Select Committee statement

We now come to the Select Committee statement on behalf of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee. Dame Chi Onwurah will speak for up to 10 minutes, during which time no interventions may be taken. At the conclusion of her statement, I will call Members to ask questions on the subject of the statement. These should be brief questions, not full speeches. I emphasise that questions should be directed to the Select Committee Chair, not the relevant Government Minister. Front Benchers may take part in questioning.

I am grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for allocating time for this statement from the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee on our report, “Science diplomacy: Sovereignty, strategy and the global race”. I am pleased to see members of the Committee in the Chamber. I want to put on record my thanks to the Committee Clerks and specialists who have supported this inquiry, as well as the many witnesses who gave evidence. I may have mentioned before that I am proud to be a chartered engineer with over 20 years of experience in industry, and for 16 years, I have been an engineer in the House, but as my friends, family and perhaps too many of my colleagues will attest, I am not a diplomat. In chairing this inquiry, I have learned much about the essential work of our diplomatic service and the international work of so many organisations and institutions, from the Royal Society to our armed forces. I thank them for their contribution. We found—the football analogy I am about to use was in the report even before England’s amazing win over Mexico—that the UK is in the premier league when it comes to scientific strengths and our global diplomatic network, but we do not know where we stand when it comes to science diplomacy. We launched our inquiry in April last year to examine how the UK Government should leverage scientific research and innovation to support its diplomatic goals, growth missions and national security. We held five public sessions and received over 50 written submissions. As the topic is so broad, we chose to look at the issues through three lenses: health and life sciences, quantum, and space. We also chose to focus on the UK Government’s strategy for science diplomacy, and its implications for sovereignty and research security, as part of the wider topic. First of all, we found that the UK has failed to adapt to the pace of geopolitics. The geopolitical landscape has been turned upside down in recent years. Alongside rapid technological advancement, this has made science diplomacy more important than ever. I will give three quick examples to illustrate this. First, the global talent fund was the UK’s attempt to capitalise on the US retreat from science funding, but as it does not address the huge up-front costs faced by researchers, it is unlikely to have the impact that the Government desired. As of June this year, just 18 researchers had been announced as taking up new roles through the fund. That is not going to move any dials. Secondly, while the Committee recognises that overseas development assistance spending has been reduced to allow the defence budget to be increased, our report highlights the short-sighted nature of some of the cuts that followed, and the impact on ODA for research and development. Thirdly, the UK-US pharmaceutical agreement has secured benefits—notably, exemptions from tariffs—but it also appears to have involved significant commitments affecting core elements of UK domestic policy. Although the global nature of the pharmaceuticals sector means that trade negotiations will inevitably have an impact on it, surely decisions about NHS spending, pricing and access to medicines should primarily be driven by the needs of UK patients, and balanced with the sustainability of the life sciences sector. Our second key finding was that there is a lack of overarching strategy. Witnesses consistently cited the strengths of the UK’s research base. Though we have less than 1% of the worldwide population, we have 6% of global publications and receive one 12th of global citations. We found that the Government have not articulated a coherent strategic framework for science diplomacy, despite those strengths. Such a framework should set out priority partners and technologies, and the intended outcomes of partnerships. For the six frontier technologies in the digital and technologies sector plan, and for space, the Government should bring forward detailed cross-governmental strategies, accompanied by clear delivery plans. The forthcoming plan for space provides an important opportunity to do that. The report also describes the Government’s approach to international scientific agreements and science diplomacy as “opportunistic”. Thirdly, we found that in a geopolitical landscape that, as I said, has been turned upside down, the UK is in a global race for sovereign capability, whether it acknowledges it or not. The US’s decision to ban foreigners’ access to Anthropic’s most powerful artificial intelligence models was a watershed moment that proved—to mix metaphors, perhaps—that there is actually a kill switch. The Government must reflect on this when considering our ambitions for secure sovereign capability. Although the own-collaborate-access framework provides a useful foundation for prioritising the UK’s approaches to critical technology, it is applied at too high a level to actually influence and guide decision making. There are so many definitions of “sovereignty” circulating. That impedes our ability to give our international stakeholders clear signals, and prevents businesses from getting the signals that they need to apply their resources—skills, investment, research and development—to the technologies that the Government will procure on a sovereign basis. The UK is highly successful at generating world-leading research and innovation, but less so in turning that strength into the growth of high-tech domestic companies. Too many UK-developed technologies are forced to look abroad to scale. The private sector needs clearer investment signals. Yesterday at the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee’s evidence session, the Secretary of State emphasised frontier models, computer chips and compute as parts of the AI tech stacks that she would like to have sovereign capability in. We need more clarity like that. To finish, we have four areas of recommendation. On global policy, our report calls on the Government to strengthen the UK’s international science and technology position through a clearer strategy, greater investment and improved resilience. On strategy, we call on the Government to publish a coherent science diplomacy strategy, with clear criteria for decisions on science partnerships, and with explicit strategies for engagement with the US and the EU, Commonwealth partners, other middle powers and competitors such as Russia and China. On sovereignty, the Government should define what “technological sovereignty” means when it comes to critical technologies and particularly AI, identify key dependencies in supply chains, and use that analysis to guide investment and procurement decisions. To support innovation, we recommend improving scale-up capital, expanding specialist investment funds and using public procurement more strategically to help UK technology firms grow. Finally, on research security, and with the recent Biobank leak in mind, our report calls for stronger research security guidance, improved information sharing between Government and institutions such as universities, and a cross-Government plan to develop a sustainable domestic skills pipeline in critical scientific and technological fields. The UK’s excellence in research and innovation is a distinct strategic advantage. To sustain it, we urge the Government to outline a science diplomacy strategy. Through such a strategy, we can ensure that science diplomacy remains a driver of progress, as well as a pillar of soft power.

