that. My only question is that I could not work out from the Spanish legislation whether it covers just goods—
It covers services as well.
And whether it is both imports and exports.
It is. The other associated question is then about Ireland. We obviously ensure that goods going into Ireland are regulated in line with EU investment. If there is an Irish ban on the importation of goods from illegal settlements, presumably there will need to be a conversation about how we stop goods from illegal settlements going into Northern Ireland, given that there are no border checks within the island of Ireland.
It is one of the complexities and one of the granular details that we have to work through.
Can I just ask about the scope? The argument that I have been making is that the ban should be comprehensive. There should be a ban in both goods and services. We should be looking to prohibit businesses, charities and financial institutions from supporting settlement activity. We should—as you suggested, Sir Chris—restrict commercial and property transactions linked to settlements, and wherever possible we should be using sanctions powers in the interest of speed. It sounds to me as though you are considering quite a broad scope of ban. Have I heard you correctly?
You have heard me correctly.
Okay, thank you, that is incredibly helpful. Breakthrough No. 2 this morning.
Can we go now, then?
No, no. We have many other parts of the world to consider.
Chris, I wonder whether we can talk about legitimate Israel, if I can use that expression. We are allies with Israel. The Israeli Government are a legitimate democratic organisation. How many of each type of export licence are extant for Israel? Where the Israeli Government are a potential end user, how many of those licences are for what the layman might regard as for weapons?
It might just be worthwhile underlining that there is a difference between the licensing regime that we have for military and dual-use material, and the conversation that we have just had, which is not about licensing in that regard at all. The figures we released on 20 April show that we have 395 extant licences in relation to Israel, of which 192 were non-military licences; 89 covered components for re-export to third parties outside Israel—sometimes we export something to Israel, for instance, and it gets put in something else that then comes back to the UK for the MOD; 37 were for commercial companies undergoing testing or for research and development, demonstration or manufacturing purposes; nine covered equipment for academic or civilian purposes, including protective equipment for non-combatants; and 68 were for material that is going to the Government of Israel as the end user, or the potential end user. As we outlined in the previous session, these are for trainer aircraft, missile defence systems—because we believe that Israel has the right to defend itself—or components for submarines, as well as the F-35 licences, which we discussed in some detail last time. Between 1 August 2025 and 28 February 2026, 112 licences were issued, the majority for non-military goods—that is, dual-use but non-military.
There are things in there that, to use the technical term, go bang, but our view is that these are for things like missile defence systems, or the Arrow programme?
They are very specific. It is trainer aircraft, missile defence systems, components for submarines, and then F-35 licences. Those are the ones that are actually going to the state of Israel. There are other licences, including a very big licence for cystic fibrosis and stuff worth £68 million, which of course would not be covered in that. That is one of the reasons why the total value of the licences is higher this year than last.
You mentioned the F-35. Obviously, that has been controversial, to say the least. It is seen as some kind of wonder weapon. We have had evidence here that the only aircraft in the Israeli inventory that could lift 2,000-lb bombs was the F-35. I do not think that that is right—I believe the Israeli version of the F-15 and the F-16 can lift those bombs—but none the less the F-35 is seen almost as a sort of bogeyman. Have you any sense of whether the F-35 is being used by the Israelis over Lebanon?
Well, that is really more of an MOD question than one for me.
We have no evidence of that, but on the comment you make around F-15 and F-16, the vast majority of the Israeli air force is exactly those types of aircraft. I will not reopen the discussion around the carve-out for the F-35 more generally, unless the Committee and the Chair want us to. Certainly, with respect to ourselves and what happens around the use of F-35s, we have no particular evidence with respect to Lebanon.
You talked there about the carve-out for the F-35. We were told that the F-35 supply chain is complex and that all the parts go into one central pool, as it were. We have stopped sending direct to Israel, but none the less the parts go into that pool, which presumably they can draw from. The carve-out was because the F-35 pool is vital for the security of the UK and our allies in NATO. There has not been a review of that, so does that remain the case?
