The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Dawn Butler, Sir John Hayes, Dr Rupa Huq, † Christine Jardine

† Berry, Siân (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)

Bishop, Matt (Forest of Dean) (Lab)

† Brown-Fuller, Jess (Chichester) (LD)

† Farnsworth, Linsey (Amber Valley) (Lab)

† Hack, Amanda (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)

† Hamilton, Paulette (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)

† Kohler, Mr Paul (Wimbledon) (LD)

† McIntyre, Alex (Gloucester) (Lab)

† Morgan, Stephen (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury)

† Mullan, Dr Kieran (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)

† Osborne, Tristan (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)

† Paul, Rebecca (Reigate) (Con)

† Qureshi, Yasmin (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

† Sackman, Sarah (Minister for Courts and Legal Services)

† Slinger, John (Rugby) (Lab)

† Ward, Melanie (Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy) (Lab)

Robert Cope, Dominic Stockbridge, Francis Morse, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 21 April 2026

(Afternoon)

[Dawn Butler in the Chair]

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Clause 3

Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation

Question (this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I remind the Committee that with this we are considering new clause 29—Review of impact of provisions of section 3— “(1) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament a report containing a review of the impact of the provisions of section 3 during each relevant period. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the relevant periods are— (a) before the end of 12 months, and (b) no sooner than 35 months but no later than 36 months beginning on the day on which section 3 of this Act is commenced. (3) Reviews under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of sections 74A to 74D of the Senior Courts Act 1981, as inserted by Section 3 of this Act, on persons who— (a) are from any ethnic minority background; (b) are White British and live in lower income households.”—(Paulette Hamilton.) This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to review, after one year and three years, the impact of the provisions of section 3 on people who are from ethnic minority backgrounds, and on White people from lower-income households.

My contribution will be brief, as other colleagues said a lot this morning. Clause 3 is extremely pragmatic and proportionate to the challenges we face. As Sir Brian Leveson made clear in his oral testimony, it is necessary because financial investment and efficiency measures alone, while essential—no one present disagrees with that—are insufficient to bring down the backlog. We all know that structural reform is critical if we are to see a meaningful reduction in the backlog. Clause 3 comes with context, because the backlogs have more than doubled since 2019. Despite some quarterly variations, which have been mentioned, we see that the backlog is increasing annually. On the current trajectory, we are now entering unparalleled territory, with real, material consequences for the victims of crime. This was all predicted and modelled in the previous Parliament, and it has since come to pass. The current trajectory is 130,000 cases by 2030, and 200,000 cases by 2035. While some may acknowledge that there are decisions that have led to this position, it requires the Government to step in and deal with the consequences. We need the policy in the Bill to meaningfully reduce caseloads, and we need it today. There is clear evidence from the testimony of many of the witnesses that cases are sometimes taking 80% longer compared with 2019, due to their complexity and the evidence and digital analysis that is required in many cases. Currently, 21,000 cases have been open for a year or longer. Again, that is the current trend and trajectory. Inequity is undermining confidence in our justice system. I say this as a former police officer: it is not just the victim who suffers, although they absolutely do need justice for the crime committed against them; defendants, some of whom may be innocent, are also having to await outcomes. The police and agencies, while not necessarily being responsive because of their independent nature, have to manage the victim. I know from testimony given directly to me by police that court waiting times and having to manage victims over many years have direct consequences for cases. There are no winners when it comes to inaction. Today, more than 90% of cases are dealt with by magistrate benches, and in some cases that is with multiple magistrates. The evidence pack indicates that only 3% of criminal cases go to jury trial. Even if the reform takes place, the majority of cases will still be dealt with in the same way as previously. Only 1% of cases will be heard by the new division. Despite the claim that there will be substantial changes for the majority of cases, only a very small number will be affected. The Bill is not about the abolition of jury trials; it is about changing the thresholds at which they are implemented.

I think the evidence is that 3% of trials currently have a jury, and that will go down to 1.5%. That is a 50% reduction. Does the hon. Member not agree that that is a huge reduction in the number of jury trials from the present number?

We are absolutely seeking to reduce the number of cases going before jury trials. It comes back to the thresholds. We have seen a long history of changes to thresholds, as well as changes to those serving on juries. In the early part of the 20th century, women were allowed to sit on juries for the first time, and it was only in the mid part of the last century that we allowed people who did not own property to sit on juries. There has, then, been an evolution in both the composition of the jury and the thresholds that are applied. For example, in 1977 Callaghan changed the law so that some cases—including of theft, burglary and criminal damage offences—could be dealt with in magistrates courts, and many of the debates we are having today happened at that time as well.

The hon. Member for Wimbledon pointed out that we are talking about a 50% reduction; can the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford tell us the percentage reduction in relation to the points he is making?

I do not have the answer for the Callaghan reduction, but my point about the thresholds is that previous Governments of both colours have looked at thresholds, had conversations similar to those we are having today, and concluded that it was a sensible and necessary step—both under Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher. Sir Brian Leveson, who was independently commissioned, indicated that “there are certain circumstances where a trial by judge alone is appropriate…based on the need for cases to be resolved in a more timely manner, in a forum most proportionate and suitable to the alleged offence or offences.” My argument is that the threshold that Sir Brian Leveson defined is the one that I agree with.

The threshold that Sir Brian recommended was two years, not three years, and the forum that he recommended was a judge with two magistrates, but we are doing just one judge. The hon. Member should be more careful in making claims about what Sir Brian recommended to support what he is saying, because we are not doing what he recommended.

The point is that the premise of his inclination was that it is appropriate for thresholds to be changed. Although there will absolutely be principled disagreement between different advocates about where that threshold will be and the appropriateness of who will oversee those cases, be that a bench or a single judge, the reality is that there is consensus, I hope, that thresholds have changed through time. The thresholds in the Bill are a proportionate response to the overwhelming challenge of a court backlog that we inherited from the previous Government. In my view, clause 3 allocates mid-level cases effectively and ensures that demand in Crown courts is reduced. We know the consequences if we do not do this. To the critics saying this is not fair, the reality is that our constitution says that everyone is entitled to a fair trial, and I believe that everyone in our courts system, be that the 90% who are engaged with magistrates courts, or those who go to Crown court, is dealt with fairly. As has been mentioned, I do not want to create an artificial divide between cases that are heard in one or the other; both are deemed fair, and we believe that people sentenced in magistrates courts are given a fair trial. The thresholds in the clause are fair and reasonable, and we have to consider this as a wider package of reforms along with the digitalisation of the court system, the modernisation of the estate and improvements to transport and infrastructure, all of which play a part. Fundamentally, it goes back to my central point that those things alone will not bring about the reduction in backlogs that we all want to see.

I will not speak at length—much to the delight, I am sure, of Government Members—but I want to pick up on a few key points that have been raised. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Reigate and for Isle of Wight East for their extensive review of clause 3, and also the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who is not in her place. Let us be clear about all the things we have highlighted that are lacking. We are talking about a significant erosion for 50% of those who currently enjoy jury trial, and we have made it clear that the evidence for the necessity of that is lacking. In earlier sittings, we talked about the backlog already falling in a number of regions, even though we are so early on in the process of trying to tackle this issue. Today alone, 11% of Crown courts are not sitting—they are sat empty—and it was the same yesterday and it was even higher last week, so there are clearly other things we could be doing. There has been criticism of the retrospective element of the measures in clause 3, which the Opposition, at least, have agreed is unacceptable. Different standards will be applied because we have not been able to amend the measures on reallocation, so there is a different standard for allocation and reallocation. That is doubled with the lack of appeal, on which we were not able to make progress. We have covered the lack of community confidence that will arise from these measures. The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington has tabled new clause 29, which we think is sensible, to try to go at least some way to addressing the issue of community confidence. However, I am not convinced that, even if the Government accept the new clause, we will get any change as a result. Let us say we do the review in a year from now and it finds there has been a deterioration in these issues, will they unpick their reforms? I am not confident that they will. We have had suggestions that the cross-examination of the defendant is inappropriate. Of course, the reforms will lead to more defendants being cross-examined, unrepresented, in the magistrates court. We have had a suggestion that the changes are not substantial. I made it clear in my intervention that, under any sensible reading of the facts, most people would consider a 50% change to be substantial. We have laid out, in a clear and detailed way, all the different ways in which clause 3 is wrong and fails on its own merits. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and make some necessary changes.

A number of the points just made were covered in earlier debates. I do not intend to rehearse the Government’s case for why the reforms we are introducing, based on the recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts, are needed, but we think that they are. The central insight of the independent review was that, absent structural reforms, we simply will not get the shameful delays under control. The three-year threshold that we picked is highlighted in the IRCC recommendation 30, with a three-year sentence being the appropriate basis for allocation to a judge-alone trial.

Will the Minister give way?

I refer the hon. Gentleman to pages 243 and 245 of the independent review. If we want to come back on the detail, we can, but I am going to make progress. I have dealt with retrospectivity. I want to spend a bit of time on new clause 29, which my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington spoke powerfully about. She is absolutely right to highlight the disparities in outcomes across our criminal justice system. This is not something new. The problem was not created by our reforms, but it is something that we seek to transform in the transformation of our courts. We know that, for too long, there have been lower levels of trust and confidence among many minoritised communities. I am keenly aware that those groups experience disproportionality in our criminal justice system. That comes across not just in our courts but in remand decisions, sentencing outcomes and the fact that people who are black or of mixed ethnicity are statistically more likely to be a victim of crime than people who are white. I welcome the new clause and the intent behind it, as laid out by my hon. Friend. As I said on the first day in Committee, the Deputy Prime Minister committed to an independent review to properly monitor the impacts of not just judge-only trials but all the court reform measures in the Bill on precisely the communities that my hon. Friend is concerned about. I welcome the opportunity we have had to debate the scope of the review. What I will take away is the fact that some deep thinking needs to be done about having good baseline data, about the scope of the review and whether it could perhaps go even further than what is proposed in new clause 29, about timing to make sure that the datasets can tell us something meaningful about the impacts of the reforms, and about the appropriate feedback mechanism so that Parliament, and future Parliaments, can consider the disproportionality that exists within our system. It will be important to benchmark the impacts of reforms against the current system. The Ministry of Justice already publishes extensive operational metrics, including on case timeliness, conviction rates and sentencing outcomes, and they provide the insight that we have been debating into the performance of criminal courts today. We have to ensure that we are looking at the right things. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and I have been discussing an important point. It is about ensuring not just that justice is done, but that it is seen to be done and people can have confidence in the system.

One of the core messages of the Secretary of State for Justice’s review, colloquially known as the Lammy review, was that openness, transparency and accountability are the best antidotes to bias. He said:

“The best way to ensure fair, equal treatment is to subject decision-making to scrutiny”.

That is what we are doing here. Bringing decisions out into the open achieves two things at once: first, it encourages individuals to check their own biases, and secondly, it helps to identify and correct them. In practice, that can mean different things in different settings, from publishing more data to allowing outside scrutiny and governance arrangements that hold individuals to account within organisations.

Since the Secretary of State’s words were written, progress has been achieved. The criminal justice datasets include the equalities data published by His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Judicial Appointments Commission, and all that rightly shines a light on the disparities that exist within our system. We attempt in this legislation to provide transparency and accountability, whether through the recording of magistrates proceedings or the efforts to make transcriptions available—our feet are being held to the fire on that by Members across the House, but it is important—and transparency and accountability are core principles that run through the Bill. There is also the giving of reasons when a judge takes the decision. It is so important that they justify the conclusions they reach so that the justification can be scrutinised. Of course, there is also the review clause that we will look to introduce at a future stage.

As I alluded to, it seems like the Government are convinced of the need for a review clause. If the review is undertaken and it finds that the reduction in jury trials has led to greater disparities in the justice system, will the Government commit to reversing the measures?

An important point was discussed in earlier exchanges with the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. While I absolutely accept that marginalised communities experience lower confidence in the criminal justice system, the current data, certainly as regards triable either-way offences and conviction rates—both for men and women, and for black, Asian, mixed race or white individuals—shows that those disparities do not actually exist based on the conviction rate data. All that is set out, and Members can find that on page 51 of the equality impact assessment. We do, though, need to get a really good sense of the baseline. If the review shows a deterioration of the position, and if the cause of that deterioration is found to be the measures themselves, then of course future decision makers, policy makers and Parliaments will want to respond and mitigate the effects. That is not to be understood as my saying we are going to rip up the Bill, because we believe that what is in the Bill is fair, and guarantees fairness at every level of the criminal justice system. But we want data and information precisely so that if disparities are exposed by the review, and if there is a worsening position, then whether it is me or someone else lucky enough to fulfil this role, someone will no doubt respond. That is exactly the point. To my mind, this is an opportunity not just to understand and monitor the impacts of the Bill, but to develop a better understanding of outcomes across the criminal justice system, and how we improve them. Given our commitment to undertake a review of the wider reforms, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington not to press the new clause to a vote. I want to pick up a couple of other points, which we may pick up later. We discussed at some length the application of the law as it stands to the existing caseload and the allocations decision. During Thursday’s Committee, the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle raised questions with me about three-strike offences. In order not to take up further Committee time, I will write to the hon. Member to address those point, and I am happy to make that correspondence available to the Committee and the wider public. However, I can confirm that clause 3 does not alter the existing statutory framework for those offences. In a similar vein, we had an exchange about situations where allocations are not amenable to judicial review, and we discussed the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. I intend—not least because we have also had correspondence from the Bar Council in relation to this issue—to write separately in relation to those questions. I will ask the Chair to publish that letter on the public register of written evidence, so that all Members can clearly see the Government’s understanding of the position.

The Minister can probably anticipate what I am going to say: this situation is highly unsatisfactory, considering that we will again be asked to vote—not have a view or give an opinion, but be asked to vote—on the system of allocation and reallocation in relation to complex and lengthy trials. Members may have seen the evidence provided by the Bar Council, which makes absolutely clear its view that the Minister was wrong in her assessment that the decision to allocate will be subject to judicial review. That was my view, the view of the Bar Council and the view of the hon. Member for Wimbledon, with his expertise. It is not satisfactory to be told we will vote again later today not knowing what the Government’s clear position is. What the Minister said is now surely under very significant doubt, given what the Bar Council has told us. The Minister should have been able to come here today—rather than writing to us later—to give us the facts. We have had a big gap between Thursday and today, and we should not be left in the position of being asked to vote without the full facts.

I was about to get to the essential position, which is that what I said on Thursday is twofold. What we were debating was in the context of whether there was an appeal route in relation to the mode of trial decision—the allocation decision. I have been absolutely clear that nowhere in this Bill is there any specific route to appeal, and I have never sought to suggest otherwise. Taking a step further, the law points against there being a jurisdictional power for judicial review on an allocation decision. Where the Bar Council’s letter discusses the availability of judicial review, it sets out that section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act significantly limits the circumstances in which judicial review will be available for decisions affecting the conduct of a Crown court trial. That is the point that is raised in its letter, and to which I will provide a line-by-line response, but the Government essentially agree with that position. As I have said in Committee—if any of this was not clear, let me be clear about it now—there is a very high bar. There might be exceptional circumstances, which might well be tested when this legislation, if it comes forward, comes into force. For example, if a Crown court judge clearly acts outside the parameters of the legislation by allocating a case that is clearly excluded under these provisions from being judge-only—because it is, say, complex and lengthy or indictable-only—that may fall outside of this rule, but it is certainly going to be only an exceptional case. The best thing for me to do is write, so that Members can see what those reasons are and see what the Government’s position is. Essentially, we think that what is set out in the Bar Council’s letter as regards the availability of judicial review—there is no appeal route, and I have never suggested otherwise—correctly states the law.

Just so the Committee is clear exactly what I said and what the Minister said in return, it was in response to an intervention from the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington, who asked what it would take to get me to accept the Government’s position. I said: “If the Minister wants to intervene on me and say, ‘I am absolutely certain that there would be a right to judicially review the allocation decision by a Crown court,’ I will be satisfied. I am asking for the Minister to stand up and say that she is absolutely certain.” The Minister replied: “If, at a PTPH, a judge makes an error of law, that is amenable to judicial review. Full stop.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 16 April 2026; c. 271.] That is completely different from what the Minister has just said now, where she is making it very clear that this will be extremely in its provisions. The appropriate thing to do is not to vote on amendments and clauses of this Bill when we are not clear on the position. It is open to the Minister to defer and to seek to reallocate the proposals before us today, instead of again asking us to vote when she is telling us that she will send us a further letter with a full, detailed explanation of the position. That is not the way we should be doing things on a matter as important as whether we will remove an expansive existing right to judicially review an allocation decision that sits with the magistrates court.

As regards the last point, Ms Butler, I am ultimately in your hands as to how you want to deal with it. I have said how I am going to deal with it, and what I consider the position to be vis-à-vis the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the availability, or lack thereof, of a judicial review route. There is no appeal route. An allocation decision in this context is final, and deliberately so, because we want to speed up the system. There are other appeal routes when one gets to questions of verdict. I have said that I will set that out. I do not want to rush Members or not provide them with the full information, and I am seeking to be as transparent as I can be. As I said, we will write to the Committee, so that everyone can have the full information. I do not think the issue radically changes the substance of our debate, but given the position the shadow Minister has taken, I will not force the point. I would rather that we ventilate the issues fully, Members get the letter and we then vote accordingly. Ultimately, I have made it clear that there is no specific appeal right or route to challenge the mode of trial allocation. There are, however, a number of safeguards, including a judge hearing from both parties and giving reasons for the decision. Those all safeguard the allocation process, but if there is any lack of clarity that I have contributed to, albeit inadvertently, in relation to how JR interacts with the Senior Courts Act, let me set the information out, and Members can have it before we proceed.

On a point of order, Ms Butler. I am being reasonable. On the matters on which the Minister said she would write to us—the three offences and whether there will be amendment in that respect— I have accepted a letter. However, it is not appropriate to ask us to vote when we are unclear about the implications of these changes. We have already had to do that once, and it is not appropriate to ask us to do it again. We can debate the clauses, which relate to the potential loss of an important right, but we do not necessarily have to vote on them. I have never said there was a right of appeal; I have never described it as a right of appeal. I have said that there is a right to judicial review of an allocation decision. It is not right that we proceed without knowing the full implications of that being taken away through the Bill.

It is up to the Minister how we proceed. We could suspend the sitting—[Interruption.] We are going to suspend the sitting and sit in private.

Sitting suspended.

On resuming—

We continue with the Question that clause 3 stand part of the Bill.

I beg to move, That the debate be now adjourned. We have had some discussion in private, and I think it will be helpful, while not revealing what was said in private, to illustrate the Opposition’s thinking on the matter. As I explained during our previous sitting on Thursday—there has been a significant length of time since—I was of the understanding that moving the allocation decision away from the magistrates court to the Crown court would lead to a substantial reduction in access to judicial review of allocation decisions. This is not about appeal—we argued separately for appeal. Rather, the point of contention is about the right to judicial review. In that debate, the Minister, I am sure inadvertently, potentially misled the Committee by suggesting that that was not true, and I was called patronising by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy, the Parliamentary Private Secretary sitting behind her, when I suggested that that was the case. The Bar Council has submitted evidence to the Committee that supports my argument that there would be a substantial change in access to judicial review. That is directly relevant, not just to clause 3, which we are being asked to vote on, but to the next clause. The Minister accepts that she needs to write to us with further clarity on this issue, so she is conceding that it is not clear, but we are still being asked, by the Government Whip and the Minister, to vote on this measure. That is highly unsatisfactory. I want us to vote with a shared understanding of what the implications are. If the Minister agreed that there would be a significant reduction in access to the right to judicial review, we would have that shared understanding, but I do not believe that she is willing to concede that point. On the basis that it is unclear what we are voting on, I am afraid that it is simply not appropriate for us to be asked to vote on clause 3. That was not my intention; I was of the understanding—I accept incorrectly—as I think the Minister also was, that we could shelve the vote and continue the debate, so that progress on the Bill was not curtailed. However, the Clerks have advised us that we cannot shelve the vote, so if this is the only available option to prevent us from voting without the full facts, I think it is appropriate that we adjourn the debate until such time as we get them. To reiterate, this was not my intention; I had expected that we would continue the debate and then have an option—[Interruption.] Does the PPS want to say something? No. On that basis, I think that we should adjourn.

I oppose the Adjournment because I want us to make progress. Everyone is here to continue the important work of line-by-line scrutiny. I do not think that anything that I have said, to assist the Committee and Members across the House, should undermine that approach, so we should proceed.

I think we all agree now, do we not, that allocation decisions are not, on the whole, subject to judicial review if they are in the Crown court. If the Minister conceded that point, we could move on. Why does she not just concede that point?

I think we are maybe dancing on the head of a pin. Whether it is a concession or not, I accept that there is no right of appeal of the allocation decision. I also accept that there is no obvious route to judicial review, because of the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act. If I might say so, the hon. Member and I are agreeing. Whether he or the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle wants to categorise that as a concession, as a reduction of rights, that is a matter for them; but we are agreeing as to the legal position. What I wanted to do was set that out formally in writing, in response to that and to the various other questions that the Bar Council asked in their letter, because I thought that would be useful. However, we are in agreement, and I think that is why we can proceed to a vote, because we have a shared understanding of the law.

I intended to intervene on the Minister to ask a question, but I am happy to pose it by way of a speech. She has indicated—in fact, she stated very clearly—that she wants to formally clarify in writing, but she is declining to formally clarify orally. Does she not accept that if we proceed to a vote on clause 3, she is at risk of inadvertently misleading this Committee if she cannot clarify what she says she wants to clarify in writing before we vote?

I think I did clarify; I do not think I have anything more to say. I clarified it in answer to the hon. Member for Wimbledon. I am not going to say anything more; I think we should go to a vote.

To my mind, that would appear to be a clarification.

I think the Minister is accepting that there is no obvious route to judicial review, which is completely contrary to what she said to us on Thursday. I think anyone would interpret that as a significant reduction in rights compared with the existing status quo, so with that clarification from the Minister, I am happy to continue. Question put and negatived. Question put, That clause 3 stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases

I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 4, page 10, line 16, leave out “one or more of the offences is an offence” and insert “all of the offences are”. This amendment would limit judge-only trials to situations where all of the offences are listed in Schedule 3ZA. Clause 4 relates to the allocation to the Crown court bench division of complex or lengthy cases. The amendment relates to how the mixture of cases presented on an indictment would affect the allocation decision. It addresses a clear overreach and would limit judge-only trials to situations where all the offences of which someone was accused are listed in new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As it stands, a case may be directed to be judge-only where only one of the offences on the indictment falls within the schedule list, with only very limited exceptions in relation to murder and related offences, and sexual assault and related offences. It is important for Members to realise just how potentially expansive new schedule 3ZA is. If just one of these offences appears on someone’s list of charges, they will lose their access to a jury trial. They include conspiracy to defraud, cheating the public revenue, offences under the Taxes Management Act 1970, offences of false accounting under the Theft Act 1968, insider dealing, money laundering and bribery—a whole range of offences whereby, just one of which will remove access to a jury trial. Someone could be accused at the same time of offences as serious as serious physical assault, grievous bodily harm, burglary or theft. Those offences may be many years apart; there may be a series of offences, dating over a number of years. That means that someone may lose a right that the Government otherwise accept they should have access to. Someone could have a serious offence of theft, with a likely sentence that, as we know, can be over the three-year benchmark. They could be facing a sentence of four years, which the Government otherwise agree should allow them to have a trial with a jury, and they will lose access to a trial by jury in relation to one of the other offences. The test is not about the seriousness of the offences; it is a test of complexity. Someone may have a less serious but complex case, in the Government’s view, and lose access to a right to jury trial. I cannot see how the Government can possibly argue that that is fair. This is a matter of coherence and fairness. Our position is quite clear: only when all the offences, instead of just one of the offences, are those listed under proposed new schedule 3ZA should someone lose access to their right to a trial by jury on the basis of clause 4.

I thank the hon. Member for his amendment, which would require cases to be eligible for an order under proposed new section 42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 only where all offences listed are schedule offences. We consider that such a method would be overly rigid and would limit the application of clause 4. In reality, most complex and lengthy cases involving fraud and financial crime often prosecute a mix of principal and ancillary offences, some of which would not appear on the schedule of eligible offences. For example, sometimes theft offences, which are not included in the schedule, are prosecuted alongside fraud or money laundering crimes. Imagine a large-scale conspiracy to defraud and false accounting, perhaps involving multiple offenders operating through a network of shell companies. The prosecution case relies on hundred, perhaps thousands, of pages of electronic banking records, company accounts, internal emails, encrypted messaging data, and expert accounting evidence that traces the movement of funds through dozens of linked corporate entities across multiple jurisdictions. This is in every sense a highly technical and inherently complex case, which is likely to last several months. But there are counts of theft-adjacent offences of, say, handling stolen goods on the indictment. Those counts are not incidental: they are related to the fraud. They provide the fact finder with a holistic picture of the alleged offending. The judge considers the counts to be clearly related and properly joined for trial. If clause 4 were constrained in the way proposed by the amendment, that plainly suitable case—long and exceptionally complex—would be excluded even from consideration for judge-only trial, because those additional connected counts are not listed in the schedule. Requiring every offence to fall within the schedule would exclude cases that meet the policy intent of clause 4, thereby preventing the court from applying the provision precisely where it is most needed, solely because of the presence of additional non-schedule counts.

As I mentioned, the Government have chosen to exclude all sexual offences. If that is the logic that the Government seek to apply, why have they chosen to not apply it to an adjoined offence that is a sexual offence?

The Government have deliberately drafted clause 4 in a manner that focuses on the overall nature of the case, rather than applying an artificial count-by-count test. The necessary question that we are asking the court to apply is whether, taken as whole, it justifies an order for a judge-only trial, given the policy intent that lies behind clause 4, not whether every individual count meets a particular threshold. Such an approach also risks incentivising artificial charging decisions or indictment charges to determine the eligibility for mode-of-trial decisions, rather than focusing on the effective management and efficient conduct of the trial.

The Minister mentions charging decisions. As it stands, the amendment would suggest absolutely nonsensical charging decisions. Prosecuting somebody for all the offences listed in part 1 of schedule 3ZA would fly in the face of common sense and go against the code for Crown prosecutors, which makes it clear that prosecutors should select charges to “reflect the seriousness and extent of the offending…give the court adequate powers to sentence” and “enable the case to be presented in a clear and simple way.” Does the Minister agree that if all the charges listed in the schedule had to be included in a case, that would be completely contrary to the prosecutor’s obligation?

My hon. Friend is right. Flexibility is not a weaking of the safeguards; it is what actually allows the statutory test in clause 4 to operate properly and in appropriate scenarios. Judges will already be required to consider the technicality and length of the case when making an order as to whether to allocate to a judge-only trial. Cases including indictable-only homicide and sexual offences are excluded from the outset because we regard those as cases where a jury trial is in the public interest. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

I want to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Amber Valley. She has engaged sincerely throughout this debate, so I do not think her comment was a deliberate. We are not saying that someone has to be charged with everything to be eligible; we are saying that anything that they are charged for on that basis that excludes them from a jury trial should only be those offences. We are saying that if someone is charged for insider dealing and the judge decides that the case is complex or lengthy, under the legislation they will get a single-judge trial. The proposed legislation says that if they were also charged with grievous bodily harm, then that case, which would ordinarily continue to have a jury trial, would be seen without a jury. That would mean that just because someone happens to be charged with one of those offences alongside another one, they lose their access to a jury trial on both offences.

