The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chair: Clive Efford

† Akehurst, Luke (North Durham) (Lab)

Ballinger, Alex (Halesowen) (Lab)

† Bool, Sarah (South Northamptonshire) (Con)

† Campbell, Juliet (Broxtowe) (Lab)

† Carns, Al (Minister for the Armed Forces)

Cox, Pam (Colchester) (Lab)

† Foster, Mr Paul (South Ribble) (Lab)

† Francois, Mr Mark (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)

† Jones, Gerald (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)

† Kirkham, Jayne (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)

Martin, Mike (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)

† Reed, David (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)

† Roome, Ian (North Devon) (LD)

† Shastri-Hurst, Dr Neil (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)

Taylor, Rachel (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)

† Wakeford, Christian (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury)

George James, Sanjana Balakrishnan, Claire Cozens, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill

Thursday 16 April 2026

(Afternoon)

[Clive Efford in the Chair]

Armed Forces Bill

Clause 42

Governance and administration of Ministry of Defence Police

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 43 and 44 stand part.

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Clause 42 amends sections 3A, 4 and 4A of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987. It widens the power to make regulations under section 3A(1) so that provision can be made relating to the governance and administration of the Ministry of Defence police. That will give the Secretary of State a power similar to the power under section 50(1) of the Police Act 1996 to make regulations for members of territorial police forces in England and Wales. The clause will also enable regulations to make provision so that a member of the MDP can be suspended from the office of constable if they are suspended from duty. As a consequence of the amendment to section 3A, it makes a minor amendment to section 4(1) so that the requirement to make regulations making provision relating to representation at disciplinary proceedings is aligned with the power in section 84(1) of the Police Act 1996. It also makes a minor amendment to the power in section 4A to make provision for police appeals tribunals, to remove a reference to legislation—schedule 3 to the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012—that was recently revoked by the Scottish Government. I now turn to clause 43. Cross-border powers of arrest are set out in part X of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Where offences are committed in one legal jurisdiction in the UK, cross-border powers of arrest enable police officers to arrest suspects in other legal jurisdictions of the UK. The purpose of the amendments made by clause 43 is to make it clear that the powers in part X can be exercised by members of the MDP within their jurisdiction set out in section 2 of the Ministry of Defence Police Act. The amendments will also slightly enlarge their jurisdiction to act for non-defence purposes, to execute arrest warrants at the request of other police forces, and to arrest suspects where it is not possible to wait for the arrival of a member of the local force. Similar amendments have already been made for members of the British Transport police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. Clause 44 amends section 2 of the Police (Property) Act 1897 to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations allowing unclaimed property in the possession of the MDP to be retained so it can be used for police purposes. The current power enables regulations to be made so that property can be retained for police purposes by territorial police forces in England and Wales. However, there is a legislative gap that means there is no scope for regulations to allow such property to be retained for use for police purposes by the MDP. This clause will allow regulations to be made that enable property to be retained for MDP use in the same way as for Home Office police forces. I commend clauses 42 to 44 to the Committee.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again this afternoon, Mr Efford. This will be a brief contribution. When I was a Minister, I had the privilege of visiting the MOD police at what was then RAF Wethersfield, which is now used for much more controversial purposes, but that is outside the scope of this Bill. I was shown a convoy protection exercise—the Minister will understand what I am talking about—and I was very impressed by how efficient and effective the MOD police were at guarding a precious cargo in that exercise. The MOD police are affectionately known as “MOD plod” throughout defence, but sometimes I feel they are slightly under-sung heroes. They keep many people safe, and I place on record our appreciation for the MOD police and everything they do to keep us safe and protect vital assets in defence, as I am sure the Minister would echo.

The MOD police do an outstanding job. The changes in this Bill enhance their ability to keep us safe and to do their job effectively. Question put and agreed to. Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 43 and 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 45 Detention etc of persons overseas in cases of mental disorder Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 7.

Clause 45 and schedule 7 will protect those experiencing serious mental health difficulties while deployed overseas. Schedule 12 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides the legal framework for admitting and detaining service personnel suffering from mental disorders in service hospitals located outside the British Isles. However, schedule 12 has never been commenced, as its drafting is based on the existence of overseas military hospitals, none of which remain. That means our armed forces cannot currently rely on schedule 12 to detain personnel overseas. Clause 45 and schedule 7 therefore amend schedule 12 to allow for the temporary detention of persons subject to service law, and civilians subject to service discipline, who experience a mental health crisis while deployed overseas, pending their removal to the UK for appropriate treatment in the civilian mental health system. That reflects the Mental Health Act 1983. The clause enables a commanding officer to make an order, regarding the health, safety and dignity of a person, to detain them temporarily in a suitable place where detention in an overseas service hospital is impracticable. In urgent cases, service police may remove a person from living accommodation, where they are suffering from a mental health disorder, and take them to a suitable place where they can be detained by their commanding officer. A registered medical practitioner or nurse should be consulted, so far as is practicable. In urgent cases, service police can also take a person suffering from a mental health disorder to a suitable place where they can be detained under the order of their commanding officer following consultation, where practicable, with a medical practitioner or nurse. Clause 45 and schedule 7 ensure that those who experience a mental health crisis while serving overseas receive appropriate protection, support and treatment. I commend clause 45 and schedule 7 to the Committee.

Clearly, all members of the Committee regard the mental health of our armed forces personnel and their families as equally important as their physical health. We therefore understand and welcome the intent of this clause.

The closure of overseas military hospitals requires a change to the legislation, and this clause does exactly that. Question put and agreed to. Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 46 Defence functions of the Oil and Pipelines Agency Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46 introduces a new section into the Oil and Pipelines Act 1985 to expand the defence functions of the Oil and Pipelines Agency. This is necessary as the agency is limited by existing legislation to dealing only in petroleum-based products and services. The OPA was established to support UK defence operations at a time when hydrocarbons were the main source of operational energy. In the decades since, the UK’s energy landscape has shifted considerably. National commitments to reduce carbon emissions and achieve net zero by 2050 have driven changes in the country’s energy strategy. The Ministry of Defence is undergoing significant reform, with a strong emphasis on energy diversification. As a result, defence operations will become increasingly reliant on a broader mix of energy sources to ensure energy security, sustainability and operational effectiveness. Those include, but are not limited to, biofuels, synthetic fuels, natural gas and renewable natural gas, hydrogen, sustainable aviation fuels, zero-carbon energy carriers and fuels, and other low-carbon alternatives. The clause therefore updates the Oil and Pipelines Act to permit the OPA to carry out activities related to the production, conveyance, storage or supply of energy for defence purposes, and to enter into agreements to support those activities. It also defines “energy” in broad terms, rather than restricting it to petroleum. The clause will ensure that the OPA remains strategically aligned, operationally relevant and capable of delivering value for money in a changing energy and defence environment. I commend clause 46 to the Committee.

I will make just one point, given the current international situation. We will not get into a long debate about the conflict in Iran, as you would rightly call me to order, Mr Efford. However, it is on the record that our Security Service has identified upwards of 20 plots in recent years, at the hands of the Iranian Government or their proxies, against facilities or persons in the United Kingdom, which mercifully it has foiled. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that there could be a threat to those key pipelines that, bluntly, allow our jets to fly. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that the additional powers in the Bill will help to improve the security of that supply network? Is there anything else that he might want to place on the record this afternoon, subject to operational security, about what we are doing to maintain critical supplies to our armed forces, not least aviation fuel for our quick reaction alert aircraft?

The clause does exactly that. It diversifies some of the regulations that had predominantly focused on petrochemical facilities, in line with the changes in technology and energy demands. That diversification gives us resilience in global affairs and against potential adversaries who would seek to disrupt those services. Question put and agreed to. Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 47 Protection of military remains Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47 addresses the existing disparity between the protection of military aircraft and vessels under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986, which secures the protection from unauthorised interference of the remains of military aircraft and vessels that have crashed, sunk or been stranded, and/or associated human remains, making it an offence to enter or interfere with a military wreck site without an authorised licence. The Act provides two types of protection: protected places and controlled sites, which are managed through the statutory instrument process in tranches. However, it does not currently allow designation of a vessel as a protected place if it was sunk or stranded on or before 4 August 1914, or a site as a controlled site if more than 200 years have elapsed since the crash, sinking or stranding of the vessel or aircraft. Clause 47 therefore amends section 1 of the 1986 Act so that all military shipwrecks that are the last resting places of service personnel are automatically protected places, ensuring alignment with the protection already afforded to military aircraft. The clause also removes the restrictive time constraints that apply to protected places and controlled sites to ensure that the nation’s historic military shipwrecks that are, by virtue of those time limits, currently excluded, can be protected. By providing automatic protection to all military shipwrecks, the MOD will enable a significant improvement in how our maritime military graves and underwater cultural heritage are protected. Diving on protected places will continue to be permitted on a “look but don’t touch” basis, and a licence to dive on a controlled site will still be required. Giving all military wrecks protected place status will help to deter unauthorised salvage and the desecration of wrecks and the military remains of service personnel. It will also enable the MOD, where appropriate, to prosecute those who flout the law. Clause 47 delivers vital changes to enable the proper protection of our naval heritage. I therefore commend it to the Committee.

This clause is important and worthwhile. Sunken warships are war graves in their own right, and they are sacred. One example is HMS Hood, which was blown up and sunk in battle with the Bismarck. Only three members of her crew survived; the rest perished as a result of that engagement. This is from memory, but I think that when the bell of HMS Hood was recovered some years ago, there was a great deal of debate about whether it was appropriate. In the end, it was decided that, in those very special circumstances, it was. We must always remember that these graves are sacred; that applies to those of navy personnel from other countries as well. It is therefore good that protections are being increased for sites where those who fought and gave their lives for their country—whatever country—and who should be appropriately commemorated.

I commend the right hon. Gentleman’s comments. It is worth remembering that some of the more costly battles in war are maritime battles. Ships could sink within minutes, and although today there are fewer crew members on those ships, there were thousands on them back in the day, particularly with the Dreadnought class. It is right that we protect those graves, which is why we are introducing this clause. Question put and agreed to. Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 48 Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989: updating Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 to align it more closely with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for England and Wales where there are references to UK armed forces. These are minor and technical amendments and do not change the substance of the legislation. Clause 48 simply substitutes the outdated reference to “the Royal Navy Regulating Branch” with “the Royal Navy Police”. It also removes reference to “the Royal Marines Police”, which has been incorporated into the Royal Navy police. Lastly, clause 48 omits reference to the repealed single service Acts: the Army Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 and the Naval Discipline Act 1957. I commend the clause to the Committee.

As the Minister rightly says, these are highly technical amendments, and therefore we have no objection.

I am very happy. Question put and agreed to. Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 49 Coroners and Justice Act 2009: correcting amendment Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49 is a very minor clarifying amendment to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Changes made by the Armed Forces Act 2021 to other legislation to reflect the creation of the tri-service serious crime unit, referred to as the Defence Serious Crime Unit, included changes to the Coroners and Justice Act. While this change introduced the wording “tri-service serious crime unit”, it missed the opportunity to also add “service” before “police force”, which is an omission from when the Coroners and Justice Act was originally drafted. The introduction of the word “service” before “police force” simply corrects that omission and provides clarity that the specific reference relates to a service police force and not a civilian police force. I commend clause 49 to the Committee.

Agreed.

Also agreed. Question put and agreed to. Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 50 Interpretation Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 51 to 55 stand part.

The general provisions set out the technical detail necessary for the legislation to operate as intended. They address such matters as interpretation, with clause 50 defining terms used throughout the Bill. Clause 51 covers financial provision and states that expenses arising from the provisions in the Bill will be paid out of money provided by Parliament. Clause 52 sets out extent in the United Kingdom and the specific legal jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, where legislation will form part of the law. Clause 53 covers extent in the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the British overseas territories and how certain provisions extend outside the UK—that is, Crown dependencies and British overseas territories. Clause 54 covers commencement and transitional provision, setting out when different parts of the Bill will come into force and enabling the Secretary of State to make transitory, transitional or saving provision. That is a standard provision designed to help bridge the gap between existing legislation and the commencement of new provisions when they come into force. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

I have one question about clause 53. The clause is titled: “Extent in the Channel Islands, Isle of Man and British overseas territories”. However, subsection (2) says: “The provisions mentioned in subsection (3) extend to— (a) the Isle of Man, and (b) the British overseas territories, except Gibraltar.” Similarly, subsection (5)(b) says: “any of the British overseas territories, except Gibraltar.” The Minister will know that there are some sensitivities about policing and such matters in Gibraltar as a result of negotiations with the Government of Spain. I will not attempt to get into a wider row this afternoon about the fate of Gibraltar. However, after the Government’s big climbdown on Chagos, we are rather hoping that they will look again at the arrangements that affect the Rock. Suffice it for this afternoon—and just to prove I have read it—perhaps the Minister could explain why there are two exceptions for Gibraltar in this clause?