Without digressing—I am sure the Chair will bring me back if I do—the F-35 is fundamental and crucial to the defence of Europe, ourselves and beyond. If I can just give a couple of examples, last year a carrier full of F-35s travelled all over the Indo-Pacific, through the middle east, back through the Mediterranean and back to us. As we speak, as the Committee will be aware, the Prince of Wales is now in the North Atlantic with F-35s on it, securing our security and that of our allies and partners. More recently there were newspaper reports—so this is not breaking any confidentiality—that, following the middle east tension, F-35s based at Akrotiri shot down drones that were seeking to do damage to us and our allies. It is a fundamental part of security, not only for ourselves but for others. That was why the decision was taken across all the Departments about the necessity for the carve-out, and the difficulty for the UK in simply extricating itself from that, given that 15% of parts are going into the F-35 global pool. We had a really good discussion and challenge in Committee two years ago around that, and obviously the discussion continues. However, the position of the MOD and, I know, across Government is that the F-35 remains an essential part of our defence and security, for ourselves and our allies and partners.
Mr Cooper, just to be clear, we have refused and would refuse licences for components for F-15 and F-16, for precisely the reasons that you have raised.
Great. Thank you.
The extant military licences have a value of £130 million. Sir Chris, you flagged the licences for re-export as £81 million, and non-governmental use as £11 million. There is then an unspecified remainder of £38 million. You have set out four different areas of extant military licences that you have argued are for training, self-defence and submarines. Are those the licences that make up the £38 million that you have not broken down?
I believe so. If I have that wrong, I will write to you.
Lord Coaker, Israel’s ambassador to the United States has confirmed that the number of flight hours that Israeli pilots have on the F-35 is greater than that of all the pilots of the other foreign countries that were partners in developing this aircraft. Apart from maybe our country’s interpretation and evidence for it, the F-35 is widely being used, by the Israelis’ own statement, in multiple directions in this conflict, whether it has been in Gaza or beyond. Bluntly, it feels like the only way we can square our relationships with the Trump White House regarding the F-35 is to sacrifice our responsibilities to the arms trade treaty by pleading ignorance about the F-35s’ use by Israel to commit humanitarian crimes. I do not think that that is good enough for this country.
I do not want to relitigate the F-35 carve-out debate, but any observations on Mr Maynard’s point about the use of F-35s would be helpful.
Well, our position is as I have just stated, taking the Chair’s direction not to go over things. As I say, the frank reality for us is that the F-35 is a crucial part of security, so I will not go over that point again. Our contribution of parts into the global pool allows the continued development and sustainment of that important fleet. As Mr Byrne has just reminded us, we had a really good, interesting and powerful discussion/debate about that last time. Mr Maynard, you quite rightly made the points then, and are making the points back in a challenge to Government. The Government’s position remains that the F-35 is crucial. Of course we are concerned about the things that we see or hear about with respect to that and, as Mr Bryant laid out, the Government have tried to respond to that in many ways to do all they can to alleviate the suffering and horror we see.
Your analysis remains that the Israeli F-35s are not being used for offensive operations, either in Gaza and the west bank or in Lebanon?
As far as the MOD is concerned, that is true. That is the case, yes.
Yes, that is also my position. We do not monitor Israeli aircraft movements and we have no evidence, apart from what we see occasionally in the newspapers, about their use in Gaza.
I just want to be clear on the question you asked me earlier, so I do not have to write to you. Training, equipment, air defence and submarines comes to a total of £37.7 million—up to that, obviously, because of the way licences work.
That is excluding anything related to F-35s.
Understood.
Minister Bryant, Campaign Against Arms Trade, an NGO you will be familiar with, says that UK exports of drone parts to Israel have not been re-exported to Romania from Israel. That was a requirement of the UK export licence. Will the items listed in CAAT’s letter be re-exported to Romania?
This is the question about Watchkeeper drones, yes? We have investigated all these reports, as you would expect us to do. We understand that they are delayed, but we assess the risk of diversion to the IDF—the central question that is being asked—as very low. They are delayed, but we believe that they are still going to go to Romania.
“Delayed” is an interesting interpretation. Elbit Systems has filed a declaration of force majeure with Romania saying that the situation in Gaza had affected its ability to “Fulfil its contractual obligations”. Does that not imply that Elbit Systems will not export the goods to Romania?
The central question is whether they are going to be diverted for use for the IDF, and we do not believe that that is the case.
My understanding is that re-export requires the goods to end up in the place that they are intended for, and it is simply not good enough for them to just not be used by the IDF. They ought to be subject to the end user requirement. You previously told us that it would be a breach—
Sorry, but I disagree with that. The only point at issue here is whether they are going to be diverted to be used by the Israeli state.