The point that the shadow Minister is making is that the clause is a substantial expansion of what we understand the legislation to be doing in terms of a judge-only trial. Somebody could be charged with 10 offences. One of those could be related to a lengthy fraud case, but the rest of the offences would mean that they would still get a judge-only trial, which is a significant expansion of what we believe this Bill is trying to do.

Absolutely, and there is not even anything in the Bill about proportionality. There is nothing. If someone is charged with one of the offences and the trial will be complex and lengthy—which is different to it being serious—that is it. Whatever else someone is charged with, they have already lost their right to a jury trial. That is a huge expansion. I intervened to ask the Minister to explain why they have chosen to exclude sexual assaults. If someone is charged with GBH, then they lose their right to a jury trial, but if they are charged with a sexual assault, which in the sentencing guidelines may lead to them having an even lower sentence than a serious GBH, they will continue to have a jury trial, and a fraud offence would continue to be seen by a jury instead of a judge. It is completely contradictory. There is no logic behind the Government’s position. If they had a throughline as to why sexual assault, which is an absolutely terrible offence, is being set to one side, but something as serious as GBH, which can carry a sentence of many years and is also terrible for victims, then there would be more logic to it. But the Government have crafted an approach that is simply unfair and, as the Lib Dem spokeswoman pointed out, represents a massive expansion in all the different types of offences and sentence lengths that could potentially lose access to a jury trial, just because they also happen to be charged with an ancillary offence related to complex fraud. I am afraid there is no rational basis to that at all.

In the last couple of weeks, there have been press reports about a particular case that was charged in 2019. I will not go into that because it is going to reopen, but clause 4 would mean, for example, that somebody who has been abusing and defrauding the elderly—perhaps many different elderly people—over many years and has caused significant harm not of a sexual nature, and who is therefore charged with multiple offences, gets a judge-only trial and is not tried by a jury. If there was a sexual offence, they would get a jury, but if they had been harming multiple people and defrauding them, they would be tried by a judge alone. Does he agree that that feels quite perverse?

It is another example of what we have talked about: the move away from what we would consider to be natural justice. The scenario the hon. Member points to is not bizarre; there are offenders who target elderly women, for example, and will use all sorts of different methods to abuse them, from financial to sexual. I have seen cases of that nature. We see people who, at the same time as physically and sexually abusing a family member, were taking money from their bank account and falsely representing them to claim benefits, which again would be covered by the clause. It covers a whole range of offences, in all sorts of patterns. The Government call our amendment too rigid when, actually, the rigidity is quite clearly in the charging and allocation decisions; it is all on the Government’s side. They are being entirely rigid. If someone is subject to one of these cases and the judge thinks it is complex or lengthy, they will lose the right to a jury trial, end of story. I do not think that is a position that the Minister should feel comfortable advocating, and it is why we intend to press our amendment. Question put, That the amendment be made.

Amendment 61 stands in the name of the hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Hussain), who is not a member of the Committee. Does anyone wish to speak to amendment 61? As nobody wishes to move the amendment, we come to amendment 29 in the name of Yasmin Qureshi, with which it will be convenient to debate amendment 46.

Could I have a little guidance, Ms Butler? Amendment 29 goes hand in hand with amendments 30 to 33. Can I cover those all in one go, instead of repeating the same speech in support of each amendment?

If the Committee is happy to debate amendments 30 to 33 then we can do that now, but they will be voted on later on, when we come to them in the Bill.

I understand that. It will just save me repeating the same thing again and again in support of each of the amendments, all of which concern clause 4. I thank the Committee for enabling me to deal with them in one go. I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert— “(d) the length of the trial is agreed by the defence and prosecution to be likely to exceed 5 months.”

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 46, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert— “(3A) A court may not make an order under this section if it considers that it is the interests of natural justice for the defendant to have a trial with a jury.” This amendment prevents a judge-only trial in complex and lengthy cases where it would be in the interests of natural justice for the defendant to be tried with a jury. Amendment 30, in clause 4, page 11, line 1, leave out “no” and insert “a”. Amendment 31, in clause 4, page 11, line 38, at end insert— “(k) an offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving under section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988; (n) health and safety offences resulting in a fatality or offences connected to a fatality; and (o) offences under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 where there has been a fatality.” Amendment 32, in clause 4, page 11, line 41, at end insert— “(c) any offence resulting in a person becoming subject to a notification requirement under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.” Amendment 33, in clause 4, page 12, line 9, at end insert— “(e) an offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving under section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988; (f) an offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving under section 2C of the Road Traffic Act 1988;”.

Amendment 29 would insert into subsection (3) an additional ground for a lengthy or complex case to be tried without a jury in England or Wales, to require agreement by the defence and the prosecution that the trial is likely to exceed five months. Amendment 30 is almost self-explanatory: it would provide a right of appeal against a judge’s decision to prevent a case from going to a jury trial. We seek to give a right of appeal to the defence—and the prosecution—if the judge decides that the case fits the category of a complex case such as a fraud case. Amendments 31 to 33 would add additional offences to the list of offences that will be excluded from the provisions of clause 4. Offences such as homicide, including under road traffic legislation, will be excluded, and amendments 31 to 33 would extend that list. I want to speak both to clause 4 and to clause 5, which, as I understand it, will enable clause 4. Unlike the provisions in clauses 1 to 3, clauses 4 and 5 at least provide that the defence and the prosecution may make representations before a judge directs a trial without a jury. I acknowledge that that is a meaningful procedural difference, but the principle remains deeply troubling, and I want to explain why. It is a further restriction on the right to trial by jury; more cases could be caught by this provision, which means that people will not be able to have a trial by jury. The central argument for clauses 4 and 5 is that certain cases—fraud cases, multi-handed cases or those involving extensive financial or digital evidence—are simply too complex or long for a jury to follow. I have to say directly that I find that argument unfair to ordinary members of the public. Trial by jury is not simply a procedural mechanism; it is a fundamental expression of the relationship between the citizen and the state. It says that, when the state seeks to deprive a person of their liberty, that judgment will not be made by the state alone but by 12 of that person’s fellow citizens. That is important, because it is embedded in our legal tradition. Let me speak from direct experience: in my years of criminal practice, I never once saw a jury that looked confused, overwhelmed or unable to follow the case before them. One of the last cases I conducted at the Bar was a seven-handed trial at the central criminal court. It went on for a number of weeks and involved serious allegations, multiple defendants, CCTV evidence and complex factual issues. Some of the defendants were charged with murder and manslaughter, there were issues such as joinder—agreement by different groups of people about whether they were committing crimes or not—and all sorts of legal directives had to be given. As it happened, the jury followed the evidence, assessed it and reached its verdicts. That has been my experience across many cases, including complex fraud, multi-defendant drug conspiracies and cases involving technical or sensitive evidence. One of the jobs I had as a prosecutor was as a specialist casework lawyer for London CPS, which meant dealing with some of the most complex cases. When I was in the CPS, I also worked on proceeds of crime cases. In fact, I was what they call a POCA—Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—specialist for my branch. We were looking at financial auditing and asset recovery, deciding what kind of charges to go by, dealing with the issues of undercover operations, surveillance evidence, what we call the RIPA—Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 —rules, and cases involving public officials. Across all of that experience, the issue was never whether the jury could follow the evidence; the issue was whether the case was properly presented. Given the way trials work, what a prosecutor presents to a jury is exactly what they would present to a judge. They explain the evidence, they connect the facts and the dots, and they build a case. The process does not change, but the audience does. If the evidence is presented clearly, a jury can follow it. If it is not, that is a failure of advocacy, not a failure of the jury, and the judge will get as confused as anybody else. For example, if a prosecutor is trying to prove certain things, they will say, “If you look at exhibit 25 on page 1,000 of the jury bundle, you will see that this phone belongs to the defendant,” and create a link. Then they will say that another page shows the evidence extracted from the phone and explain how that is linked. They would do that for a judge as well, because judges want the prosecution to explain things to them, too. They must do that and follow the continuity of the evidence. At the end of the day, whether the case involves insider dealing or financial accounting, people can see if the information is presented to them properly. The prosecutor might show them a document that says there was x amount of money in one account, but it went missing and has now been found in another person’s account. It is about making sure that all the dots are connected, and they would have to do that with a judge as well. The judge will not just flick through the papers and say, “Ms Prosecutor, you can just sit down and I’ll go through it.” The prosecutor, through their witnesses or their physical evidence or their section 9 statements or section 10 admissions, will have to prove each and every aspect of the case and the role each defendant played in it. Although a number of people may be charged with one offence, we know that under our criminal law the sentence they can get if convicted varies depending on the role they played in the crime. Issues include who counselled it, procured it, aided and abetted it—who played what role—and people will be sentenced accordingly. Again, that is a matter on which a prosecutor or defence counsel would show everyone evidence and say, “This is what happened.” Therefore, it really makes no difference whether the case is being presented to jurors or a judge.

Does the hon. Lady agree with His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, who argued that jury trials could actually impose discipline in complex fraud cases, whereas in a judge-only trial there is no incentive to get on and hear all the evidence? He also said that in such cases, juries decide issues of dishonesty and facts that are not necessarily technical, meaning that 12 jurors are in a much better position to reach a decision based on dishonesty.

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. I could go on and on explaining how evidence is presented, but all I will say from my years of experience—not just in the CPS, but in the independent Bar as well—is that I have gone through thousands of pages of documents, and juries have reacted to that and been able to deal with the cases unfazed. The issue is how well the evidence is presented, and counsel would have the same duty to do that in front of a judge. In some respects, a jury trial is better when legal issues or the admissibility of evidence have to be determined during a trial. In a jury trial, the judge can send the jury out and listen to everyone’s representations about whether something should be admitted or not, and then make a decision. That is helpful because juries then never know about all the debates that have taken place. Sometimes there is evidence that a party wants to be admitted that is inadmissible or would be prejudicial.

There was a time, when I first started practising in the criminal law, when defendants’ previous convictions were never allowed to come in unless they were “strikingly similar”. For example, if the defendant had been convicted of a rape in which they had grabbed a woman at night, dragged her through the streets and beaten her up, and they were then charged with a very similar type of offence, it could be argued that that previous conviction should be allowed in, but it was all done in the absence of the jury.

Since then, the rules have changed massively. Now, in a lot of cases, previous convictions can be brought in, which means that a lot of cases involve applications to do so. As the jury is separate from the judge, it is not prejudiced by other things. That is important because, at the end of the day, the fact that a person has a conviction does not mean that they committed the offence that is in front of the court. They may have been convicted in the past, but they could still be innocent of the offence in question.

There are countless applications that can be made; another example is an application to introduce certain evidence. Again, those arguments are made in front of the judge. The jury is unaffected, and the jurors will come back afresh and concentrate only on the evidence that is presented to them. I have described some of the reasons why we have so many procedural safeguards, and that is why the jury trial is so important in our criminal justice system.

The Government’s case is that judge-alone trials will be faster, but that claim has no reliable evidential foundation. The Criminal Bar Association highlighted that the estimate relied upon—that judge-only trials may be 20% quicker—was itself described as being subject to

“very high levels of uncertainty”

and even characterised by a senior judge as having been reached on a “finger in the wind”. That is not a sound basis on which to dismantle a constitutional safeguard.

When we look at how trials actually operate, the argument becomes even weaker. It takes 20 to 30 minutes to swear in a jury—that is the headline saving. But while a jury deliberates, the judge is free to conduct other work. The system continues to function. A judge sitting alone does not have that flexibility. They must consider all the evidence, reach a decision and produce a detailed, reasoned judgment. That is not a quick process. It is, in many cases, a longer one. That judgment, quite properly, would be open to scrutiny and appeal in a way that jury verdicts are not, creating further pressure on the system. The claim that this will save time does not stand up to scrutiny.

There is also, of course, a human consequence to the proposals. At present, responsibility for a verdict is shared across 12 jurors; no single individual carries that burden alone. Under the clause that we are discussing, the responsibility would fall entirely on the judge. That exposes judges to greater pressure, greater scrutiny and, potentially, greater risk. Senior members of the judiciary have already raised concerns about increasing threats and the need for enhanced security. To concentrate decision-making power in a single individual is to increase that exposure significantly.

Recently, we heard about a certain politician from a certain party naming immigration judges. That has led to one particular immigration judge being scared, and many others are terrified about what is happening. Again, if these things are left to the judge, we can imagine what might happen in a case where there is a lot of public sensitivity. The crimes that everyone understandably gets most concerned about are the sexual abuse of children or similar horrendous crimes. The sexual abuse of a child is not indictable—it is not that serious—so it does not have to go to the Crown court. If a child abuse case is heard in the Crown court, and the judge reaches a decision of not guilty, people might say, “Why are you bringing a verdict of not guilty?” Again, we are exposing our judiciary to more dangers than they already face. So, again, the amendments would allow our judges and our criminal justice system to operate properly.

We have discussed the issues with the backlog of cases, and I have maintained for the last week or so that it is not juries causing these problems. Members will be pleased to know that I will not go into the full list of cases and data I spoke to earlier, but if there is better triaging of cases, earlier and more effective management between prosecution and defence, improved use of technology, and earlier service and scrutiny of evidence, that will ensure that meaningful progress is made at every stage of proceedings. Those practical, workable solutions would address the real cause of delay, and none of them requires the removal of the jury.

Real operational failures are also contributing to delay. In one case at the Old Bailey, a trial that was expected to last three months went for five, largely because the defendants were not brought to court on time. Around 40 sitting days were lost waiting for prisoner transport, which is the equivalent of eight rape trials. That is not the failure of juries; it is a failure of basic system management. So let us fix the contracts, the logistics and the system.

Earlier we discussed the fact that other countries do not have a jury system, and that is correct. Scotland was referred to, and it was probably an inadvertent misunderstanding, but I understand that Scotland still has a jury system for certain offences; there are 15 jurors for criminal matters, and 12 for civil cases.

One also has to understand that comparing one country’s tradition to another is not the correct way. Continental systems, for example, operate on an entirely different foundation. They use panels rather than a single judge, and the panels will have three lawyers or judges and two lay people, or it could be a different combination. So there is group of people trying someone.

However—this is very important—most continental systems start from a different premise. As I said previously, our system is considered to be adversarial, but theirs are considered to be inquisitorial, which is about finding out what has gone wrong. One big difference in our system is that if a police officer arrests somebody, and that person makes an admission to the police officer, that admission is allowed as evidence, unless it was adduced by coercion, for example. A statement that a person makes to a policer officer can therefore be directly used in evidence in court proceedings. However, in many continental inquisitorial systems, where the relationship between state and the citizen is a bit harsher and more suspicious, any statement made to a police officer is not admissible in evidence unless and until the examining judge or investigating magistrate is dealing with the case and the person says, “Yes, I did make those admissions to the police.” Then the evidence can come in.

I am trying to explain that different countries have different philosophies and jurisprudence, and different systems and set-ups. In the system we have, the jury system is the best option available. It is not correct to say that we can just remove it because it may reduce the backlog by a few cases.

Finally, we have a presumption of innocence. Our system says, “You are innocent until proven guilty.” The defendant can sit there and do nothing, and it is for the state to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. That is very important, because although this debate has mainly been framed as being about long delays caused by juries, there has also been discussion about it being in the interests of the victim. However, to focus only on the victim is to risk presuming guilt. In our system, built on the presumption of innocence, the rights of defendants are not in opposition to the rights of complainants—they are part of the same commitment to fairness. No victim would want the wrong person convicted.

Therefore, to present the removal of jury trials as a benefit to victims is a false choice. We should remember— I have seen this—that people who have been victims sometimes become defendants. I therefore always come back to the question I asked last week: if they were offered a jury trial, would Members say, hand on heart, “No, I’ll have a judge-only trial”? That is one of the fundamental things we are talking about here.

To conclude, the question is not whether juries can handle complex cases, but whether we are prepared to remove a fundamental safeguard instead of fixing the system. These clauses do not address the cause of delays or solve the backlog, but they do risk undermining confidence in our justice system, while offering at best uncertain and marginal gains. Therefore, I again ask the Government to reconsider this clause. Let us adopt some of the safeguards, as well as some of the ways we can reduce court delays, so that we can continue with our jury system, which is genuinely known as the best in the world.

I rise to speak in support of Opposition amendment 46, which is in my name, as we debate elements of the Government’s proposals to remove jury trials and make use of the new Crown court bench division in relation to potentially complex and lengthy trials. To make sense of this debate, we must consider how the measures will apply. As we touched on earlier, the Government’s stated aim is to reduce the time taken to hear particularly lengthy and complex cases by permitting judge-alone trials and therefore—they say—freeing up additional Crown court capacity. The cases must involve at least one fraud or related financial offence listed in proposed new schedule 3ZA, which includes fraud by false representation, cheating the public revenue, money laundering and other offences, and would not involve an indictable-only homicide offence or sexual offence, including attempts or conspiracies to commit such offences. We can already see, when considering the written evidence we have received, why there are rightly many questions about how the provisions will operate. In amendment 46, we therefore propose a requirement to ensure that defendants have a route in the law back to a jury trial. I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence of Dr Natalie Hodgson, from the University of New South Wales, and Dr Matt Thomason, from the University of Nottingham, which was particularly helpful. They point out: “Currently, the proposed s.42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not define what is meant by “lengthy” or “complex”...Similarly, the proposed legislation provides no detail as to what judges can and should consider in determining whether ‘it is in the public interest’ for the trial to be conducted by judge alone. The Explanatory Note makes clear that ‘the court will retain full discretion’ as to whether it is appropriate to order a trial by judge alone.” That is giving judges enormous power over these decisions. Dr Thomason and Dr Hodgson also say: “In contrast, we note that in New Zealand—which has a similar provision permitting judge-alone trials in cases ‘likely to be long and complex’—the relevant legislation sets out with greater specificity what a judge should consider in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex…In particular, the New Zealand legislation specifies that a Court must not order a judge-alone trial unless all reasonable measures and arrangements have been taken to shorten the length of the trial, but the ‘duration of the trial still seems likely to exceed 20 sitting days.’” So New Zealand was capable, in its legislation, of drawing a line in the sand as to what it considered to be a lengthy trial, but we do not seem to be doing the same.

The hon. Member is making a really interesting point about what we perceive to be lengthy or complex, as the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden tried to do with her amendment. Amendment 29 seeks to define a lengthy trial as one going beyond the five-month point, but Geoffrey Rivlin KC collected data over six years from Southwark Crown court—the primary venue for complex financial crime trials—which showed that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two typically lasting more than that, and only two cases in total lasting over six months. Does the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle agree that it would be helpful for the Minister to clarify what she believes “lengthy” or “complex” to be? The judiciary will also be asking that.

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The Minister is always keen to draw lessons from other jurisdictions, and as I said we have a clear lesson from another jurisdiction that is specific. In our system, my understanding is that the practice directions for complex cases are that the prosecution and defence should do everything possible to make sure a trial does not last longer than six weeks. So that is another example where we might expect the Minister’s view. Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say: “The New Zealand legislation also specifies that judges should consider the following factors in deciding whether the defendant’s right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively.” Those include “the number and nature of the offences with which the defendant is charged…the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of evidence likely to be presented…the imposition on potential jurors of sitting” for a long time and “any other matters the court considers relevant.” Again, that is much more specific than the measures we have before us. The written evidence continues: “In New South Wales, Australia—where judge-alone trials can be ordered when a defendant elects a judge-alone trial and the judge considered that a judge-alone trial ‘is in the interests of justice’—the legislation specifies that, without limiting the factors a Court may consider, ‘the court may refuse to make an order…if it considers that the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community standards’ such as an issue of reasonableness, negligence, or dangerousness.” Again, that cuts to the heart of the difference in our approach. We have talked about matters of dishonesty and the different elements of an offence that we might seek to prove. Even if a trial is highly complex, if it comes down to a judgment about reasonableness, behaviour and the choices people make, that is where a jury trial comes in. The approach in the Bill has a comparative lack of clarity and specificity, and that is why I have tabled amendment 46, which would weight things back towards the defendant, who at this stage is still innocent until proven guilty. Even if the general right to elect for a jury trial is restricted for certain offences, defendants must be allowed to elect for one where they can demonstrate that a summary trial would violate the principles of natural justice. That is vital for individuals with a previously unblemished character or those whose livelihoods are directly imperilled by a conviction. The evidence from the Institute for Government and JUSTICE, and from recent parliamentary debates, is clear that a one-size-fits-all approach to efficiency risks compromising the integrity of the justice system it seeks to serve. In relation to similar Opposition measures on previous clauses, the Government said that if they supported us, they would lose the court time they were seeking to secure. Let us remind ourselves of how questionable those claims are. The Institute for Government believes that the Government’s claims are highly uncertain, and others have questioned whether the claimed savings will ever actually be made; we will visit that later—for example, when we discuss the summing up the judge will need to make. The backlog is largely a product of longer-term issues related to, for example, judicial vacancies, prison transport, lack of early pleas and all sorts of other reasons not related to jury trials. So the efficiency gain is marginal, and we must ask whether it is worth the constitutional cost. By forcing complex cases or those with high personal stakes into a bench division, we are essentially prioritising a spreadsheet of data over citizens’ rights to be judged by their peers. A natural justice exception would act as a safety valve, ensuring that speed does not override the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Why does it matter whether a judge or a jury hear a case? In many instances, the legal outcome might be the same. However, the process of reaching the outcome is where natural justice resides. In his paper “For Mercy’s Sake”, Geoffrey Robertson KC emphasised the importance of jury equity—the ability of a jury to look beyond the strict letter of the law to the broader circumstances of a defendant’s life. He is right to argue that a jury possesses the unique capacity to dispense mercy where the law, in its rigidity, cannot. For a defendant of previous good character or one whose career hangs in the balance, the collective common sense of 12 citizens provides a bulwark against the mechanical application of statute, which may result in an outcome that is legally correct but morally disproportionate. That is the essence of my argument: for a first-time offender, the move from a clean record to a criminal conviction is a life-altering transition. In some cases, the evidence may be nuanced or the impact of a guilty verdict may be uniquely devastating, such as the immediate loss of a professional license or employment. In previous debates, we referred to the fact that MPs might suffer those consequences, as would doctors, judges and all sorts of other people. When the defendant can show that the consequences of a trial are so profound that they require the ability to exercise their right to a jury, rather than just a professional bench, the law should accommodate that request. When we speak of natural justice, we speak of the right to be heard in the manner that is fair. If the defendant can demonstrate that their case involves something that a professional bench might treat with case-hardened cynicism, the system must remain flexible. The Law Society highlights that public trust in the legal system is inextricably linked to the jury, and that the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. If defendants feel that they have been processed through an administrative division, rather than tried by their peers, the moral authority of the sentence is diminished. Critics will argue that an exception for natural justice will lead to every defendant claiming they are a special case, thereby clogging the system further. That is a misplaced fear; we already have established legal tests for interests of justice in other areas of the law, such as the granting of legal aid or the admissibility of evidence. In fact, just yesterday, the Government accepted a reform to expand the eligibility to apply to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, when it is in the interests of justice to do so. In an earlier sitting, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden helpfully approached similar issues with an amendment that was more specific about the situations in which we might agree that natural justice should allow for a jury trial—for example, when the defendant is of good character, has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence, or will be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, or where being convicted of the offence or offences for which they are to be tried would likely result in significant reputational damage or their employment or professional qualifications being adversely affected. As I discussed in previous debates, those are all scenarios in which we think not having a jury trial would be against the interests of natural justice, and which our amendment seeks to curtail. To conclude, the Bill in its current form is too blunt an instrument in relation to the decision to remove the jury. The tests set by the Government are not well defined and are too heavily weighted against the rights of the defendant. That is why our amendment introduces a stronger requirement to consider the matter from the perspective of the, until proven guilty, innocent defendant and what represents natural justice for them. By incorporating this safeguard, we preserve the mercy and common sense that Geoffrey Robertson KC so eloquently defends. Yes, justice must be efficient, but above all it must be fair. Let us not sacrifice the principles of natural justice on the altar of administrative expediency. Let us allow defendants who can show just cause to elect for a jury they deserve.

I will not press my amendment to a vote. In fact, Ms Butler, I notify you and the Committee that I am not asking to vote on any of my amendments.

I will call the Minister, and then you can withdraw your amendment.

To be clear, I intend to address amendment 29, albeit that it is not being put to a vote, and amendment 46, which was grouped with it. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden referred to other amendments further ahead, but it may be convenient to deal with those when we get to them, unless you want me to deal with them now, Ms Butler. I am in your hands; I am happy to deal with them either way.

The Committee agreed to discuss amendments 30 to 33 in this debate.

In that case I will deal with amendments 30 to 32 once I have addressed amendments 29 and 61, because they all touch on similar issues in relation to clause 4. Much has been said about the policy rationale behind this provision, and whether juries are somehow incapable of following complex trials involving fraud or financial matters. That is not the Government’s contention, although some of the cases that are routinely dealt with in Southwark Crown court, particularly in a modern environment with crypto and complex financial instruments, are indeed highly complex. The primary issue is jury burden, which is a theme that emerged from the independent review of criminal courts, and it has long been identified as a significant issue. As long ago as 2001, Lord Justice Robin Auld said that the “increase in the length of such trials over recent years has become a severe intrusion on jurors’ working and private lives. It cannot be good for them or for justice.” Sir Brian Leveson picked up that theme in part 1 of his review, in which he said that “the personal and financial burden placed on jurors, particularly those involved in lengthy trials, is significant.” He also said that “serious and complex fraud trials…place more significant burdens on court resources and jurors’ time.” There is evidence of the financial strain on jurors who sit in lengthy trials, particularly those who are self-employed or who have caring responsibilities. In addition, under the current system, the companies that jurors work for cannot claim back losses incurred while their employee is on jury service. As I have said before, we commend the participation in jury service of people from across society and from all backgrounds, which is why we are seeking to preserve jury trials for our most serious cases—those pertaining to matters that are not only serious for individuals but are in the public interest.

Will the Minister give way?

I will make a bit of progress. We also need to be mindful of the burden that lengthy trials place on jurors. In this country, between January 2024 and December 2025, almost 3,000 jurors sat in trials that lasted more than six weeks. We should be mindful that trials for fraud and serious financial crime, which are within the purview of this clause, are some of the longest and most demanding in the Crown courts. We also have to be mindful of our argument on the time savings of having judge-only trials for such cases.

Has the Ministry of Justice done any modelling on the benefits of introducing Maxwell hours for all lengthy fraud cases? Doing so would benefit jurors, as they would only be committed to sitting from 8 am until midday and could go on to fulfil their caring responsibilities and such. The same goes for judges when dealing with complex fraud cases.