It may seem unusual that the Armed Forces Act 2006 extends directly to each of the British overseas territories, except for Gibraltar. However, there is a reason for that. The Act originally extended to all the British overseas territories, but it ceased to extend to the British overseas territories in 2011 as a result of a drafting error when it was renewed for the first time by the Armed Forces Act 2011. The Armed Forces Act 2016 corrected the error by extending the 2006 Act to the British overseas territories. Gibraltar was not included because it had instead asked to deal with armed forces matters using legislation passed by the Gibraltar Parliament—the Armed Forces (Gibraltar) Act 2018. Question put and agreed to. Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 51 to 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill. New Clause 2 Veterans’ Mental Health Oversight Officer “(1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows. (2) After section 343C (Establishment and functions of veterans advisory and pensions committees) insert— ‘343CA Establishment and functions of a Veterans’ Mental Health Oversight Officer (1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person to be the Veterans’ Mental Health Oversight Officer. (2) The general function of the Officer is to oversee the mental health care and treatment provided to veterans by the health bodies specified in section 343AZB. (3) In exercising their function, the Officer must, in particular, monitor and assess the extent to which health bodies are complying with the duty imposed by section 343AZA (Duty to have due regard to the covenant) in relation to the mental health and well-being of veterans. (4) The Officer may require a health body to provide such information as the Officer considers reasonably necessary to discharge their functions under this section. (5) The Officer must prepare an annual report on the exercise of their functions and the general state of veterans’ mental health care and treatment in the United Kingdom. (6) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the Officer’s annual report before each House of Parliament. (7) In this section, “veteran” means a person who has at any time been a service member.’”—(Ian Roome.) This new clause establishes the statutory role of a Veterans’ Mental Health Oversight Officer. Brought up, and read the First time. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time. Question negatived. New Clause 3 Duty to provide medical records on discharge “(1) This section applies where a person ceases to be a member of the regular forces or the reserve forces. (2) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a complete copy of the person’s service medical records is provided to the person no later than one month after the day on which the person is discharged or otherwise ceases to be a member of those forces. (3) Those regulations may specify the manner and form in which service medical records are to be provided under this section, including provision for records to be transferred directly to a civilian health body with the person's consent. (4) In this section— ‘health body’ has the same meaning as in section 343AZB; ‘service medical records’ means any records relating to the person’s physical or mental health care and treatment created or maintained by or on behalf of His Majesty's forces during the person's period of service.”—(Ian Roome.) This new clause places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that all service personnel leaving the military receive a complete copy of their medical records within one month of their discharge date. Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. New clause 3 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that all service personnel leaving the military receive a complete copy of their medical records within one month of their discharge date. The one-month timeframe would create a hard deadline, and it would align the provision of records with their completing their registration with a GP. The new clause would apply in respect of all regular and reserve personnel and ensure that detailed medical records are made available after discharge, to both the individual and the relevant health body. Under the new clause, the form those service medical records take would be specified, as is now common with data disclosure, to make health information transparent and accessible. The new clause would also create a formalised handover process for all physical and mental health records to a civilian health body, such as the NHS, as already defined in the Bill in proposed new section 343AZB of the Armed Forces Act 2006. Disclosure would happen with the person’s consent in a structured way, which would help to ensure better awareness of their service history during their future healthcare. Lost medical records have been the focus of veterans’ campaigns, such as those launched by the UK nuclear test veterans, who say that decades-old records of blood and urine samples taken during the 1950s nuclear tests may have been actively withheld from service personnel to avoid liability over radiation-related illnesses. The new clause would recognise that a service career can be dangerous, so timely transfer of a copy of a person’s medical records at the end of their service should be standard procedure.

The Opposition have some sympathy with what the hon. Member for North Devon is trying to achieve. There has historically been something of a cliff face. The medical requirements of a person serving in the armed forces are primarily attended to by Defence Medical Services; when that person leaves the armed forces and becomes a veteran, they transfer to the national health service. It is probably fair to say that in some cases there is a hiatus in medical information and records when that transfer takes place, and I am sure that it would be possible to improve it. Some GP practices have veterans champions and some practices automatically ask someone who signs on with them, “Are you a veteran?” Unsurprisingly, those practices tend to be better at making sure that medical records are passed on. The hon. Member raised the specific case of the medical records of nuclear test veterans. I am not impugning the Minister, but I think the Ministry of Defence could try harder to ensure that those specific records are made more freely available. On the more general point, we could do better at the transfer of records, particularly for those people who have suffered episodes of mental ill health, which are perhaps not immediately obvious. The vast majority of armed forces personnel leave military service in good shape, both physically and mentally, but I know from experience that for some veterans—the Minister has taken a real interest in this—there is, perhaps some years after they have left, what the professionals call a “trigger event”. Perhaps their father is diagnosed with a terminal illness with very few weeks to live and is then gone. That can suddenly bring out in the veteran all sorts of issues, perhaps relating to their service and operations. In those circumstances, unfortunately, people can spiral down very quickly; they might have trouble with their relationships, lose their job or become reliant on drink or drugs. In the worst cases, they might lose their home and end up in a dingy one-bedroom flat in the rough end of town—and in the worst of all cases, sometimes, they even take their own lives. This is not in any way a partisan point. Governments of all colours have tried to work on the problem, as have charities such as Help for Heroes, the Royal British Legion and Veterans Aid—I think of everything that Hugh Milroy has done in this space—but we could do more. Being able to pass across medical records in a timely and accurate way when people leave would help in those circumstances, even though sometimes problems lie hidden, for want of a better phrase, and come out only some years later. For those reasons, I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Member for North Devon proposes.

I wonder whether the Minister will confirm that veterans will have access to their medical records, whether within the month or not. As he knows, we have had some issues getting hold of the medical records of veterans who developed cancer after service with certain helicopters. It has proved very hard to get hold of those records. Will the Minister confirm that veterans will always have access to their medical records?

As that was technically an intervention, I will have the first crack at it, but I am sure the Minister heard what the hon. Lady said. I see what she is trying to do here. Within the NHS there is the mantra “no decision about me without me”. If an NHS patient requests their medical records, they are meant to get them in a timely manner. We could all name constituency examples where that has not necessarily always been the case. Nevertheless, that is the principle, and it seems to me that it should apply equally to people who have served in the armed forces, who should suffer no disadvantage by virtue of their service, under the armed forces covenant. I am certainly sympathetic to what the hon. Lady said, and I am sure the Minister will be, too.

I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling new clause 3, which would require the provision of full medical records within one month to all personnel leaving the armed forces. The Ministry of Defence absolutely recognises the importance of facilitating the transfer of healthcare information to civilian healthcare providers quickly and efficiently when an individual leaves the armed forces. In short, individual access to medical records is already legislated for under the Data Protection Act 2018, and we are rolling out a system that will transfer most records within a day. The Act allows service personnel to request their own military records, including healthcare records, through a subject access request. There is an expectation that records will be provided within 28 days, extended to three months for more complex cases. Service personnel are advised to register with an NHS GP at their discharge medical, which takes place one to three months before discharge. On leaving the care of Defence Medical Services, service personnel are provided with a medical care summary and a form named FMed 133. They are advised to provide a copy of their FMed 133—a patient record access request—to their NHS GP. The information provided to service personnel for their GP on discharge includes physical and mental health diagnoses, medication and allergies, significant past medical history, ongoing referrals and care plans, and details of significant occupational exposure with health implications. Handover discussions are had for complex cases. When a patient’s full DMS health record is required, it is provided on request from the NHS GP. The FMed 133 provides details of how the NHS GP may request a patient’s full DMS health record. Preparing a patient’s full DMS health record for release to the individual or their GP requires clinical oversight, and compliance with data protection and security protocols must be ensured. Full DMS health records may require redaction of sensitive operational information, and their release must comply with the principles of the General Data Protection Regulation.

The new clause would create a deadline and shorten the timeframe. The Minister has just said that some complicated cases can take up to three months, but it is probably those cases that need the urgency of a 28-day timeframe. I know that in future it may all go digital, but at the moment we cannot confirm that, and I get some really serious and difficult cases in my constituency casework. Does the Minister therefore agree that we really need to improve the timeframe to 28 days?

I agree that we need to improve the system, and I am not going to stand here and tell the Committee that it is foolproof. I have heard of many cases where health records have gone missing in the bridge between systems. That is why I want to highlight the new electronic health records system, which is already under contract and will allow the immediate electronic transfer of medical records from DMS to NHS GPs at the end of service. Digitisation is the big issue here, alongside interoperability between Defence Medical Services systems and those in the NHS. The new system will allow the transfer of NHS records to defence on entry, and their sharing when required, which will have a big impact on recruitment, particularly in reducing the time between a person expressing an interest in joining and the moment they do so, where the transfer of medical records has been an issue in the past. Records access and transfer can occur within a day, and the new system is planned to be live from December 2027. I hope that reassures the Committee that the new clause is not needed, and on that basis I ask the hon. Member for North Devon to withdraw it.

When I called you to speak, Minister, there was nobody else on their feet. Since then, somebody else has indicated that they would like to speak. In the interests of the debate, I will allow that, but you will be free to come back after they have spoken, if you wish.

Thank you, Mr Efford; I appreciate that. I think new clause 3 is very sensible. I know from personal experience that life in the military is fast. A person may deploy somewhere and get a number of different inoculations, and they do not necessarily think about what they were getting before being deployed. When people come out of the armed forces—I have definitely found this myself—and go travelling, knowing what they have had is really important. For someone to have to go back to the Ministry of Defence to try to get their medical records and pass them to their GPs is, as anyone who has tried to move information through GPs or NHS trusts will know, extremely difficult. As the Minister has said, moving that information between the MOD and the NHS is an even bigger burden. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford made a number of points about mental health, but there are smaller, practical points that the new clause would address. Having a physical copy of our military records within one month would be really valuable, so I look forward to supporting the hon. Member for North Devon on the new clause.

When the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East left the military, I am sure he received his FMed 133. If he did, he will recognise that it contained information on physical and mental health diagnoses, medication, allergies, significant past medical history, and ongoing referrals and care plans, as well as detailing significant operational exposures with health implications.

I wish to press new clause 3 to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 4

Independent review of Armed Forces recruitment and retention

“(1) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review of the processes for recruitment and retention across His Majesty’s forces.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must, in particular, consider—

(a) the efficiency and consistency of recruitment processes across the Royal Navy, the regular army, the Royal Air Force and the reserve forces,

(b) the effectiveness of steps being taken to improve diversity and inclusion within His Majesty’s forces,

(c) the impact of the quality of defence housing (including single living accommodation) on the retention of service personnel, and

(d) the impact of the medical discharge process on retention and transition to civilian life.

(3) A report of the review must be laid before each House of Parliament no later than 12 months after the day on which this Act is passed.”—(Mr Francois.)

This new clause requires the Government to commission an independent review into recruitment and retention in the armed forces and lay the report of the review before Parliament.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 5—An armed forces retention strategy— “(1) This section applies where the Secretary of State lays before Parliament the Ministry of Defence Votes A paper seeking Parliamentary authority for the maximum numbers of personnel to be maintained for service with the armed forces in the following financial year. (2) The Secretary of State must lay alongside the Votes A paper an armed forces retention strategy. (3) The retention strategy must include— (a) an assessment of the current rates of retention across the regular and reserve forces, (b) an explanation of the steps the Ministry of Defence is taking to improve retention to meet the maximum numbers of personnel set out in the Votes A paper, and (c) an assessment of the findings of the most recent Armed Forces Continuous Attitudes Survey and its findings regarding satisfaction with service life.” This new clause would require the Government to lay an armed forces retention strategy alongside the annual Votes A paper on the maximum number of personnel to be maintained in the armed forces.

On the issue of recruitment and retention, the Committee will recall from an earlier debate that I produced a report called “Stick or Twist?” for a previous Prime Minister, which was submitted in February 2020, just one month before the nation went into lockdown. The essence of that report, which contained multiple recommendations—all but one were eventually adopted by the Ministry of Defence, to varying degrees—was that there are a variety of reasons why people twist, or leave HM armed forces. However, the overwhelming reason, which has been consistent for a number of years, is the overall effect of service life on family life. People can be picked up for short-term deployment, sometimes overseas, and not see their partners and children as often as they would like. Sometimes, the cumulative effect of that—the pressure—becomes too much. For the record, there are a number of other factors, and it is often a decision in the round—normally, it is a combination of factors that persuades someone eventually to leave—but sometimes there is one straw that breaks the camel’s back. I gave the example in a previous debate of someone who had to miss his best friend’s wedding because he was trawled to the British Army Training Unit Suffield as a watchkeeper. He was a rising cavalry officer, who spent nights sitting in a tent with a laptop or reading a novel, and he came back and basically told the Army to stuff it. That was a very poor leadership decision by somebody. Other factors could include pay, childcare and the expense and difficulty of obtaining it, housing—we have debated that previously at some length—and spousal employment, as people sometimes leave because of the effect on their partner’s career rather than on their own.