Not quite. You previously told us that if there is evidence that material has not been re-exported as committed—these are your words—that would be a breach of the licence and we would be able to revoke it.
That is true, but that is not our reading of where we are with the Watchkeeper drones.
Is your assessment that they will leave Israel?
Yes.
We do not have a system in the UK of post-shipment checks. How will we monitor that they will eventually end up in Romania?
It is difficult to have a system of post-shipment checks, not least because you have to have the other country agreeing to allow that to happen. In this case, it will be happening in Israel. We have looked at other countries that have done something similar in this kind of area. In the United States of America, less than 1% is looked at and that system costs it about $2.25 million a year. Of course, long before anybody exports something, the main thing that we do is try to assess whether there is any risk of diversion, which is something that the Foreign Office or MOD will do on our behalf. Category 7 diversion risk is one of the main reasons that we reject licences. We are very rigorous about this. Of course we get concerned when we see things that might be delayed and look like they are just sitting there, but I do not think that is the case here.
How often are you checking in with Elbit Systems about its intentions to re-export this stuff?
We continue to check in, but there have been discussions with the relevant UK exporters to understand what is going on. There seems to have been a delay, as the Minister has said, but there is nothing in those conversations that suggests any risk of diversion—including UK parts—to the IDF. If anything in that changes, of course we would want to take further action.
On the point about post-shipment checks, I appreciate that the United States system is quite large and significant. The last report of the Committees on Arms Export Controls suggested that the UK should implement a pilot of post-shipment checks. What consideration is being given to even piloting such a system?
I suppose the decision for any Minister in this post would be: are you going to put resources into doing post-shipment or into making sure that we have got it right in the first place? We have a pretty good record on assessing diversion and are pretty aggressive. With lots of companies, we are dealing with people we deal with regularly. If I were asked that question in three months’ time, I would put all my eggs in the pre-assessment rather than post, because frankly once it is gone you have fewer powers to effect a change.
I can assure you that both what Sir Chris said about the use of criterion 7 and the extent that we look at this are based on a long-standing look at the records of what has happened previously, the assurances that we have and the assessment that we have done. As Chris says, it is most crucial to get this done beforehand. Once something has gone somewhere it should not have, you have very little ability to take action, except to try to put steps in place in the future. The teams go through this in granular detail. Certainly, when the riskiest decisions come up to administrators, including myself, this is one of the most common things that we ask, look at and go through in granular detail, looking at the history and any possibility. I can tell you that we take an extremely cautious approach to any risk of diversion.
If we find in future that this was not a delay and that the drone parts have indeed been diverted to the IDF, will there then be a refusal of future licence applications from those exporters?
Yes, of course. Just to be absolutely clear, the Government of Israel are not a party to this licence in any shape or form, so it would be a fundamental breach. If the company ever wanted to do business with us again, it would be in a very difficult place.
We want the UK to be taken seriously, where what we say is what we mean and we will enforce it. On your point about granular detail, Minister Doughty, it is very logical to say, “If I’m exporting weapons to you, one of the commitments is that you’re not going to forward it on to somebody I don’t want you to forward it on to. You will therefore make me the promise that if I ask where that is now, you will tell me.”
They do.
That pilot scheme that my colleague Richard Foord is asking for would provide teeth to that. I am interested and intrigued as to why it is not in our national interest to explore a pilot scheme to demonstrate that we have some teeth and backbone, to make sure that what we want to happen happens.
I am only assessing where I would put more resources if I had to choose. This is always a question about resources in the end. It is all very well to say, “Let’s have a pilot on this, that and the other.” We have looked at other countries that have some form of system. Germany does seven or eight a year. We are trying to assess from Germany whether it has any value at all, because I do not want to do something that has no value. At the moment, whatever we do has to be proportionate to the risk. We assess the risk very rigorously, both in the Foreign Office with Stephen and then with me when a licence comes up to us, and the first questions are whether we have assessed the risk of diversion, whether this is a company that we have dealt with frequently and so on. We have been getting this right.
I am keen to move on to discussing Sudan and the UAE. Just to close off the discussion on Israel, in your judgment, how quickly could you table proposals for a ban on settlement goods and services if the new Prime Minister asked you for it next week?