I do not have any modelling to hand, but I can certainly take that away. If that work has been done, I will let the hon. Lady have it, but I do not have it to hand so I simply do not know. I do not want to go over old ground, but we heard in oral evidence, particularly from the panel of experienced judges, about the time savings related to judge-only trials. Reference was made to other jurisdictions, and the data from New South Wales, which is a comparable common law jurisdiction, shows that when it introduced judge-only trials in complex cases, it saw a 29% reduction in the length of trials, so the Government are confident that clause 4 will result in material time savings. Amendment 29 would make parties’ agreement that a trial is likely to last more than five months a condition of judge-only trials under clause 4. Of course, I agree that five months is an exceptionally long time to expect any member of the public to serve on a jury, but we cannot ignore the fact that considerably shorter trials can be equally as disruptive to jurors’ lives, particularly if they are self-employed or have caring responsibilities.

We regard five months as an artificial and overly rigid threshold. We consider that the way in which the test is currently drafted affords the court greater discretion and flexibility. As Sir Brian rightly makes clear in his report, there can be no absolutely precise way of predicting, at the outset of a case, exactly how long a trial will run. The Government agree with his statement that

“problems can arise when trials unexpectedly go beyond their predicted trial time”.

Against that reality, I cannot see how a rigid threshold of five months could capture all the cases that would most appropriately benefit from the treatment this policy affords of having a judge-only trial in certain categories of offence prescribed under the Bill.

Placing control of eligibility for judge-only trials into the hands of the parties, rather than the judge, runs counter to the objectives of this reform package and fails to support fair and effective trial management. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the amendment.

I also thank my hon. Friend for tabling amendment 30, which would introduce a new right of appeal against a decision to order a judge-only trial. The Government do not consider that to be either necessary or appropriate, for many of the same reasons that we do not afford a route of appeal in allocation decisions to the Crown court bench division.

Mode of trial decisions of that kind are procedural in nature—they are case-management decisions—and are intended to ensure that cases are tried efficiently and fairly and managed proportionately. The absence of a route of appeal in that context is designed precisely to promote procedural finality and to avoid delay in a system in which we are seeking to root it out. For all the reasons I outlined in respect of earlier discussions on the right to appeal allocation decisions, I again urge my hon. Friend not to press the amendment.

Amendment 31 would add additional offences involving death to the list of homicide offences that are specifically excluded from the judge-alone framework for complex and lengthy cases under clause 4. I say at the outset that I understand the intent behind the amendment, and I certainly do not underestimate the impact of such offences on victims and their families, but this is a policy designed for technical and lengthy fraud and financial cases. How that test is interpreted and applied is a matter that this clause leaves to judicial discretion.

Clause 4 is deliberately drafted so that jury trial remains the default mode of trial. Judges will be required to apply the statutory test carefully and under the proper safeguards set out in the clause, considering suitability and the public interest in each individual case. I recognise the concerns raised by amendment 31, and I would welcome the opportunity to talk to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden outside the Committee about how the safeguards we have set out will operate in practice.

The Minister talks about the statutory test for complexity, among other things. I cannot identify the statutory test for complexity. Where is the test in the new legislation?

We consider it to be set out in clause 4 as drafted. It is sufficiently flexible and will no doubt be subjected to interpretation. We think that, as drafted—with all the carefully prescribed exceptions to what could be included, in addition to the public interest exclusion—it is sufficiently clear, and that there is a clear understanding of the sorts of offences that would come within the provision. I am also keen to work together constructively to ensure public confidence, particularly in cases involving loss of life, while still providing the courts with the flexibility they need for the clause to work appropriately. In the case of amendment 31, given the high bar already set in the clause and the cautious way that we expect judges will exercise these powers, we consider the statutory exclusion of these additional offences unnecessary. Again, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press her amendment. Finally, the placement of amendment 32 in proposed new section 42B(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 means that it would not, in fact, exclude any offences beyond the indictable-only sexual offences that are expressly excluded by proposed new section 42B(2)(b). As I have said previously, we set up the clause so that jury trial is the default. Judges apply the test, and there are safeguards for case suitability and public interest. It would be very rare for sexual offences to be tried alongside the kinds of complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases that clause 4 is designed to capture. For those reasons, once again, I urge my hon. Friend not to press the amendment.

I thank the Minister for her response. My amendments are short and easily identifiable. I think the offences I have suggested should be included within the categories of certain murders and homicides, but as I said earlier, I will not press the amendments to a vote.

rose—

Forgive me, Ms Butler, is it possible that I have not addressed the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle?

Amendment 46.

indicated assent.

Finally, let me address amendment 46. As Members will get sick of hearing me say, the courts are facing an unprecedented challenge. Although relatively few in number, cases involving fraud and serious financial crime are some of the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court. In that context, and in line with the recommendation of the independent review of the criminal courts, we have taken the decision to introduce judge-only trials for lengthy and complex cases. The policy is intended to create an additional, tightly defined and controlled discretion for a very small number of cases where the burden on jurors and court resources is excessive, ensuring that cases are dealt with efficiently while maintaining fairness and judicial rigour.

I am in danger of not knowing my figures, but I think the impact assessment suggests that 25% of cases in the list of offences will be included, so I am not sure whether it is reasonable to describe that as a small proportion—I do not know whether the Minister said “proportion” or “number”. How many cases does she think it will involve?

My understanding of the time saving—we measure it in the context of Crown court sitting days—is that we are looking at around 500 sitting days, which no one is suggesting is a huge number. As I said, the reality of how we expect judges to apply the provision in these cases is that jury trial is the default. The provision in clause 4 is fairly narrowly drawn, so we do not expect that lots of cases will be captured by it, but we expect that lengthier fraud and financial crime cases that come within the provision will result in significant time savings—significant when every little helps, to put it that way. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. As I have said previously, the principles of natural justice—the way in which the amendment is framed—are preserved in the framework provided by these reforms. We think that makes the introduction of an additional, open-ended safeguard unnecessary. The right to a fair trial, protected under article 6 of the European convention, is preserved here. Judges will be required to apply the statutory test carefully and under the proper safeguards of clause 4, considering suitability and public interest on a case-by-case basis. It is not a category approach; it is based on the individual nature and facts of the case. Judges will also, in accordance with the established principles of fairness and open justice, have to give reasons for those allocation decisions, which we think will also ensure a level of accountability. We think that judges, in accordance with their judicial oath, will do this transparently, fairly and well. For those reasons, the amendment would not add to a procedural safeguard, and I urge the hon. Member not to press it.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment proposed: 46, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert— “(3A) A court may not make an order under this section if it considers that it is the interests of natural justice for the defendant to have a trial with a jury.”—(Dr Mullan.) This amendment prevents a judge-only trial in complex and lengthy cases where it would be in the interests of natural justice for the defendant to be tried with a jury.

I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 4, page 11, line 1, leave out from “is” to end of line 2, and insert “a right of appeal against a decision to make an order under this section on the grounds of natural justice. (5A) where an appeal is made under subsection (5), it must not be heard by the judge who made the original determination.” This amendment would add a right for defendants to appeal against the decision for a judge-only trial for lengthy and complex cases. Much of our discourse has focused on whether judge-only trials should exist at all, but as with the previous amendments, we must also address the critical procedural omission in the drafting of this clause: the absence of a clear interlocutory right of appeal for a defendant against a decision to allocate them to a judge-only trial. The Government’s stated aim is efficiency, but efficiency without a safety valve of oversight often leads to systemic instability. By denying a defendant the right to appeal an allocation decision before the trial begins, we are not streamlining justice but creating a procedural blind spot. We believe that providing an immediate right of appeal is not only a matter of fairness, but the most efficient path available to the court. As we debated in relation to clause 3, on the Crown court bench division, the lack of such a mechanism risks baking in errors that can be rectified only through costly and time-consuming post-trial appeals. The pursuit of headline-ready speed must not eclipse the logistical reality that a trial conducted in the wrong forum is a wasted trial. If an allocation decision is found to be flawed only after a conviction, the state incurs the double cost of the original judge-led hearing and a subsequent jury retrial. If a case is allocated incorrectly, the defendant currently has no immediate recourse, and they must undergo the entire trial in the bench division. If, on appeal against conviction, it is determined that their allocation was indeed improper, the entire proceeding is voided. An interlocutory appeal lasting perhaps one or two hours is a negligible investment compared with the risk of a three-week trial perhaps being overturned on a procedural technicality regarding allocation. By resolving the question of the right forum at the outset, we ensure that when a trial does proceed, its verdict is final and resistant to procedural challenge. That is the true meaning of efficiency.

Again, I draw the Committee’s attention to the written evidence submitted by Dr Natalie Hodgson and Dr Matt Thomason, who say this approach is

“opposite to the approach taken in other jurisdictions, where such a decision can be appealed.”

In their submission to the independent review of criminal courts itself, they identified that

“the ability to appeal a decision to order a judge-alone trial as an important procedural safeguard that ensures that judge-alone trials are only ordered in appropriate circumstances and in line with statutory criteria. A significant problem with not permitting appeals on decisions to order judge-alone trials is that it precludes any possibility of the appellate courts developing interpretations of key concepts used in the application of the legal tests which are used to order those trials.”

In the previous session, the Minister mentioned that she thought, for example, that the test of whether to allocate a trial would be subject to legal interpretation. That was an admission that the Minister made—which is probably self-evident.

Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say:

“For example, without appeals, the ‘public interest’ test will be left to the discretion of individual judges, with no judicial guidance on relevant factors to consider and irrelevant factors to ignore. The same risks attach to the concepts of ‘lengthy’ and ‘complex’. There is a significant risk of inconsistent and arbitrary decision making on allocation of factfinder, which is a matter of substantial importance to both the defence and prosecution.”

The necessary case law will be built up much more quickly and efficiently if those cases are heard as appeals in the first instance, rather than over a lengthy period in relation to conviction after sentence. The witnesses I described therefore strongly recommend that decisions to order a judge-alone trial be appealable. That is in addition to our recommendations to provide guidance in the legislation for key terms, which we talked about in the previous amendment.

One of the most troubling aspects of the current Bill is the inconsistency it creates between the magistrates court and the Crown court. As we have covered to some extent, under our current system, when the magistrates court makes an allocation decision for an either-way offence, that decision is subject to judicial review if it is seen as irrational or procedurally unfair. However, the bench division is an element of the Crown court and decisions made by the Crown court regarding its own internal allocation are protected from judicial review. By moving the allocation decision to a bench division without a statutory right of appeal—though, as the Minister is right to say, there is not an appeal as such—the Bill effectively creates a legal vacuum where a defendant has fewer rights of challenge in the Crown court than they would in the magistrates.

The Minister agreed that in that scenario, there would be no obvious route to the judicial review—as she described it—that currently exists in the magistrates court. If we allow magistrates allocation to be challenged, it is logically inconsistent to deny a challenge to an allocation made by a Crown court judge—particularly when the consequences and stakes are potentially much higher in Crown court proceedings under the provisions in this legislation.

Without this availability of judicial review and a specific right of appeal, we are asking defendants to accept a decision that is functionally unreviewable until—from their perspective—it is much too late. This lack of parity undermines the principle of legal certainty. The necessity of appeal in clause 4 is even greater than in clause 3, because of the more nuanced and even more subjective element to the decisions to allocate in these types of cases. In the clause 3 undertakings it was based on sentencing guidelines and sentencing length of three years or less. We had a debate about the fact that that is not necessarily black and white and purely factual, but it is certainly considerably more established and laid out in terms of law than this provision, because complexity is an even more subjective metric.

As I have said, evidence was raised with the Committee about the inconsistency with which this might be approached across the region. A right of appeal ensures that a body of case law is developed by the Court of Appeal, providing clear guidance on when a case must remain with a jury. The perception of fairness is vital for public confidence in the law. If a defendant feels that they have been managed into a judge-only trial against their will, and without any way to challenge that choice on its own, their faith in the eventual verdict will be non-existent.

A right of appeal also acts as a check against case hardening. Although our judiciary has many positives, an appeal mechanism ensures that the pressure of the backlog does not subtly influence the application of the law in these circumstances. The right to challenge the forum of one’s trial is a fundamental safeguard against the professionalisation of the verdict. It ensures that the state cannot simply select the most efficient path to conviction without a transparent, reviewable process. Although our judiciary is independent of the executive, it is still an arm of the state.

In summary, the proposal for a Crown court bench division in complex and lengthy trials requires a robust mechanism for appeal on allocation if it is to be fair and effective. By including a right of appeal now, we would prevent the waste of resources associated with post-trial retrials, close the legal black hole created by the lack of judicial review for Crown court allocation, ensure consistency in how the test will be applied across the country and uphold the dignity of the defendant, acknowledging that the choice of forum is a decision of profound consequence. Let us ensure that the Bill includes the tools for that self-correction. We must not allow the pursuit of speed to strip away the procedural protections that ensure that our justice system remains of a high standard. Let us provide a right of appeal that is clear, immediate and fair.

I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, which would ensure the right of appeal to a decision whether a trial should be heard by a jury. The Government’s reason for not accepting the amendment, as they have put forward on a number of previous amendments, is the principle of efficiency—that it would slow the system down and would not drive the efficiencies that they hope to secure through the Bill. The principle of efficiency cannot be an untamed principle that runs roughshod over carefully fought legal principles of fairness and natural justice. Efficiency cannot simply trump everything. If efficiency has no limits, why have trials of more than a few days at all? The arguments have been well made by the shadow Minister, and I do not wish to repeat them, but it is not an inefficient process to allow a right of appeal. I assume that the decision made by the judge in the first instance on how to allocate the trial will not be a particularly lengthy process anyway, so an appeal of that decision will be no lengthier—indeed, less so. I have never heard the argument that appeals are against efficiency in any other aspect of law. Indeed, appealing the substantive outcome of a case—a claim of wrongful conviction—has not one but many stages of appeal: appeal to the High Court, appeal to the Court of Appeal and appeal to the Supreme Court. I have never heard the argument that someone should not have the right to appeal the outcome of a trial because it is inefficient or might cause delays. It seems that efficiency is being used to justify a fairly hastily put together Bill, and that the Government do not recognise the possibly unintended consequences of its provisions in order to get their business through. The best way of addressing those issues, and accepting that there might be loopholes and unintended consequences, is to give genuine due regard to amendments tabled in good faith, on this occasion by the shadow Minister, to improve the lawmaking process and the Bill. The amendment does not seek to drive a coach and horses through what the Government are trying to achieve with the Bill, even though we disagree with some of it; it seeks to improve, to perfect and not to allow unfairness to creep into the Bill. I am sure that the Government do not intend the Bill to be unfair, but time and again they risk allowing it to be so.

The amendment would effectively introduce a new right of appeal against a decision to order a judge-only trial. Once again the Government does not consider that to be necessary in the interests of fairness, or appropriate given the time saving this Bill seeks to achieve. We are seeking, by the process set out in clause 4, to encourage procedural finality and to avoid delay rather than setting up additional procedural layers to add complexity and delay. Of course, all that should not come at the expense of overall fairness. That guarantee of fairness is expressed in a number of ways: because we consider the different modes of trial that might be afforded to a case to be fair; because a judge sitting alone will be required to give reasons for the allocation itself and then for the substantive verdict, whether a conviction or an acquittal; and because that in itself can be subject to an appeal in the Crown court in the usual way. We regard that as an important safeguard in terms of fairness, but we do not want to encourage mode-of-trial allocations—which we think that judges will do well, transparently, efficiently and having heard from both sides—to be relitigated. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East for his remarks. I will paint a scenario for the Minister and ask whether she thinks it is one she will end up regretting if she does not accept at some point, if not at these stages, the idea that appeal is actually serving her own interests in reducing the backlogs. The scenario is that the Bill has passed, has been operating for a year or even two, and there have been multiple complex and lengthy cases heard without a jury under the schedules in this clause—potentially saving, in the Government’s own arguments of its merits, many days of crown court time—but then one of those people appeals post-conviction and successfully argues there was some error of judgment in the judge’s decision to allocate them a trial without a jury. My understanding of the law is that that would set a precedent and that anybody in those same circumstances allocated a trial without a jury would then be entitled to say that the law as then written by the Court of Appeal should apply to them. We could have a situation where dozens and dozens of cases were then ordered to be retried with a trial by jury. That would not only fail to have made the savings the Government wants to achieve, but make the situation even worse, leading to many more Crown court sitting days being taken up by these cases. The Court of Appeal approach on allocation will allow the case law to be built up quickly, ahead of trials and convictions, to bring the clarity that judges will need to make sure their decisions are not successfully challenged in the Court of Appeal. We made that argument in relation to clause 3, but it is even stronger in relation to clause 4, because it is just so much more subjective and open to interpretation, and there is so much more room for judges to make decisions that the Court of Appeal find erred against what the Minister is intending through her legislation. This amendment is a genuine attempt to save trouble down the line. I hope—even if not at this stage—the Minister reconsiders her view that these appeals are necessary. We know that people are not allowed to make meritless appeals. They have to have legal advice from somebody, telling them, “Yes, you have a reasonable case to be made”, and so this will not become some frivolous thing. We have talked about the magistrates court and the Government seeking to restrict that, but even without that restriction, the vast majority of people do not seek to exercise an appeal right—when they already have that right and exercising it comes at a low opportunity cost—even though the Government’s argument is that it can be used as appeal for appeal’s sake. The idea that an appeal right would flood the courts with those types of cases does not stand up to much scrutiny. Even if that were the case initially, as the case law developed, it would become harder and harder for people to make appeals on this element of the process. On that basis, we will push the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 4, page 12, line 27, leave out subsection (5)(a). This amendment would prevent the court unilaterally overriding a reason to issue a revocation order so that a case allocated for judge-only trial under this section could be tried by jury.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 48, in clause 4, page 13, line 11, at end insert— “(g) the interests of natural justice for the defendant.” This amendment would ensure that the interests of natural justice for the defendant are relevant to the decision to revoke an order for a judge-only trial for the offences listed in Schedule 1.

In earlier sittings, I spent some time testing the basis on which the Government are asking the Committee to accept the changes proposed in the Bill, particularly in relation to the claimed benefits and how the system will work in practice. That is particularly relevant in the context of clause 4, where the justification for removing jury trials rests on the assessment of complexity and length, and therefore on how those judgments are made and revisited in practice. During evidence, I asked Sir Brian Leveson about the modelling underpinning the proposals. His report points to the need for further modelling, but when that modelling was discussed, it was clear that there is uncertainty about the figures and what the impact will be. That is important context for these amendments; if there is uncertainty about how the system will operate and what it will deliver, it becomes even more important that the framework we are putting in place is clear on how decisions are to be made and what factors will be taken into account. Throughout our discussions, I have also tried to focus on how the provisions will operate and what they will mean for people going through the system, particularly those who are not legally represented and who may find it difficult to navigate more complex procedures. The amendments are aimed at those practical questions. Amendment 50 relates to a point that is fundamental to how the framework will operate in practice. The Bill sets out conditions under which a judge-only trial order may be revoked, including where the case is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy. That reflects the Government’s central argument that a jury trial is displaced only because certain features of the case justify it. However, the Bill then provides that, even when those conditions are met, the court may none the less decide not to revoke the order if it considers that “it would not be appropriate to do so”. I want to be clear about what that means in practice. If the justification for removing the jury is complexity or length, what is the position when that justification falls away? What is the court expected to do at that point? Is the expectation that the case should ordinarily return to a jury or that, once the decision has been made, it should remain judge-only unless something else actively pushes it back? The Bill does not answer that question, and that matters because, throughout our debates, I have tried to emphasise that it is about not just what is written in the Bill, but how its provisions will operate day to day in real cases. As I set out in earlier debates, we have a whole range of factors here, and many of them must be weighed rather than applied as straightforward rules. That inevitably leaves a significant role for judicial interpretation. Judicial discretion in itself is not a problem, but when Parliament sets out a structured framework with specific conditions, it is important that those conditions actually do something and have a clear consequence. Otherwise, we risk creating a system in which the criteria exist on paper, but the outcome is ultimately determined by a broader and less clearly defined set of judgments, and that is precisely the concern here. We are told that if a case is sufficiently complex or lengthy, it may be tried without a jury, but we are also told that if it is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy, the court may nevertheless decide that it is still not appropriate to return it to a jury. The Committee is entitled to ask, “What weight are we really giving to those original criteria?” In earlier debates, I made the point that courts will look at the legislation, and indeed our debates, to understand what Parliament intends. If we leave this question too open, it is not clear what guidance the courts are expected to follow in practice. If a defendant is told that their case is no longer sufficiently complex to justify a judge-only trial, but that it will nevertheless continue without a jury because it is considered not appropriate to change it, the basis of that decision will not be clear to them. This amendment is relatively modest but important. It seeks not to remove judicial discretion entirely or create an inflexible system, but to ensure that, where Parliament has set out the conditions for revocation, those conditions have a clear and meaningful effect. If the basis for removing the jury no longer exists, that should carry real weight in the decision that follows. Otherwise, we are in danger of creating a framework in which the justification for removing the jury and the decision to keep the jury become disconnected. Amendment 48 relates to the factors that a court must consider when deciding whether to revoke a judge-only trial order. The Bill sets out a number of considerations, including delay, the interests of victims and the impact on court business. Those are clearly important issues. We have heard a great deal of evidence in Committee about the impact of delays, particularly on victims, and I do not think anyone would dispute that that is a serious concern. In my role as shadow Justice Minister, I have focused on the experience of victims in all different elements of the system, including the effect that long delays can have on them. Looking at the list of factors in the Bill, I am interested in what is not included. It is striking that, in the statutory list, there is no explicit reference to the interests of natural justice for the defendant. That omission matters. In earlier debates, we have been clear that these questions are, in part, about weighing exercises—balancing different factors—and that there are, in reality, more and less fair ways of doing things. We have also discussed that defendants are not all in the same position. The system already recognises that in other ways, whether through good character, prior convictions or the wider consequences that a conviction may have on someone’s life. We treat individuals differently, because fairness requires us to do so. That is why the framework matters. If the court is directed to consider certain factors, those factors will shape how decisions are made in practice. If fairness to the defendant is not explicitly part of that framework, there is a risk that it will not be given the weight it should be. That is particularly important in this context, because we are dealing with decisions about whether a person should continue to be tried without a jury. In debates on earlier clauses, I made the point that jury trial is, in some respects, a superior form of justice, even if we accept that it is not practical in every single case. That necessarily means that moving away from it is not a neutral step; it is a step that has consequences for fairness. When the court is deciding whether that position should continue and whether a case should remain judge-only or return to a jury, it seems entirely reasonable that fairness to the defendant should be part of that decision—not assumed or left to implication, but explicitly recognised. Amendment 48 would not remove any of the existing factors. It would not prevent the court from taking into account delay, the interests of victims or the impact on the wider system, but it would ensure that, alongside those considerations, the court was also required to consider the interests of natural justice. Given the nature of the decision, that seems to be an essential part of a balanced framework. These amendments are intended to clarify how this framework will operate in practice. They are about ensuring that the conditions set out in the Bill have a clear effect, and that the factors guiding courts’ decision making reflect the full range of relevant considerations.

I will address amendments 50 and 48 together. The cases that we are considering in the context of clause 4, which involve fraud and serious financial crime, are, as I have said, among the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court, routinely running for many weeks and often months. Cases can, and sometimes do, evolve as they progress through the courts—that is not unusual. Like earlier clauses, clause 4 makes clear provision for orders for a judge-alone trial to be revoked where the circumstances of a case change. That is, again, an important safeguard. For example, a charge on the indictment may be dropped, suggesting that the case becomes less technical, but that is not always clear cut. Money laundering, tax evasion and fraud charges can fall, but cases may none the less remain complex and lengthy in nature due to the volume of digital material, financial accounts or, indeed, the number of defendants involved. That is why the policy is intentionally designed in a discretionary manner and defines what is required for a judge-alone order, but ultimately a judge, seized of the facts of the case, is best placed to determine whether the conditions are met for each case. Judges must have discretion to determine whether an order is or no longer remains appropriate. In deciding whether to revoke an order, the court must also consider named factors such as delays to the proceedings and the impact on Crown court listings. I am pleased to hear that there is consensus, in this context, about the relevancy of the factors that are prescribed. I do not think that anybody here would disagree that we want judges to have regard to the efficiency of our system and the impact on individual cases. For all cases under a judge-alone order, it is important to underscore that if an excluded offence is added or the court considers that it is in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, the order will always be revoked and the case sent to be dealt with in that way, with a jury. Where a jury trial has started already, an order can never be made. That would clearly cause disproportionate disruption within our courts. In relation to the points around natural justice, the right to a fair hearing, the rules against bias and the duty to act fairly, we consider that those are already upheld within our reforms and therefore do not require the specific provision that is provided for in amendment 48. As hon. Members have heard me say, the fact that a trial happens without a jury does not in itself offend the principles of natural justice. We have also designed the test for revoking an order, as set out in clause 4, to ensure that relevant interests are properly balanced by the courts. Importantly, parties are given the opportunity to make representations on reallocation, meaning that the defence can draw the court’s attention to how the factors in the Bill intersect with a defendant’s interests, including the issue of delay. At the same time, as we have heard, clause 4 requires the court itself to have regard to the interests of victims when deciding whether reallocation would be appropriate. That ensures that interests are properly weighed by the court, alongside the other factors set out in the Bill. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

To reiterate, as in clause 3, we risk creating an unfair dual standard for defendants. The Government accept that such defendants should have rights to a jury trial, but they will potentially be denied one unnecessarily because of the circumstances changing throughout their trial, rather than at the outset. Can we create two identical legal tests for the outset versus in the trial? No, but we can certainly make a better effort than we have. This issue ties back into the question of appeals. If we do not make the process fairer, there is a greater likelihood that defendants who experience failure to reallocate when the circumstances change—who sit there knowing that, if they had been in those circumstances at the outset of the trial, they would have had access to a jury trial—will be encouraged to appeal, post conviction, against the decision not to allocate them to a jury trial. Therefore, again, on the Government’s own test in relation to efficiency, there is a benefit to having a more effective and more balanced test for reallocation during trials. On that basis, we will push our amendments to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

Amendment proposed: 48, in clause 4, page 13, line 11, at end insert—

“(g) the interests of natural justice for the defendant.”—(Dr Mullan.)