The right hon. Gentleman is right to talk about the different pressures that cause people to leave. Will he join me in welcoming the fact that in the year to September 2025, there was 1,000 more in inflow to the regular forces than in outflow? That year included the first two quarters in a row where inflow has exceeded outflow since 2021.

The hon. Gentleman pre-empts me; I notice that he said “into the armed forces”, not “into the Army”. I will come on to why that is the case in a minute. As he says, quarter by quarter, more people are joining the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force than are leaving, and the Opposition welcome that. But the latest annual statistics show that more people are still leaving the Army than are joining, which raises the obvious question: why the dichotomy? Why is there still net outflow from the Army when there is welcome inflow to the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force? I believe that one of the reasons for that dichotomy is lawfare, and the Government’s Northern Ireland troubles Bill. It is true that some RAF members, principally at RAF Aldergrove, served in Northern Ireland during the troubles, as did some Royal Navy members. Certainly, many members of the Royal Marines served there during Operation Banner, including the Minister, to whom I pay tribute for his service. But it was primarily a job for the Army, who often ended up as piggy in the middle between two warring communities. That was a difficult task. Therefore, to put it mildly, it is a great shame that the Government are still seeking to push that benighted Bill, the effect of which would be to open veterans up to lawfare. That is why a number of them are leaving the service, particularly in the special forces community. I know that the Minister has strong historical links with that community. To prove my point, a letter was recently published by the Special Air Service Regimental Association, the Special Boat Service Association and the association for what is now the Special Reconnaissance Regiment—that grew out of 14 Intelligence Company, which served in Northern Ireland. That letter described the situation as a “national disgrace”. We are still world class in the area of special forces, but if we allow this legislation to progress, those people will be dragged back into the dock via inquest and civil prosecutions. Fewer people will join and more will leave.

Order. We ought to come back to this Bill and the new clauses. You are touching on issues that relate to another Bill.

I have been here too long to argue with the Chair, but I am doing so, Mr Efford, because the new clause is about retention. My question is: why are more people joining the Navy and the Air Force than are leaving, and why are more people leaving the Army than joining? I believe that the troubles Bill is the fundamental difference.

The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 5 would merely commission an independent review, not prosecute it. It does seem that we are getting out of scope.

Order. Let us be clear that it is for me to decide whether we are out of scope, not for Committee members.

I am sure that the Chair can speak for himself, and I shall not try his patience. To end, in the next fortnight, Members will have to vote on whether to carry over the troubles Bill into the new Session or to let it die. I will give the Minister some advice: take the hint and drop it.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. To reinforce the importance of having a review on retention, the Navy’s loss is perhaps my gain in that a new member of my staff who went through officer training in the naval scheme unfortunately left, because there were no opportunities for him to move on with his training. He was told that it would be between 12 months and two and a half years before he could move on with his career. That was a huge issue and meant that he felt he had to walk away. As I said, that is my gain as I have a fantastic and incredibly qualified new parliamentary assistant, but it is important that we consider that as an element of retention. Also, as has been said, single service accommodation is important, particularly for the Navy. As part of the wider Bill, we have talked about families, and obviously family accommodation is vital, but we must not lose sight of improving single service accommodation, particularly for those in the Navy.

Unusually as I moved the new clause, I am not proposing to press it to a vote, because I hope that the point has been made. I hope that the Liberal Democrats, who tabled it, will not argue with that.

I thank Liberal Democrat Members for tabling the new clauses. To step back, I had 24 years in the military, and I sat and watched Governments come and go—I was less interested at the start of my career, but far more interested at the end, which just happened to coincide with the previous Government. What did we see? We saw a fundamental failure to address the recruitment and retention issues. To blame recruitment on the Northern Ireland legacy Bill, which I agree we are working on, is fundamentally flawed, as is highlighting a recruitment issue in special forces: we have already talked through how that is not the case, based on very close analysis that I have done, on an issue very close to my heart. The reality is that a new Government have come in. We have looked in detail at the problems and systemic issues in the people space, which we have all lived and breathed, and we have fundamentally dealt with them. There is a long way to go, but we are seeing the shoots of success, with a percentage increase in recruitment and a reduction in outflow. Why? Childcare initiatives. Not shiny ships, bombs or bullets, but childcare initiatives, retention payments, housing, the right to a family life—something the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford mentioned—and two inflation-busting pay rises. Under the previous Government, morale was at the lowest level in a generation, and now it is rising. We cannot put the recruitment and retention issues down to one Bill. When I joined the military, I did not even know what a pension was; I would not have been tracking the legislation going through Parliament. These matters are usually down to the things people can feel and breathe—the things close to their fingers. Those are childcare, the right to a family life, service and operations. That is what keeps people in, and that is what we have done.

Will the Minister give way?

No, I will not. That is where we have delivered the output. The previous Government failed. We are succeeding. There is a long way to go, but we are moving in the right direction. It is about time that the previous Government held their hands up and said that they categorically failed with recruitment and retention.

Well, explain the letter from the regimental associations.

Order. We are moving into issues that are beyond the scope of the Bill. Mr Francois, you have the last word, as the mover of the new clause.

As I said, I am not going to press the new clause. I just leave the Minister with this thought: if what I am saying is completely wrong, how does he explain that letter from his own mates?

The Minister does not need to explain that in this setting. Perhaps he can do so outside of the Committee.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 6 National Veterans’ Commissioner (England) “After section 366 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 insert— ‘366A National Veterans’ Commissioner (England): establishment (1) Within 12 months of the passing of the Armed Forces Act 2026, the Secretary of State must appoint a National Veterans’ Commissioner for England (“the Commissioner”). (2) The Commissioner shall act independently in carrying out the functions of the office. (3) The Commissioner shall, amongst others, perform the following functions— (a) promote the interests of veterans in England; (b) monitor the operation and effectiveness of the Armed Forces Covenant in England; (c) review the effect of public policy and public services on veterans and their families; (d) identify barriers faced by veterans in accessing housing, healthcare, employment, education, and other public services; (e) make recommendations to the Secretary of State and to public authorities on improving support for veterans. (4) In exercising these functions the Commissioner may— (a) carry out reviews and investigations into matters affecting veterans; (b) consult veterans, service charities, public authorities, and other relevant organisations; (c) publish reports and recommendations. (5) The Commissioner shall prepare an annual report on the exercise of the Commissioner’s functions. (6) The Commissioner may at any time prepare a report on any matter relating to the interests of veterans in England. (7) The Secretary of State shall lay any report prepared under this section before both Houses of Parliament. (8) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for— (a) the provision of such staff, accommodation, and other resources as they consider necessary for the Commissioner to carry out their functions; (b) the publication of the Commissioner’s reports. (9) The Commissioner is to be appointed for a term of three years and may be reappointed for a further term. (10) The Secretary of State may remove the Commissioner from office only on grounds of— (a) incapacity, (b) misbehaviour, or (c) failure to discharge the functions of the office. (11) In this section— “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998; “veteran” means a person who has served in His Majesty’s armed forces.’”—(Sarah Bool.) This new clause would require the Government to appoint a National Veteran’s Commissioner for England and sets out its functions. Brought up, and read the First time. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 8

HM Forces and Veterans Railcards

“(1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, provide for the continued provision of—

(a) the HM Forces Railcard, and

(b) the Veterans Railcard.

(2) The railcard schemes under subsection (1) must provide eligible persons with discounted travel on the national rail network.

(3) The regulations must specify that such railcard schemes—

(a) operate on a national basis;

(b) are subject to published eligibility criteria;

(c) are maintained in a manner consistent with other national rail concessionary schemes.

(4) The regulations may make provision for the detailed operation of the railcard schemes.

(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(Mr Francois.)

This new clause places a duty on the Secretary of State to secure the continuation of rail fare concessions for members of the armed forces and veterans, giving such schemes a clear statutory basis and aligning them with other national rail concessionary arrangements.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The essence of the new clause is that changes that are under way in our national railway industry, including the taking back into public ownership of a number of rail franchises and the gradual evolution of an overall entity known as Great British Railways, should not disadvantage either serving or former armed forces personnel and their families by discontinuing the popular HM forces and HM veterans railcards. In highlighting that issue, I should immediately declare an interest, as I hold a veterans railcard. Indeed, I can attest to the Committee that the railcards represent excellent value for money, having cost, from memory, something like £70 for three years, but in return allowing for a discount of a third on almost all rail journeys, significantly including both the morning and evening peak periods; it is not just an off-peak railcard. Moreover, those holding a veterans railcard can also travel in company with their partner, who then qualifies for much the same discount on the same journey. It is an extremely positive measure, and I hope the Minister can give us a cast-iron assurance that the major changes under way within the railway industry will not somehow lead to either of the cards—or, worst of all, both—being discontinued. It was, admittedly, in their manifesto that the Labour party intended to take the railways back into public ownership. However, it was not in their manifesto that armed forces personnel, veterans or their families should suffer as a result.

Would the right hon. Gentleman update me on where he heard that the Government have any intention whatsoever of withdrawing the HM forces or HM veterans railcards? I have a veterans railcard, and I have not seen any evidence anywhere that there is an intention to withdraw them.

As I understand it, it is not merely a Government decision; it is partly a concession that is offered by the railway industry. Some uncertainty has been put to us that, as we transition to GB Railways, which is to be a holding organisation for the railway network, there may be some changes to concessionary fares. What we are trying to achieve is an assurance that the withdrawal of these railcards will not be one of those changes. It is really about the avoidance of doubt, so all the Minister needs to pop up and say is, “As far as the Government are concerned, these two railcards will continue”, and I am hopeful that the railway industry will take note of the Minister’s intention. It is really as straightforward as that, but if we cannot get an assurance on that, we will most assuredly vote on it.

I declare an interest: I am also a proud holder of a veterans railcard, as are many of my constituents. The new clause is modest in scope. It does not create new schemes. Both HM forces railcards and the veterans railcard are already in place. The purpose of the new clause is simply to give a clear statutory basis to ensure that they continue to operate on a national footing with transparent eligibility criteria and proper parliamentary oversight before any future changes are made. That is not an onerous demand on the Government, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford has already laid out. It is a straightforward safeguard for those who the schemes are intended to support. The Minister suggested that legislation is unnecessary because there is no intention to withdraw these railcards. However, having spoken to colleagues who were on the recent transport Bill, I know that similar questions were put to Ministers in that Committee. We have had no support, and this issue has ended up in my casework. Having spoken to other Members of Parliament who have veteran populations in their constituencies—

I put it on record that I am a holder of a veterans railcard. Many of my constituents have veterans railcards and, with the cost of living crisis, they find it a great way to move about. Does the hon. Member agree that we really need to continue with the veterans railcard?

The hon. Member has a Royal Marines base and a large veteran community in his constituency. This has been an issue, and I want it to be quashed as quickly as possible. If Ministers in the Department for Transport have not been able to confirm it, I really hope that the Minister in this Committee can stand up and say that there is no issue around these points and that the veterans railcard will continue to be in play. Hopefully, we can give it more support through the passage of this Bill so that it has a statutory footing. Without a statutory foundation, Parliament would have no formal role in protecting the veterans railcard; that is the point I am raising. The position is hard to justify when set alongside other concessions in the rail system: discounts for younger passengers, older people and disabled travellers are already underpinned by legislation. The reasoning for that approach is clear and sensible. It is therefore difficult to see why the same principle should not apply to those who are serving, or have served, in the armed forces. If the argument rests on trusted Ministers—I look across at the Minister and he is extremely trustful—that is not a standard applied consistently elsewhere, nor is it one that we should be asked to rely on. The new clause is carefully framed and constitutionally sound. It ensures that any future changes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny, which is exactly where decisions belong.