I call the shadow Minister.

I start by thanking the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee and its entire membership for the publication of a very interesting and timely report. Business, academia and the whole tech sector needs clarity, in some ways more than anything else. Does the Chair share my concerns, which are stated quite well in the report, that “The government has repeatedly outlined that building sovereign capability is a ‘critical priority’ for the UK but has not been clear on exactly what this means or how it might be measured”? There are lots of different definitions of sovereignty being bandied around, which mean lots of different things in different contexts. Does the hon. Lady agree that we need some clarity on what exactly it means in this sector when we use the word “sovereignty”?

It is one of the thrusts of the report that we need greater clarity on sovereignty. This is not an academic debate—we do not need philosophical discussions on what sovereignty may or may not mean—but as the shadow Minister indicated, on tech stacks, particular technologies and their supply chains, we need to understand what we are trying to achieve, so that business, academia and Government, and particularly Government procurement, can move in that direction. It is interesting, because it was almost implicit that we did not want to say where we were looking for sovereignty, or where we did not have it, as that might alert our competitors to weaknesses. I think China and Russia probably know our weaknesses quite well, and it is our tech start-ups and our great businesses and scale-ups that need to better understand our intended strengths, so that they can support them.

I welcome this very interesting and timely report, and I particularly welcome the recognition that one of the barriers to developing or strengthening our sovereignty is the lack of access to deep capital markets at the later stages of start-ups’ development. Will the Chair tell the House a little bit more about what the Committee found on that, and how she thinks the Government can help make sure that companies that want to rapidly grow in the UK can get resource in the UK, rather than in the United States?

My hon. Friend highlights an important point in the report on investment and access to it, particularly for sovereign capabilities. That may be for what we call deep tech, which is tech that requires a long-term investment and that will not yield a return tomorrow, or even next year. We recommend supporting the setting up of funds that are dedicated to that, because it takes particular skills and particular access to investment vehicles to support that kind of long-term funding.

I thank my hon. Friend for the report, and for all the hard work her Committee has put into it. I was very interested in the section about space. Does she share my pleasure in the announcement today that the SaxaVord space station is likely to have a launch of a rocket within the next three weeks?

I think it is brilliant. SaxaVord got some investment from the UK Government.

In addition to acknowledging the investment from the UK Government, may I ask whether my hon. Friend’s Committee agrees with the recommendation of the Scottish Affairs Committee, which I chair, that we should have a Minister for space in Government? That is because we recognise the cross-cutting nature of many of the issues that face companies that want to be involved in space, and the very many jurisdictions with which they have to negotiate. I think of maritime agencies, as well as Government Departments, local jurisdictions and planning. It would be helpful to have an indication of her view.

I thank my hon. Friend and Select Committee Chair for that excellent question, and congratulate Scotland on the proposed launch. The Committee chose space as one of the lenses through which to look at science diplomacy and all the issues associated with it. Though we did not recommend a Minister for space per se, evidence to the Committee highlighted the confusion about where the responsibility for space lies. Space is increasingly important in defence, and it is an area in which we already see covert, and sometimes explicit, conflict. There is a huge defence programme to consider. It is economically incredibly important as well; we see the role of Starlink and other private sector providers in Ukraine in supporting communications, and the roll-out here. This issue is also important when it comes to negotiations on space debris and all sorts of matters, and it relates to planning permission and domestic issues as well. My hon. Friend is certainly right to advocate for greater clarity on the responsibilities for space.

I am proud to represent Shoreditch, which has a lot of tech start-ups, so I welcome my hon. Friend’s report. Following on from the question from, and answer to, my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South (Gordon McKee), will she expand on how we can get that money into tech businesses, so that they can grow and develop? A lot of my businesses find that the machinery of Whitehall is slow and clunky, and they can get better investment quicker from other jurisdictions and sources. What does my hon. Friend hope that the Government can do, in relation to setting up the new fund that her Committee proposes? Does she have any faith that the Government will be able to move at the pace needed for those tech companies to grow, and to stay in the UK?

I thank my hon. Friend and Chair of the Treasury Committee for her question. She highlights one of the principal concerns regarding technology-driven growth, which we reported on in our report “Flying blind: innovation, growth and the regions”: the access to capital, particularly for the kind of tech start-ups that we are discussing, which require long-term investment. One thing we should regret most is DeepMind going to the US to form Google’s excellent AI base, rather than remaining as a UK-owned company. How can we get better long-term investment? I recommend encouraging the growth of specialist funds with deep sectorial expertise. In achieving investment goals, we cannot get around the need to have technological knowledge and to attract international talent and technology leaders. The Government should also use their procurement of UK start-ups and scale-ups, because nothing is so valuable to a company as an actual contract signed with the Government, who are generally known to pay on time.

I am very happy to complete this hat trick of Scottish colleagues. I thank my hon. Friend for this excellent report, and I agree about the need to focus on science diplomacy, which is an opportunity for the UK; we should be much more ambitious about what we do. As a former member of a science and innovation network overseas, running a team that wonderfully created the UK’s first trilateral water research project in the middle east, I put on record the great work that our science teams are doing around the world. Will she say more about opportunities to increase or prioritise work between science, technology and innovation network staff in embassies?

I thank my hon. Friend for that question, because it gives me the opportunity to put on record how much the work of the SINs, which I now think are called the SATs, or something—

SAINTs, maybe.

Yes, the SINs and the SAINTs. The name may have changed, and there are concerns about the level of support they are receiving from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, but there was unanimous support for the work they did. There are countless examples of that support having enabled tech companies to invest in the UK, and UK tech companies to identify and address attractive markets across the world. The SINs, under whatever name, are a successful example of our science diplomacy network.