This amendment would ensure that the interests of natural justice for the defendant are relevant to the decision to revoke an order for a judge-only trial for the offences listed in Schedule 1.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 4, page 13, line 30, leave out “trial beginning on or” and insert “cases whose first hearing in the magistrates’ court takes place”. This amendment prevents the provisions in section 4 coming into effect retrospectively. We previously discussed the issue of retrospectivity in clause 3, and the exact same questions arise here. As drafted, the Bill provides that the new regime applies to trials listed to begin after a specified day, regardless of when earlier stages in the case have taken place. Subsection (6) makes it clear that this applies regardless of when the preparatory hearing was ordered, for example. That means that cases already in the system may be brought into the new regime before they are heard. We have already considered this issue in debates on earlier clauses, where I raised concerns about how changes to the procedural framework affect people who are already part way through the process. Defendants do not approach their case in a vacuum. They make decisions at different stages about how to approach it, how to prepare and how to engage with the system, based on the entire framework that applies to them at the time. In this context, that includes the expectation that their case will be heard by a jury. Where a defendant has proceeded on that basis and the case has progressed through the system with that understanding, it is not a small matter to change that position part way through. To change the basis on which a case is to be tried part way through proceedings is not simply a technical or procedural adjustment; it alters the ground beneath the defendant’s feet, and that point goes directly to fairness. The Government may argue that this is simply a procedural change, and that the case remains in the Crown court with the same offences and the same sentencing powers, but that does not fully address the issue. We have already discussed the meaningful distinction between a trial before a jury and a trial before a judge sitting alone. The Minister has accepted that there is “something special” about a jury trial. If that is the case, removing it cannot be treated as a neutral step. It follows that changing the mode of trial after a case has already entered the system is not simply a question of procedure, but a change that affects how the case is determined. There is also a practical dimension to this. I have referred to the position of defendants who may have made decisions in expectation of a jury trial. That may affect whether they elect a particular route, how they prepare the defence and how they approach the proceedings as a whole. It has also been pointed out that defendants awaiting trial may be doing so on remand, expecting that their case will be heard in a particular way. Had they known that the framework would change, they may have taken different decisions at an earlier stage. That illustrates that this is not simply an abstract concern; it has real consequences for individuals. There is also a broader question of how such changes will operate in practice. Applying a new regime to cases already in the system introduces an additional layer of complexity. It raises questions about how existing cases should be treated, how decisions already taken are to be revisited and how the courts should manage that situation practically. We have already heard concerns that this could lead to additional steps in the process, including further consideration of allocation and, potentially, challenge. That has implications for the efficiency of the system. If all the cases currently sat in the backlog to which this applies are subject to a further additional hearing in addition to the new cases coming in, that will create a burden on the courts. On fairness, it is difficult to justify changing the basis on which a case should be tried after it has already progressed through the system. On practicality, it is not clear that retrospective application will achieve the objectives that the Government have set out—particularly if it introduces additional complexity. In debates on earlier clauses, I also made the point that retrospective measures require a particularly strong justification. We previously talked about the guidance to the House and how stringent those tests are. We have heard an unconvincing case, in my view, that such a justification exists here. The amendment therefore takes a straightforward and proportionate approach. It would ensure that the new regime applies only prospectively to cases entering the system after the change, rather than to those already under way. That respects the position of defendants who are already part way through the process, avoids the fairness concerns that arise from changing the framework mid-stream, and provides greater clarity about how the system will operate. Given the nature of the change being made, that is a distinction that I think the Committee should take seriously. This is a question about how changes to the system are applied in practice. The amendment is intended to provide clarity about that and to ensure that the framework is applied consistently to cases moving forward, but not retrospectively.

On amendment 49, consistent with our approach to the allocation of cases within the existing caseload but where trials are not yet commenced in relation to allocation to a Crown court bench division, we follow the same approach in relation to questions of allocation with the creation of a judge-only forum for cases of the nature we have been discussing in relation to clause 4—namely those of a lengthy and complex nature. We follow the same rationale and principles that trials should be treated and heard in accordance with the law as it stands at the commencement of trial. As I said earlier in the debate, applying the measures in the Bill to cases in the open caseload will enable us to bring forward and thereby accelerate caseload reduction, which is one of the main—if not the primary—objectives of the Bill. That approach to the application of the law to the existing caseload is consistent with precedent. For example, Parliament previously legislated in 2003 for judge-only trials in cases involving jury tampering and that applied to trials begun after commencement, regardless of when the case first entered the system. I grant that what we are seeking to do here is bolder and more extensive, but it is the principle of whether trials should be heard in accordance with the law as it stands when the Bill is brought into force. That also means that we avoid a situation where there are two different procedures running in parallel in the Crown court as a result of arbitrary cut-off dates. Although I do not seek to overstate the impact that that application of the legislation will have on the relatively small number of cases that we are talking about in this context, it is important that we derive, in the delay reduction, every little benefit that we can from the measures that we are bringing forward as soon as we can, because of the extent of the delays. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

The only point I would add is that, as the Minister has accepted, this is a relatively small number of cases, so the test of what is justifiable is actually disproportionately weighted against the Minister in these cases, in comparison with the earlier cases on clause 3. People’s rights and expectations remain the same, and from their perspective will be undermined by these measures, yet the benefit that the Government will actually secure from them is relatively minor, as the Minister accepts. I refer to the fact that 11% of Crown courts are sat empty today, and for a very minimal gain we are putting forward measures that make it difficult for people to exercise their rights in the legal system in a fair and reasonable way. On that basis, we will press the amendment to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 51, in schedule 1, page 38, line 3, leave out paragraph 20. This amendment prevents the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations. Schedule 1.

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendment 51. I will first set out the rationale for clause 4 and schedule 1 and then address the amendment. Clause 4 and schedule 1 will allow for particularly complex or lengthy fraud and financial offences to be tried by a judge sitting alone. Cases involving fraud and serious financial crime are some of the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court. They routinely run for weeks or even months, and there are examples of the most complex cases running for over a year. That is an incredibly substantial burden for jurors—lay members going about their lives—to bear, particularly as the compensation for those they work for is non-existent and their own compensation covers expenses but no more. Let me give a real-world example. A Crown court fraud trial was listed to run for 13 weeks—already a substantial commitment for any jury. Partial verdicts were returned by the jury four months later, with further verdicts provided the following month. The case finally concluded five months after it started. By that point the jury had dwindled from 12 to nine, worn down by delay after delay in such a long-running and complex trial. As I said, this is the primary rationale behind what we consider will also be a time-saving measure. This is a significant challenge. In fraud cases, marathon trials can drag on for months—at times, well beyond the original estimate—as jurors fall away, delays compound and the system ends up bending around the logistics of keeping 12 ordinary men and women available for an extraordinary length of time. Sir Brian Leveson was clear, as was Lord Justice Auld, that trial by jury is not always the most sensible and proportionate approach to the resolution of these types of lengthy and complex cases.

The Minister has already said “particularly complex or lengthy”, and just then she said “complex and lengthy”. Having rejected an amendment that would have set a limit of five months, will she think again about defining both complex and lengthy more rigorously in the Bill? The explanatory notes say “complex and lengthy”, but we do not have a definition of complex or a length limit. I think we need to hear more about that from her.

I thank the hon. Member for her point, which has been raised by others. Those terms are well understood in their ordinary meaning and can be applied in a clear and straightforward way by judges.

Will the Minister give way?

I am going to make some progress— I know the hon. Gentleman has raised this with me. Those responsible for drafting the legislation do not need to add further definitions of what we mean by “complex” and “lengthy”. That is well understood. As I said, given the other safeguards and considerations related to the kinds of cases that will be suitable, we think that the discretionary approach that judges will apply will suffice.

Will the Minister give way?

I will not; I am going to make some progress. As Sir Brian’s report clearly outlines, “this is a principled reform based on the need for cases to be resolved in a more timely manner, with a forum well suited to the demands of the case.” He suggests that allowing a judge to hear these cases alone—in tightly defined circumstances, of course—can cut hearing time by at least 20%. As we have said already, we heard from various witnesses about how that time saving would be achieved. That is a gain for the system and for capacity in the Crown court that can be used to progress other sorts of cases. That is not an abstract assumption. There is not an absence of evidence here: we have heard from those with judicial experience, as well as from international comparators such as New South Wales, where complex cases have been found to be 29% quicker when tried by judge alone. Let us be clear about what we mean in practice when we talk about long jury trials. Imagine someone being told they are required to serve on a jury in the Crown court, not for the typical two weeks’ jury service, but for at least several months. Imagine receiving that letter and that news. Although we are very grateful for people who do that—I know how willingly so many citizens participate in juries—I have, as the Minister for Courts, received lots of correspondence about the burden that lengthy trials can impose. If someone is self-employed or in insecure employment, the time away can mean a significant loss of income. If they are a carer, it can mean scrambling around to find, or having to pay for, alternative support for a loved one. Even for many in stable employment, it is not just inconvenient; it has a real impact on personal life and finances. That is why, as policymakers, we need to be proportionate and, dare I say it, judicious about how we use this special resource. Yes, I use the word “special”, and I do not resile from it—sitting on a jury is a special thing. However, we have to use that resource where it is right, proportionate and appropriate to do so. Reducing the need for members of the public to sit as jurors on very long and intensive trials means that fewer people will face that disruption and loss of earnings. The nature of crime and evidence has changed. It is no longer a couple of paper files and a handful of witnesses; Sir Brian Leveson is clear that modern cases of the sort we are talking about can involve vast volumes—terabytes—of digital material held on servers and hard drives, and highly complex financial records. All that complexity means that directing and explaining the evidence at the pace of the slowest juror, which is the pace that an advocate has to go at, presents additional delay. I am grateful to Sir Brian for making that point clearly in his report. The scale of “The Crown Court Compendium”, which is the guide that judges use to direct juries in criminal trials, is such that it now runs to some 560 pages, demonstrating the extraordinary time and effort that judges now need to devote to guiding juries in these complex trials. That support is plainly valuable and shows the great effort the system has already made to account for the huge change over the last couple of decades in the complexity of such cases. It also powerfully illustrates the real impact on timeliness, and Sir Brian’s observations only reinforce why it is right that we address the challenge head on. If it was true when Lord Justice Auld talked about the rationale for a judge-only trial in these sorts of cases over 25 years ago, it is certainly even more true now. As I have said, the crux of the legislation is not whether a judge or a jury is better at understanding evidence or ascertaining the honesty or dishonesty of a defendant; it is about being honest with ourselves about the time that we have, ensuring that trials run as efficiently and effectively as they can, and preserving jury trial for the cases where it makes most sense and matters most. It is important to remember that this is not wholly new territory. Our justice system already recognises limited exceptions to jury trial, most notably where there is a risk of jury tampering, and those trials are conducted fairly by a judge sitting alone. The clause does not bring about wholesale change to jury trials, which the Bill preserves for the most serious cases; it creates an additional, tightly defined and controlled, discretion for a small number of cases where the burden on jurors and court resources is excessive. It means that no case can be moved into the judge-alone route without a rigorous, transparent assessment against the statutory tests, with both the defence and prosecution having the opportunity to make representations, ensuring that decisions are fair and balanced. A case can only ever qualify if it involves a scheduled fraud or financial crime offence, and even then, a judge must first have ordered a preparatory hearing—something that happens only where a case is genuinely complex or lengthy. We have also drawn hard lines. The gravest crimes can never be heard under this policy. That is why we have carved out all indictable-only sexual offences and homicide offences, such as rape, murder and manslaughter, which are all excluded. If any such offence is added to a case, the order must be revoked and the case must be sent for a jury trial, without exception. Where a jury trial would be in the public interest, a judge cannot hear the case alone. The clause is about three crucial things. First, it is about making a reasonable ask of the public in respect of their important civic duties, and not asking them to bear a disproportionate burden on themselves, their jobs or their loved ones. Secondly, it is about taking every responsible option available to us to get the criminal justice system moving again, because justice delayed is justice denied. Thirdly, it is about modernisation. The world has changed, and the nature of these crimes and the evidence that is involved have changed. What made sense in 1971, or even 25 years ago, is not always what works best today. In that reforming spirit, the clause presents a modern, balanced and proportionate approach. It is exactly the sort of thing that is needed in the light of the current pressures on the system. For that reason, I commend clause 4 and schedule 1 to the Committee. Amendment 51 would remove the power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences in proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 by order, and the Government cannot support it. A fixed and closed list would not reflect the reality of modern crime. Fraud and financial offending continue to evolve rapidly, and new forms of criminality and new legislative offences across all aspects of crime will inevitably emerge in the coming years. If Parliament were required to revisit primary legislation every time a new, appropriately relevant offence was created or identified as suitable, that would significantly reduce the agility and effectiveness of this framework. Criminal cases are increasingly shaped by technological change, new technical and digital instruments, and increasingly sophisticated ways of handling evidence. A system that cannot adapt risks becoming obsolete almost as soon as it is enacted. I have heard concerns that this power amounts to Government overreach, and I want to be clear that it does not and that this is not an unconstrained Executive power. The schedule can be amended only via the affirmative procedure, which requires debate and approval by both Houses of Parliament. That ensures proper democratic oversight, while ensuring that the law can keep pace with the ever-changing nature of crime without unnecessary delay. This is not an unusual approach to criminal legislation. Parliament has adopted similar delegated powers elsewhere in criminal legislation, including provisions now consolidated in the Sentencing Act 2020. For those reasons, the Government believe that this power strikes the right balance between keeping pace with modern crime and remaining firmly anchored in parliamentary oversight. I urge the shadow Minister not to press his amendment to a vote.

I rise to speak in opposition to clause 4 and in support of amendment 51 in my name. I remind the Committee that this is not a new debate. As the Minister touched on, it is an idea that has been postponed, debated and largely rejected several times over the last few decades. Each time, the conclusion has been that the jury is not the problem in fraud cases, but a vital component of the solution. The Government’s current justification rests on two pillars: that fraud causes are too complex for ordinary citizens, and that removing the jury will create significant efficiencies to help clear the record-breaking court backlog. Although we all acknowledge the severity of the backlog, we must ask whether these specific measures are evidence-based or merely an attempt to appear tough on administrative delays at the expense of the right to trial by one’s peers. The Bill will allow a judge to order a trial to be conducted without a jury if they are satisfied that the complexity or length of that trial would make it a heavy burden on a jury. As the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion pointed out, it would be good to get clarity on whether a judge may make such a determination on the basis of complexity or of length individually, or whether they must do so on the basis of both complexity and length—that was a fair question. Complexity is highly subjective. For one judge, a case involving intricate cryptocurrency ledgers might seem manageable for a jury, but for another, it may seem impenetrable. By making the right to a jury trial contingent on a judge’s personal assessment of what a typical citizen can understand, we introduce an element of judicial lottery. Furthermore, fraud is fundamentally about honesty and dishonesty, which are concepts that ordinary people are well placed to judge. When we professionalise the verdict in fraud causes, we move away from a community-based standard of morality towards a technical, legalistic one that may lack the public’s moral buy-in. I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence provided by the City of London Law Society, which points out: “The government’s rationale for judge-only trials in ‘complex or lengthy cases’ rests on two assumptions: that juries struggle to understand complex fraud cases, and that judge-only trials will be significantly more efficient. Neither assumption is adequately supported by evidence. There is substantial research and practical experience demonstrating that juries, when properly directed and assisted with appropriate case management, are capable of understanding and deciding complex fraud cases. Modern trial techniques have been brought in to address issues that arose in the past, significantly enhancing jury comprehension. Juries have been involved in many hundreds of fraud trials, following the evidence and reaching rational decisions. The Leveson Review noted that in the Jubilee Line case (one of the longest running in British legal history and one which pre-dated many of the changes that have been introduced to help improve the jury’s understanding), jurors reported ‘a very good understanding of the evidence’, with ‘some commenting that it was not all that difficult’. More recently, in R v Hayes & Palombo, the Supreme Court opined that a properly directed jury would have no problem assessing dishonesty in the context of a complex financial service-related case. The assumption that juries cannot cope with complexity is unproven and patronising. It fails to recognise that juries regularly include individuals with professional expertise, financial literacy and analytical capabilities, and that issues of intent and dishonesty are familiar and well understood by the jury.” The society states that we should also note “that the cases that have been preserved for jury trial under the Bill are also likely to include complex expert evidence (such as forensic medical or science-based expert evidence or statistical analysis), which undermines the argument that complex trials should be left to a judge alone. The hypothesis that judge-only trials are more efficient also relies on the assumption that time will be saved by counsel not having to simplify evidence when presenting to a judge rather than a jury. However, this fails to take into account that, without the requirement to simplify charges and evidence, this is likely to encourage increased charging by the prosecution and increased applications for more complex evidence to be presented to judges.” While judges are experts in the law and legal matters, there is nothing at all to say that they are any more or less expert in cryptocurrency or complex financial matters than a member of a jury. In total, the society continues: “This will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of and time to produce written judgments.” In total, this will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of time to produce written judgments.

Importantly, the City of London Law Society has put forward alternatives, which are something that the Minister often presses critics of her reforms for. It suggests that we go further on written direction and aide-mémoire, and improve visual presentations and timelines for juries and provide them with glossaries of technical terms. It advises that structured verdict documents and regular judicial summaries during the trial are just some examples of ways in which the situation could be improved.

The society also points to the City of London fraud court, which is due to open, and will likely have a positive impact on the case backlog, opening up more capacity in the system to hear economic and cyber-crime cases. It would be good to understand, considering the small volumes that the Minister has talked about and how we are moving forward with that specialist court, what proportion of cases she thinks will not sit within that specialist court, where a case might be made that the complexity is even greater. I hope that she would agree that the specialist City of London fraud court, with or without juries, is well placed to hear jury cases.

The Minister pointed to measures that made it on to the statute book under a previous Government. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 allowed for the prosecution to make an application for trial without jury in serious and complex fraud cases, although it is important to note that this was never enacted. There is obviously a world of difference between a specific and unique application on a case-by-case basis for a trial without jury and the broad, sweeping measures that are before us today.

A significant concern regarding this proposal, which we covered in the debate on an amendment that was not passed, is the lack of a robust mechanism for a defendant to challenge the allocation to a judge-only trial. As it stands, the decision of a Crown court judge to sit without a jury is an interlocutory decision with no immediate right to appeal. We have talked previously about how that creates a procedural cul-de-sac. If a defendant believes that the judge has applied the complexity test incorrectly or has ignored a vital natural justice consideration, such as the defendant’s previous good character, they have no way to seek a second opinion before the trial begins.

Without a right of appeal, the allocation decision is functionally unreviewable. That is particularly egregious when compared with the magistrates court, where allocation decisions are subject to judicial review. The Bill as drafted, particularly as the Government have rejected our amendments, creates a lower standard of procedural protection in the Crown courts for these even more serious cases. If an allocation error is identified only on appeal after conviction, the resulting retrial will cost the taxpayer hundreds of thousands of pounds and add further delays to the system.

If we are serious about efficiency, we should look at where the system is actually failing. The Bar Council’s paper points to the low-hanging fruit of court logistics. One of the single greatest causes of wasted court time is the failure of prison transport. When a defendant is not brought from prison to the dock on time, the judge, lawyers and jury sit idle. We are contemplating the erosion of a fundamental constitutional right to save hours while simultaneously losing thousands of hours every year because of failing prisoner escort contracts. If the Government want efficiency, they should fix the vans before they dismantle the juries. Improving the infrastructure of our courts—from reliable transport to functioning digital evidence portals—will provide a much greater return on investment for the taxpayer without requiring the surrender of a single liberty.

Perhaps the most constitutionally alarming part of these provisions is that they allow the Secretary of State to expand the list of offences that they consider to be fraud and that will lead to complex and potentially lengthy trials, which are thus eligible to be judge-only, through secondary legislation via statutory instruments. That is why we tabled amendment 51. Without it, a future Government could broaden the scope of non-jury trials to include other complex areas—potentially even health and safety and cyber-crime—without a full parliamentary debate or the ability of the Commons to amend the proposals.

In a previous sitting, it was argued that the right to a jury trial is too fundamental to be left to the whim of a Minister’s pen. If we accept that fraud can be tried without a jury via primary legislation today, we are setting a precedent that the rest of our other either-way offences could be moved to the bench division via secondary legislation tomorrow. The boundaries of the jury system should be defined by Parliament in the most transparent and deliberate way possible. To relegate the future of the jury to the realm of secondary legislation is to treat a core constitutional right as a mere administrative detail.

In opposition to our amendment, the Minister argued that the Government need to remain nimble to the evolving nature of crime and offences. If the Government are creating new offences in primary legislation that respond to a need to change the law, they can use that opportunity, if they see fit, to amend schedule 1 through the same Bill they are using to create the new offences that the Government insist they need to be so nimble to—unless the Minister is suggesting that the Government plan to legislate for new offences through secondary legislation, which I very much doubt. We must resist this mission creep. Any expansion of judge-only trials, if it must happen at all, should require the highest level of democratic oversight, not a late-night Committee vote on a statutory instrument that is unamendable.

The proposal to remove juries from complex fraud trials is a solution in search of a problem. The Minister contested that the tests are legally defined, and then consistently used examples of trials of several months. It is fair to recognise that that is not typical; it is trials of weeks that are more likely to be caught up in this. The Minister thinks that it is well understood, but I have told her that “complexity” and other terms in the Bill are not already recognised in the courts with one understanding.

The tell, so to speak, that the Minister recognises that this is not quite as simple as she makes out is that she was unwilling to make any attempt to give some examples and define it more clearly. I think she knows that if she did so, she would probably become unstuck. The Minister also accepted that there will be a whole series of appeals and cases questioning how these measures are implemented, so to suggest that it is clear is not credible. I have highlighted that other jurisdictions were perfectly capable of more clearly defining what was meant in these circumstances than the Minister seeks to.

The Minister asked us to reflect on the fact that the Auld review also recommended similar measures around complex and lengthy cases, as the Leveson review has, but I remind the Committee that the Minister is in a pick-and-choose mode when it comes to listening to Leveson and Lord Justice Auld, because both recommended a judge with two magistrates, and the Government have rejected that proposal and are using just a judge. The Opposition are just as able to decide when we will or will not listen to the view of an expert as the Minister is.

The test for complexity is too subjective. The procedural safeguards are non-existent. The evidence for efficiency is weak, and the power to expand these measures through secondary legislation is constitutional overreach. If the Government are truly concerned about the backlog, let them invest in the mechanics of the court, fix prisoner transport, reform legal aid to ensure early guilty pleas and maintain the court estate. Those are the efficiencies that will actually work. Removing the jury from court fraud cases is an expensive, risky and ultimately ineffective distraction. We should maintain the jury as a permanent feature of the Crown court, not as an optional extra for the simple cases.

It will no doubt be a relief to Members to hear that I am not going to talk for quite as long as I did this morning. I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1 standing part, and I support amendment 51, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. As is becoming habit, I will begin with a very brief overview of what we are considering. Clause 4 and schedule 1 create a new framework for judge-only trials in certain complex or lengthy cases. The listed offences include fraud, tax evasion, false accounting, insider dealing, money laundering, terrorist funding, bribery and related offences. The court may order trial without a jury if it is satisfied that the likely complexity and/or length makes that appropriate, that it is not in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, and that there are no other reasons why it would be more appropriate for the trial to be with a jury. There would be no right of appeal against that decision. That is a serious and constitutionally significant change in its own right, but what makes it even more troubling is that it has been justified on the strength of a paper-thin theoretical benefit. The House of Commons Library states that the Government estimate clause 4 will save 200 Crown court sitting days. That is around 0.18% of current Crown court capacity, which indicates just how small the potential gain is—if there is that gain at all. That is the first and most obvious point I want to make. The Government are proposing a very serious encroachment on jury trials in return for a saving that amounts to just 200 sitting days. JUSTICE describes the change as “unnecessary,” says that it “will not impact the backlog in any meaningful way” and warns that it risks opening the door to restricting jury trials in other categories of case too. The Law Society is similarly clear: “Removing jury trials for serious fraud cases is unlikely to have a significant effect on the backlogs, but would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.” That should be the frame for the whole debate on clause 4. We are not being asked to approve some modest efficiency measure; we are being asked to displace the jury in some of the most important and contested criminal cases for an alleged benefit so small that, even in the Government’s own case, it barely registers against total Crown court demand. That trade-off is so poor that I refuse to believe the Minister, in her heart of hearts, believes it is the right way to proceed. The second point is that the case against juries being used in serious fraud and related cases has never really been made. In written evidence, the Law Society tells us: “Serious cases of any complexity, including serious allegations of fraud, must be presented by the prosecution in a way that is understandable, not only to the judge and jury…but also, in line with the principle of open justice, to the public.” It goes on to say: “They should be subject to effective case management to ensure they take only a reasonable length of time, if necessary, by reducing the number of charges”. In other words, the answer to complexity is to manage it properly, not to remove the jury. It is worth reminding ourselves that the issues juries decide on in fraud trials are factual, not technical—in particular, whether the defendant was dishonest. That is judged by reference to the standards of ordinary decent people. Twelve ordinary jurors are far better placed to decide that than a single judge alone. That goes to the very nature of fraud. Fraud is not merely an accounting or regulatory puzzle; it is an allegation of dishonesty, and dishonesty, by definition, is exactly the sort of question on which the community’s judgment matters. Who should decide dishonesty: a single professional judge, or 12 citizens applying the standards of ordinary life? In a democratic criminal justice system, the answer should remain: the jury. The evidence that we have does not support the idea that juries are what make these cases collapse, drag on or miscarry. JUSTICE’s written evidence points to the Southwark Crown court data gathered by His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, showing that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two per year lasting over three months and only two cases in total lasting over six months. That is important, because it rather punches the myth that these are all endless epics that juries simply cannot understand or follow. Rivlin’s evidence also says that jury trials compose a discipline that helps to keep fraud trials shorter. Without that discipline, judge-alone trials may end up running as long as, or even longer than, jury trials. More to the point, delays, collapses and miscarriages of justice in fraud are not caused by juries, as shown by R v. Hayes where convictions were quashed because of judicial misdirection, not because of anything the jury did wrong. That strongly refutes the suggestion that juries are the weak link in these cases. The Government have two problems here: first, they have not shown that such cases are generally too long for juries; secondly, they have not shown that juries are what is causing the failures when these cases go wrong. Unfortunately, that leaves the Government looking rather like they are indulging in ideological hostility to jury trials rather than evidence-based reform. There is also a wider constitutional point. The Law Society says, and I very much agree, that removing jury trials for serious fraud cases “would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.” These are often cases involving major companies, financial institutions, public markets, public money, terrorism financing, bribery and corruption. They are exactly the sort of cases where the public must have confidence that justice has not simply been done inside a closed professional world by one member of that same world. Fraud and related financial cases often concern the conduct of powerful, well-resourced and sophisticated defendants. In those cases, public confidence matters immensely. A verdict reached by a jury of citizens commands a kind of legitimacy that a judgment by a single judge does not carry in the same way. That is not a criticism of judges, but a recognition of why juries exist in the first place. They are there to not just decide facts but connect the administration of criminal justice to the public itself.

The Opposition support amendment 51. If the Government insist on retaining clause 4 and schedule 1, then there is a compelling case for removing the power of the Secretary of State to add further offences to the list by regulation. I am particularly concerned by that unconstrained power. If the Government have currently singled out fraud, money laundering and terrorist funding as the special class of lengthy and complex cases, there is no obvious stopping point. Terrorism, murder, rape and drug trials can also last many months and be highly complex, especially where there are multiple defendants or contested expert evidence.

If the schedule said complex and lengthy fraud cases, then the Minister might be able to argue that it is constrained, but the schedule is just “Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases”. It actually opens the door to any number of types of offence being added purely because they are complex and lengthy. I think of, for example, the Lucy Letby trial, which was clearly complex and lengthy, but something that clearly needed to have a jury in terms of public confidence. That could end up included by schedule 1.

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks. In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already “appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.” That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences. He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as “a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.” That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge. For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later. If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too. Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later. I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to. I urge the Committee to think about this carefully. We are taking important decisions for the future.

As I have talked about in earlier debates, uniquely in this situation we already know what the Lord Chancellor wanted to do. From leaks, we know that five years was the test, in terms of these proposals. The Opposition are being fair in suggesting that this is potentially the thin end of the wedge.