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling this new clause and recognising the important contribution made by members of our armed forces and the veterans community. The Government are clear that supporting those who serve and have served remains an absolute priority. That includes ensuring that they are able to benefit from discounted travel, including through the existing HM forces railcard and the veterans railcard schemes. However, we do not consider it necessary to place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to secure continued provision of those specific railcards, as proposed by the new clause. As set out in the Bill, the existing legislative framework provides a strong basis for the continuation of concessionary fare schemes while allowing appropriate flexibility in how those are designed or delivered over time. That flexibility is really important: it enables the railway to respond to changing passenger needs, affordability considerations and wider policy objectives while continuing to support groups for whom the cost of travel can be a barrier. Placing a specific scheme in primary legislation risks constraining that flexibility and creating unintended rigidity in how future discount arrangements are managed. As it stands, existing discount schemes, including those for veterans and members of the armed forces, can continue to be offered via policy and operational decisions without the need for legislative prescription. The Government remain fully committed to supporting the armed forces and veterans community, through this and other means. I reassure the Committee that there are no plans—I repeat, no plans—to withdraw HM forces or veterans railcards, and the Government remain fully committed to supporting the armed forces community. For those reasons, while I understand the intention behind the new clause, the Government do not believe that it is required and I therefore ask the right hon. Member to withdraw it.

I thank the Minister for what he said but, given that there is still vagueness in the Railways Bill, which is why we have tabled this new clause, I am afraid that I am not entirely reassured and will have to press it to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 9

Authorisation of drone use for defence purposes

“After Part 16D of AFA 2006 (inserted by section 4 of this Act) insert—

‘Part 16E

DEFENCE DRONES

343R Authorisations of drone use for defence purposes

(1) An authorised person may authorise the use of unmanned aircraft systems for the purpose of defence—

(a) testing,

(b) evaluation,

(c) training, and

(d) capability development.

(2) For the purposes of this section, an “authorised person” means—

(a) a member of the Armed Forces who has been deemed authorised by the Secretary of State, or

(b) a civilian employee of the Ministry of Defence who has been deemed authorised by the Secretary of State.

(3) An authorisation under subsection (1) must—

(a) be in writing, except in urgent cases in which it may be given verbally and later confirmed in writing as soon as reasonably practicable, and

(b) not have effect for a period exceeding six months.

(4) An authorised person must have regard to the principles of necessity and proportionality when granting an authorisation under subsection (1).’”—(David Reed.)

This new clause enables an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation and training.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 10—Designation of defensive drone offshore areas— “(1) After Part 16D of AFA 2006 (inserted by section 4 of this Act) insert— ‘Part 16D DEFENCE DRONES 343R Designation of defence drone offshore areas (1) An authorised person may designate an area of sea and associated airspace as a defence drone offshore area for the purposes of authorised unmanned aircraft operations. (2) For the purposes of this section, an “authorised person” means— (a) a member of the Armed Forces who has been deemed authorised by the Secretary of State, or (b) a civilian employee of the Ministry of Defence who has been deemed authorised by the Secretary of State. (3) Before making an authorisation under subsection (1), the authorised person must consult— (a) the Civil Aviation Authority, (b) the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and (c) Any other maritime authorities as the authorised person considers appropriate. (4) An authorised person may impose conditions regarding the operation of unmanned aircraft systems within a designated area.’” This new clause allows authorised personnel to designate offshore areas for drone operations. New clause 11—Review of Regulatory Framework for Uncrewed Systems— “(1) Within 12 months of the passage of this Act and once every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State must conduct a review of the regulatory framework governing the testing and operation of uncrewed systems in the maritime and land domains. (2) A review under subsection (1) must consider— (a) the framework’s impact on the development, testing and deployment of uncrewed systems by small and medium-sized defence suppliers; (b) the existence of any regulatory barriers to timely testing or operational deployment of uncrewed systems for defence purposes; (c) developments in the regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom’s military alliances; (d) the framework’s impact on the competitiveness of the United Kingdom’s defence industry. (3) A review under subsection (1) must be published as a report and laid before Parliament.” This new clause requires the Secretary of State to annually publish and lay before Parliament a review of the regulatory framework for uncrewed systems. New clause 14—Designation of Maritime Uncrewed Systems as Warships— “(1) The Secretary of State may designate an uncrewed maritime system as a warship where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate. (2) A designation under subsection (1) may be made only where the system— (a) is operated by or on behalf of the armed forces, and (b) is used, or intended to be used, for defensive purposes. (3) An uncrewed maritime system designated under this section is to be treated as a warship for the purposes of domestic law. (4) In this section, ‘uncrewed maritime system’ means any vessel or platform capable of operating at sea without a person on board.” This new clause enables the Secretary of State to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships for domestic law purposes.

New clause 9 would provide a clear framework for an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation, training and capability development. The Committee has already considered the counter-drone provisions in the Bill, and we have had a good debate on that. The powers to detect, deter and, where necessary, disable unmanned aircraft that threaten defence sites are welcome and they have our support, but there is an obvious counterpart that has not yet been addressed. If our forces are to counter hostile drone activity effectively, they must also be able to train with, test and refine their own systems without legal uncertainty. That is the gap that the new clause would fill, and it would do so in a proportionate and practical way. It would establish a delegated authorisation process. The Secretary of State could designate authorised individuals within both the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence civilian workforce. Those individuals could then approve drone use for defined defence purposes, namely testing, evaluation, training and capability development. Authorisations would have to be set out in writing, except in urgent situations where verbal approval would have to be confirmed in writing as soon as possible. Authorisations would be time limited to a maximum of six months and would be granted in line with the established principles of necessity and proportionality. That is a balanced approach. It would ensure accountability through a clear chain of authority and defined limits, without creating unnecessary bureaucracy or introducing sweeping new powers. It would provide a structured basis for activities that are, in reality, already a routine and essential part of modern defence. As we all know, drone capability is no longer a niche area; we see it all around us. It sits at the centre of contemporary warfare. Recent operations in Ukraine have demonstrated how uncrewed systems now shape reconnaissance, strike capability, logistics and force protection. Our armed forces must be able to train continuously with those systems, adapt their tactics and develop their doctrine in step with rapid technological change. At present, the legal footing for such activity lacks clarity, but the new clause would address that. There is also an important industrial dimension. On Second Reading, concerns were raised about limited access to testing environments for small and medium-sized defence enterprises operating in the field. Many of those firms are producing highly effective systems and are contributing directly to allied capability, yet some are questioning whether the United Kingdom offers the right environment to grow and scale. I have seen Members from across the House of Commons raise that issue—namely the hon. Member for Plymouth Moor View (Fred Thomas) and my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), whose constituencies cover the national centre for maritime autonomy. They work hard on these issues because they have engaged with cutting-edge companies that want to go to tests and want to provide for UK defence, our allies and the export market, but are being hampered by regulation on the ability to train their devices. I have experienced that myself in the air. As a former wingsuit skydiver who has seen things from an aerial perspective, I realise how constrained our aerial environment is and how difficult it is to test aerial drones. There needs to be a clearer statutory framework for authorised drone use, which would support closer collaboration between industry and the armed forces. It would signal that the United Kingdom is serious about creating a regulatory environment that keeps pace with innovation and supports the development of advanced defence technologies. The new clause is deliberately focused. It would apply to routine activities such as training and testing. It does not extend to wider operational use, nor does it seek to. There is an interesting point to add here about working with the Home Office and police departments, if the Ministry of Defence is not already. Having gone out recently with the Exeter drone units in Devon and Cornwall police, I see that they are going through the same operational issues we are trying to tackle in the defence space. The purpose of new clause 9 is to ensure that the essential groundwork for capability development takes place on a clear and secure legal basis. There is a wider point: legislation must evolve alongside capability. The Bill recognises the changing nature of the threat, and the new clause recognises that our response must also adapt. Effective defence requires practice, experimentation and confidence, built through regular and lawful training. Without that foundation, operational effectiveness cannot be sustained. New clause 10 would introduce a practical and long overdue measure. It would enable authorised defence personnel, whether members of the armed forces or civilian Ministry of Defence staff, designated by the Secretary of State, to designate areas of sea and associated airspace as defence drone offshore areas for authorised unmanned aircraft operations. It would also require that, before any such designation is made, the authorised person must consult the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and any other relevant maritime authority. In addition, it would allow conditions to be imposed on unmanned aircraft operations in those areas. That matters because the context is clear. The Bill already addresses the threat posed by rogue drones to onshore defence sites, and that is welcome. We have seen the facts and figures throughout this Committee: reported incidents near military bases more than doubled last year, rising from 126 incidents in 2024 to 266 in 2025, which is a significant jump. That is a concerning trend, and the provisions in the Bill to allow authorised personnel to respond without waiting for police assistance are both sensible and necessary. However, the threat does not end at the shoreline. Defence activity at sea faces growing exposure. Naval exercises, offshore patrols, protection of undersea infrastructure, amphibious operations and a wide range of authorised unmanned aircraft activities all take place in the maritime environment, where there is currently no equivalent legal mechanism for Defence to designate and manage operational airspace. That gap represents a real vulnerability. Legal uncertainty slows decision making, and delay in the operational environment carries risk. Commanders should not be left in any doubt about their authority to protect personnel and missions when operating offshore. New clause 10 would provide that clarity. It is also important to be clear about safeguards. These are not broad or unchecked powers. Only individuals formally authorised by the Secretary of State may designate such areas. There is a clear requirement for consultation with the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and other relevant maritime bodies before any designation is made. I have spoken to a few of those agencies throughout the passage of this Bill, and they are fully aware that regulation needs to be tightened up. On a separate matter, it does not seem to be applied evenly across the space. I have done a small amount of paramotoring before coming into Parliament, and doing it in British airspace is almost unregulated, yet we seem to be in a really contested environment for drones, which definitely needs to be opened up. To raise an extra point, I understand the limitations. We are bringing in autonomous systems, and we are not always completely sure how they will behave in the airspace. The current regulation deals with aircraft or maritime devices that are human-operated, so dealing with automation adds extra layers of complication, but it is one of those knotty problems we need to work out. New clause 10 would ensure proper co-ordination and protect both aviation and maritime safety. The ability to impose conditions on operations in designated areas would add a further layer of control. It may be argued that existing maritime or airspace regulations already offer sufficient flexibility, but that is not the case—I refer back to my point about automation. The current framework was not designed with defence unmanned aircraft operations in mind, and the absence of a clear statutory basis creates a gap that could offer areas to be exploited. The Government have taken important steps to strengthen counter-drone capability and protect onshore sites through this Bill. New clause 10 is the logical offshore extension of that work. I now move to new clause 11. The regulatory barriers facing uncrewed systems across the maritime and land domains are significant. They are already harming British industry and slowing the adoption of technologies that our armed forces urgently require. I recently travelled down to Plymouth to meet representatives of a company called MSubs. They have working for them really innovative people—very smart people. They are able to raise funding to grow their company, yet they cannot actually test the equipment that they are trying to build, so they are looking for opportunities to move abroad. I have now heard it said repeatedly that if you want to grow, you have to go. We should not be in that position. We have some of the smartest people in this country. We have brilliant research universities. We should be in a position to offer our defence industry access to those people and give them the opportunity to grow in that space. This new clause is straightforward. It would simply require an annual review of the regulatory framework, with findings reported to Parliament. Given the speed at which the technology is advancing and the rate at which both our allies and potential adversaries are deploying it, that would be a reasonable and proportionate step. The need for such a review is clear. At present, regulation in this area is fragmented. Responsibility is spread across several Departments, including the Ministry of Defence, the Department for Transport and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. Oversight is further divided among bodies such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Military Aviation Authority and Ofcom. Each operates within its own remit, but no single authority is responsible for ensuring that the overall framework supports the development and testing of systems required for defence. In practice, that creates a patchwork that acts as a brake on progress. This issue has already been acknowledged by Ministers. For smaller firms, it is not a minor inconvenience. If a company cannot test its system, it cannot demonstrate its capability, and without that, it cannot secure contracts. The consequence is a loss of both innovation and industrial capacity. Small and medium-sized enterprises are at the forefront of innovation in this sector. They are agile, willing to take risks and often responsible for the most promising developments. However, they are also the most vulnerable to regulatory delay. Unlike larger firms, they do not have the extensive legal resources or the financial resilience to withstand prolonged uncertainty. When delays erode limited funding, companies fail. New clause 11 would recognise that reality by requiring any review to assess the impact on SMEs directly. There is also a clear international dimension. Key allies are moving very quickly. The United States is integrating uncrewed systems across its armed forces at scale, supported by a regulatory environment that enables rather than restricts innovation. If we look at the geography and topology of the United States, it has much more airspace and access to a larger maritime area, and I understand that it would be an easier process for the United States to be able to designate an area and do testing. We need to find a similar way to do that here in the UK. NATO partners are developing standards that will shape future interoperability. The United Kingdom has strong advantages, including a world-class defence technology base and a long maritime tradition, but those strengths will translate into success only if our regulatory framework keeps pace. If it does not, companies will either fall behind or choose to develop their technologies elsewhere. We refer back to the point that if you want to grow, you have to go. We need to get out of that mindset as quickly as possible and improve things in this country. For that reason, a requirement to assess developments in allied regulatory frameworks would be particularly important. It would ensure transparency and enable meaningful comparison. Parliament would be able to see clearly whether the United Kingdom was keeping up with its partners, rather than relying on general assurances of progress. The Government have recognised the importance of this agenda, and the creation of a new uncrewed systems centre of excellence is a positive step. However, co-ordination alone is not sufficient. There must also be accountability. New clause 11 would provide that by ensuring regular reporting to Parliament. If the current framework is effective, the review would confirm that. If it is not, Parliament would be informed and the Government would be expected to respond. That would be a realistic expectation and one that supported both our defence capability and our industrial base. New clause 14 would give the Secretary of State the power to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships under domestic law. This is a necessary and forward-looking measure, and one that reflects the pace of technological change and the realities of modern defence. The Royal Navy has long been defined by its ability to adapt. From the wooden walls of a sailing ship to the silent deterrent of nuclear submarines, each generation has embraced innovation to protect our shores and project stability beyond them. We now stand at the threshold of another transformation. Being so close to Plymouth, with the history of that dockyard which has been there for more than 500 years, this new wave of automation coming in and bringing back that cultural heritage is fascinating to see.