That is a very hypothetical question to which I do not have an answer, I am afraid. I cannot give you a timeline, but maybe Stephen can.
I cannot give you a timeline, but there are some genuine resource constraints in terms of getting these things right. You will appreciate that getting the regime right is crucial, because what we do not want to do is face a huge amount of litigation in the opposite direction that gums up the whole system and affects the impact on the ground. As you can imagine, we are subject to a huge amount of litigation in relation to sanctions from those who do not like being sanctioned. It is important that we have it right from the start. The team is adequately resourced and knows this is a priority. We are also, of course, looking at a huge range of other sanctions regimes. Obviously it will be for a new Prime Minister to make a decision about resourcing within Departments as well, to ensure we can make these things move forward quickly.
To Mr Cooper’s question earlier, we do not want to damage our trade with green-line—to use his term—legitimate Israel, or for that matter Palestinian businesses. We want to make sure that we get all that right.
Given that you have been working on this for a few months with Foreign Office colleagues, it does not sound as if this would take you years to get into place.
Correct. It is certainly not years.
Don’t go any further, Stephen!
In which case it is months.
I knew that was where he was going to go! I am not going to give you a timetable, I am afraid, not least because who knows who will be making these decisions in a week’s time? I do not have a timeline to give you, but we are working on it with some urgency and determination. We want to make sure that we get this right. I do not want to underestimate the challenges that that will pose.
How would you characterise how far through the process you are?
Some way.
I will settle for that.
Minister Doughty, do you accept that the UAE is actively arming the RSF in Sudan?
Let me be clear from the outset. What is happening in Sudan is utterly appalling and despicable. The Foreign Secretary, and indeed the previous Foreign Secretary, are two of the leading lights in shining a light on what has been happening. They have done so not only by taking action, by exposing and by urging international action, but by raising it at the highest levels, including with all those countries that are involved in any way in facilitating and furthering this conflict. There are multiple countries that have entities and individuals arming and facilitating this conflict on both sides. We urge them all to stop. We raise this at the highest level with them all, and as you can imagine, that includes our conversations with the UAE and others.
My question was, “Do you accept that the UAE is arming the RSF?”
As I said, there are multiple countries that are fuelling this conflict on both sides. We raise our concerns with them all and have done so in recent weeks. They all need to stop.
Is the UAE one of them?
Well, you can imagine that, yes, the UAE is a country we have spoken to along with a number of other countries. We are very clear that any weapons or arms going in are making this conflict even worse. They are fuelling atrocities, and this must absolutely end immediately.
The reason the UAE is significant relates to the RSF. It was found after the fall of El Fasher that it had the hallmarks of a genocide. There was a reasonable inference of genocidal intent, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. It is widely reported and, by many, accepted that the UAE is funding the RSF, so the UAE stands apart from some of the other countries.
I think it is important to be accurate here. There are multiple countries—the Foreign Secretary said this yesterday in her evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee—that are fuelling this conflict. They all need to end that. They are arming both sides. They are supporting both sides. This must end. On the atrocities you describe and what happened in El Fasher, I speak as somebody who has worked on issues in relation to Sudan for a very long time, including before coming into this place. Some of the things are just extraordinary. I have a number of people from the Sudanese diaspora in my own constituency who have come and talked to me about the implications of what is happening in Sudan today and what we have seen. It is simply unthinkable. Every country, every entity and every individual who is fuelling this conflict, on either side, needs to stop doing so immediately.
Given the widespread reporting that the UAE is arming the RSF and the general acceptance that it is, what account does the UK Government take of that in making licensing decisions in general to export to the UAE?
At our instigation—I was certainly personally involved in this—we conducted a full review of over 3,000 licences and their end users in countries in the region. That includes the UAE. The conclusion was clear: there is no evidence of UK weapons or ammunition being used in Sudan. I really want to be clear with the Committee about that. We have taken a fine-toothed comb through this and you can be absolutely assured that, in terms of the diversion risk and all the matters we have just been discussing in relation to wider export policy, this is a key consideration. We are clear from our review that there is no evidence of UK weapons or ammunition being used in Sudan.
I am not necessarily talking about diversion; I am talking about the UAE’s activity in relation to Sudan and its conduct. Does it therefore make the UAE an unsuitable partner for the UK’s arms exports in relation to international humanitarian aid?