I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do. Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51. Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

I will speak against the inclusion of clause 4. It inserts part 6A in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which will allow complex or lengthy cases to be tried without a jury. My main opposition to the clause is that it is a pointless exercise by the Government that will in no way affect the backlog. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that the savings will amount to just 200 sitting days per year, which is a tiny fraction—0.18% of the current sitting days. The Government argue that these cases can continue for many months, thereby wasting jurors’ time or putting additional pressure on those called for jury service. However, data from Southwark Crown court, where the majority of fraud and other such cases are heard, shows that only one or two cases per year exceed three months, and only two between 2018 and 2024 went beyond six months. His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC has argued that jury trials impose discipline, which helps to reduce the length of fraud trials. Without that incentive, judge-alone trials may be as long as or even longer than jury trials. I alluded to this earlier, but jurors decide on issues of dishonesty and fact in these cases, which are not necessarily technical. Twelve jurors are therefore in a much better position to reach a decision. I also have grave concerns about the terminology of “complex” and “lengthy”. I know the Minister has said that the meaning of complex and lengthy are well understood in the judiciary. I would argue that a lot of people in the legal profession are pushing back against that assertion, and that the Bill does not provide clarity on what they should determine to be complex or lengthy.

The hon. Member is making a very good speech, but she is almost being generous. The wording in the Bill is not “complex”; it is “complexity”, which is a description, not even a value. The Bill is even vaguer than what the hon. Member is suggesting in her well-made point.

I thank the hon. Member for his point; he characterises me very well as being generous. I would also argue that the scope is expanded significantly if one of the offences that a defendant is charged with is fraud, money laundering or any of the offences that sit in that category. There can be 10 charges against a defendant, and if one of them is fraud, money laundering or terrorism funding, that entire case could be heard in a judge-alone trial. The Minister spoke very clearly about recognising the burden on jurors. She made a legitimate point, and it is certainly reflected in reality. Especially when jury trials do not run as we would expect them to run, the impact on jurors can be huge, especially for those who are self-employed or have caring responsibilities. As I mentioned earlier, I ask the Minister to go away and look at the Maxwell hours, which have been successful for longer cases. For a morning session, it means that those who are self-employed are able to commit to working in the afternoons. In some cases, it means that those with caring responsibilities know that they are going to get home at a reasonable hour. The Maxwell hours are used in lots of different areas, and could be the answer to retaining the key principle of jury trials in fraud cases, while still ensuring a better experience for jurors. Amendment 51 would prevent “the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.” The concern is that it would give unconstrained power over the list of offences that may be heard without a jury on the basis that cases are considered complex or burdensome for jurors. That rationale could easily be extended to lengthy murder, rape, or drug trials. As the shadow Minister mentioned, if the wording in schedule 1 specified fraud or that particular type of case, it would be a different matter. However, it does not; it just says “complex or lengthy”. The Minister makes the point that this is a complex area, and criminal offences are added all the time, but she also referred to the specific types of fraud cases. If she can include the provision of fraud in clause 1, that would provide a reassurance that there would not be additionality of scope. That is not to suggest that the current Lord Chancellor would be inclined to increase the scope, but a future Lord Chancellor may be able to extend the provision far beyond the huge change that the Government are already proposing. Trials for things like terrorism, murder, rape and drug offences can last many months. They can be as complex as fraud cases, and they can involve multiple defendants and expert evidence. On that basis, the arguments that the Minister has made do not stand. That is why I will be voting against clause 4.

How long is a piece of string? The unanswerable question. I could ask another question: is a 2-metre piece of string a long piece of string? If I asked you that question, Ms Butler, you would have a lot of questions for me before you gave your answer, yet the Minister thinks it is easy to answer the question, “Is a two-week trial a long trial?”. She thinks it is obvious and that a judge will be able to make a decision. She is not willing to put a definition on that, because she says it is evident in the way that the Bill is drafted. I look at the words in the Bill—which is all that a judge will have to make that decision. On length, it says that the judge will have to decide if the “likely length of the trial…makes it appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.” On complexity, they will have to decide whether “the likely complexity of the trial” is “appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.” It is even hard to decipher from that whether it means complex is good or bad for a jury. Complexity is just a description; it is not a value. This is incredibly unusual, novel and, I would say, badly worded legislation. Ordinarily, a provision of this sort would say something along the lines of: “If the court is satisfied that the length of trial is so long that it would make it unreasonable for a jury”. That would be more normal wording. The principle of reasonableness, while giving discretion and, some might argue, a vague term in the English language, is a well-tested word in criminal law and the English legal system. We know what reasonableness means; it is an objective test—“What would an ordinary person think is reasonable?” What about appropriateness? Does that mean appropriate to that judge on that day? Does it mean appropriate to a particular, theoretical juror? There is absolutely no guidance in Bill about how this novel word, “appropriate”, should be interpreted. Even when there are words in legislation such as “reasonableness”, which are backed by decades or even centuries of case law, the judge is very often given guidance in the legislation as to what is and is not reasonable.

My hon. Friend is making some powerful points. Hearing him read out what the law says brings home to me just how terrible this Bill is. Surely everyone can see that there is no clarity how it would work. Rather than there being any clear guidance, it essentially feels as though any judge can have their own view on complexity and length. We will end up with inconsistency and disputes and arguments about the approach. Surely, that could do the opposite of address the backlog by adding additional complexity and confusion to our justice system.

I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here. On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing. That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things—[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.

I talked before about how judges will look to what Ministers have said around a measure in trying to interpret it, so if a judge is not clear what was meant by this, and pulls up Hansard to read what the Minister has said, surely they will take from the fact that the Minister has talked about the disruption to a juror’s life that they should have that as the test. What is disruptive to one person’s life is very different from what is disruptive to another’s.

I agree with my hon. Friend; he actually pre-empts the point I am about to get on to. I thank him for taking me on to that. It should be fairly obvious to most people that there will be a wide range of views as to how much time a person can take out of their ordinary life, bearing in mind that people are not called for jury service at the drop of a hat. They are not told, “You must cancel all your plans next week”; there is a degree of warning. Most people take quite a wide view on how much time they can afford to give, depending on what is going on in their life. For some people, taking two weeks or even a week out is very disruptive. This theoretical person that the judge has to imagine would make an argument that it is appropriate that the trial should not take place with a jury, because they do not have a week in their busy life to just hand over. Alternatively, others may say that they see it as a civic duty and a fundamental contribution they make to society to be available for jury trial if called. Perhaps they have never been called and they have reached a ripe old age, and they are happy and prepared to take a month or two out of their life to devote to making a decision on whether someone is guilty.

Currently, when a person sits on a jury, it is understood that, outside of the most extreme circumstances, they will be there for as long as the case takes. However, if the public get the sense that they can debate what asks are reasonable or unreasonable, I would not be surprised if jury members, in trials that go on a little bit, start sending notes to the judge to complain. They might say, “This has gone on for a week, and I didn’t think I’d be here for that long. I understand that if a trial goes on for too long, it shouldn’t be heard by a jury. This is going on too long. Judge, will you look at that?” That will open a whole can of worms about something that at the minute is extremely constricted in people’s minds.

Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury? Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial. Even the Government are not willing to put a specific time value on that.

As my hon. Friend was speaking, it suddenly occurred to me that under our current system, jurors can already make that argument—that if sitting on a jury would be particularly disruptive, they should not have to do so. How does that interact with this measure? It feels like this does not make sense.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected. “Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury? I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers. Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted. If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate has given one example, but another, with which I expect people will be familiar, is the LIBOR trials. They were very complicated and sophisticated, and the appeals were successful because of a judge. It was the judge’s misdirection to the jury that led to the LIBOR trials becoming another example of cases collapsing. If anything, the evidence shows that it is the judges who are the issue here, not the juries.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Obviously judges are not infallible. That is not a criticism of judges—judges know that they can make mistakes. On the mindset of the person, I am unclear as to whether the Government or indeed anyone on the Committee, regardless of party, thinks that there is anything more complex than what is in a person’s mind—a mind that cannot be unlocked or opened. We can ask this person what was in their mind, but they want to be acquitted, so we must take a value judgment on whether they are telling the truth or not. Surely the most complex thing there can possibly be is what is in the mind of a human being. A very complex set of spreadsheets or cryptocurrency that only half of us understand is complicated, but there is perhaps nothing more complicated than the motivation and mindset of a human being. That is specifically what juries are for—to make that sort of judgment on whether it was reasonable for someone to do something. That is why we have 12 members, so that they must come to a view unanimously, or certainly as a large majority. A judge is not in a more privileged position—no one would argue that they are—to decide what is and is not reasonable. They are in a more privileged position to make decisions about the law, and indeed they do make decisions about the law in jury trials and direct the jury on matters of law. It is incredibly uncertain what “complexity” means. I know what the Minister thinks it means, and I do not criticise her. It is a perfectly reasonable view of what it means. My point is that it is not the only view. She thinks—I paraphrase; I do not seek to put words in her mouth—that it is complex financial evidence, presumably written evidence in many cases, in a fraud trial or crimes related to money. It is perfectly possible to have a great volume of evidence but, as the case unfolds, a detailed understanding of that paperwork may no longer be the issue on which the case turns. Does having a large volume of written evidence and a long list of witnesses make a case complex, or does it depend on what the witnesses might say or exactly what is in those papers? The Minister has spoken about juries moving at the pace of the slowest member. Is her test for complexity the mindset of the slowest member of a random 12 selected from the British public, or is it the average—one might say reasonable—person? She could help judges making this decision by setting that out in the legislation. This is not merely a theoretical, academic discussion on the criminal law of this country. I can point to another country. The Minister has taken pleasure in using other countries as examples to justify many provisions in the Bill, as though England and Wales can learn from other jurisdictions. I do not disagree with that premise. I will give her the example of New Zealand, another common-law jurisdiction. It has a similar provision, whereby a judge has to exercise a similar sort of decision making about whether a trial is likely to be “long and complex”, rather than its likely complexity. Set out in its legislation is a legal test. The Minister says that there is a test of complexity in the Bill. I tried to intervene on her to say that there is not. This is what a test looks like. The law of New Zealand directs a judge to consider, in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex, “the number and nature of offences with which the defendant is charged”. We understand what that means. It also directs them to consider “the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of the evidence likely to be presented” and “the imposition on potential jurors of sitting for the likely duration of the trial”. It has a catch-all, which is not unusual in legal drafting: “any other matters the court considers relevant.” The judge in New Zealand has a test to apply: whether the case is likely to be long and complex. There is absolutely no reason why the Government could not have included a test in the Bill—it does not have to be the same test—to assist the court and give certainty, which would help defendants and victims and would improve efficiency.

The Government and Labour Back Benchers have spoken about the experience of victims and have said that part of the reason for cutting the backlog is to reduce stress on them. There is nothing in this clause to say that the judge might want to consider the impact on victims or complainants when deciding whether to allocate a trial for a jury. Does that go to the heart of “complexity”? I think most people would say probably not. The Government could have included a provision to allow cases that would have a significant impact on the wellbeing of a complainant or victim not to be heard by a jury, given their view that jury trials are often longer, more unpredictable and more stressful. The Minister might like to address why the impact on the victim is not one of the considerations that a judge is invited to take into account when deciding allocation.

Amendment 51 seeks to curtail the extension of this clause. I have already spoken about how wide-ranging it is and the wide discretion that it gives judges in making allocation decisions with insufficient legal test, guidance or case law. At least let us leave that as the problem; let us not introduce the potential for a future Secretary of State to extend the provision to a whole range of other offences too. That would make the things that I have spoken about even more uncertain.

The Minister said that she effectively, although not exclusively, considers the issue to be lengthy financial documents. If the provision were expanded across sexual offences and others in future, with powers that a theoretical future Secretary of State might want to apply, that untested, unclear issue of complexity would become even more uncertain. Indeed, length would become even more uncertain if we are talking about a judgment about whether vulnerable or distressed witnesses should give oral evidence, with or without a jury.

It rather looks as though yet again we have a clause that, in the interests of trying to rush through legislation, has not been properly thought out. I cannot believe that the Government intend to introduce such vagueness into law. It is perfectly clear that they are trying to tackle the backlog—I do not criticise them for that—and that we simply disagree with the ways they are trying to achieve that, but I cannot believe that they intend this Bill to have so many loopholes and unintended consequences. By calling them unintended consequences, I am trying to be generous to the Minister and to the Government. I look forward, I hope, to hearing her try to deal with rather a lot of issues in the clause.

Several points have been raised in this debate. First, on the definition and the application of the eligibility test, when I was explaining the rationale behind the provision for judge-only trials in complex and lengthy cases—a realisation of one of the key recommendations of the independent review—I was talking about the importance of considering not just efficiency, but jury burden. While it is of course a relevant policy factor, I was not suggesting that that in itself is the test to be applied. The terms used in the legislation have been the subject of criticism from a number of hon. Members. I consider that those terms are straightforward and well understood. The notion of a complex case is used in other contexts. Currently, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Serious Fraud Office can send serious and complex fraud cases to the Crown court, subject to section 51B of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, so there is existing practice. Those are terms with which the judiciary are familiar. If it proves in due course that guiding factors and the Criminal Procedure Rules would be of assistance, that can be looked at. However, I do not think that the definition itself presents the cataclysmic problems that hon. Members suggest.

To make it really clear, what is the minimum length that the Minister thinks would constitute a lengthy case?

I am not going to second-guess how the judges will apply this. As I say, that is for the judiciary and the courts. I am not going to put an arbitrary time length on it; I do not think that is needed. The second point that hon. Members made was that the provision risks becoming too wide-ranging if a future Parliament or Secretary of State wishes to add to the offences. I addressed that point in my earlier remarks. I do not think that that is a real risk. Another point that has been made is that none of this will have much of an impact, because we are talking only about a narrowly defined set of cases. I fully anticipate that while the system gets to grips with the use of this legislation, there will be a very small number of cases to begin with, but these are by definition the lengthiest cases and they take up a large amount of the courts’ time. The savings that we are talking about, which are set out in the impact assessment, may sound modest, but in a system under extreme pressure those small shifts matter. Every case heard by a judge sitting alone—as was deemed appropriate in these sorts of case not just by Sir Brian but by Lord Justice Auld and others—saves valuable Crown Court and jury time that can be deployed to serious cases that need a jury. In the context of the emergency in which we find ourselves, I make no apologies for seeking every little impact. For all those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.

I just want to pick up on some points. The point about the scale of the issue was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, who pointed to 200 sitting days. She highlighted the criticism from others suggesting that the list of offences was “the work of a moment”, which is probably a fair description of what is going on. As we have heard, trying to understand what “complex and lengthy” means has proved difficult. A telling point was the Minister’s insistence that it will be obvious to judges. Other jurisdictions have set out a minimum in legislation, but as the person legislating she is not able or willing to give a sense of how long she has in mind. On her suggestion that judges are better placed to understand this stuff, I say with no disrespect that over 70% of judges are aged over 50. I think some apprentices I have met at IT firms in my constituency might have a better understanding of the issues relating to cyber-crime than some of our judges. The Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, made it clear that it is not a supposition, nor does it take extensive reasoning, to suggest that future Governments will be able to make use of these powers in exactly the way that we have described. That is not a matter for debate; it is about the statutory framework that has been put in place, which will definitely be available to future Governments on the basis of the maximalist, expansive approach that this Government have chosen. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East has explained how other jurisdictions have done a better job. We are looking into the details of the Bill here, but goodness knows what will happen when a Minister has to defend these proposals in the Lords, with the expertise and experience of its Members, who include retired judges. Given clause 4’s lack of appeal, its illogical approach to how fraud and non-fraud offences interact, the minimal savings, the flimsy evidence and the lack of definition, which we have covered extensively, the Minister in the other place will have a very difficult time if the Government do not start being a bit more open to the non-wrecking but sensible amendments that Opposition Members put forward. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

New Schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003

Amendment proposed: 51, in schedule 1, page 38, line 3, leave out paragraph 20.—(Dr Mullan.)

This amendment prevents the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question put, That the schedule be the First schedule to the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

I remind Members that the House has agreed that the Committee must conclude its work by 5 pm on Tuesday 28 April. We have just passed schedule 1. I have no power to impose a time limit on speeches, and it is for the Committee to decide on how to use its time, but I encourage Members to consider the length of their speeches and interventions in the light of the wish of all Members to consider the whole Bill and the amendments that have been tabled. Clause 5 Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4

I beg to move amendment 52, in clause 5, page 14, line 36, leave out subsection (5) and insert— “(5) The judgment must be given at the time of conviction, except where an adjournment is necessary for preparing— (a) pre-sentence reports, (b) psychiatric or medical reports, (c) victim personal statements, or (d) further legal advice relating to sentencing.” This amendment would ensure that judgments are handed down on conviction in all but the circumstances covered by the amendment.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Clause stand part. Amendment 58, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert— “(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 3 to 5 into force until he has— (a) commissioned an independent review to assess the length of time required for a judge sitting alone to deliver a judgment after conviction, (b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the review under subsection (3A)(a), and (c) made a statement to the House of Commons on the Government’s response to any recommendations from the review.” This amendment would stop sections 3 to 5 coming into force until the Government had an evidence base for how long these provisions might delay the issuing of judgments after convictions.

I rise to speak in support of amendments 58 and 52; I will start with amendment 58. We find ourselves at a significant juncture in the history of our legal system, and the Government have presented us with a Bill framed primarily as a pragmatic response to the current record-breaking backlog of nearly 80,000 cases in our Crown courts. The central justification for their reforms, specifically the restriction of the right to a jury trial, is efficiency; the Government argue that by moving towards judge-led trials, we can streamline proceedings and reduce the demand on the Crown court by almost 20%. However, when we are asked to curtail a right that has stood as a cornerstone of our democracy for more than 800 years, we must move with extreme caution. We must ask whether this fundamental change is based on robust data or merely an intuitive sense of speed and individual opinions. It is not only reasonable, but essential to ask the Government to conduct an independent formal study into the actual time savings achieved by judge-only trials before they are implemented. Amendment 58 focuses on one of the more easily measured elements, which could be properly studied. The Government’s case for reducing jury trials is predicated on the idea that it means the trials will be 20% shorter, yet when we examine the source of this figure, its foundation begins to look unstable. Sir Brian Leveson, whose review informed much of the Bill, stated that the estimate of a 20% reduction is subject to “very high levels of uncertainty”. He further stated that “seeking to model how much time would be saved is extremely difficult.” That point is reinforced by the Government’s impact assessment. Their attempt to quantify the time saving found that it was likely to be in the range of 10% to 30%—potentially half the time saving that Sir Brian claimed—and even that figure is born of what we might call a light-touch engagement session with judges and others, rather than rigorous comparative data. If the primary justification for stripping away a constitutional right is a 20% efficiency gain, then Parliament is entitled to see clear, verified evidence that that gain is actually achievable. While the Government promise a transformation of the system, independent experts argue that the actual time saved will be marginal. The Institute for Government has analysed the proposals and suggests that the judge-only trials in the new bench division might save only 1.5% to 2.5% of total Crown court time. Furthermore, the Criminal Bar Association has pointed out that the Government’s impact assessment assumes that the average length of a trial in scope is six and a half sitting days when, in reality, these trials typically last closer to three days. By doubling the realistic length of those trials in their modelling, the Government have likely overestimated the potential savings. When we look at these figures, we must ask whether it is right to curtail a fundamental safeguard for a gain that may be as low as 1.5%, when today alone we have 10% of Crown courts sitting empty for no other particular reason than a lack of efficiency. The Government’s efficiency narrative is focused almost entirely on the front end of a trial, the time it takes to empanel a jury and deliver legal instructions, and the time they claim is taken up by what some have described in evidence as playing to the jury. It ignores the back end of the process, the delivery of the judgment. In a jury trial, once the evidence is closed, the jury deliberates continuously and provides an immediate verdict of guilty or not guilty. Importantly, in that time, a judge can be otherwise engaged, hearing other cases and doing other work. From their perspective, the fact-finding phase is over instantly. A judge sitting alone does not have that luxury. To satisfy the requirements of transparency and guard against appeals, a judge must produce a reasoned judgment that addresses every point of law and fact. In other jurisdictions, delivering a verdict and providing those judgments can be reserved, meaning that they are written weeks or even months after the trial concludes. Unlike a jury, a judge has a full docket of other administrative duties. We risk a situation where the time theoretically saved is then lost through another route. Without a comparative study of what I will refer to as the judicial deliberation gap, we are making systemic changes based on an incomplete set of metrics. Additionally, because a judge’s written reasoning provides a detailed map of their logic, we are likely to see a significant spike in appeals. A jury’s verdict is difficult to appeal on the facts; a judge’s written judgment invites scrutiny for any minor error in law or logic, further clogging the higher courts. The Government have spoken frequently about the lack of availability of professionals within the legal system to hear criminal cases, and it will be the same KCs and others who will be stuck in the Court of Appeal on these cases, instead of being in the Crown court hearing cases from the backlog. For those reasons, we propose a simple, pragmatic pause. We are asking the Government to commission an independent study of the length of time required for a judge sitting alone to deliver a judgment after conviction. This is a matter of sequencing: evidence first, implementation second. In any other field, be it medicine or engineering, we would never implement a change of this magnitude without a pilot study or a comparative dataset. We picked this element as something amenable to study; there is nothing preventing the Government from commissioning a series of either sitting or retired judges to sit in the public galleries of trials happening in the ordinary way and then to go away and consider what reasons they would present and how long that would take. The Government could then measure and study the reality of that. Of course, that would vary from judge to judge, but a study with sufficient statistical power, with enough people taking part, could give us a genuine insight into how long these things will take. If the Government are confident that this process will be short and sharp and able to save time, I see no reason why they would not want to know it for sure before proceeding on that basis. If that study showed that that 20% saving was a myth, and that the time taken on the back end cancelled out any gains made during the trial, of course the reforms should be paused or reversed. We should not trade a system that works for one that merely looks faster on a spreadsheet. Jury trials are not an obstacle to justice; they are a safeguard against its abuse. It is important that we gather the facts and measure the actual time it takes for a judge to provide a reasoned judgment. If the evidence does not support the Government’s assumptions, we must have the courage to stop these reforms before we permanently damage one of our most valued constitutional inheritances. I now move on to amendment 52. As I have mentioned, we are debating the important element of reforms that are historic in their reduction of our access to jury trials. They are predicated on the idea that that is the sole and only way that we can tackle the backlog in the Crown courts. If we are to accept the Government’s claim that trials without juries are a tool for efficiency, we must hold the system to that standard. For that reason, it seems sensible and necessary to require that, in any trial without a jury, the judge must provide their verdict and their reasons immediately. Allowing a judge to delay their reasoning is not just a procedural flaw, but a logical contradiction that undermines the very efficiency that the Bill seeks to achieve. The Government’s most frequent argument for restricting juries is that they waste time due to the need to go slowly through the evidence and the unpredictable length of deliberations. The Government promise that a judge, as a legal expert, will streamline the process. However, that argument collapses the moment that a judge says, “I will give my verdict, but you will have to leave it with me while I go away and write it up.” The goal is to save time but, if there is a separate process that requires significant enough time that it cannot be done as part of the trial, where is the saving? In written evidence, we were warned of what might be called a bottleneck shift, where we might clear courtroom space more quickly, only to move the delay into the judge’s chambers. As the Criminal Bar Association points out, the reasonable time provision is currently too vague. I understand that it is not unheard of in other jurisdictions with judge-alone trials, such as Canada and New Zealand, for parties to sometimes wait months for the full reasons to be given for the verdict. By contrast, a jury provides a benchmark of finality. They do not go home to handle other business for a month; they deliberate while the evidence is fresh and stay until the job is done. As I pointed out earlier, while they are doing that, the judge is free to carry on with other matters. A case awaiting a verdict is a frozen case. It hangs over the court’s docket. It prevents the defendant from moving to the sentencing or appeal phase and potentially requires the judge eventually to relearn and reacquaint themselves with the full details of the case, perhaps weeks later. We are told that judges are professional triers of fact and that, precisely because of that expertise, we should be able to expect a system that reflects it. A jury of 12 people must be taught the law from scratch, whereas a judge, who already knows the law, should be taking structured notes and filtering and identifying relevant and irrelevant information in real time. By the time closing arguments are finished, a professional judge has been living with the facts and the law for days or weeks. They are in the best possible position to explain their logic at that moment. When a judge delays a verdict and the reasons for it, they are forced into double-handling the evidence, re-reading transcripts and notes to recapture their original thoughts. That is not efficiency—it is a waste of judicial resources. The requirement for immediacy is also a vital safeguard of the integrity of the law. There is potentially a subtle temptation for a judge who announces an initial verdict on a Monday, but writes the reasons for it on a Friday, to reverse engineer the logic of their original conclusions, even if inadvertently. Instead of the reasons leading the verdict, the verdict begins to dictate the reasons. The judge may subconsciously highlight only the facts that make their decision appeal-proof, rather than providing a raw, honest account of why they believed one witness over another. Members may well be familiar with the idea of confirmation bias; it is something that we are all affected by. If we make a decision and then come back to it at a later date, we have an inherent human failing of tending to dwell on, have our attention drawn to and be more mindful of things that reinforce our decision, rather than things that take away from it. Therefore, immediate reasoning ensures that judges are ruling on the evidence as it was heard. If the Government claim bench trials are superior because they are reason-based, those reasons must be robust enough to be stated out loud at the moment of verdict, forcing a level of intellectual honesty that is the only acceptable substitute for the collective common sense of a jury. Critics may argue that some cases are too complex for an immediate ruling. However, as some of the evidence suggests, very good reasons to delay should be defined strictly and should not include a busy schedule or a desire to write at another time. A very good reason should be limited to genuinely unforeseen situations. Indeed, as amendment 52 provides: “The judgment must be given at the time of conviction, except where an adjournment is necessary” for specific and well understood purposes, such as preparing medical or psychiatric evaluation reports, victim personal statements that were not available or that they sought to amend, or further legal submissions. However, the substance of why must be given when “guilty” or “not guilty” is uttered. The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot strip away, to a great extent, the historical right to a jury trial in the name of streamlining the system and allow that system to grind to a halt while a judge reserves a decision for days, weeks or potentially even months.

To ensure that the bench trial is a tool of justice rather than of administrative convenience, we must mandate immediacy. We should not trade a system that works for one that merely looks faster, as I said earlier. Let the judge speak when the evidence is fresh and the parties are present. A verdict without immediate reasons is not streamlined justice; it is opaque, slow and intellectually suspect. If a trial without a jury is truly about efficiency, that efficiency must be visible and present in the room.