The increasing use of autonomous and remotely operated maritime systems marks a profound shift in how naval power is developed and deployed. Those systems are not theoretical; they are already in use. Our allies are investing heavily in them and so, too, are our adversaries. The systems offer new ways to gather intelligence, to monitor hostile activity and to operate in environments that would place human life at unacceptable risk. In short, they are becoming an integral part of our naval capability. It follows that our legal framework must keep pace.

At present, there is a gap between the operational reality of those systems and their recognition in law. It is very promising to hear the First Sea Lord talking about that step and moving our Royal Navy in a more autonomous way. We can do it far more cheaply, but it is all irrelevant if we cannot get the regulatory framework to marry up with those procurements. New clause 14 addresses that gap in a clear and practical way, by allowing uncrewed maritime systems, when operated by or on behalf of our armed forces, to be designated as warships. It would provide them with defined legal status.

That clarity matters, because designation brings with it both rights and responsibilities. It would ensure that such systems can benefit from sovereign immunity, just as crewed naval vessels do. It would support their recognition under established principles of international maritime law, and provide certainty to those who operate them, to those who design and build them, and to those who must interact with them in an increasingly complex maritime environment. This is not just a simple technical adjustment; it is about ensuring that our legal structures remain credible and coherent in the face of rapid change. Without this step, we risk ambiguity at precisely the moment when clarity is needed most.

I also welcome the safeguards in new clause 14. The power to designate is limited to systems used for defensive purposes. That is an important and deliberate choice, which reflects a commitment to responsible innovation and to the rule of law. It signals that even when we embrace new capabilities, we do so in a way that is consistent with our values and our international obligations.

Understandably, there is concern in some quarters about the role of autonomy. Different points have already been made about that in this debate, but it is right that such questions are asked. New clause 14, however, does not remove human judgment from the equation. It does not hand decision making over to machines. What it does is enable the armed forces to make better use of technology while retaining clear lines of accountability and control.

Uncrewed systems extend our reach. They enhance our situational awareness. They allow us to operate in dangerous waters without placing sailors directly in harm’s way. In doing so, they strengthen our ability to deter threats and to respond effectively when required. Ultimately, this measure is about alignment. It aligns modern capability with legal authority. It aligns innovation with responsibility, and it would ensure that the United Kingdom remains both secure and principled in an increasingly contested maritime domain.

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling the new clauses. The development, testing and use of uncrewed systems is vital to the UK’s defence. Not only have we seen uncrewed systems cause a significant number of casualties on the frontline in Ukraine, but we have seen their use in the Iranian conflict. To let hon. Members into a little secret, in 2017 I proposed the building of an indoor drone-testing range. Since then, or before then and continuing through, we saw ISIS’s use of drones. Now we have seen the revolution in military affairs in Ukraine. I am an individual who hon. Members will not be able to out-drone on drones, but I will say that the revolution is here to stay, and we are not going to have an option to fight differently. After my recent visit to Ukraine, I have a couple of random statistics. At the moment, one drone equates to 22 artillery rounds in lethality and accuracy. That in itself, if we think about the height of the counteroffensive in 2023, is 900 tonnes of ammunition to the frontline. Dividing that into trucks, it is about 57 15-tonne trucks; dividing it into drones, it is two trucks to deliver the same lethality. Whatever the maths—there are lots of “circa” stats in there—the point is that drones do not just change the frontline of the battlefield. They change everything, down to logistical changes: shipping, trucks, movements, industrial pipelines and the supply chain. That is significant. Although the Government recognise the importance of regulatory reform to the uncrewed systems sector in the UK, we are satisfied that the current law and regulations allow defence to develop, test and train uncrewed systems without the need for the new clauses. The defence uncrewed systems centre, which is coming in the future, will lead the development of testing and training for uncrewed systems, using the freedoms that the defence safety regulators already enjoy. It is not lost on me that there is a requirement for better education and communication as drones proliferate across defence. There is a lack of capacity and coherence among the different regulators. The uncrewed centre should bring them together and reduce bureaucracy, increasing a systematic approach to dealing with regulatory requirements that delivers more testing and trialling across more of the defence space. Ongoing work by the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency is further supporting the testing and training of non-defence uses of maritime uncrewed systems. There lies the critical point: defence systems have a lot of freedoms to test and trial. When companies are developing capabilities that are not defence systems, and that have not been brought into a trial as part of a procurement process, those are in the civilian space. That is where we need to make the changes, and that is why we are in discussion with the Department and the agency to do so and make things easier.

The Minister has a great deal of experience in this space, and defence is working hard to unblock some of these issues. The point I raised in my speech was that it is almost impossible to work through the split responsibilities across so many different Departments and regulatory bodies. As we have had regulations built on top of one another, we end up in a quagmire. Across all these different Departments and agencies, who is the accountable head who co-ordinates to make sure that regulation is fit for purpose?

The hon. Gentleman asks an impossible question. For example, there are sub-surface uncrewed systems, surface uncrewed systems, airborne uncrewed systems, airborne uncrewed systems that come off surface systems, and surface systems that deploy uncrewed below-surface systems. Trying to find an individual or body that will deal with all of those—across the totality of airspace, sub-surface and surface regulation—is exceptionally difficult. I can assure him that we are taking all our different defence regulators and putting them together—hopefully, over time, in one location—with the experts who know the good, the bad and the ugly when it comes to drones and uncrewed systems. That will make defence far more effective in articulating the requirement, procuring the systems and then pushing those systems into the Army, Navy and Air Force. That will come in due course. I will confine the rest of my remarks to the effect of the new clauses. New clause 9, as set out in the explanatory statement, would enable an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation and training. I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that the Defence Maritime Regulator and Military Aviation Authority can already authorise the use of uncrewed systems for routine testing, evaluation and training, and that more than 30 maritime systems are already approved for routine testing, evaluation and training. In addition, the Defence Maritime Regulator is bringing forward proposals to establish regulatory sandboxes for the testing and training of uncrewed maritime systems, in line with recommendation 39 of the strategic defence review. I think that that is due at the end of the month, but I will come back to the Committee on that. New clause 10 would create a new authorisation regime to designate offshore areas for drone operations. In bringing forward proposals in line with the SDR recommendation, the Defence Maritime Regulator will also increase access to areas for testing and training for non-sponsored systems. The proposals therefore do not require changes to primary legislation, and are under way already. New clause 11 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament annually a review of the regulatory framework for uncrewed systems. Again, primary legislation is not required for such a review. The defence industrial strategy team within the MOD recently conducted a review of the regulatory system governing uncrewed systems. In addition, the Defence Safety Authority regularly conducts reviews of all defence regulations to ensure that they remain fit for purpose for new and emerging technologies. I turn to new clause 14. The explanatory statement sets out that this new clause would enable the Secretary of State to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships for domestic law purposes. However, the Defence Maritime Regulator already has the authority to disapply elements of civilian regulation for defence purposes. I will just make a couple of extra points. If there is no need for regulatory change, why are certain parts of industry unhappy? The Government are already engaging extensively with industry to understand the variety of constraints that exist and we have conducted multiple reviews within the Department, as well as with civilian organisations. I would argue that the Government are actually going faster and further to enable autonomy than ever before, and that is only going to increase. We are establishing the uncrewed centre of excellence to ensure that there is coherence. We are maximising the freedoms enjoyed by defence regulators to allow for more testing and training, and, over time, increasing capacity. Importantly, we are also exploring with the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency how they can further support civilian applications in the maritime domain. I hope that I have reassured the Committee on why new clauses 9, 10, 11 and 14 are not needed. I ask the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East not to press them to a Division.

I thank the Minister for his response. He has a great deal of experience in this area, and I know that there will be no one else in Parliament who is pushing for progress in it as hard as him. However, there is a systemic issue across the Government that they need to sort out. Having spent a lot of time with the defence industry, which is producing these technologies, and knowing the rate of change that companies in the industry are going through, we need to send a strong demand signal to them that we are trying to change regulation so that we can actually allow them to develop in this country, and to grow, scale up and export. Despite those answers from the Minister, I want to try and push the new clauses as much as possible, so I will seek Divisions on them. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 10

Designation of defensive drone offshore areas

(1) After Part 16D of AFA 2006 (inserted by section 4 of this Act) insert—

“Part 16D

DEFENCE DRONES

343R Designation of defence drone offshore areas

(1) An authorised person may designate an area of sea and associated airspace as a defence drone offshore area for the purposes of authorised unmanned aircraft operations.

(2) For the purposes of this section, an “authorised person” means—

(a) a member of the Armed Forces who has been deemed authorised by the Secretary of State, or

(b) a civilian employee of the Ministry of Defence who has been deemed authorised by the Secretary of State.

(3) Before making an authorisation under subsection (1), the authorised person must consult—

(a) the Civil Aviation Authority,

(b) the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and

(c) Any other maritime authorities as the authorised person considers appropriate.

(4) An authorised person may impose conditions regarding the operation of unmanned aircraft systems within a designated area.””—(David Reed.)

This new clause allows authorised personnel to designate offshore areas for drone operations.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 11

Review of Regulatory Framework for Uncrewed Systems

“(1) Within 12 months of the passage of this Act and once every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State must conduct a review of the regulatory framework governing the testing and operation of uncrewed systems in the maritime and land domains.

(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—

(a) the framework’s impact on the development, testing and deployment of uncrewed systems by small and medium-sized defence suppliers;

(b) the existence of any regulatory barriers to timely testing or operational deployment of uncrewed systems for defence purposes;

(c) developments in the regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom’s military alliances;

(d) the framework’s impact on the competitiveness of the United Kingdom’s defence industry.

(3) A review under subsection (1) must be published as a report and laid before Parliament.”—(David Reed.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to annually publish and lay before Parliament a review of the regulatory framework for uncrewed systems.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 12

Protective Orders: Persons No Longer Subject to Service Law

“(1) This section applies where a person—

(a) is charged with, or has been convicted of, an offence within the service justice system, and

(b) was subject to service law either at the time of the alleged conduct or at the time of the charging decision, whether or not they remain subject to service law at the time of trial or sentencing.

(2) A service court may make any of the following orders in respect of a person as if they were still subject to service law—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order or interim sexual harm prevention order (see sections 103A to 103K of the Sexual Offences Act 2003);

(b) a sexual risk order or interim sexual risk order (see sections 122A to 122K of that Act);

(c) a service domestic abuse protection order;

(d) a service stalking protection order;

(e) a service restraining order (see section 229 of the Armed Forces Act 2006).

(3) An order made under subsection (2)—

(a) has effect as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction, and

(b) is enforceable accordingly.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the recognition, enforcement and variation of orders made under this section, including provision about which court has jurisdiction to vary or discharge such an order after it is made.”—(Mr Francois.)

This new clause ensures service courts can impose protective orders on individuals who leave service before trial, preventing avoidance of such orders simply by leaving service.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

I will now suspend the sitting for 10 minutes for a comfort break for the Chair, if the Committee does not mind.

Sitting suspended.

On resuming—

New Clause 13

Overseas operations and the European Convention on Human Rights

“After section 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998 insert—

‘14A Duty to consider derogation in relation to overseas operations

(1) Where the Secretary of State considers that any overseas operation is, or is likely to be, significant, the Secretary of State must consider whether it is appropriate for the United Kingdom to make a derogation under Article 15(1) of the Convention.

(2) In this section—

“overseas operations” means operations of Her Majesty’s forces outside the British Islands in the course of which members of those forces may come under attack or face the threat of attack or violent resistance;

“Her Majesty’s forces” has the same meaning as in the Armed Forces Act 2006 (see section 374 of that Act).’”—(Mr Francois.)