With respect, you will understand—not least given the current situation in the middle east and the important ability of Gulf partners and allies to respond to horrific attacks on their cities and businesses, and indeed our interests in the region as well—that they have to have the right to defend themselves and they have legitimate defence and security interests that we engage with. In relation to anything that could possibly be used to fuel this conflict, we are clear that no UK exports are. We have gone through all those licences and consider this incredibly seriously. The most important point here is that all countries that are fuelling all sides of this conflict—as I said, there are multiple—need to stop doing so.
This might be helpful. Stephen is absolutely right. As you know, the ECJU is a joint venture between the three Departments. We reviewed 3,000 licences, of which 2,000 were in relation to Sudan, and precisely as Stephen said, we did not find anything. Obviously the most important thing for us is to establish whether UK businesses were selling something to the UAE that might then be diverted to Sudan. We are very confident that that has not happened. We also instructed HMRC to inspect a bunch of uncontrolled shipments to Sudan and South Sudan, to assess whether there is a military end use. I am pretty confident that we have done everything that we should on that specific issue. Stephen and I have both personally been reviewing quite a lot of this material ourselves.
To reassure you, this goes well beyond the UAE. We have been looking at the widest possible geography for any possible links where things could have been diverted and ended up fuelling that conflict.
Again, to pull it away from diversion, I am talking about the UAE as a suitable partner for UK arms exports, given the reported and alleged arming of Sudan.
I am sure you are not suggesting that the UAE should not, for example, be able to defend itself against missiles coming in from Iran or any other attacks on its cities, civilians or infrastructure, and indeed our interest there as well. With respect, there are legitimate exports. There is then the SELC, which we consider all our exports against, and if we think there is a risk of them being used in violation of the SELC, we refuse licences.
I know you do not like us talking about diversion, but none the less it is a key thing that is vital to us, because otherwise you are basically talking about a total arms control ban for the UAE. Between 2021 and 2025, there were 29 SIEL refusals for the UAE, the majority of which were refused on the basis of diversion. We take this very seriously and have done since 2021.
Is there a reluctance by the Government to call out the UAE’s actions publicly, in that it might affect trade deals or arms sales?
I completely reject that. The Foreign Secretary has regular contact with her counterparts in the UAE, and frank and robust conversations—as you would expect—with any partner over such matters. We have been clear in doing that and raising those concerns.
Mr Doughty, I just want to go back to the beginning. I am not talking about any other countries; I am talking about the UAE here. Is it arming the RSF, given the widespread reporting in international press? Is that something you accept; do you not know; or is there insufficient evidence? Whether it is The New York Times, Reuters, the FT or a bunch of others, there is tons and tons of evidence out there in the public domain; I am sure you have a lot in the private domain as well. Can you please give a clear answer as to whether you believe that it is not true or that there is insufficient evidence, despite the wall of evidence that has been provided in the public domain? Please tell us whether the UAE is arming the RSF or not.
As the Foreign Secretary said yesterday and as I have just said, there are multiple countries. It is important to remember that this conflict is being fuelled by two sides and multiple partners arming, aiding and supporting both sides. All that needs to stop. We are raising concerns with every country that is involved or has individuals or entities fuelling this conflict. We are doing so at the highest levels and being very clear about that, including in our conversations with the UAE.
So the UAE is one of those countries you are talking to, because it is a country that is fuelling this conflict.
I was very clear that we are talking to the UAE and the Foreign Secretary regularly engages with it.
We all accept that there are tens of thousands of people being killed in Sudan now. The RSF is, in large part, responsible for that murder. Under the SELC, criterion 1, paragraphs (a), (b) and (f) are about our obligations as a country for governing conventional arms transfers to the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Criterion 6, paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii) further set out our obligations about that. What I would like to understand is whether you are confident, and if so why you are confident, that we are not breaching criterion 1, paragraphs (a), (b) and (f), or criterion 6, paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii), by selling any weapons to the United Arab Emirates given what it is doing in Sudan by arming the RSF?