As my hon. Friend the shadow Minister pointed out, there are a number of problems that not only arise with what clauses 3 and 4 try to do, but carry over to clause 5, which tries to replicate aspects of jury trials in trials that will not be heard by a jury because a judge has made an allocation decision. The problems with juries seem to be, as the Minister and the Government have articulated, time wasted through swearing in, the unpredictable nature of convening 12 people—with people sometimes dropping out—and the fact they can hear evidence only at certain times of the day, which makes the day for hearing evidence shorter. Of course, none of those things are new; they are things that have always existed with jury trials. Citing issues with juries that have existed since juries began, in order to deal with the more recent issue of backlogs, misses the point. The Government have taken measures to deal with the more recent issues with criminal cases, including the fact that evidence inherently takes longer, although that is the same with evidence that a judge has to consider, and that cases have become more complex because of evidence and technology. That also is true of cases that are heard by a judge only. The Government have made plenty of complaints and shared plenty of views about what they think of the previous Government. They have spoken about under-investment and caps on sitting days, things that they say they have addressed through allocating more sitting days and investing in the legal system. Surely, that is the remedy for their complaints. However, they have not been prepared to spend the time to assess that remedy, to see whether the benefits in reducing the backlog will be felt in the coming months and years. To take an inherent feature of the jury system—the jury itself—as a justification for doing away with it in certain cases because of more recent pressures for other reasons is neither logical nor fair. The problem with simply transferring all the provisions that would ordinarily happen in a jury trial to a trial that is decided by a judge alone, as clause 5 seeks to do, is that there are features of a jury system that cannot simply be replicated by a judge sitting alone. Let us remember that a jury decides the facts. It decides whether something happened and it decides what was in the mind of the defendant at the time in question. That is the preserve of the jury. It is for the judge, even in a jury trial, to decide the law, to direct the jury—where appropriate—and to decide issues of procedure. Some of the procedural issues or arguments about evidence, including about whether evidence is admissible or not, are decided by the judge in the absence of the jury. The jury is sent out of the room. Of course, that can make the whole trial last longer, but there is a very good reason for it. It is because sometimes the arguments that are made—for example, arguments about the admissibility of certain evidence—are in themselves prejudicial to the decision maker of the facts, which is the jury, or prejudicial to the way that they might decide the case. A judge might need to hear the contested evidence, or at least hear what it is about to decide whether it is admissible. A judge might decide that evidence is inadmissible because it is not relevant, or—this is where I go way beyond my legal expertise; I never practised as a criminal lawyer—because it might effectively prejudice the jury. We do not want the jury seeing that evidence, which is why they are out of the room. If the judge rules that the evidence is inadmissible, the jury come back into the room never having seen it, and the trial continues with the jurors’ minds unclouded by inadmissible evidence. However, when the judge is also deciding the facts—that happens, of course in magistrates courts, where the magistrates decide the facts and are guided on the law by a legal professional sitting in front of them—and indeed when a judge is deciding the facts and the law, and procedural issues and issues of the admissibility of evidence, then, if they take separate arguments or separate submissions from the defence and prosecution on whether an item of evidence is admissible or not, and they decide that it is not admissible because it would cloud the judgment of the jury or confuse the issues of the main trial, they effectively have to pretend that they never heard that prejudicial evidence, having decided that it is prejudicial. Judges are trained and professional, and have to do all this anyway in certain cases where a judge decides both—

We have already covered a fair amount of the same ground. The example that I gave a couple of sittings ago was in relation to judges considering contempt of court applications, where they themselves would have seen the offending behaviour and have to make a determination about it. Judges are well used to dealing with these issues, both in the criminal context and the civil context. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that?

I accept that judges can do all this, and indeed sometimes do all this. Surely, however, the Minister will accept that, given human nature, there is a limit to the extent to which a human being can be so well trained or so professional that they can simply disregard something that they have heard as though they had never heard it. Indeed, that is one reason why we have jury trials. It is also one of the leading reasons why in more complex cases or longer cases—in cases involving murder, or sexual offences, or in all those cases that have to be heard by a jury—we have a jury. It is to separate the decision makers of fact from the decision makers of law and procedure.

As we are touching on these issues, those of us on the Opposition Benches are happy to say that we have to work harder on judicial accountability and decision making, and we are not afraid to say that we think it is better that juries do these things, because judges err. There is an irony really, because at the heart of the Bill is another measure in relation to the powers that we give family court judges. My hon. Friend will know that the impact assessment says that the law at the moment basically says that judges already know—based on the law—that the welfare of the child comes before visitation rights. The Government accept that that is what the law says, but they do not trust judges to understand and accept that law. They want to introduce measures that further restrict judges’ decision making. The Government cannot have it both ways; they cannot introduce measures in the same Bill that are based on the idea that judges are not sufficiently enacting the law as written, and then say that we are wrong to have concerns about judicial decision making in these sorts of scenarios.

My hon. Friend the shadow Minister makes a good point, and we will get on to talking about the provisions relating to the family courts. In relation to this particular provision, the family courts are where we have a judge making a decision on very emotive facts and on procedure. But family courts are far more collaborative in nature. A judge’s role is also about straining to find consensus. That is very different from the criminal courts where, ultimately, a judge or a jury, depending on who is hearing the case, has to make a yes-or-no decision on innocence or guilt. That has wide-ranging and profound impacts, which sometimes turn on a knife edge on hard-to-determine evidence. That is different from the family court, where the intention is to try and find consensus, rather than making those decisions. Of course, juries are used in civil courts in some defamation cases. Again, it is where the value judgment on intention—why somebody made a statement about someone and whether they knew it to be false or not—of 12 ordinary people selected at random in this country is better than a judge’s decision making alone. My issue with clause 5 is that it simply sweeps all sorts of provisions in a number of existing clauses of different legislation passed at different times into judge-only trials when those provisions were designed for jury-led trials. Unless I have misunderstood, that seems to have been done through a set of Government amendments and elements of existing law that were not envisaged on the first drafting of the Bill. That possibly demonstrates the slightly rushed and painful nature of how we are having to deal with this legislation, with so many loopholes and gaps in it. I am happy to be discharging my duties, dissecting and scrutinising the Bill. I do not mind how long it takes because that is my job; it is why I am here and I am pleased to be doing it.

On that final point, we are all delighted to be here and perform the function of Government properly. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Exactly, and the company of all Members is a delight, as always. On a serious point, there is some suggestion that the Government are rushing the legislation through. I do not think that is right. Yes, the Government have a sense of urgency about gripping this problem. I make no apologies for that. The depth of the problem and the shameful delays demands that urgency, but it is not true to say that this is rushed legislation. We commissioned a two-part independent review of hundreds of pages. We took our time to consider how we would bring that forward in a pragmatic way that vindicated the evidence base that the IRCC had put together. Now we are scrutinising it in the usual and proper way, and it will take as long as it takes. I do not want the public to think that the integrity of the process is somehow compromised. I know it would not be under your chairship, Ms Butler.

I am going to respond to amendment 52. I will then turn to clause 5 and then to amendment 58. These provisions relate to the production of judgments. I have heard that there is a challenge around the time that may be taken to produce these judgments and at what point in the process such judgments are produced. I will make a general observation, which I have touched on before: one of the important safeguards in a judge-only context is the provision of reasons. As decision makers ourselves in different contexts, we know that the fact that we need to justify and provide a rational basis for our conclusion, particularly a conclusion as important as whether or not someone is guilty when that will have consequences for that person’s liberty, is a good thing.

It is suggested that this will lead to more appeals. Well, it will lead to more scrutiny for sure, because people will know why they have been convicted, or indeed acquitted. At the moment, one of the features of a jury trial is that they never know. Having spoken to complainants and participants in the system, sometimes not knowing how on earth the jury could have reached the conclusion it did having heard all the evidence can lead to a lack of closure. One of the guardrails and important safeguards in judge-only trials is the provision of reasons. Our judges, familiar as they are with the process of adjudication—that is what they are trained in—know well how to formulate reasons.

Amendment 52 would require judgments in judge-alone trials to be given specifically at the time of conviction, except where an adjournment is needed for sentencing-related documents to be prepared. We can see no particular reason why those specific documents would be necessary for the giving of reasons for a verdict. In fact, if those documents contained information that was not part of the trial evidence, those parts of the documents should not be taken into account when giving reasons for a verdict.

I understand the concerns that have been raised about the time taken to deliver a reasoned judgment, but I take Members back to what we heard at the oral evidence session, where a panel of senior judges, and in particular a former recorder of Liverpool, confirmed that they do not expect providing verdicts, including reasoned judgments, to take a long time. Indeed, Clement Goldstone said:

“I also do not accept that there will be additional time spent in the writing of judgments. The vast majority of decisions will follow the conclusion of the defence speech”.––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 76, Q161.]

The suggestion was that in the vast majority of cases, reasons could be given immediately.

The Bill provides that:

“The judgment must be given at, or as soon as reasonably practicable after, the time of the conviction or acquittal.”

It provides for the vast majority of judgments to be handed down at the time of conviction or acquittal, not least because that makes practical sense. It also serves the benefit of some of the reasons of timeliness that the shadow Justice Minister pointed out. The “reasonably practicable” qualification is necessary, as recognised by the judges at the oral evidence sessions, and indeed by this amendment, because there are times when judges might need more time for detailed consideration. However, limiting that to scenarios where sentencing documents must be produced does not make sense in our view. I am confident that our judiciary can determine when a judgment might be reasonably and responsibly delivered. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw amendment 52.

Clause 5 is a technical but essential provision. Its purpose is to ensure that the statute book works with coherence and consistency where a Crown court trial is conducted without a jury under the new judge-alone provisions inserted by clauses 3 and 4. Many of the Acts cited in this clause currently refer explicitly to a “jury”, a “jury’s verdict” or a “jury’s finding”. Where Parliament provides for a trial to proceed without a jury, it is imperative that the law makes clear beyond doubt who is performing those functions instead. This clause ensures that, in judge-only trials, those functions are exercised by the court, and that the court has the same powers and jurisdiction it would have if a jury were present.

As part of this we are ensuring that judges provide those reasoned judgments, setting out how they reached their verdict. As I have said, that is an important safeguard against arbitrary decision making and is crucial to enhancing transparency. That extends to the existing judge-only provisions, such as in cases where there is a real risk of jury tampering. This clause is essential to ensure that these obligations apply consistently across all legal frameworks for judge-alone trials. Without these consequential amendments, there would be legal uncertainty and inconsistency, with existing legislation continuing to assume the presence of a jury where one was no longer sitting.

This clause does not expand the circumstances in which judge-alone trials may be appropriate under the new provisions introduced by clauses 3 and 4, nor does it affect who is eligible for trials by judge alone. It provides the necessary support to operate the new provisions established by clauses 3 and 4. Its only function is to ensure that, where Parliament has decided that a trial may proceed without a jury, the surrounding legal framework is consistent and operable. As such, I commend clause 5 to the Committee.

Finally, I come to amendment 58, which would prevent the commencement of clauses 3 to 5 unless and until the Lord Chancellor had commissioned an independent review into the length of time required for a judge sitting alone to deliver a judgment following conviction, laid that report before Parliament and made a statement to the House of Commons setting out the Government’s response. The shadow Minister will be unsurprised to hear that the Government cannot support that approach; we quite simply do not have that time at our disposal. Any pilot in this context would require primary legislation. As I have said, the Government inherited a justice system in crisis with a record and rising backlog. Without immediate action, including bringing these reforms forward as soon as is reasonably practical, the situation will continue to spiral far beyond the point of recovery, and we cannot let that happen.

I understand the challenge and concerns about timing, but we have heard from experienced judges how that is likely to work. Providing judgments will replace work that judges already have to do in jury trials. They will no longer have to give summing up remarks; those take time and, as we have heard, involve explaining the law to the jury, setting out the prosecution and defence’s cases, and summarising and giving directions on how to assess evidence—in essence, providing the route to verdict. That is time already taken up in our current constitution. That exercise is relevant to the preparation of an eventual reasoned judgment that would need to happen; it does not materially add to the time that would be taken.

This Bill says that judgments must be delivered at, or as soon as is reasonably practical after, the time of conviction or acquittal. It anticipates that, in the majority of cases, judgments will be delivered at that time. I am confident that our judiciary can determine when a judgment might be responsibly delivered.

The Crown court backlog is at a record high. Everyone in the system—victims, witnesses and defendants—is already waiting too long for justice. In that context, the Government do not believe that it is responsible to delay the commencement of clauses 3 to 5 pending the commissioning and completion of a further review, particularly when we have the views of senior and retired Crown court judges who have been clear that they do not expect the delivery of judgments to involve significant delay. Sir Brian Leveson considered the matter in part 1 of his review and was clear that he did not anticipate that such judgments would need to be lengthy or even in writing. For that reason, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

I want to pick up on a couple of points the Minister made, particularly the one that our amendment, in relation to a study, would require primary legislation. That is simply not the case. We specifically identified an element that could be studied without a need to change the law. No law would need to be changed to allow some retired or sitting judges to sit in on a court case and provide the judgment that they would have given had they been hearing it. No legislation is required for that. The Minister leans heavily on the experienced judges who agree with her, but more than 3,000 legal professionals, including senior retired judges, disagree with her. And of course, to move away from opinions, the Government’s own study, which attempted to turn opinions into a quantitative exercise, found that the savings could be half those that Sir Brian Leveson said are achievable. It found that they could be between 10% and 30%, whereas Sir Brian said they would be 20%. The Minister said that time would be saved on summing up. I sincerely hope the defendant will get to hear the same things a jury would have got to hear. If they do not, I suspect we will see a further increase in appeals. The Minister spoke about the time taken. A Bill that will have a seismic impact on our legal system has been introduced without a public consultation or pre-legislative scrutiny, and the Committee time has been less than that given to the Railways Bill. As I understand it, the Bill has been given roughly the same time as the Salmon Act 1986, which introduced the offence of salmon handling, so it is reasonable to ask whether it has been given sufficient time. If the Minister thinks there will be no real gap in time in terms of judgments, there is no reason for the Government to oppose amendment 52, which says that those should be immediate. Given the controversy and the varying opinions from experts on both sides of the debate, a non-legislative study is a perfectly reasonable thing for the Opposition to ask for. We will press amendment 52 to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ court

I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 6, page 15, line 28, after “regulations” insert “made under the affirmative resolution procedure”.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 13, in clause 6, page 15, line 36, leave out lines 36 and 37. This amendment provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months. Amendment 21, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert— “(1B) Regulations under this paragraph are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.” This amendment would make changing the general limit on custodial sentence for an eitherway offence in magistrates’ courts changeable by affirmative resolution only. Amendment 53, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert— “(1B) In paragraph 14A(3), for “negative” substitute “affirmative”” This amendment ensure regulations to extend magistrates’ courts sentencing powers must be approved by both houses of Parliament. Amendment 71, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert— “(1B) In Schedule 23 to the Sentencing Act 2020 (powers to amend the Sentencing Code), in paragraph 14A (general limit on magistrates’ court’s power to impose custodial sentence), omit sub-paragraph (3).” This amendment is consequential upon Amendment 34.

Amendments 34 and 71 are probing amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Abtisam Mohamed). I will not be asking for them to be put to a vote. Amendment 34 concerns magistrates’ sentencing powers. The amendment would remove the word “regulations” and insert “made by the affirmative resolution procedure” to prevent significant changes from being made to the sentencing powers of magistrates courts without a proper debate and vote in Parliament. If such changes are to be made, Parliament should fully discuss their impacts. Amendment 71 is consequential on amendment 34. Clause 6 increases magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months. In my opinion, and in the opinion of many people, that represents a restriction on appeals. If sentencing powers are increased while access to appeals is reduced, which is what is being done in clause 7, the risks to fairness in the system are significantly heightened, particularly for those without legal representation, given that the rules for legal aid in the magistrates court are very different from those in the Crown court. For those reasons, the Bill raises fundamental questions about fairness, trust and the proper functioning of the justice system. The solution to delay is not to remove our historical safeguards, but to fix the system. I ask the Minister to consider whether it is right to give the magistrates court the power to impose sentences of 24 months, which is a considerable period. If that is being contemplated, there should be a proper debate and a vote in Parliament; it should not be put through on the nod.

Amendment 13, which was tabled in my name, provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months, which would keep the Bill in line with Leveson’s suggestions. The Government have failed to take into account the impact that increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers will have. Magistrates’ backlogs are increasing, and magistrates courts are not set up to take on more complex cases. The Government are also making some bold assumptions about the speed at which magistrates can clear these cases. They have their own backlog to face, which stands at 379,000 cases and increasing. That is a 17% increase on the previous year, which comes alongside a major cut to the number of magistrates over the past decade or so, from 28,000 to just over 14,000. Removing the power of defendants to elect, plus the changes in sentencing powers, will increase the workload of magistrates courts, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Magistrates will be required to deal with more complex cases despite the summary nature of their jurisdiction. Either they will be unable to handle those cases and will send them to the Crown court, or they will risk delivering poor-quality justice, which would let down victims and defendants alike. The cohort affected by this change consists by definition of defendants expected to receive a prison sentence of between one and two years. The impact assessment shows that the Government assume that each of these trials in the magistrates courts will be completed within just four hours. The impact assessment also assumes that cases involving a guilty plea will take just 30 minutes. Either the impact assessment is incorrect or these cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve. Our other amendment, amendment 21, would make changing the general limit on custodial sentences for either-way offences in the magistrates court possible by affirmative resolution only. It is very similar to amendment 34, which the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden spoke to on behalf of her hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central. The amendment would ensure that any changes to magistrates’ sentencing powers—if amendment 13, to limit their powers, is not passed—is subject to the affirmative procedure. It would give greater parliamentary oversight, as all changes would have to pass through a Delegated Legislation Committee. Leaving that to the discretion of the Lord Chancellor is not a strong enough condition; it does not provide enough scrutiny or protection against rogue actors. The measure was also recommended by the Law Society of England and Wales. It would provide just that protection, and would ensure that Parliament would have and maintain its say in matters.

I will speak as quickly as I can. I support the amendments tabled in this group by the Liberal Democrats, which would limit any increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates beyond 12 months; amendment 34, which was moved by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden; and the Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments that would ensure that, if that limit is not accepted, any further changes are made by the affirmative resolution procedure. I am sure we will all remind the Minister that Sir Brian Leveson specifically made his reforms to jury trials contingent on not increasing the sentencing powers of magistrates. He stated that specifically in paragraph 71 of his report. He also stated: “My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months.” That followed, in paragraph 70, another important caveat that the Government seem to have overlooked: “While removing the right to elect for certain offences may streamline the judicial process and alleviate the burden on the higher courts, it raises concerns about balancing the right of the defendant with the broader interests of justice.” We have to admit that the Government are taking a risk with the moves they are making. The magnitude and volume of that risk increase with the number of extra cases that are pushed to the magistrates courts through other provisions in the Bill, while the consequences of that risk increase with the higher sentences made possible under clause 6. This is not a step we should take alongside those other steps. They increase the risks to justice. In oral evidence, we heard from Claire Davies, the leader of the south eastern circuit, who said of magistrates courts: “There are errors and mistakes made, but if the length of sentence is extended, it will potentially increase that risk.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 51, Q99.] We also heard from Emma Torr, from APPEAL, who described “swift and speedy justice in the magistrates court. It is often rough and ready; we are talking about cases being tried by lay justices, some of whom may be experienced but some may not be, and we are also talking about less experienced judges. You often find in the lower court, the magistrates court, that advocates are more inexperienced and tend to be at the start of their career.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86-87, Q185.] This point was also emphasised by Fiona Rutherford, the chief executive of JUSTICE, who said: “There is a question mark about the accuracy of the way in which magistrates are making decisions.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 82, Q174.] These are the risks we are talking about compared with having a judge and jury. Risks also come from the surrounding bureaucratic situation, which could lead to more defendants being unrepresented. When the shift is made, we will be leaving them without legal aid, because of the changes in the income requirements. We heard from Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE that without this representation there could be additional risks to victims. The Minister needs to admit that this part of the Bill goes too far. On top of the other things she is doing, she is adding more consequence, not just more volume, to the risk equation. That is a poor step to take. Clause 6 should not stand part, and I support all the amendments.

I rise to speak to my amendment 53 and to amendment 13, tabled by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester. Clause 6 includes a provision that seeks to expand the Secretary of State’s power to vary the maximum custodial sentence that may be imposed by magistrates courts for triable either-way offences. At present, the general limit for such sentences stands at 12 months, having been increased from six months in 2022. The Bill proposes that we allow that limit to be further increased, by way of regulations, to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government frame that as a necessary tool for operational flexibility, it represents a significant extension of the custodial powers of our magistrates courts. The central question we must address is not merely whether the powers should be increased, but how such a decision should be scrutinised by Parliament. The Bill allows the changes to be made under the negative procedure. Through amendment 53, we propose that any future exercise of the power be subject instead to the affirmative procedure, requiring the explicit approval of both Houses of Parliament. As I have said, I also support amendment 13 from the Liberal Democrats, which says the powers should not be increased full stop. Increasing the maximum custodial sentence a court can impose is not a minor or technical adjustment; it is a substantive change in the fundamental balance of our criminal justice system. When we discuss the power to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years, instead of one, we are discussing one of the most serious powers the state can wield. Magistrates courts are designed for summary trial, which is a process intended for the swift disposal of less serious, low-level cases. Allowing that framework to pass two-year sentences is a major shift. As laid out by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, the evidence we heard explained that such an expansion will mean that more serious and complex cases will be dealt with by lay justices. For a change of this magnitude, the negative procedure provides an inappropriately low level of scrutiny. To understand why the affirmative procedure is necessary, we must look at the mechanics of parliamentary oversight. Under the negative procedure, a statutory instrument is usually made by a Minister and becomes law immediately upon being laid before Parliament. It remains law unless either House successfully votes to annul it, through a process known as praying against an instrument, within a set 40-day period. In reality, the power to object is rarely used and even more rarely successful. I understand that the House of Commons has not successfully prayed against a negative instrument since 1979, and the House of Lords has not rejected one since 2000. The procedure essentially relies on the absence of objection to grant legitimacy to a change in law. In an area as fundamental as the power to imprison citizens for extended periods, Parliament should not rely on a lack of noise to signify consent. It must require explicit, recorded approval. The affirmative procedure provides a much more robust safeguard. Under that route, a statutory instrument is laid in draft and cannot become law until it has been actively debated and approved by both the Commons and the Lords. That ensures that the Government must stand at the Dispatch Box, in the same way the Minister has been doing all week, in a Committee Room just like this, and openly justify why the increase in sentencing powers is necessary and proportionate. That level of scrutiny is essential, because the Government’s current justifications are contested. The Government argue that the powers will allow more cases to be retained in magistrates courts, thereby reducing pressure on the Crown court backlog. However, independent bodies such as the Institute for Government have noted that assumptions about time savings in magistrates courts are highly uncertain. There are serious concerns that magistrates courts, which already face their own peak backlog of over 370,000 cases, simply do not have the capacity to absorb that work. Although the provision in clause 6 will not lead to an immediate increase in sentencing length, it is reasonable to assume that the Government would not have introduced it if they did not have some intention, at some future point, to increase the sentencing powers available to magistrates and therefore to retain more cases in the magistrates courts. We must also consider the differential quality in justice administered under the expanded powers. As we have heard, critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for—[Interruption.]

Order. I suspend the Committee for 15 minutes for the first vote and 10 minutes for each subsequent vote. I aim to resume at 8.25 pm.

Sitting suspended for Divisions in the House.

On resuming—

[Christine Jardine in the Chair]

Thank you, Ms Jardine, for taking the Chair as we continue this later sitting. Before we suspended, we were debating my amendment 53 to clause 6 in relation to the use of the negative procedure rather than the affirmative procedure to change sentencing powers. I was talking about the importance of considering the nature of the justice delivered in the magistrates court when making changes to the powers of that court. As I have said previously in Committee, the fact that we have some criticisms of elements of the magistrates court does not mean it should be got rid of—we accept that these must be balanced measures—but it is important for us to consider that when expanding its powers. Critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for what they describe as “rough justice”. The procedures in magistrates courts are streamlined. For example, the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that even these more serious trials will be completed in a matter of hours. Furthermore, there is a significant disparity in access to legal representation. The income threshold for legal aid in magistrates courts is much lower than in the Crown court. That means that a defendant who would have been eligible for a publicly funded lawyer in the Crown court might be forced to represent themselves in the magistrates court, even when facing a two-year prison sentence. If we are to allow a system where unrepresented defendants face longer custodial terms in shorter hearings, that decision must be subject to the highest level of parliamentary debate. It is also worth noting that the Government’s proposals depart from the recommendations of the very review they claim to follow. Sir Brian Leveson, in his independent review of the criminal courts, recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument of any kind should actually be repealed. He suggested that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent, rather than leaving it as a “variable” that the Executive can adjust. Crucially, when we have previously raised the question of the Government varying from Sir Brian’s recommendations, the Minister has prayed in aid Sir Brian saying that the Government could go further in some circumstances. This could not be further from that. He said that the reforms he recommended were “contingent” on the Government also introducing a power to cap the sentences that could be passed by magistrates. The use of Sir Brian as evidence of opinions across the board is reaching farce now. We have the Government disagreeing with Sir Brian on whether there should be a judge and two magistrates, disagreeing with Sir Brian over the maximum sentence for triable either-way cases in the magistrates court, and now they are directly opposing what he wanted them to do in relation to magistrates’ sentencing powers. It is important that we read what Sir Brian said: “My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months. Furthermore, I recommend that the legislation be amended so that the Lord Chancellor no longer has the power to reduce the maximum to six months via a Statutory Instrument. The 12-month maximum should be made permanent.” Here we have another example of the Government wanting us to set aside all our concerns about the erosion of jury trial rights on the basis of Sir Brian’s expertise and experience, at the same time as ignoring it themselves. If the Government intend to move in the opposite direction of expert legal advice, it is only reasonable that they be required to obtain explicit approval from Parliament through the affirmative procedure every time they seek to do so. We must look at the cumulative impact of the Bill. While clause 6 increases the power of the magistrates courts at the front end, clause 7 restricts the right to appeal those decisions at the back end. The Bill replaces the automatic right of appeal and full rehearing with a permission-based model. That creates a clear and troubling shift: more power is being exercised at the lower level, while the ability to challenge those decisions is being constrained. With around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts currently successful, it is clear that the system is correcting a meaningful level of error. Increasing sentencing powers while simultaneously narrowing the mechanisms for correcting those errors is a double blow to the rights of defendants. The combined effect makes it even more imperative that any increase in power is not snuck through via the negative procedure. As we have heard from other Members, there is a backlog in the magistrates courts of 379,000 cases. Anything that increases their workload will potentially have adverse consequences. In summary, increasing the maximum sentence in magistrates courts is a major constitutional change that affects the liberty of the citizen. It is not a matter of administrative convenience that should be left to the fast track of the negative procedure. If the Government are confident that increasing the maximum to 18 or 24 months is the correct solution to the backlog, they should have no objection to making that case openly and seeking a positive vote of approval from both Houses. We must ensure that our fundamental rights are not treated as administrative details to be checked off on a spreadsheet. For those reasons, I support the proposal that any future increase to magistrates’ sentencing powers must be subject to the affirmative procedure, as well as other amendments that seek to constrain the Government’s actions in this regard.