This new clause reinstates a duty, removed during passage of the Overseas Operations Act 2021, requiring the Secretary of State to consider derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights during significant overseas operations.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 15—Exemption from the European Convention on Human Rights for deployed members of the reserve forces— “A member of the reserve forces who has been deployed for operations under this Act may not be subject to the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights for the duration of that deployment.” This new clause would make provision for the members of the reserve forces who have been deployed under this Act to be exempt from the ECHR for that period of deployment.

I hope that we are all much refreshed. I should say up front that, while we have been able to conduct this Committee for most of the time in a relatively consensual manner, I fear that on this subject there may be some fundamental differences of principle at stake and that therefore we may find it genuinely difficult to agree. I would have been intrigued to know the attitude of Liberal Democrat members of the Committee, as we are debating the effect of the European convention on human rights on service personnel, but unfortunately they are no longer here. Nevertheless, the essence of new clause 13 is that it would reinstate a duty removed during the passage of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021 to require the Secretary of State to consider derogation from the ECHR during significant overseas operations. Similarly, the essence of new clause 15 is that it would make provision for members of the reserve forces who have been deployed under the provisions of the Bill to be exempted from the ECHR for the period of that deployment. Let me say at the outset that I have never met a member of His Majesty’s armed forces, whether past or present, who believed that the military should not operate subject to legal constraint. After all, soldiers fight to defend our democratic way of life and, in Northern Ireland, they fought to uphold the rule of law. We have had for decades the law of armed conflict, which has at its heart the well-established Geneva convention. It is not as if we have never had any boundaries to control the actions of armed forces personnel. How did we get to the situation in which we are today, where the European convention on human rights has spread to the battlefield, not just within Europe but globally? The history is significant, and it lies behind why we have tabled the new clauses. It all came about because of something called the al-Jedda case, which was heard before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords a couple of years or so before the United Kingdom Supreme Court was created. I think, from memory, that the UKSC was stood up in 2009, but this case, or at least at the first crank of the handle, as I will go on to explain, predated that. In essence, the al-Jedda case was about the treatment of a prisoner detained in Iraq. The case was brought by a now disgraced lawyer called Phil Shiner. His name will be known to anyone who has ever served in the British Army. For the record, he was subsequently convicted of fraud and was struck off as a practising solicitor, although, at least to date, he never went to jail. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords heard this case, and Phil Shiner instructed legal counsel to put forward his case to the House of Lords. The lead appellant in that case, before he became a Member of Parliament and our Prime Minister, was one Keir Starmer QC. The Minister for Veterans and People got into some trouble over this, because when we raised it in the Commons, she was adamant that that individual had not been working for Shiner and was merely acting as a so-called third party, as a kind of expert witness to the court on a point of law. Unfortunately for the Minister, we had the court records from the House of Lords, which showed very clearly that Keir Starmer, as he then was, was the lead appellant, appointed and “instructed”—that word is used in the records—by Phil Shiner’s law firm, Public Interest Lawyers. That law firm, I am pleased to say, is no longer in business, and quite right too. The Minister for Veterans subsequently had to come to the Commons in February and go through the embarrassment of having to correct the record and admit that our version of events, as explained to the Commons, was true. How did we get from there to now? Phil Shiner was a persistent man, particularly when money was at stake, so several years after losing in the House of Lords, he took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. To be clear, the current Prime Minister was not involved in the case at that stage, but he clearly had been previously. Shiner won, so the ECHR, which we were then subject to, ruled that the European convention on human rights would then apply to any theatre in which British armed forces personnel were serving. Through that judgment, they effectively created an industry that Shiner was very expeditious in exploiting. He brought literally hundreds of cases against current and past British armed forces personnel—many of the cases were funded by British taxpayers through legal aid and were completely and utterly fabricated—for money. It was the use of the ECHR that allowed him to do that. In other debates in the Chamber, we have heard senior Ministers, including the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, say that there is no such thing as a vexatious prosecution. Self-evidently there is, because otherwise why was Shiner struck off and convicted of fraud by a court of law? There can be—in fact, there were—hundreds of vexatious prosecutions against British military personnel. It was, for the record, Johnny Mercer when he served on the Defence Committee some years ago, when he was the Member for Plymouth, Moor View, who led a sub-committee to look into this issue. Its very powerful report helped to bring Shiner to book, no doubt saving the taxpayer a lot more money, and led to his career ending in disgrace. But what if there was a ceasefire in Ukraine? Let us posit a situation in which, under the auspices of the coalition of the willing, British service personnel were deployed to Ukraine. If, by some happenstance, they became involved in a firefight with Russian people who had perhaps crossed the line of ceasefire, who is to say that years—maybe decades—later, those personnel will not end up in a court of law for obeying what they believed to be perfectly legitimate orders, but which were subsequently second guessed by a human rights lawyer? For the avoidance of doubt, that is why the new clauses would alleviate such a situation. In short, we cannot allow this Government’s obsession with human rights to put our armed forces at risk—either now, in the future or, indeed, historically—and potentially force them to fight ruthless opponents with one arm tied behind their back. This issue is not going to go away, and at some point the Government, be it through the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill or some other mechanism, will be forced to address it. The purpose of these new clauses is to force them to address it today. It is a shame that we are not going to hear the Liberal Democrats’ view on this, but I will be intrigued to hear the Government’s. Before that, however, I suspect that we will hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East.

I will speak in support of new clauses 13 and 15. My right hon. Friend has laid out quite a scary case study of what happens when international legal frameworks are used to affect our service personnel. New clause 13 deserves support because it reflects a clear and honest understanding of the legal position. While our long-term view is that the United Kingdom should not remain bound by the European convention on human rights, the reality is that the convention still applies today. Until that changes, the Government have a duty to use every lawful tool available to protect our armed forces, safeguard the national interest and uphold the integrity of operations overseas. The new clause would do that by requiring Ministers to consider derogation when significant overseas operations make it appropriate. This is not an acceptance of the status quo; it is a recognition of the conditions in which decisions are currently made. Our forces operate in dangerous, fast-moving and legally complex environments. They should not be constrained by frameworks designed for peacetime while Ministers fail to even consider whether the convention’s emergency provisions should be engaged when circumstances clearly demand it. Failing to do so is not leadership; it is a refusal to confront responsibility. A Government committed to the rule of law should also be committed to using the law as it is intended. Where a significant overseas operation is under way, the Secretary of State should be required to address the straightforward question: is derogation appropriate in these circumstances? That is a responsible approach. I raise this point because it has happened in recent history. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Government at the time derogated from article 5 of the ECHR, enacting part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which authorised the indefinite detention of foreign national terrorism suspects.

Given that the hon. Member is outlining cases where a previous Government—in 2001, if I am right, that was a Labour Government—derogated from ECHR articles without being required to in a piece of legislation such as this, why would he not expect any future Government to be equally rational in making choices about whether to derogate? We have the example of our great allies in Ukraine, who remain signatories of the ECHR but have taken the appropriate derogations to deal with their wartime emergency. They are fighting an enemy that withdrew from the ECHR in 2022, and I am getting a hint that, morally, the hon. Gentleman is on the side of the line of the country that withdrew from the ECHR, rather than the one that is continuing under it with appropriate derogations.

I am not sure that I welcome that intervention. To say that I am aligned with the people who—

indicated dissent.

That is exactly what the hon. Member just said. I will go back in Hansard to check what he just said.

It is very clear that the hon. Member for North Durham basically implied that we are aligned with the Russians. That is a despicable thing to say.

I have spent my entire adult life serving my country, and I view being in this House as an extension of that service. For the hon. Member for North Durham even to hint that I am aligned in that way is absolutely atrocious, and I hope he will withdraw his remark.

I am happy to clarify that I had no intention of hinting that the hon. Gentleman was in any way politically allied with Russia. Clearly, he is an ally of Ukraine, as we are on the Government side of the House, but it is a matter of fact that the only countries in Europe that are not signatories to the ECHR are Russia and Belarus. I do not wish us to make the same choice that they have made.

The fact that other countries that we consider to be close allies are also considering this is an important point that I will come on to. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Government chose to derogate from article 5 of the European convention on human rights through part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act. That permitted the indefinite detention of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism who could not be deported without breaching other international obligations. While contentious, that step showed that, in the face of exceptional threats, Ministers can and should use the mechanisms available within the convention itself. In the same spirit, the provision requires Ministers to take clear, accountable decisions when national security and operational effectiveness are in play. It ensures that responsibility cannot be delayed or sidestepped when prompt judgment is needed to protect our personnel and maintain the proper conduct of military operations. That is important and that principle is evident. The provision follows that precedent by ensuring that Ministers must take clear and accountable decisions where national security and operational effectiveness are at stake. It prevents responsibility from being deferred or avoided in circumstances where timely judgment is essential to the protection of our personnel and the proper conduct of operations. The importance of that is clear. The convention has increasingly been interpreted in ways that place strain on operational decision making, encourage litigation and create uncertainty for those serving on the frontline. Our armed forces need clarity and confidence. They need to know that the Government stand firmly behind them, not that they will face legal challenges long after the events. New clause 13 would move us towards that clarity. If we are serious about restoring control over our legal framework, we should not pretend that the current arrangements are working in Britain’s interests. Ministers are at least required to consider derogation when our forces are engaged in demanding and hostile conditions. The new clause is a practical and measured step. It does not claim to resolve every difficulty, but it does establish the simple and necessary principle that Ministers must take responsibility, make considered decisions and put the interests of the country and those who served it at the forefront. I also support new clause 15, which seeks to provide exemption from the European convention on human rights for members of our reserve forces when they are deployed under the Act. The intention behind that proposal is both practical and just. Our reservists serve alongside regular personnel in demanding and often perilous conditions. They shoulder the same responsibilities, face the same threats and act under the same operational pressures. It is therefore right that they should be safeguarded under the same legal framework that recognises the realities of military deployments. In recent years, some interpretations of the convention have become stretched and detached from the practical realities it was designed to address. The world that we face today is very different from the world of the 1950s. I will not digress too much—in fact, I will not digress at all, Mr Efford—but this is an important point. The structures of the ECHR, designed in the 1950s by the people that experienced world war two, were all just and morally sound, and we can all accept that point. But the world has moved on rapidly in the years since the 1950s. Since the ECHR is broad in scope, we have had a number of different lawyers see interpretations—and able to move things—that may be outside of our national interest. My hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire raised the interesting point that this is not just a problem for us in the UK—it is also a problem for a number of our allies across Europe who are considering either derogating or leaving the convention because it is not serving their national interest. Bear in mind that we are a tolerant country with a good legal system. I have no doubt that a lot of these laws would be reproduced. We need to be in a position to give our forces the legal confidence that they can operate in those environments and that we have the jurisdiction here in the UK to be able to carry out that legal framework. I very much support the new clauses, and I hope the Committee will consider them.

I will reinforce the points made by my hon. Friend. As he said, the ECHR was created in a completely different environment and age from that in which we are living now. It is its interpretation, in particular, that has given rise to some of the problems we are facing across the board, whether on migration or dealing with these cases here. The hon. Member for North Durham made a point that he hopes the Government would act in the same way as previous ones. Unfortunately, hope is not enough in these situations and actually having legal clarity set out in black and white gives the certainty that we require. Given that our current Prime Minister prides himself on being a lawyer—and I am a former lawyer, so I will say this myself—we are giving him the opportunity to have it in absolute black and white exactly what he should do in the circumstances, rather than leaving it to chance.

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling new clauses 13 and 15. New clause 15 seeks to exempt members of the reserve forces deployed on operations from the European convention on human rights for that period of deployment. As the Committee will know, the UK has an international legal obligation to comply with the provisions and protections contained in the ECHR. The ECHR provides for legally enforceable rights within the jurisdiction of the state. That includes, in exceptional circumstances, extraterritorial jurisdiction which applies beyond the territory of the state. The UK is obliged to guarantee rights under the ECHR in circumstances where the armed forces either exercise authority and control over an individual, for example a detainee, or over an area, for example military occupation. New clause 15 seeks to change domestic law, but it should be made clear that that would not remove the UK’s international obligations under the ECHR. As a signatory to the ECHR, the UK cannot simply opt out of its obligations on a case-by-case basis. Removing the potential for these matters to be considered in the UK courts merely provides a fast track to Strasbourg. The only formal route to avoid the UK’s obligation under the ECHR would be to withdraw from the convention itself, and it is this Government’s position that we remain a party to the European convention on human rights. That leads us to new clause 13, which seeks to emulate clause 12 of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill introduced by the last Government. That clause would have required any future Secretary of State to consider whether to make a derogation under article 15 of the ECHR. That article provides: “In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.” At the time, concerns were raised that clause 12 of the Bill risked damaging the UK’s reputation for upholding the rule of law and our commitment to human rights. It was also seen as unnecessary, in that the Government can already derogate under article 15 of the ECHR, meaning that the provision did not add any additional legal power; its inclusion seems to have been largely symbolic. I am uncertain why the Opposition would seek to reintroduce the provision in this Bill, when the last Government agreed to its removal from the Bill. I therefore urge the right hon. Member not to press these new clauses.