As you pointed out, criterion 1 is concerned with the UK’s international obligations and commitments, including sanctions from the UN Security Council. They are fact-specific assessments. We have not yet seen evidence that UK exports are inconsistent with those obligations. Of course we consider all the SELC criteria and there are different thresholds and criteria that need to be met. The most commonly used is the one in relation to criterion 7 because of the nature and risk of diversion. I know you do not want to talk about it, but that is absolutely crucial because it is, again, about whether UK exports are ending up fuelling this conflict. Our assessment is that that is not the case. Again, it comes back to the point that Mr Bryant and I were just raising with Ms Harding. Of course the UAE has a right to be able to defend itself in its region and we have legitimate exports in that regard. We are absolutely clear that UK exports are not going via the UAE and fuelling this conflict.
Do you accept that we have obligations beyond that? We have prima facie obligations under criterion 1 that we should not break our obligations to the United Nations arms trade treaty.
We have obligations under the entirety of the SELC and consider them all in relation to each individual decision. It is an extremely forensic and careful process. I can assure you—not least given the work that we have done to highlight what is happening in Sudan, our absolute condemnation of it on the international stage, including in the United Nations, and the work of the Foreign Secretary—that this is taken incredibly seriously for each criterion. We take the decisions appropriately and Chris has set out very clearly how we consider all the licences and how we have reviewed them all and rejected a number of them.
May I make a suggestion? When we had the debate that we had last year on the F-35 carve-out, we had a very useful exchange of correspondence that really helped us establish the decision-making criteria that the Government had used to construct a legal basis for continuing with F-35 exports. The point that Mr Maynard is raising—the challenge that we have—is how to square the full meaning of criterion 1 with a decision to continue allowing licences. It could be that we follow up in writing just to really crystallise the legal judgments and the balancing tests that you have undertaken in order to arrive at the decision that you have arrived at. Sir Chris, it could well be a joint piece of correspondence between you and Mr Doughty.
I am very happy to do that. I just want to add two bits to what Stephen said. The first is that when we decide to grant or refuse a licence, obviously there are aggrieved parties at either end of that decision. We have to make sure that we are fulfilling both the letter and spirit of the law, but most importantly obviously the letter. The threshold for strategic export licensing criteria 1, 2, 3 and 4 is quite high—a clear risk—whereas for criteria 5, 7 and 8 we have more discretion, in a sense, because it is things that we can take into account. As Mr Maynard has just referred to, criterion 6 is split into two halves. I am very happy to write about how all this applies to individual cases. We are cognisant of the fact that if we turn down a licence, the company might turn to us and say, “Well, hang on, we want to challenge that.” That is why we have to get it absolutely right.
It is a fair summary that we are struggling to see how you are squaring criteria 1 and 6 with a decision to continue with licences. It would be useful to try to understand that.
I get that, and we will be happy to write to you. It will be a joint letter between the three of us.
Sir Christopher, you have just helpfully set out the criteria that you operate under and what you described as discretionary criteria 5, 7 and 8. Why are they not mandatory? For example, surely criterion 5—the national security of the UK—ought to be a mandatory criterion.
It is the way the SELC was written. It was introduced in 2021, some time before I came into post. There is an advantage to keeping the criteria consistent, because that means that companies are able to know how they can operate with us and have a degree of predictability about what licences will and will not be granted. I presume you have a follow-up that is going to be more difficult.
I would just suggest that if you have a degree of discretion in some criteria, it is actually not going to be helpful for companies, because you may have inconsistent decisions. How do you establish whether using the discretionary criteria—
It is my fault; perhaps discretionary is the wrong word. What I simply mean is that the threshold under criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and half of criterion 6 is quite a high threshold. You have to have clear risk, and that is a fact-based decision. Under the others, we can take things into consideration. That is the only distinction that there is. As I say, when decisions come up—either to officials or me—we are using the criteria that exist.
Let us look at criterion 7, which is the risk of diversion. You have all said quite a lot this morning that it is a really important one. There have been over 400 refusals on that criterion. You can double-count in terms of reasons for refusal, so it may be refused on other grounds, but that is by far the largest ground for refusal. Does that give you any cause to think that you need to look at whether that should now be a mandatory issue, because that is clearly coming up as a pattern?
No. That point has not been made to me previously. I am happy to think about it, but I am content with where we are at. Obviously I want us to be able to decide as many of these as swiftly as we possibly can. That is not always easy, because we want to be able to do all the due diligence before we grant a licence to make sure that we think that there is not going to be diversion, and that can sometimes take quite a bit of time.