I support the position of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. There is a degree of cross-party support on the Opposition Benches; we heard some very good submissions from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, which seems a while ago now. The Government’s position on many of the contentious issues in Committee has been anchored on Sir Brian Leveson’s report—indeed, why would it not be? It is an independent report that the Government commissioned. But they freely depart from his recommendations, seemingly on a whim, without any substantial justification. This is one of those cases. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that magistrates should continue to have sentencing powers only up to a year, and the Government are effectively doubling those sentencing powers. This is about more than just sentencing powers; it fundamentally changes what magistrates courts are for and how our criminal courts are structured. The Crown court, whether sitting with only a judge or with a jury, is for more serious cases, with more serious sanctions, because it is able to deal with levels of complexity, be it in relation to evidence or procedure. We have heard about “rough and ready” justice in the magistrates court. That is not a criticism; it is a way of characterising the absolute foundations of our magistrates courts. They do a huge amount of criminal work in this country, but they are meant to be summary courts; they are meant to be courts that act quickly and do not have the rigour or probity of the Crown courts. That is their particular purpose, and it is therefore right that they have always had limited sentencing powers when it comes to deciding whether to lock someone up. Fines and community orders are the sort of sentences that are far more typical of magistrates courts. Depriving someone of their liberty is a very serious matter. It is one thing to deprive someone of their liberty for months, especially given that such sentences are often reduced—in practice, a year can be reduced to months—but it is another thing to deprive someone of their liberty for two years. That would suddenly make the magistrates courts’ summary-style justice, or rough justice—call it whatever; I do not mean any of those words as a criticism—incredibly inappropriate for the powers that the Government would like them to exercise. The clause therefore does much more than just fiddle with thresholds, or however the Government might want to characterise it—we will soon find out. It fundamentally alters what magistrates courts are for.

I remind the hon. Member that magistrates in the youth court are able to impose sentences of up to two years, and that in its written evidence, the Magistrates’ Association states that it asked for and welcomes the increase to up to 24 months in the sentencing powers of magistrates courts. Does he recognise that?

I recognise evidence, but I give greatest weight to Sir Brian Leveson, the author of the independent report commissioned by the Government. As the hon. Lady knows very well, the youth court is a very different beast, because a different set of principles and rules applies to cross-examination, evidence and so on for people who are of the age of minority. Simply to say that if the youth court can do it, then the magistrates court can do it for people over 18 is a slightly off-the-cuff argument, if I may say so; it does not really have any rigour at all. Allow me to return to my line of argument about magistrates courts. If there is a genuine intention and belief that magistrates should be able to impose sentences of up to two years—as I say, in my view, that fundamentally changes the nature of the court—then that should be met with provisions that make the process in the magistrates court more rigorous. I would not agree with that, but at least it would hang together, show consistency and demonstrate an intention that justice must be delivered in a process that is commensurate with the sanction the state is looking to impose on someone. There is no greater sanction in this country than depriving someone of their liberty and locking them up. In this case, it is more than a threshold argument; the Bill is fundamentally changing what magistrates courts are for, what Crown courts are for, and the difference in procedure between the two.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Jardine. Amendment 34 would ensure that the negative procedure—what I call the back route—cannot be used to allow magistrates courts to take away people’s rights for up to 24 months; it would require a proper debate and a vote in Parliament.

When we were having all the various debates about legislation as we were exiting the European Union, we in the Opposition, among others, argued that the Government should not use Henry VIII provisions to essentially sweep changes along and make laws without proper debate. The then-Government were rolling up a whole lot of legislation into one and essentially bypassing parliamentary oversight. We argued against that at the time, but we are now doing something similar, so I ask the Minister to reconsider.

My hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley mentioned that the youth court can sentence someone to up to two years’ imprisonment. There is one big difference: youth courts often deal with indictable offences. Some of those youngsters are charged with really serious offences that would go straight to the Crown court if any adult were charged with them, so magistrates in the youth court are specially trained to deal with them, and in that context a two-year maximum sentence is manageable and acceptable. However, in a magistrates court, which is supposed to deal mostly with summary offences or either-way offences to which people have pleaded guilty, 24 months is a long period.

Sir Brian Leveson recommended that a case should be heard by the Crown court bench division, with no right to a jury trial, only if it carried a potential sentence of 24 months or more. To change the maximum sentencing period in the magistrates court without proper consultation and debate in Parliament is a fundamentally wrong way of looking at these cases. Serious changes to the law should be properly debated and scrutinised, not just nodded through, which does not set a good precedent for our parliamentary democracy.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central and the hon. Members for Bexhill and Battle and for Chichester for tabling the amendments in this group. In addressing them, I will seek to cover the principal arguments that have framed the debate: first, the impact of the clause on the magistrates court and the suggestion that it carries a risk of overburdening the court; secondly, the critique that because the clause departs from the recommendations of the independent review, somehow it is not a tenable or viable way to proceed; and, thirdly, the procedure through which magistrates courts’ sentencing powers may be varied. By having the ability to vary magistrates court sentencing powers by statutory instrument using the negative procedure, the Government can respond flexibly to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures on the criminal justice system. Magistrates court sentencing powers have been amended using the negative procedure for this very purpose in the past, including to mitigate pressures on prison capacity in 2023, and to address the Crown court open caseload in 2024. Requiring changes to magistrates court sentencing powers to be made using the affirmative resolution procedure would constrain the Government’s ability to respond efficiently to pressures across the criminal justice system. It would mean that reductions in magistrates court sentencing powers, such as the 2023 decrease in response to prison capacity pressures, would also be subject to the affirmative procedure. The ability to vary sentencing powers using the negative procedure is an important mechanism, which enables the Government to act with the speed and certainty of timing that the affirmative procedure does not so readily allow. We consider it proportionate and consistent with existing practice for the level of magistrates court sentencing powers to be adjusted by secondary legislation, within the limits that have already been set by Parliament, using the negative procedure. The negative procedure enables timely adjustments while still ensuring parliamentary scrutiny in the period following the statutory instrument being laid. In that respect, I ask the hon. Members to withdraw their amendments. On amendment 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, Sir Brian’s recommendations have, as I have said previously, been critical in informing the Government’s thinking. I do not seek to suggest that clause 6 formed a specific part of his recommendations, but he invited the Government to consider the sorts of measures necessary to address the backlog. As the impact assessment demonstrates, on the Government’s modelling, which has been externally quality assured and verified, extending magistrates court sentencing powers to 18 months would produce a saving of some 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That is hugely significant. To be candid, part of the reason why the Government are introducing this measure is not simply a vote of confidence in our magistrates court and what we think it can cope with and deliver, but because it will enable us to bring down the backlogs quicker. That is the rationale. Although it is an extension, and goes beyond what was recommended by the independent review, we think that it is justified in the circumstances. We have therefore decided to introduce powers that would enable magistrates court sentencing powers to be extended either to 18 months or up to 24 months. Those powers provide flexibility to extend magistrates court sentencing powers in the future to respond to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures on the criminal justice system. The Crown court is facing significant pressures, and many triable either-way cases currently heard and sentenced there can be dealt with fairly and expeditiously in the magistrates courts. Lord Burnett, former Lord Chief Justice, told us in Committee that he had spoken publicly on many occasions about his personal belief that there is need to rebalance the work between the magistrates court and Crown court, and this measure is, in part, a way of doing that.

If we are increasing the sentence in the magistrates court, I would imagine the Minister will agree that, in some situations, we are increasing the complexity of the case. For example, a sexual assault case could be quite complicated and require, in order to look after the alleged victim and make sure their wellbeing is managed, four consecutive days of sitting to get that over with. How will the magistrates court do that? They are all volunteers, and quite often they are working. How will this help address the backlog if we are in a situation where those volunteer magistrates are not able to commit to the four consecutive days needed to deal with a complex and sensitive case such as a sexual assault?

One of the things we have to in order to successfully deliver this court transformation is properly resource our magistrates court. You have heard me say before about what we need to do to increase magistrates recruitment and the steps that the Government have taken in that regard. We are also increasing the recruitment of district judges who sit within the magistrates court. In reality, many of the serious and longer cases currently within the magistrates court would be heard by more experienced magistrates or a district judge. We had a discussion earlier in Committee about the desirability of having lay magistrates serve alongside Crown court judges as part of the constitution of the Crown court bench division. I have recognised the merit in that. One of the challenges there is not just the number of magistrates you require, but finding magistrates who can sit in longer trials, which inevitably those would be. I understand what the hon. Member for Reigate said, but we already see on a daily basis how serious and less serious matters in the magistrates court are apportioned in that way. We are hiring up to an additional 80 district judges under our current plans, and they will be able to hear those sorts of cases. Part of the capacity also relies on expanding the number of, and support for, legal advisers, who are also critical to delivery.

Why is increasing resources a legitimate argument in favour of positions that you want to take and a criticism of positions that you want to criticise? We surely need to increase resources, but you are using that point to defend your position and not to address the criticisms we are offering.

I am not sure that is right. I think we have all agreed—even those Opposition Members who were responsible for the justice system and deprived it of the resources that were needed—that more investment is needed, and the Government are making that. I make these points about capacity partly to meet the question that was asked, but also to meet the concern expressed. It is a legitimate concern: by following the thrust of the IRCC recommendations, are we diverting some cases into our magistrates court and creating a risk for that court? People have pointed to the size of the caseload; we need to distinguish between open caseload and backlog. The magistrates court currently has a caseload, which it needs to operate efficiently, but we obviously do not want that to become a backlog, or to simply divert the problem from one place to another, which is why I talk about resources. I am trying to reassure the Committee and the wider public that by empowering magistrates to assume greater sentencing powers, which means dealing with more serious cases, we are equipping them with the resources they need to do that responsibly. Extending magistrates courts sentencing powers will retain more cases in the magistrates courts, thereby freeing up valuable Crown court capacity. A sentencing increase of up to 18 months is estimated to save 8,000 Crown court sitting days in the 2028-29 financial year. When magistrates court sentencing powers were raised from six to 12 months in May 2022, a review of the impact confirmed that it helped to reduce the pressure on the Crown court at the time, with fewer cases sent for sentencing and trial. In November 2024, the extension of magistrates court sentencing powers was estimated to free up the equivalent of 2,000 Crown court sitting days a year—so it is proven to work. By increasing magistrates courts sentencing powers, offences such as common assault, the theft of lower-value items and lower-level fraud could be heard in the magistrates court. This will ensure that Crown court resources are rightly focused on the most serious and complex cases. We have confidence in magistrates to exercise higher sentencing powers accurately and fairly. As others have pointed out, in the youth court magistrates already have the power to impose detention and training orders of up to two years in cases concerning serious violence. It cheers me that the change was welcomed by the Magistrates’ Association and that magistrates are willing to take on the additional challenge with greater powers, aligning with the youth courts. The Magistrates’ Association has stated that this is “the most effective and straightforward way for magistrates’ courts to further assist in reducing the Crown Court backlog”. The introduction of the ability to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 18 or 24 months will address the open case law and provide the flexibility to enable a more proportionate allocation of resources. For the reasons I have set out, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to seek to withdraw her amendment.

As I said, my amendments are probing amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I gently remind Members to use the third person when speaking to one another, as when they say “you” they are actually referring to me.

Amendment proposed: 13, in clause 6, page 15, line 36, leave out lines 36 and 37. —(Jess Brown-Fuller.)

This amendment provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Amendment proposed: 21, in clause 6, page 15, line 37, at end insert—

“(1B) Regulations under this paragraph are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)

This amendment would make changing the general limit on custodial sentence for an eitherway offence in magistrates’ courts changeable by affirmative resolution only.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

We will not put amendment 53 to a vote because we voted on amendment 21.

I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 6, page 16, line 2, at end insert— “( ) in subsection (1)— (i) after ‘imposes’ insert ‘, in respect of two or more offences,’; (ii) for the words from ‘exceed’ to the end substitute ‘exceed— (a) where each of the offences is a summary offence, 6 months; (b) in any other case, the longest term that could be imposed in respect of any one of the offences’;” The effect of this amendment is that, where a magistrates’ court imposes two or more terms of imprisonment or detention in a young offender institution to run consecutively, and the offences in question are all summary offences, the aggregate of the terms may not exceed 6 months.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 11.

Amendment 10 is a technical amendment concerning magistrates court sentencing powers when imposing consecutive sentences for multiple summary offences. The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 introduced a power to vary the general limit on magistrates court sentencing powers for a single triable either-way offence between a maximum of six months or a maximum of 12 months. Clause 6(1) of the Bill amends that power so that the limit for a single triable either-way offence can be set at 18 months or 24 months, in addition to six months and 12 months. As part of the changes in 2022, a consequential amendment was made to section 133 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which makes provision in relation to consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed by a magistrates court. As a result, the maximum aggregate term of imprisonment that can be imposed for multiple summary-only offences cannot exceed the longest term that could be imposed for any one of those offences. Therefore, where the highest maximum sentence for the individual offences is less than six months, the magistrates court cannot impose more than that maximum when imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment for multiple summary-only offences. For example, low-value criminal damage has a maximum sentence of three months’ custody. Therefore, in sentencing someone for two or more criminal damage offences, the magistrates court can impose only up to three months to be served consecutively, rather than six months. As a result of this amendment, magistrates courts will be able to impose a maximum of six months’ custody consecutively for two or more summary only offences. That will ensure that magistrates courts can impose sentences that adequately reflect the overall offending behaviour, as consecutive sentences enable courts to proportionately reflect the overall criminality when multiple offences have been committed. Importantly, this amendment does not alter the statutory maximum penalties available for existing individual offences. Amendment 10 agreed to. Amendment made: 11, in clause 6, page 16, line 13, leave out “paragraph” and insert “paragraphs 16(a) and”.—(Sarah Sackman.) This amendment is consequential on amendment 10.

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 6, page 17, line 11, at end insert— “(9) After section 15 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, insert— ‘15A Entitlement to Crown Court funding levels in certain proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court (1) This section applies to criminal proceedings in a magistrates’ court where— (a) an individual is charged with an either-way offence; and (b) the court, having regard to the sentencing guidelines, considers it likely that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 12 months will be imposed upon conviction. (2) Where this section applies, any relevant representation order shall provide for remuneration at the same rates and under the same conditions as would apply if the proceedings were determined in the Crown Court.’” This amendment links legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It ensures that defendants facing more than 12 months' imprisonment receive Crown Court level funding, regardless of which court the case is heard in. The amendment would link legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It would ensure that defendants facing more than 12 months’ imprisonment received Crown court-level legal aid funding, regardless of which court the case was heard in. The context of this is that the Bill’s equality statement acknowledges that “if more cases are dealt with in the magistrates’ courts, it is likely that an increased proportion of these defendants may be ineligible for legal aid when they would otherwise have been eligible if their case had been heard at the Crown Court.” That is because the eligibility threshold for receiving representation from a publicly funded lawyer in the magistrates court is an annual income of below £22,325—significantly lower than the Crown court threshold of £37,500. As a result, individuals in full-time minimum wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court. Without that being addressed, it is clear that we will face an increase in the number of defendants attending court without legal representation, which undermines fairness for all those involved. Complainants, victims and witnesses may be cross-examined by the alleged perpetrator of the crime; it could slow proceedings down; it risks unfairness to the accused; and it means that the outcome of the cases will depend on whether the defendant can afford expensive lawyers, not on the true justice of the case. That concern is compounded by the fact that clause 6 provides magistrates with greater sentencing powers, meaning that defendants will be facing more serious cases. It will also prolong hearings, which will reduce the savings the Government claim they will make by shifting cases into the magistrates court. Our amendment would ensure that, if the Government’s plans are implemented, which we oppose, legal aid would be linked to the sentence length, ensuring that those who face longer sentences in the magistrates court received the funding they would expect in the Crown court. There is a lower threshold for legal aid in the magistrates court because it is assumed that cases will be shorter and simpler. That will no longer be the case, with more serious cases taking place that could take days to complete. Our amendment would avoid concerns about two-tier justice and an increase in the number of defendants appearing in court without legal representation.

It is very good to see you in the Chair this evening, Ms Jardine; thank you for looking after us. I will speak very briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have added my name. I have spoken already about the many risks piling up with the Bill, and this amendment is one essential mitigation for some of those risks. If the Government press ahead, they cannot ignore it.

I rise to support the comments made by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, about the importance of legal aid. There has already been a real reduction in the number of cases in which legal aid is given. Many defendants turn up at the magistrates court without any legal representation because of the constraints on legal aid. Bearing in mind that such defendants could now, if the Bill goes through, be facing up to 24 months imprisonment, it is important that legal aid provision is given to people facing custodial sentences. Means should not be the only element; an important thing to consider is whether somebody has a real chance of going into custody. We have found historically—this may be anecdotal evidence—that defendants not getting legal representation at an early stage results in more delays. They often plead guilty right at the last stage, when the matter is set for trial. By then, six or eight months have passed, and they might have been able to save some money; or it has got into their head that they have to have this trial, so they try to raise some money. That causes delays. If people are guided, right at the beginning, as to what the evidence and the likely sentence are, they are more likely to plead guilty at an earlier stage. The previous Government made significant cuts to legal aid. One of the arguments I remember raising then—this was more than 10 years ago, during the passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—was that restricting legal aid would mean lots of unrepresented people turning up at court, and that that would delay the system. It is also fundamentally unfair. Someone facing a criminal charge should be able to access legal aid. I ask the Government to think about that, and perhaps extend legal aid and make it more generous.

This looks like another entirely reasonable amendment, which looks to mitigate some of the harsher provisions in the changes that will allow magistrates to give sentences of up to two years. A moment ago, I talked about the difference between the more rough and ready justice in the magistrates court and the more rigorous, lengthy and developed procedure, practice and ability to operate in the Crown court. When it comes to deciding the income threshold for whether a defendant qualifies for legal aid, surely the most important thing is not the process or procedure as such, but the harshness of the possible sanction that the state is looking to impose on that person. Rather than looking at the £22,000 income threshold for magistrates courts and £37,500 for Crown courts, we could instead say that, if someone will be sentenced for up to one year, the income threshold is £22,000, and if someone will be sentenced for more than one year, it is £37,500. That is a true statement—that is how it currently stands. We should merely extend that principle, basing the figures on sentencing thresholds rather than on the venue that dishes out that sentence. That would achieve fairness, so that if somebody might be locked up for two years, they have the legal might and can afford the legal advice to defend themselves and articulate a case in a more professional manner. If having a legal professional does not give someone at least the chance of delivering that in a more professional manner, there is plainly little point in the legal profession. That is the rationale, and the Government do not have to apply a different principle at all if they just see the current threshold as applying to a one-year sentence rather than to venue. This delivers again on other amendments, not only from others on these Benches but from the shadow Minister, and it allows the Government to deliver what they want to deliver. It does not run against the principle of what the Government are trying to do, even though Conservative Members have differences of opinion on that. It merely perfects, improves and cures some of the defects and unintended consequences of the Bill. The entire reason that the Bill Committee sits is to seek to do that, but time and again, the Government would prefer to just vote things down and use their majority rather than taking the time to look at provisions that seem to me objectively reasonable.

Another good thing we can do in Committee is try to clarify the Conservative party’s position. Is the hon. Member’s position now that the almost 40% cuts to legal aid during the last Conservative Government were wrong? If so, would he like to apologise for them?

This is a strange venue to ask for an apology for previous Government legislation from an MP who, like me, has been in this place for less than two years. The hon. Gentleman and I were on broadcast media yesterday; that might have been a better venue for him to ask me to apologise, but I would have rejected his invitation at that time, and I will certainly reject it in Committee. This is not about previous Governments’ views or opinions; it is about the views and opinions of this Parliament.

This happens all the time. We point out deficiencies in the Government’s position, so Members get their Whips’ handouts with suggestions to “just point out to them what they did on x, y and z.” But the public do not care. That is a zero defence of their position—[Interruption.]

Order. I think we are getting a bit off track.

I will be quick. The public care about the Government’s justification for what they are doing, not what we have done. If the Government are leaning on what we have done in the past, it shows how weak their arguments are.

Indeed, it is quite interesting that the Government’s benchmark is the previous Government. I do not recall them making that clear at the last election. I will leave it there.

I rise to speak in support of amendment 22 tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester. This is another element of the Bill that will not survive contact with the Lords. It is quite clearly unfair. I want to pick up on some of the points that were made. There are key reasons why the amendment is sensible. In other parts of the debate, Government Members have raised the negative impact of cross-examination by defendants, which they do not think is a good thing. They do not think it is a good thing that victims may be cross-examined by defendants, yet they will not support a measure that would reduce the risk of that happening, and it does happen. The context of all the different parts of the clause is important to bear in mind.

Does my hon. Friend agree that Government Members and the Minister have spent a lot of time talking about victims being central to all of the changes, so why on earth would they not support the amendment if it is really about protecting victims from being cross-examined?

The consistent position is that unrepresented defendants can take up more court time and can cross-examine victims, and that is more difficult for victims. As other Members have touched on, this takes place in the context of the other things that we have been unsuccessful in changing this evening. Sentencing powers are increasing and the right to appeal is being watered down. There is a pernicious erosion of the fairness of our courts at the same time as the yardsticks are being essentially changed in relation to access to legal aid. This is important in the wider context of what is happening with legal aid. The Minister wants to say all the time that the Government are stretching every possible sinew to do everything else they possibly can to improve the backlogs in the courts. Yet we heard in evidence from the Criminal Bar Association and the Bar Council that the £34 million of legal aid announced in December still has not filtered through into the system and is still not available. We are now in April.

Will the hon. Member acknowledge that one of the first things this Government did when we came into power was invest £92 million, focusing primarily on duty solicitors who deal with cases at the coalface, including those involving unrepresented defendants? That money is in play. It is in their pockets. Will he acknowledge that?

Yes, absolutely. I have acknowledged that on a number of occasions, along with what the Government have done on Crown court sitting days and a number of other ways that I recognise the Government have improved things. The point I have made repeatedly is that the Crown court backlog prior to the pandemic was lower than the backlog we inherited from the previous Labour Government. Again, I think the Minister might get a better hearing from us Conservatives if she was fairer in that regard, in terms of her criticisms of our record—if she actually acknowledged the record in its entirety in relation to the backlogs prior to covid. I mentioned that £34 million because the Minister cannot have it both ways. She cannot say, “We are doing everything possible,” and then react so vociferously when I point out a clear example of where the Government are not doing everything possible. If they were doing everything possible, that £34 million would be available to practitioners through additional legal aid. So right now, the Government are not doing something that they could do to help increase things such as the availability of legal advice and the number of people choosing to practise in the criminal Bar. Again, in relation to legal aid, this is a perfectly reasonable amendment. I am pretty confident that the Government will have to announce or concede to this change at some point, and it is purely for party political reasons that the Minister will not concede this point—because it is a Lib Dem amendment. I would eat my hat, if I ever had one, if this Government do not end up conceding this point in the end anyway.

On a note of clarification, I understand that Opposition Members have mentioned defendants cross-examining victims, but, in fact, the procedures have been changed. For sexual or domestic abuse-type offences, a defendant cannot cross-examine the victim or complainant himself, or herself. Instead, the court will appoint a solicitor or barrister to do the cross-examination for them. I just add that for clarity.

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling the amendment, because the issue and importance of legal aid is something that I think we both care deeply about. Access to justice is a fundamental principle within our justice system; it is fundamental to the fairness of processing criminal cases through our courts. But if I am vociferous, I think it is entirely justified. We are a Government stretching every sinew to put our legal aid sector back on a sustainable footing. That, by the way, is not simply a matter of increased fees, although we have done that and are continuing to do so. The inheritance we received—I say this not just as the Courts Minister responsible for the legal aid system—regarding the whole infrastructure of legal aid and the IT systems on which that was built, was wholly inadequate. It is no surprise, then, that the minute there is a cyber-attack, the whole thing keels over. One of the difficulties with these fees is actually implementing them. We cannot implement them overnight because of the lack of investment, as well as the cutting of fees, that took place over 14 years. What we have done, as one of our first steps, is make significant uplifts to criminal legal aid fees for criminal solicitors, focusing on duty solicitors and prison lawyers—precisely the people we need to deliver this court transformation. That has already been implemented; we have an additional £116 million a year once in steady state. And we have announced the funding that is to come as part of these reforms, with £34 million for criminal legal aid advocates, alongside a commitment to match-fund criminal barrister pupillages to open up the pipeline to people from all backgrounds and to build our workforce. So that is pragmatism, principle, social mobility and investment. No one could doubt the passion and commitment, as well as the investment, in transforming the infrastructure so badly needed to implement these criminal legal aid fees, and indeed the civil legal aid fees, which, by the way, we are also uplifting. This investment reflects the valuable and tough decisions that we have had to take, and the valuable and tough work undertaken by those who work in the criminal justice system. It will help them to ensure that justice is served. Turning to the specifics of amendment 22, under the current financial eligibility rules, the Government are confident that the majority of defendants charged with either-way offences are expected to be eligible for legal aid at the magistrates court. For individuals who do not qualify for legal aid, there are already measures in place in the magistrates court to provide some support. The hardship review mechanism can provide support to those who fail or who do not meet the means test for legal aid but face higher than usual outgoings or expenses associated with their case. In addition, unrepresented defendants may also receive support via the free duty solicitor scheme, which we are investing in and that can provide representation at a first hearing if required. In terms of remuneration for legal aid lawyers, legal aid fee schemes are specific to the court where the case is heard and are designed to reflect the differing processes and nature of work in the magistrates court and Crown court. The magistrates court fee scheme is designed to be simpler to administer and use for providers, reflecting the greater speed and volume of cases going through that court. Providers appreciate the greater simplicity. A non-standard fee route exists for exceptional cases to ensure that work on more complex cases is appropriately remunerated. Fees and financial eligibility conditions at magistrates courts can already provide representation for defendants facing potentially longer sentences if convicted of an either-way offence. We remain committed to the provision of legal aid and recognise the vital role that it plays in underpinning access to justice. We will keep our approach to the rules that govern financial eligibility across legal aid under review, including by carefully assessing the impact of all the recommendations made by the independent review of the criminal courts and the final formation of the Bill before taking further decisions. In the light of that explanation, I hope the hon. Member for Chichester will agree to withdraw her amendment.