I have listened to the contributions during this debate, one of which I think was particularly unworthy; having heard that contribution in particular, I now wish to press both new clauses to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 14

Designation of Maritime Uncrewed Systems as Warships

“(1) The Secretary of State may designate an uncrewed maritime system as a warship where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate.

(2) A designation under subsection (1) may be made only where the system—

(a) is operated by or on behalf of the armed forces, and

(b) is used, or intended to be used, for defensive purposes.

(3) An uncrewed maritime system designated under this section is to be treated as a warship for the purposes of domestic law.

(4) In this section, “uncrewed maritime system” means any vessel or platform capable of operating at sea without a person on board.”—(Mr Francois.)

This new clause enables the Secretary of State to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships for domestic law purposes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 15

Exemption from the European Convention on Human Rights for deployed members of the reserve forces

“A member of the reserve forces who has been deployed for operations under this Act may not be subject to the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights for the duration of that deployment.”—(Mr Francois.)

This new clause would make provision for the members of the reserve forces who have been deployed under this Act to be exempt from the ECHR for that period of deployment.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 16

Laying of the Defence Investment Plan

“Within one month of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay a Defence Investment Plan before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Mr Francois.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay a Defence Investment Plan before both Houses of Parliament within a month of the passage of this Act.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. Like our previous debate, I fear this may be an area on which, as a Committee, we find it difficult to agree overall. Nevertheless, this is a very important subject, and I am glad that we have an opportunity to debate it in Committee this afternoon—I am sad that, again, the Liberal Democrats are not here. As it turns out, we debated this issue at Prime Minister’s questions yesterday lunchtime and in the subsequent urgent question, which I led for the Opposition, in the Commons Chamber, but it is very appropriate to debate it in the context of this Bill as well. The essence of new clause 16 is that it would require the Secretary of State for Defence to lay a defence investment plan—or DIP—before both Houses of Parliament within a month of the passage of this Act. The defence investment plan was mentioned in the strategic defence review published last June. There was some criticism of the SDR that, while it was good in parts, it did not provide much granular detail on the Government’s intentions regarding military kit. For the record, when we were in government, we published what was then known simply as the equipment plan just about every year—I think there was one year when we did not—which laid out in quite some detail the spending on military programmes undertaken, or proposed to be undertaken, by the MOD, looking a decade ahead. There was a very sensible reason for doing that, because procuring military equipment does not necessarily fit within the standard three years of a public expenditure round. Just to take two examples, it takes about four years from scratch to build a Typhoon fighter aircraft, and it can take around 10 years to build an aircraft carrier. Clearly, there has to be some kind of budget that accounts for the length of time it takes to build those kinds of kit. We therefore published that plan year in, year out, and it performed two very important functions—well, three, really. First, it allowed industry to plan. Those businesses are obviously there to win contracts, to do work for defence and to satisfy their shareholders. They could see what was—in pub English—coming down the pipe, so they could make sensible commercial investment decisions accordingly. Secondly, it was good for the morale of our armed forces, because they could see the kit that the Government of the day were planning to buy, which they would ultimately get to use. Thirdly, it had a deterrent effect, because it said to our potential adversaries: “Here we are intending to spend hard-earned taxpayer cash, in many cases on hard power in order to deter any potential aggressor from attacking us or our allies.” There was a whole host of good reasons for doing it, and that is why the Government faithfully promised that they would publish the defence investment plan to make up for that detail not being in the SDR. We were absolutely promised it for the autumn of 2025, we were faithfully promised it by Christmas, and then we were absolutely going to get it early in the new year. But here we are, in the middle of April, with no DIP. We have to ask the Government why that is, although it is an open secret: the MOD is in open warfare with His Majesty’s Treasury, and the Chancellor has repeatedly refused to sign it off. All three of the SDR’s authors were explicitly clear, when they published it, that in order to achieve the programme outlined in it the Government would have to commit to spending 3% of GDP on defence. That was, in simple terms, the price of implementing the SDR. In the last 72 hours, all three of those authors have come out very strongly against the Government. It seems to me that months of frustration has effectively boiled over, and it cannot be a coincidence that all three of them have now gone public with their criticisms. Dr Fiona Hill said there is a “bizarre” lack of urgency in Government defence planning. General Sir Richard Barrons, another co-author of the SDR, said there is “an enormous gap between where we have to be to keep the country safe…and where we actually are”. Lord Robertson, lead author of the SDR, former Labour Defence Secretary and former NATO Secretary-General, who is widely respected, spoke about a “corrosive complacency” by the Prime Minister towards defence. The attitude of Ministers is pure bluster. Basically, they have just started being rude to people. They have started talking about armchair generals. They can call me that; that is water off a duck’s back to me. It is nice to be referred to as a general, having made the dizzying heights of lieutenant in my military career. But General Sir Richard Barrons is not an armchair general, and I would caution the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry over his behaviour yesterday. For good measure, he has apparently now lost it in some interview with The Telegraph about Ajax. There are some tensions between Ministers on the fifth floor, for reasons I will not go into this afternoon, but HMS MOD is not a happy ship. It seems that the pressure is getting to the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry. Very simply, when will we get the DIP? We are fed up with being told that Ministers are working flat out, straining every sinew and all these other euphemisms. When will the Prime Minister, primus inter pares, intervene and order the Chancellor to sign it? A couple of days or so ago, the Minister for Veterans and People told the Defence Committee that they were still working on the staff work—utter nonsense. The staff work was completed months ago. It has been ready to be signed for months.

Order. The hon. Members being mentioned are not here to defend themselves.

Fair enough. Anyway, it has not been signed for months and has, metaphorically, been sitting on the Chancellor’s desk. It is probably fair to say that the Chancellor has no background with the military. She has never shown much empathy for the military; it is not her long suit.

Order. Personal criticism is not called for. We need to stick to the facts.

Well, Mr Efford, if the Chancellor signed it, there would not be any criticism. For whatever ends, she has not chosen to do so. When we had exchanges with the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry yesterday about defence spending, to which the drip—the DIP, rather—is fundamental, he gave the game away. He talked about percentages of GDP on defence, and said: “We will hit 2.6% in 2027” and “3% in the next Parliament”.—[Official Report, 15 April 2026; Vol. 783, c. 834.] Assuming that this Parliament goes the full term, the last possible legal date for the election is August 2029, which means that we would not get to 3% for another three years. It is our policy that we should get to 3% before the end of this Parliament. As the Minister knows, we cannot deliver the SDR until we say at what point we will get to 3%, because that is the price of doing so. When we pick a year, we can put a pin on a graph and draw a line back from it, and everything underneath that line will be money that we have to spend. Until we decide what that year is, we cannot draw the line; we do not know how much money we have and we cannot pass a 10-year equipment plan. Because the Treasury will not agree on what year we will get to 3%, there is a complete institutional impasse in the Government. Do hon. Members honestly think that, at the Russian, Chinese or North Korean embassies, they have not spotted this? Do they not think we are a laughing stock in those embassies? What deterrent effect are we providing against our potential aggressors by not being able to tell them, let alone our own Parliament, when we will publish a document that is now nearly nine months overdue? How do we prevent war by doing that?

If the right hon. Gentleman is referring to our armed forces as a global laughing stock, is that perhaps because of—we had this debate in the Chamber yesterday—the inheritance his party’s Government left: no ships, no aircraft and the lowest number of British troops since the Napoleonic wars? Does he concede that one of the problems with delivering the DIP is that appalling inheritance?

For the absolute avoidance of doubt, I never said that, and the hon. Gentleman is putting words in my mouth. I never said, or even implied, that our armed forces are a laughing stock—absolutely not. They are still, man for man and woman for woman, among the best in the world, if not the best. It is the Government they serve who are now the laughing stock, not the military personnel. It is a Government who cannot take a fundamental decision about defence spending, whose own MOD Ministers are privately at each other, and who have an MOD and a Treasury that cannot agree. The only way that that is resolved in the British system is when the first among equals intervenes and knocks heads together, and the Prime Minister will not do that because he is terrified of what happens to him if he does. We have an impasse in which the Government, not the armed forces, are regarded as a laughing stock, not just in Washington but in the capitals of our adversaries. That being the case, I ask the Minister in all sincerity to tell us this afternoon when the defence investment plan will be published.

I think that everyone who cares about defence shares the right hon. Gentleman’s anxiety about wanting to see the defence investment plan published. Would he accept that we are only days away from polling in a very important set of elections that are governed by a purdah process? Perhaps, if the Prime Minister stood up in the Chamber on Monday and announced the investment, some of it would be targeted at Scotland, where there is a Scottish Parliament election; some would be targeted at Wales, where there is a Senedd election; and some would be targeted at places around the country where there is a defence industry but where council elections are happening. The right hon. Gentleman’s party would probably say that the Government were breaking purdah and trying to sway the outcome of those elections if we were to announce the DIP between now and polling day.

In fairness to the hon. Gentleman, I will meet him halfway. I could get him references from Hansard for where the Opposition made exactly that point in the Chamber some weeks ago. We argued that, obviously, there would be expenditure at Faslane, at Lossiemouth and suchlike, so if the Government did not come up with the DIP by the third week in March then purdah could kick in—as I think is the convention—and mean that they could not then publish it until the middle of May. A minute ago, I asked the Minister to give us a date when the DIP will be published. That might be after the purdah period; I was listening. But—and I hope that the hon. Member will be equitable about this—we warned about the risk of the purdah window months ago. I think we now know that we are going to get a King’s Speech on 13 May. If that purdah block is in place, and it probably is, the earliest that we can realistically expect the DIP is another month further on, but we have been waiting nine months as it is. In fairness to the hon. Gentleman—and we may have fallen out on the previous new clause—he has a point, but I will admit that he has a point only if he will admit that we raised this publicly months ago. Even The Times has reported that there is an impasse. Its political editor Steven Swinford and its excellent defence editor Larisa Brown today produced an article entitled “Keir Starmer delays defence investment plan over cabinet split”, the opening sentence of which is: “Sir Keir Starmer’s ten-year plan for investment in defence will not be published until the summer as the government is split over how much should be committed to the armed forces.” We cannot go on with the Chancellor holding the armed forces to ransom. Bearing in mind what the hon. Member for North Durham said about purdah—I got that point—will the Minister, when he sums up this debate, at least give us a date by which the DIP will be published? At the very least, will he promise the Committee, and through us, the House, that it will be, at the very latest, by the time the House rises for the summer recess, which is currently programmed for 16 July?

Notwithstanding what the right hon. Gentleman just said, I remind the Committee that it is discussing a new clause that requires publication of the defence investment plan within a month of the Bill’s passage.

I rise to support new clause 16, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford. In the last 10 years working in the defence space—in the civil service, with industry, handing out defence contracts, running a small or medium-sized enterprise that worked with defence, and working for a defence prime—I have seen at first hand what happens when political malaise in this place slows down the defence process. I refer back to the previous discussion on automation in relation to another provision. At a time when the world is becoming far more dangerous, and when we need to innovate, work with people and carry out the recommendations of the SDR for a whole-of-society effect, we need to bring people together. We also need to make sure that the rhetoric in Parliament, which is reflective of the international system, marries up with investment. We are not seeing that at the moment. I am sure that the Minister and Labour Members have had conversations with European and American partners who are looking at the UK and seeing the assets that we are starting to give birth to. To go back to the phrase I have used repeatedly this afternoon, if you want to grow, you have to go. Companies are seeing that they cannot get the investment here and cannot access the regulatory environment. The Government contracts are not coming out because the DIP has not been agreed yet, so they are now saying, “We want to help out the UK and defence, but we are not in a position to do that because there are no contracts.” That is happening in real time, and those companies are simply closing down or leaving, and the people with that expertise are going to other industries. We cannot do this; it is beyond a farce. These are Government timelines. The Government said they would release the DIP back in October. That is why I do not agree with the comments of the hon. Member for North Durham about purdah and going into an electoral period, because we originally said that it would be October. It is all well and good using the election as a new excuse, but we have had since October. How can we be so late, and how can we not have a proper argument for why it is not here? I know the Minister wants to get this done as quickly as possible—the whole Defence team wants to get it published—but there are wider problems in governance. The media has reported today that there are splits in the Cabinet about this. Conversations are being forced, and I hope that Ministers will align on that and speak out as quickly as possible.