Can I just ask you about criterion 6? There have not been refusals for the previous few years, but one popped up in the report we received yesterday. Are you able to give us any more details on that particular refusal?
We would never comment on individuals. You knew I was going to say that.
Yes, but I thought I had better ask. Can I just ask a slightly broader question? There have been a number of high-profile convictions for export control breaches in the last few months. Is that indicative of greater activity, of greater awareness of enforcement or of more resources being put into it? Is this part of a wider pattern around the world? What is going on?
As you know, we came to the Committee in private earlier this year and had a bit of an open-heart session. Something that I have been concerned about is trying to make sure that we are able to name and shame instances, because it looks terrible if somebody basically gets fined and nothing more and nobody even knows what the instance was. As I said then, a problem with that is that quite often one of the HMRC-negotiated settlements with the individual company will be that it is being fined X hundred thousand pounds, or whatever it may be, and with a guarantee of anonymity. We have been trying to remove that. There is one particular licence, Petrofac Facilities Management Limited, which was the first that we were able to name for breaches of Russian sanctions in June. It paid a settlement of £569,000. This is a shift. We want to do this more. I would like to see more prosecutions. You could argue that if there are not many prosecutions, it is because we are actually doing a good job. The vast majority of people in this territory are frequent customers of ours and they do not want to get themselves into trouble, because then that is the future of their business down the drain.
Since 2022, there has only been one licence refusal under criterion 6, “The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community”. Is there any particular reason for that? Given what is going on in the world, that seems a strangely low number of refusals. It could be that you are able to can these applications more expeditiously using other criteria.
That is precisely it. There is also a higher threshold for criterion 6, and often the threshold is met using criterion 7, for example, which enables us to refuse the application.
If there is a case for reform that we might look into, looking at the thresholds under criterion 6 might be one area for us to focus on. Lord Coaker, can I ask about the export licensing review that was promised in the strategic defence review? Could you give us a sense of what the parameters might be and what progress is being made?
The SDR is a joint internal review between us and the DBT, as I am sure the Committee is aware. For clarity, the SDR and the work that has gone on do not include plans to review the strategic export licensing criteria; that is a separate piece of work that my colleagues have just been talking about, in answer to Mr Madders’s question. This particular review deals with internal processes, how things are done, how they could be done better, the collection of data, more transparency and all those things. For complete clarity, where we are at is putting together the terms of reference for that review. We are looking at that between our two Departments—let me get to the end of this, because it is good news for the Committee. The terms of reference will be something that we will talk to industry and interested parties about. We will be very keen to share the draft terms of reference with this Committee, for any comments that you may have, so that we get it right. It is in all our interests for this review to move in the direction that we would all want. I will make that commitment to the Committee. There is a draft at the moment and once we have the Committee’s view on the progress for that, we can start the review properly. It is basically an internal piece of work along the lines that I have mentioned.
Do you have a timeframe in your own mind for when you want to try to get this done?
The honest answer to that is that as far as I am aware there is not a timetable. It needs to happen as quickly as possible, given the significance of some conversations we have had in Committee this morning and some serious dilemmas, problems and issues that we are all dealing with here. As all three of us have said, our desire is to be as open and transparent as possible while recognising some difficulties that we face. I want the draft terms of reference done as soon as possible, and for that to be shared with this Committee so that it can have an input into it as well.
Is it your—
Is it worth—
I was just going to ask about AI and quantum, but please go ahead.
Do that, and then I will do open general licences.
Is it your view that it needs to include what is a very difficult set of issues now about how we are going to prevent diffusion of AI and quantum technology, which could be dual-use? Is that a question that is within the scope of this work?
That is a discussion to be had about what we include. The whole point of discussions about what the terms of reference should be is that we can decide among ourselves and discuss what should be included and what is perhaps not appropriate to be included. Clearly, if you are reviewing what the terms of reference should be about—licensing, trade, the collection of data—all that takes you into new territory in terms of the way data is being collected, the sharing of information, the ability to share information, the use of AI and all those things. That is something that we will have to consider.
Yes, this is not easy. Sir Chris, did you want to add something?