I thank the hon. Members for Bexhill and Battle and for Bolton South and Walkden for their contributions to the discussion on amendment 22. I recognise that thresholds exist for a reason, but people earning £22,325 are not making a different consideration from somebody earning £23,325. They are lucky if they get to the end of the month with any money left in their bank account, let alone being able to consider paying for an hour’s legal advice. Even the concept of contacting a law firm and asking for simple, early-stage advice is going to feel totally alien to these people, because they do not have the funds to be able to do that. So thresholds exist for a reason, but the Government need to do a piece of work on where those thresholds land, because with the cost of living crisis, it is really hard in this country for people to afford to exist, let alone to afford the additional pressures that a case being heard in a magistrates court would put upon them. The Minister said that access to justice is a fundamental principle. I agree entirely, and I know how strongly she feels about making sure that legal aid is fit for purpose. We have had many conversations about that, and I am confident that we will continue to do so. I know she will vote against the amendment, but that does not mean that I will not push it to a vote, because it is important to get how important legal aid provision is on the record. This conversation is not over, and I am sure the Minister will agree to carry it on.

indicated assent. Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6 introduces a measure to extend the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to enable the general limit on magistrates court sentencing powers to be set at 18 or 24 months of maximum imprisonment for single and multiple triable either-way offences. Currently, magistrates court sentencing powers are set at 12 months. The Government can already vary magistrates’ sentencing powers between six and 12 months by secondary legislation using the negative resolution procedure. That has been done twice, and used to good effect, since July 2022. However, the Crown court is now facing significant pressures, and many triable either-way offences currently heard and sentenced there can, as we know, be fairly and expeditiously dealt with in the magistrates court. Increasing magistrates court sentencing powers is one of the ways in which we will increase the range of cases that magistrates courts can hear and sentence, freeing up valuable Crown court capacity for the most serious and complex cases. By enabling the powers to be increased in that way, the clause will help us to free up capacity in the Crown court to the tune of 8,000 Crown court sitting days in the 2028-29 financial year, making a significant dent in the backlog. Magistrates are well prepared to take on that responsibility. They are dedicated and highly trained volunteers who give back to their community, working alongside highly trained legal advisers and an impressive cadre of district judges. The magistrates undergo an extensive selection process and work tirelessly to ensure that justice is delivered swiftly and fairly, currently assuming responsibility for 90% of all criminal cases. The clause does not increase magistrates court sentencing powers; instead, it enables the Secretary of State to set the general limit in the future at 18 or 24 months. As I have said, any such change would be made through a statutory instrument under the negative resolution procedure, when necessary, to respond to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures across the criminal justice system. Importantly, the clause also ensures that the aggregate maximum term available for consecutive sentences will track the general limit. It also provides a safeguard that magistrates courts cannot impose a sentence exceeding the offence-specific maximum available on indictment, even if the general limit is set at 18 or 24 months. As such, I commend clause 6 to the Committee.

I oppose clause 6, which, as we have discussed, grants the Lord Chancellor the power to increase the maximum sentencing limit in magistrates courts from the current 12 months to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government present that as a necessary measure to relieve the backlog in the Crown court, we must look closely at what is being sacrificed in the name of speed. This proposal is not a minor adjustment; it is a fundamental shift in the nature of summary justice. It would allow magistrates—volunteers who have to sit only 13 days a year and who on average sit 17 to 23 days—to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years. That expansion of power comes at a time when the system is already under immense strain in the magistrates courts, and it is the view of the Criminal Bar Association, JUSTICE, the Bar Council and others that this move is unnecessary and potentially unsafe for the integrity of our legal system. The central concern shared by legal professionals is that magistrates courts are simply not designed to handle the complexity of cases that may, at some point, carry two-year sentences. As the Criminal Bar Association pointed out in its evidence, the “practices and procedures” of those courts are “necessarily ‘summary’ in nature.” They were built for the swift disposal of what some consider to be minor offences, not for the intricate legal and factual disputes that characterise more serious crimes. The Criminal Bar Association has been blunt in its assessment, calling the extension of summary justice to cases carrying two-year terms a “recipe for rough justice”. That concern is backed by the Government’s own impact assessment, which assumes that magistrates will complete those more serious trials in just a few hours. As the CBA notes, that assumption is “clearly naïve in the extreme”. Either the cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve, or the predicted time savings will never materialise. One of the most troubling aspects of increasing sentencing powers is the legal aid gap. Given that we were unsuccessful with amendment 53, it is important to reiterate the impact of that gap when considering the clause as a whole. At present, the income threshold to qualify for a publicly funded lawyer is significantly lower in the magistrates courts, at £22,305, than in the Crown court, at £37,500. JUSTICE has highlighted the severe unfairness that this creates. Individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment, who would be eligible for legal aid in the Crown court, will find themselves ineligible in the magistrates courts. We face a reality where a defendant could be facing a two-year prison sentence while being forced to represent themselves, because they cannot afford a lawyer and do not qualify for state support. As JUSTICE warns, unrepresented defendants are often observed to receive harsher sentences, as they do not know how to mitigate. We cannot call a system just if it increases the stakes of a trial, while simultaneously stripping away the means for a professional defence. We must also confront the impact of these changes on minority communities. The Bar Council and JUSTICE both point to the findings of the 2017 Lammy review, as it is referred to in shorthand, which identified juries as a “success story of our justice system”, because they do not appear to discriminate between different ethnic groups when returning verdicts. However, the review found that the positive story of jury equity was not matched in magistrates courts. The Minister has previously spoken about the lack of disparity in sentencing outcomes, for example, but specific statistical analysis showed that black, Asian and mixed ethnic women were more likely to be convicted—conviction is the question we are considering here—in magistrates courts than white women. We have discussed before how that may not necessarily be a direct causal relationship, as it could just be correlation. However, as the Lammy review points out, it is incumbent on Governments of any colour—Conservative, Labour or whatever they might be—to justify and explain those disparities. As we have discussed previously, we have not managed to justify and explain them, yet we are introducing measures that could potentially exacerbate them. Beyond ethnicity, the Lammy review noted a great cultural gulf between predominantly white, middle-class judges and magistrates and the defendants appearing before them. By forcing more serious cases into the magistrates court, and removing the right of defendants to elect a jury trial, the Government are moving cases away from the most trusted and equitable part of our justice system into one where public trust, at least for some communities, is already fragile. JUSTICE notes that any reform that reduces choice risks deepening existing disparities and exacerbating distrust for minoritised communities. The Government’s primary justification is efficiency, but the Bar Council argues that these reforms will likely consume resources without bringing down the backlog. As we have said, there is also a challenge with the backlog in the magistrates courts, which are currently facing their own record high of 370,000 cases. The system is also facing a critical shortage of magistrates and legal advisers. The loss of sitting days due to the absence of legal advisers, who are often trainees, even for better-paid work, is a persistent problem. Some estimates suggest that there are more than 20,000 sitting days-worth of work from professional judges in the Crown court. Expecting that to be absorbed into an overstretched and shrinking cohort of volunteers in the magistrates courts would, as the CBA describes, “transfer the burden from one over-stretched part of the system to another.” Finally, we must look at how the clause interacts with the rest of the Bill. While clause 6 increases power at the lower level, clause 7 restricts the ability to challenge those decisions by removing the automatic right of appeal and replacing it with a permission-based model. The Bar Council describes this combination as “a comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.” At present, around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts are successful, and 47% of appeals against sentence are upheld, demonstrating that the lower courts frequently make meaningful errors. Doubling their sentencing powers, while simultaneously making it harder for a defendant to correct a wrong conviction, is a dangerous path to take. It is also worth noting that the Bill departs from the recommendations of the very review that it claims to implement. Sir Brian Leveson recommended that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent. I draw attention to a previous response from the Minister, when she again raised the possibility that the review invited the Government to go further. We have discussed that this might be a relevant argument to make if, for example, we were talking about a recommendation on which the review did not clearly oppose the Government going further. If I was Brian Leveson, I would feel a bit like I was being mugged off by the Government, because they are saying, “We agree with what you want to do, but we’re going ignore you on the position that you are fundamentally clear on. Indeed, we’re not only ignoring your specific recommendation, we’re ignoring what you said about the other recommendations being contingent on the Government doing this thing around controlling the sentencing”. It is doubly insulting to Sir Brian to then suggest, as the Minister did, that he would be relaxed about this, and that he invited them to go further. Certainly, no reasonable person would interpret his suggestion in that way. There is also a question about the numbers. We know Sir Brian’s central recommendation is that we reach 130,000 sitting days. That is the number that he arrived at. We must assume that he has arrived at that number contingent on the Government sticking to his advice that we do not increase the maximum sentencing powers of the magistrates. If the Government are claiming that that will be a further 8,000 sitting days, there must be some juggling with the figures. If the Government are seeking to achieve 130,000, and Sir Brian thinks that is the right number, and the Government’s plan has got an additional 8,000 that Sir Brian never envisioned, does that mean we have 8,000 to play with in some other regard that Sir Brian did not understand? Can the Minister explain how we have ended up with the same figures and the same goal, but in a completely different way, with a further 8,000 that Sir Brian never anticipated or wanted? We also heard the argument that this is fine because the youth courts do it. We had that argument in an earlier sitting, and I made it clear that there are some fundamental differences. It really undermines the concept of having a specialist court if what goes on in that specialist court is then used to support an argument of general application. That goes against the whole point of a specialist court—we have gone out of our way in that case, because we recognise that the circumstances are special. For example, the types of custody, the implications for criminal records and the style in which cross-examination happens are all different in the youth court and the adult estate. We must therefore recognise that we are in a completely different position. The Minister also talked about how the negative resolution procedure is already used in this area. The crucial difference is that we are taking a leap to 24 months, in terms of the impact of these decisions. What might have arguably been permissible at the lower end of the threshold does not automatically translate into an assumption that it is therefore appropriate at the higher end of the threshold. It is because the measure will apply towards the higher end of threshold that we think it is inappropriate. We failed to persuade the Government, and as a result this clause remains concerning. In summary, the proposal to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months is a move towards cheaper, faster justice that is likely to be neither cheap nor fast, and it will certainly not be just. It risks creating a surge of unrepresented defendants, exacerbating racial disproportionality and displacing the backlog into a court jurisdiction that is structurally ill-equipped to handle it. We should not trade away fundamental procedural protections for a marginal gain in court sitting days. If we want to solve the backlog, we should focus on the low-hanging fruit identified by the Bar Council and others: open all existing courtrooms, more than 10% of which are closed today and were closed yesterday; fix prisoner transport, an issue that costs us thousands of days every year; and properly resource the legal profession. We must reject the 24-month limit and maintain the 12-month cap to ensure that serious custodial decisions remain subject to the full rigour and safeguards of our Crown courts.

Clause 6 expands the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to change the general limit on the custodial sentence that a magistrates court may impose. It replaces the current list of possible maximum terms—six or 12 months—with a new list of six, 12, 18 or 24 months. That will allow the Secretary of State, by regulation, to change the general limit within these set terms. The sentencing powers of the magistrates court were increased in 2022 from six months to 12 months. This clause would allow the Lord Chancellor to further increase the maximum by statutory instrument to either 18 or 24 months. The result will be more triable either-way cases being heard in the magistrates court. The practical reason we oppose the clause is that magistrates courts are facing their own increasing list—Members can decide whether they want to call it a backlog or a list. I recognise the Minister’s comments that we should not describe the 379,000 cases waiting in the magistrates courts as a backlog and I agree with her assessment that we need a certain number of cases in order for the magistrates court to function.

The same could be said for the Crown court. We would not charge someone and want to see them in a Crown court the next day. There is a separate conversation to be had about what the figure should be, with increasing cases. In 2021, the MOJ’s assessment in its spending review was that it would like the backlog to go from 60,000 to 53,000. The Department determined that it would be an indicator of success if it reached that target, but the figure is arguably now different, as that number would be incredibly difficult to achieve with the complexity of cases that we hear. However, we have to recognise that we have 379,000 cases in the magistrates court, which is a 17% increase on the previous year, and that is alongside what have been major cuts to the magistracy over a long period, from 28,300 to 14,600.

I know the Government have been embarking on a big recruitment drive, but they also have a retention issue at the other end. They are bringing in magistrates at one end but losing them at the other. Removing the power of defendants to elect, plus the change in sentencing powers, will increase the workload of the magistrates courts, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Receipts were unchanged and disposals decreased slightly, by 2% on the previous year, in the magistrates courts. Receipts remained above disposals, causing a 17% increase in the open caseload to a series peak of 379,437.

The latest open caseload volume roughly equates to around three months of disposals, based on latest disposal levels and not factoring in any receipts during that period. Since the end of 2021, single justice procedures have tended to make up about 50% of the open magistrates court caseload. Single justice procedure disposals exceeded receipts in the last quarter by 3,000. However, this goes against the general trend seen in recent years, so while the open SJP caseload fell by 2% on the previous quarter, it remains 15% above levels seen in the same quarter 4 in 2024.

Because of that cocktail of measures—extending sentencing powers in the magistrates, not addressing the disparity in legal aid between the two courts and restricting the right to appeal—clause 6 should not stand part of the Bill, and I will be voting against it.

The central issue here, as with so much of this, is the impact that a single provision, or a single intention—in this case clause 6—has on other areas of the criminal justice system, and indeed provisions in the Bill. There is a lot of interplay between clauses 6 and 7—we are about to discuss clause 7, so I will save my comments on that for a few minutes’ time. The central issue is the unintended consequence, yes, but also the other provisions that Parliament will not get to debate. In this case, Parliament will not get a proper opportunity to debate the fairness of having magistrates courts sentencing up to two years, because the clause effectively creates a power for the Secretary of State to do that job instead. That is why this Committee is having to debate whether it is right that a summary court should suddenly have the power to sentence someone up to two years. The Government can argue that at least some of the provisions that the Opposition do not agree with are anchored somewhere in Sir Brian Leveson’s report. I would argue that this provision is specifically argued out by Sir Brian Leveson. Indeed, he talked about it being contingent on the magistrates court continuing to have sentencing powers of up to only one year. When the Government appear, in my view, to be doing something that specifically runs against Sir Brian Leveson’s report, rather than is simply absent from it, they need to explain their position. It is not good enough to run the same old arguments. The central argument in all this seems to be efficiency. How much will the Government sacrifice at the altar of efficiency? Efficiency cannot trump all, and certainly not the justice arguments already made by me and others, which I will not repeat. If the Government cannot explain where these provisions have come from, when they run counter to Sir Brian Leveson’s report, they should rightly submit these proposals through a proper procedure so that they can be debated by Parliament, rather than just giving a power to the Secretary of State. As I say, I will restrict my comments to the interplay between clause 6 and clause 7, which restricts the right of appeal. We have already heard some good arguments about legal aid, and it does not do much for the Minister, who is quite exercised by the previous Government’s record on legal aid. This is about not necessarily increased funding for legal aid—she says she is doing that already—but the right to it when the state is trying to lock someone up.

If people end up being seen in the magistrates court when under the old measures they would have been in the Crown court, there will be lengthier trials and, potentially, a more expensive legal aid bill. It may not necessarily even be an issue of resource; it is just about making sure that legal aid follows the cases where they are being heard, which may well even save money.

That is entirely right but, of course, we do not know, because the assessments in respect of the Bill are so light—there is not one on that point. It may or may not at all mean more spending. So many times, the argument on this issue, and on many others, is, “Oh, it doesn’t affect that many cases,” or, “Don’t worry.” Well, it deeply affects the person whose case it is. If a defendant wants to exercise the right that the Government are pulling away, it is hardly an argument for the Government to say, “Well, we’re not pulling that right away from very many people.” For that defendant, the right has been lost. The same applies to the argument when it is about victims or complainants. The Government are rightly willing to focus an argument on individual victims; they should be prepared to do that for the individual defendants who will lose rights and, in the case of sentences of up to two years, may suddenly no longer be able to access legal aid because the regime is focused on the venue rather than on sentencing power. That should be adjusted not because of what previous Governments have done, but because this Government are moving the goalposts on sentencing powers in the magistrates court, so they should make the matching adjustment when it comes to qualifying for legal aid. For that reason, I do not agree with clause 6.

It is a pleasure to start the day with you and end the day with you, Ms Jardine. I am sure you are very much enjoying starting your day with me and ending your day with me, too. [Laughter.] I have just realised how that can be interpreted. My apologies, Ms Jardine; I cannot account for the minds of other Members. To get back to business, I do not support clause 6 standing part of the Bill. It will expand the Government’s existing power to increase the maximum custodial sentence that a magistrates court can impose for a single either-way offence. The current maximum is 12 months, but the clause will permit Ministers, entirely at their own discretion, to increase that to 18 months or even 24 months. That will affect consecutive sentencing for multiple either-way offences. The Government have justified the change on the basis that the power is needed so that sentencing limits can be adjusted swiftly to rebalance work between the magistrates courts and the Crown court. The Government estimate that increasing the maximum to 18 months would save 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That all sounds rather neat but, in reality, it is another example of the Government trying to force more serious criminal business into a part of the system designed for swift, relatively low-level justice, and doing so before they have properly shown that the courts can absorb it or that the benefits are worth it. The first and perhaps most important point is that even Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the change. Sir Brian said that his recommendation on restricting the right to elect trial by jury was “contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current maximum of 12 months.” He also recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed, and that the current 12-month maximum be made permanent. Clause 6 therefore cannot be said to follow Leveson: it goes beyond him and, on this point, directly contradicts him. That is a serious weakness in the Government’s position. Ministers have repeatedly leaned on Leveson when defending the Bill as a whole, but in this instance he gave no endorsement of what clause 6 will usher in. More than that, he warned us directly against it. It is perfectly valid to ask, “If the very review on which the Government say the Bill is based said that 12 months should remain the ceiling, why are Ministers now seeking the power to raise it to two years?” Let me briefly touch on a second common-sense point. The move from six to 12 months took effect only for offenders convicted on or after 18 November 2024. In other words, the current system has barely had time to bed in and the Government are already asking Parliament to authorise a further jump to 18 or 24 months. The earlier increase to 12 months was justified as a response to court pressures, and the Government said it would save up to 2,000 sitting days. We have not had anything like enough time to assess properly how that change has worked in practice before Ministers seek power to go dramatically further. If the Government and the Minister wish to make evidence-based law, they should first show Parliament what the 12-month expansion has actually done: what kinds of cases have been retained, what sentencing patterns have changed, what effect there has been on appeals, what impact there has been on magistrates courts and whether the claimed savings have materialised. Instead, they are asking, through clause 6, for a much broader delegated power, and inviting us to trust that this will all somehow work out later. That is not good enough where a question as fundamental as the administration of good justice is concerned. The Bar Council puts its objection crisply and, I think, rightly. It says: “Summary trial is designed for the purpose of dispensing swift justice in low-level cases. The extension of summary justice to cases in which a defendant could receive up to 2 years’ imprisonment…particularly when combined with the removal of a right to elect Crown Court trial, and the removal of a right of automatic appeal” amounts to a “comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.” That is blunt language, but it is hard to disagree with. Clause 6 will change the kind of cases that summary justice is expected to absorb. The Law Society warns that under the clause magistrates will have the power to impose lengthy custodial sentences for serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and possession with intent to supply drugs “in proceedings that are intended to be quicker” and less formal than than those in the Crown Court. It warns that this raises the likelihood that “people will receive longer custodial sentences with fewer safeguards or opportunities to rectify wrongful convictions.” I will dwell on this point for a moment, as it is something that none of us who have been tasked with scrutinising the Bill in detail should forget. A system designed to be faster, simpler and less formal is being asked to shoulder cases in which the consequences are far more severe. Two years in prison is not some trivial matter: a custodial sentence like that can cost a person their job, their home, their family life, their good name and their future. A justice system that is appropriate for low-level offending cannot be assumed fit for cases that carry that sort of life­changing penalty. There is then the practical point that clause 6 will not solve the pressure in the system so much as move it around. The change will merely transfer the burden from one overstretched part of the system to another. The Law Society says that the magistrates court already has its own backlog of more than 370,000 cases, and that the Government have shown no convincing plan to deal with the added pressure brought by more serious and complex cases. JUSTICE makes the same point, and adds an especially telling practical detail drawn from the Institute for Government’s analysis: since magistrates’ sentencing powers were increased from six to 12 months in 2024, only around 30% of sentences in the six-to-12-month band were handed down by magistrates. That suggests a lack of confidence, or a continuing tendency to send more serious cases upwards, which in turn means the Government’s projected savings may not materialise in anything like the way they hope. If magistrates are already not retaining all the cases that the Government assumed they would after the jump to 12 months, what is the evidence that authorising 18 or 24 months will suddenly transform the position? If cases continue to be sent up, or bounce between jurisdictions, the supposed efficiency gain becomes much more doubtful.

The reforms come at a time when the magistrates courts are themselves under very visible strain. JUSTICE says that magistrates generally sit for only around 13 full days per year, that cases in the magistrates’ courts have become less complex in recent years, and that the system is not currently set up to absorb a greater volume of more complex allocation decisions and more serious cases. JUSTICE also points out that magistrate numbers have fallen sharply since 2010-11, and that the magistracy includes many relatively inexperienced members following recent recruitment drives. [Interruption.] I am happy to take an intervention if any Member wants to make one. The Law Society similarly points to the huge fall in the size of the magistracy over the last two decades and questions the system’s ability to absorb the extra responsibility.

It is only fair to acknowledge that the Magistrates’ Association takes a different view. It supports the extension of magistrates’ sentencing ranges, and says this is

“the most effective and straightforward way for magistrates’ courts to…assist in reducing the Crown Court backlog”.

It also points to youth courts, where magistrates have long dealt with cases carrying up to 24 months’ custody. But that support does not answer the central objection. The issue is not whether magistrates are dedicated, public spirited or capable of serious work. Of course they are, and many do excellent service. The issue is whether the summary justice system as a whole, taken with its procedures, resourcing, legal aid rules and appeal structures, is the right place to impose up to two years in custody in a much wider class of cases. On that, there is substantial and credible concern from across the justice sector.

Another concern is legal representation. The Law Society warns that the Bill’s proposals would increase the number of defendants in magistrates courts who are ineligible for legal aid, even though they would currently qualify if their case were heard in the Crown court.

The way my hon. Friend articulates the point suggests that the rules are effectively stripping people of the right to legal aid by pushing them down from a court where they currently qualify into a court where they do not. Is that a fair way to characterise it?

I agree with my hon. Friend. Frankly, I am shocked that a Labour Government would do that. It is the last thing I expected of a Labour Government.

I am not shocked by anything a Labour Government do.

Perhaps I am more optimistic about these things.

On a point of order, Ms Jardine. I ask for your guidance. We hear the rehearsal of a number of the same arguments that we have heard again and again over a long period. Everyone here wants to make progress and wants to scrutinise, but I am not sure there is much merit in hearing the same arguments and, indeed, the same quotes again and again. I seek your guidance on how best to deal with that, Ms Jardine.

The way we can best deal with it individually is by being succinct and not repetitive.

Further to that point of order, Ms Jardine. I seek your guidance. We are discussing issues on which amendments were tabled, but we were unsuccessful with those amendments, so is it not perfectly legitimate for us to discuss all the consequences for the Bill that flow from the fact that the amendments were denied? The Minister may be frustrated and think that that is not a good use of time; we were previously debating things that might not have happened, but now that the amendments have failed, we know exactly what the Bill will do, so it is perfectly in order to go back through the concerns we had. That is my understanding of it.

I will check with the Clerk, but my understanding is that if an argument has been rehearsed and heard in full and a decision taken, we move on from that argument; we do not go back and re-rehearse it. To that extent, the Minister is right. If you have already debated an issue in connection with an amendment and voted on it, you do not go back and bring it up in relation to a further amendment, unless it is a new aspect that you have not debated before. Does that help?

Yes.

Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine, but that seems to suggest that we are not allowed ever again in this Bill Committee to bring up the fact that the right to elect for jury trial and rights to legal aid are being removed. Surely we need to be able to talk about that as we go through the Bill.

You can ask for further advice, but the Clerk tells me that the scope of this debate is clause 6, and when we move on to other clauses, we will debate those clauses.

Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine. I would suggest that the legal aid changes are a really important outcome of clause 6. In fact, I think I would come under huge criticism if I made this speech without mentioning legal aid, because I have not raised it at all—well, I did in an earlier speech. I have not raised it at all today.

It is not for me to say what is a valid point. I was asked for guidance on the scope of this debate, which is clause 6.

Thank you for that, Ms Jardine. I reassure you that I will not be speaking for very much longer, but I will cover the last of what I consider to be the important points. Thank you for your guidance and patience. The Law Society warns that the Bill’s proposals will increase the number of defendants in magistrates courts who are ineligible for legal aid, even though they would currently qualify if their case were heard in the Crown court, because the magistrates court means test is significantly stricter. It notes that duty solicitor numbers have dropped sharply between 2017 and 2025 and that the impact assessment does not properly address “the disparity between the magistrates’ and Crown Court means tests”. We know that individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, and that unrepresented defendants often do not understand charges, and often enter inappropriate pleas, struggle with cross-examination and end up with harsher outcomes. Under the Bill, then, a defendant may face a much more serious case in a summary forum, with a possible sentence of 18 months or two years, yet be less likely to have publicly funded legal representation than they would be if the case were before the Crown court. That simply is not fair. Even if one were somehow persuaded that giving the magistrates courts the power to impose sentences of 18 or 24 months might in principle be acceptable, we would still have a major objection to how the clause is drafted. It does not simply set the limit and leave it there; it expands the regulation-making power so that the Government may increase the maximum to 18 or 24 months by statutory instrument. The delegated powers memorandum justifies that on the basis that magistrates’ sentencing limits may need to be adjusted swiftly “where operational pressures” require a “rebalancing of work”. Are we not, then, being asked to hand over a flexible tool that could be used to rebalance criminal jurisdiction by secondary legislation? I could not be more convinced that Parliament should retain oversight of increasing the powers of magistrates. At the very least, any such regulation should be made by affirmative resolution. This is not the sort of decision that should be casually adjustable at ministerial convenience. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 6 standing part of the Bill. Even Leveson did not recommend this change; on the contrary, he said his wider recommendations were “contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at…12 months” and recommended that the power to alter them by statutory instrument “should be repealed”. The move to 12 months has taken effect only recently and has not yet been properly evaluated. The clause will extend summary justice into cases carrying up to two years’ imprisonment, despite the fact that summary justice was designed for lower-level, swifter cases. It will push more serious cases into magistrates courts that are already under strain, and do so in a package that also weakens appeals and intensifies legal aid problems. It risks moving the backlog rather than solving it, and it does so by way of an over-broad delegated power that gives Ministers too much room to reshape criminal jurisdiction by regulation. The magistracy deserves respect, and nothing I say should be taken as criticism of the many magistrates who serve conscientiously and well, but having respect for magistrates is not the same thing as assuming that every structural burden should now be placed on the summary justice system. The Government have not even begun to make the case for the clause compellingly.

Members have asked about the intended impact of the clause. As I explained earlier, the reason why we are making this change is that we have confidence in our magistrates and because it would save a significant number of Crown court sitting days. This is a tried-and-tested approach: the sentencing power of magistrates courts was raised from six months to 12 months for a single triable either-way offence in May 2022, under the previous Government—Conservatives can look to their own record to see the evidence for what we should do—and a review of the impact between May 2022 and March 2023 confirmed that increasing magistrates sentencing powers had helped to reduce to pressure on the Crown court. In that context, there was a 21% reduction in the number of defendants sent by magistrates courts to the Crown court for sentencing, and a further 6% reduction in the number of theft offences sent for trial to the Crown court by March 2023. That shows how recalibrating sentencing powers—[Laughter.] I did not realise it was that funny, but we are getting into the witching hour, so I am going to be kind to everybody. That reduction is just one of the ways in which we think the clause can assist with the backlogs. I addressed the points about legal aid in my remarks on amendment 22, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. I have set out the justifications both for extending the powers and for the flexible, agile mechanism that the negative procedure affords us.

Will the Minister give way?

I am not going to give way. For all those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Stephen Morgan.)

Adjourned till Thursday 23 April at half-past Eleven o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

CTB 32 Tim Crosland, PlanB.Earth (further evidence)

CTB 33 Claire Throssell MBE (supplementary submission)

CTB 34 Bar Council (further evidence)

CTB 35 Both Parents Matter (further evidence)