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling new clause 16. The Defence Secretary has been really clear that we are working flat out to finalise the defence investment plan. I think it was a slip of the tongue that needs to be corrected in Hansard—

I am so sorry, but will the Minister give way?

No. The right hon. Gentleman can wait two minutes.

That is twice now.

Well, I do apologise.

Thank you.

I would like to correct Hansard, because I think there was a slip of the tongue when the right hon. Gentleman said “drip”, not “DIP”. There seems to be an element of dripping going on about the DIP. Well, for 14 years there has been a dip in morale, a dip in recruitment and retention, a dip in ship orders, a dip in aircraft orders, a dip in capability, a dip in successful major programmes—48 or 49 major projects have been delayed or over budget—and a dip across a whole plethora of capability in the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and then you wonder why the DIP is taking so long. Unfortunately, whether we collectively like it or not, you left a hollowed-out and massively underfunded—

Order. I did not leave anything.

The right hon. Gentleman left a massively hollowed-out and underfunded defence.

The Minister is talking about the past, but we always talk about the importance of the present and moving forward. All the plans that the current Government want to put in place and give security for require the DIP. One can blame whatever happened in the past, but that does not get us any further forward. Elements of this Bill, such as the defence housing programme, absolutely require the DIP so that we can put in place the contracts that have been promised. If we do not give the markets certainty, we will never be able to make the improvements that the Government seek.

The reality is that we are already spending. We have awarded more than 1,200 major contracts since the election. There is a £1 billion contract for military helicopters in Yeovil, £500 million has been invested in state-of-the-art British Typhoon jets, and there has been a £100 million boost for the RAF P-8 submarine-hunting aircraft. The DIP needs to come, but we have collectively been left an exceptionally complex problem set. The war in Ukraine is driving transformation, and we have a hollowed out and underfunded defence, with old capability platforms arriving that are no longer relevant because of the technological revolution in Ukraine—

What does that have to do with it?

It has everything to do with it. The Committee needs to understand the details of what has been left, because it has everything to do with it. We cannot take anything in isolation; it is all combined. As a result, we have a deeply complex problem set to deal with.

Does my hon. and gallant Friend agree that the problem is not just the legacy that his Department inherited, but the wider legacy of debt that our Government inherited, which means that the path that Germany is going down—raising new finance—is not open to us? We inherited a bow wave of immense welfare spending from the previous Government, who let the welfare bill get out of control. This is not happening in isolation; these are systemic problems of government that we are having to address, and we are having to find a source of funding for the incredible investment that we now need to make.

My hon. Friend highlights that this is not just a multifaceted problem within defence or the security architecture of the nation, but a consequence of what the broader Government inherited collectively. If not over 14 years, at least in the last four years, we saw Ministers change at such a fast rate, we ceded responsibility to the civil service, and we sat in a wallow of bureaucracy and process that has delivered nothing. That is why we are having to deliver the change required to get after it. I would rather get it right once than get it wrong three or four times, as we have seen over the last 15 years.

There is a major inconsistency in this new line of attack. I do not want to fall into the blame game, because we need to look forward and be in a position where we can protect ourselves and our country, but we are essentially now blaming officials. [Interruption.]

No, no, no.

Order.

We are now blaming officials. If the original deadline for the DIP was October, and now the argument is that the delay is because so many problems have been identified, were the Ministers’ officials telling them inaccuracies about when it could be published?

First, to be absolutely clear, we are not blaming officials in any way, shape or form. What we are saying is that when the leadership is changed every 10 to 15 minutes, consistency in command and control will be lost. An individual who has such experience in command will know that, and the hon. Member knows—the Committee knows—that when people are shuffled and changed every six months to a year, the system resets. That is not a problem with officials; it is, unfortunately, the culture that we have in large organisations. Various Committee members understand that. For a long time—the last 14 years—we have shuffled people at an unprecedented rate. I want to clarify another point. We talked about inconsistency on the fifth floor, but there is none; we have our portfolios and we deal with those portfolios as a whole. I have been pushing really hard to ensure that the uncrewed lessons that we learned early on are included in the DIP. Another concern was expressed pointing to individuals for being rude. I genuinely believe that a bit of self-reflection is required from Committee members on who is rude and who is not, and on how we can misinterpret what people say.

Order. Let us come back to the subject of the new clause and not reopen that debate.

Our aim is to ensure that the decisions in the plan are robust and support the development of current and future capabilities to help drive the transformation of the armed forces, as described in the strategic defence review. It will be an affordable, deliverable programme to transform our armed forces, and it will highlight how this Government’s historic investment in defence will deliver warfighting readiness to deter increased threats and drive defence as an engine for growth. We have announced the largest sustained defence spending increase since the cold war: 2.6% of GDP from 2027, with an additional £5 billion for defence this financial year and £270 billion of investment across this Parliament, ensuring that there is no return to the hollowed-out armed forces of the past.

Ministers keep talking about this “largest sustained increase” in defence spending since the cold war. Why, then, were there £2.6 billion of efficiency cuts last year, and why is there a target for £3.5 billion efficiency cuts this year?

Order. This debate is about the period in which the DIP should be published, not about how much is in the budget. Can we get back on the subject, please?

The DIP will be an affordable, deliverable programme to transform our armed forces. I hope I have provided the necessary reassurance to the hon. Member and, on those grounds, I ask him not to press the new clause.

As a right hon. Member, I am afraid that we have just heard the same ministerial bluster that we have had for months, so I will press the new clause to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Order. During that Division, I called for the doors to be locked before the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley was present, for which I apologise. New Clause 17 Defence Readiness Plan “(1) Within one month of the passage of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State must lay a Defence Readiness Plan before both Houses of Parliament. (2) The Defence Readiness Plan shall include, but shall not be limited to, a statement of the number of personnel in, and readiness of, each of the Reserve Forces governed by the Reserve Forces Act 1996.”—(Mr Francois.) This new clause requires the Government to publish a Defence Readiness Plan which must include information about the numbers and readiness of reserve forces. Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. This is the last new clause we will debate today, so I will try to keep to the point. New clause 17 would require the Government to publish a defence readiness plan, which must include information about the numbers and readiness of reserve forces. In a sense, the new clause gets to the heart of what people conceptually believe our armed forces are for. I have always believed that they exist to save lives, by persuading any potential aggressor that they could not win a war with ourselves and our allies. The Minister will forgive me, because he has heard this from me before, but it is summed up in the Roman military theorist Vegetius’s famous phrase, “Si vis pacem, para bellum”—“He who desires peace should prepare for war”. When he published his strategic defence review, Lord Robertson emphasised readiness, but the official policy of the Government, as announced in that review—from memory, on page 43—was that we in Britain should be prepared to fight a peer enemy with allies by 2035. That is nine years from now. The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker, said about a year ago that we might have to be prepared to fight the Russians in 2027, just one year away, and the First Sea Lord is on the record in another forum saying that we might have to fight them by 2029. There is a clear dichotomy in terms of readiness between the policy of the Government and the Ministry of Defence and the policy of at least two of the service chiefs. When the Government asked Lord Robertson to front the SDR, they knew what they were doing. He is very widely respected, he oversaw the 1998 strategic defence review, and he is also a former Secretary-General of NATO. When added to Sir Richard “not-an-armchair-general” Barrons and Dr Fiona Hill, in fairness to the Government, they had a credible front-of-house team to conduct the review. They were all adamant that the price of delivering readiness was defence spending at 3% of GDP. What did Lord Robertson say about our preparedness and readiness to go to war, if necessary, at a speech in Salisbury on Tuesday night? He said this: “We are underprepared. We are underinsured. We are under attack. We are not safe…Britain’s national security and safety is in peril.” Lord Robertson is deeply respected. There is no way he could be characterised as some kind of Tory stooge; he has never been a stooge for anybody. For him to be warning us about these risks is a really serious wake-up call, and for him to accuse the Prime Minister of “corrosive complacency” in being ready to defend this nation is an extremely powerful intervention. In pub English, the authors of the review have plainly had enough. They have gone public and are being very critical of the Government. What was the point of them spending a year doing that very detailed report if the Government they reported it to have not followed up on what they advised them to do? I note in passing that the Health Secretary is today quoted as saying that we should cut welfare to fund defence. When he was challenged about why he said that, he said that Ministers “need to put more money” into the armed forces, and that expenditure has “got to come from somewhere.” In terms of improving our military readiness—here is where I suspect we part company—we announced a few weeks ago that we would return to the two-child benefit cap. That would generate about £3.2 billion in a full year, and we would use at least half that money to increase the size of the Regular Army, subject to the problems of recruitment and retention, to 80,000 and the active Army Reserve to 40,000, making for a mobilisable Army of 120,000. There is a very clear difference between us and the Government on this. For the sake of brevity, I end with one plea to the Minister for information. We have had our argument about when the defence investment plan should be published. We are asking for a defence readiness plan through new clause 17, but the Government have promised a defence readiness Bill. As we are pretty close to the King’s Speech, can the Minister tell us whether that Bill will be in it? If it will be, when is it intended that the defence readiness Bill—which, given its name, surely will be designed to improve our readiness for war—be on the statute book? We have Lord Robertson telling us that we are underprepared, underinsured and under attack—do not take it from me; take it from him—so where is the plan and, more to the point, where is the defence readiness Bill?

I thank the right hon. Member for his views on the Bill and acknowledge his request for us to publish a defence readiness plan that must include information about the numbers and readiness of the reserve forces. One of the main reasons we are underinsured, underprepared and under attack is the systemic underfunding of defence over the last 20 years, and since the end of the cold war, and our pursuit of usually non-state actors at a cost to our state-countering capability. However, for the first time in decades, the Government have set a clear path for the next decade and beyond to transform and boost our reserve forces, through the strategic defence review. I reassure the Committee that we have been clear about our move to warfighting readiness, and the MOD is working around the clock to deliver that through our armed forces plan, as stated by the Chief of the Defence Staff at various recent briefings. However, for reasons that I am confident all Members of the House will understand, these readiness plans should not be subject to a statutory requirement for publication. The House is already equipped with robust and appropriate mechanisms to scrutinise defence and defence readiness, including this Committee, the House of Commons Defence Committee, the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, and the Intelligence and Security Committee. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence publishes quarterly personnel statistics containing data on strengths, requirements, intake, applications and outflow. The latest set, containing data up to 1 January 2026, was published at the beginning of the month. We already provide extensive information on the readiness of our reserve force, and disclosing comprehensive details of our readiness plans could risk giving our adversary a strategic advantage. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the right hon. Gentleman and, on those grounds, I ask him to withdraw the motion.

We do indeed have a disagreement on principle. I suspect that the Minister might privately have some sympathy with the new clause but, for reasons we are all aware of, he cannot say so today. I will give him a chance to vote with us by pressing the new clause to a Division.

Very kind. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Schedules 1 to 7 agreed to.

That brings us to the end of our line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. I will put the Question to report the Bill to the House once we have agreed the special report next week.

On a point of order, Mr Efford. I take this opportunity to thank all colleagues and all Opposition Members for our healthy and important debates. Importantly, I also thank all the Clerks, officials and you in the Chair, Mr Efford, for pulling the Committee together and making it run smoothly. It is not lost on me that the Bill is hugely important. A lot of the clauses are about getting us ready and preparing us should a crisis befall the country. The Bill is doing nothing other than thickening our ability to protect the freedoms that we have exercised here in this Committee Room. On behalf of those of us on the Government Benches, thank you very much indeed.

Further to that point of order, Mr Efford. I very much echo the Minister’s sentiments. We have agreed with the general thrust of the Bill from day one. We said that we would attempt to be a critical friend and to improve it, or to make suggestions, and the Minister—to be fair to him—has said on a number of occasions that he will take things back to the Department or take a closer look. I know him, and if he says that, I know that he will. I am afraid the officials will have some extra work to do. Thank you, Mr Efford, for chairing our proceedings with a light touch and, if I may say so, a sense of humour. I thank the excellent Clerks for assisting us with amendments and providing good advice, and for organising the excellent visit to Portsmouth. I hope that we have done the House some service. Along with all my colleagues, I thank all who have been involved in this process. We look forward to producing our report and to debating these matters on Report.

I do not think it is normal for a Bill Committee Chair to say something, but this is a peculiar Committee, because it has been a Select Committee and a Bill Committee. It has been a joy to chair these meetings. I just say to anyone who is following our proceedings that everyone here is trying to do their best for our armed forces. We understand what they go through and put themselves through, and we have absolute respect for them in their roles. Everyone here hopes that, with what we are doing with the Bill, we will do the best we possibly can for our armed forces. I thank all the officials who have supported me in getting the Committee through the Bill, and I will see Committee members at our private meeting next Tuesday to finalise our report. Thank you all very much.

Committee rose.