I was only going to say that something that we have already instituted is the open general export licence changes that were brought in in June. We have had a system of dual-use OGELs previously for EU members and a couple of others, and we have now extended that to some other countries where we reckon that there is a low risk. As well as Canada, the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Norway and Switzerland, it now includes South Korea, Singapore, Chile, our overseas territories and Uruguay. That is just trying to simplify the system, because everything we do is based on a risk assessment. Where the risk is low and we are dealing with allies, obviously that is a much simpler situation than in other countries. As you know, the other thing that we have introduced this year is an end-use control system for categories that do not fall under military or non-military and we have higher risk concerns.
Just for clarity, the dual use is not subject to Crown exemption, so we need to make sure that that forms a part of the discussions that we have.
Mr Bryant, you talked about and listed the new destinations. I wonder what undertakings those nations had to give to be treated as trusted partners.
We did not do it on that basis; we did it on the basis of our historic licensing decisions. Obviously we have a strong relationship with those, and this was tested with FCDO and MOD counterparts. It is a pretty obvious list, I would have thought.
Some countries are pretty obvious; others a little less so.
I do not know which country you are referring to as being less obvious.
I was just going to add to what the Minister said. In some cases there are very specific exclusions, but broadly this is all based on rigorous analysis of historic decision making.
How are the new arrangements going to be monitored with the new destinations?
That is a constant process that we engage in all the time. Incidentally, something I said in the Committee earlier when we were in private session—sorry, Mr Foord, you would not have been here—is that I have been concerned about the fact that we have lots of different systems. When we have lots of different systems, it makes it more difficult for us to provide swift and effective decision making because of our transfer from one computer system to another. I have been keen for us to narrow down rather than increase the number of different licensing systems that we have.
Finally, I have a separate question about controls on sharing academic research and technical knowledge. I wonder if there are any further plans to examine those controls.
What kind of thing are you thinking about?
Universities have a trusted research approach and there is a lot of self-regulation in the academic sector in this space. I know that there has been discussion in the past about how, if universities and research institutions do not regulate themselves, the state might choose to step in and regulate this space more.
Obviously we also have ATAS, which has been subject to a lot of scrutiny in other bits of this place. We are acutely aware of the risks of proliferation and sharing of knowledge to hostile states or parties that might engage in things that are in contravention of the SELC. Actually, Chair and Mr Foord, I would strongly welcome the views of the Committee and indeed others on emerging technologies, proliferation of knowledge and so on. I have to say that some of the most frightening risks that I see are related to new battlefield technologies, AI, quantum, developments in cyber and otherwise, and developments in space technologies. It is worth recognising that while in these discussions we focus quite often on the SELC, ATT and other related mechanisms, if I look at the work that we do around nuclear non-proliferation, the NPT, the missile technology control regime and the Zangger Committee, there is a whole list of other mechanisms that we are involved in shaping on a global level. Essentially, like everybody, we are trying to keep up with the rate of change in technologies and knowledge. Often we are looking at physical goods here, but often it is what is in people’s heads, minds and knowledge. That is a much bigger question for Government and for Departments on how we shape global norms, put strong regulation in place and ensure that the expertise and knowledge in this country does not end up in the hands of those who want to commit human rights atrocities or terrorism, or indeed undertake attacks against other countries.
Sir Chris, was that new OGEL something that was driven internally, or was it external demand for it that brought you there? I spoke to a company that is heavily involved in the AUKUS deal, and it reported quite big problems with people moving—not so much the knowledge, but the people themselves moving between the US, the UK and Australia. I just wonder whether this is a reaction to that and is likely to help that problem.
No, it is not specifically. If you have an open general licence, people do not have to apply for individual licences; we reckon that that will be about 500 fewer licences that we will have to deal with. That is just us being efficient and trying to base everything we do on a risk-based assessment. We have to be proportionate to the risk in the requirements that we place on businesses and, for that matter, on ourselves. I do not want to delay something unnecessarily just for the sake of having a system.
As there are no further questions, that draws this session to a conclusion. Thank you very much indeed, Ministers and officials, for the hard work that you are doing and for presenting to us with such clarity and candour this afternoon. We are very grateful that we have had at least two significant breakthroughs in our policy work together with you this morning. On behalf of the Committee, I want to say thank you for the way you have engaged with this Committee over the course of this Parliament. It has been a step change in the way we have been able to conduct scrutiny of arms control in this country and in this Parliament. We wish you very good luck in the days to come.
This is very valedictory! Morituri te salutant. Chair: That’s it.