The Foreign Affairs Committee are continuing their inquiry into the appointment of Peter Mandelson and the security implications of that. We have in front of us today Catherine Little. We are very grateful to see you; thank you very much for coming. Would you mind giving us your full title and saying what your responsibilities are?

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to the Committee this morning. I have two core responsibilities relevant to the hearing today. The first is that I am the senior official responsible for overseeing the Government’s response to the Humble Address. There are two things that I do as part of that: I oversee the operational response across the whole of Government and I advise the Prime Minister on how to ensure that the Government fully complies with the Humble Address. The second role I have is that I am the Cabinet Office permanent secretary and the chief operating officer for the civil service. In that role, I am also responsible for the oversight of services to Government Departments, of which a number are run from the Cabinet Office. That includes UK Security Vetting. I think it is important that I should say two things up front in relation to those two responsibilities. First, I have not been involved at all in either the events to appoint or the withdrawal of the former HMA for Washington, and my first involvement with this was—

Peter Mandelson.

Yes, sorry—Peter Mandelson. And my first involvement was when I became responsible for the Humble Address in February, when I was asked by the Prime Minister to lead this process as the acting Cabinet Secretary. The second thing I should really make clear is that, as has been said in a number of pieces of evidence to you, the sanctity of the operational security vetting system is absolutely essential to the day-to-day running of national security for this country and so in my responsibilities for overseeing security vetting, I have absolutely nothing to do with the day-to-day operations of UKSV. That is important both to safeguard the information and to make sure that there isn’t any undue interference outside the way in which we operate with Departments.

Good. I would like you to help us with the narrative, to begin with. At the beginning of Sir Oliver Robbins’s evidence, he told us that the Cabinet Office had been in touch with him—I believe he said—saying that it was not really sure that vetting was required. Presumably that was because Peter Mandelson was a Member of the House of Lords, a Privy Counsellor and a former member of the Cabinet, and also presumably because these sorts of political appointments are as rare as hen’s teeth. From what you understand, was there a question like that that was being asked? Do you know what the discussion was between the Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office?

I do not have records of verbal conversations. In my role in gathering information and the audit trail, and fact finding about the decisions that were undertaken, I do have access to a number of emails that have been disclosed recently to me. What those emails set out is what I see as a very reasonable policy conversation between security officials, whereby the Foreign Office personnel security team get in touch with the UKSV and the Government Security Group in the Cabinet Office and ask the question: could they get some advice? The presumption had been that, given that Peter Mandelson had been a Member of the House of Lords, the long-standing convention that he did not require developed vetting was assumed, and they wanted to get proper policy advice from experts on whether that was the case. What I can see is an audit trail of discussion between security officials debating how the policy framework would apply in this instance. I should say that it is unusual, although not unprecedented, for a political appointee to take up post as an ambassador. What I can see is that there is a senior official from the Government Security Group who goes back to the Foreign Office security team and advises two things: one, that this is a decision for the Foreign Office, and two, that they would advise that developed vetting is sought.

We know that vetting took place. When this developed vetting happens, it is not done by the Foreign Office; it is done by the UKSV and they produce a document. Is that right?

That is correct.

Is it one document, two documents or what?

I think it would be helpful to explain what happens for the benefit of the Committee and the House. The process, which is governed by a formal agreement between UKSV and the Foreign Office, is that they are classified as something called a “make recommendation” Department. That means that UKSV do all the vetting that they would normally undertake for any other Department and they make a recommendation that is non-binding to the Foreign Office.

The Foreign Office is an exception, along with some other Government Departments—I think Olly Robbins was telling us that. Is that right?

That is correct.

So there are other Departments—presumably like the MOD, I would have thought—where there are going to be lots of these DVs. Is that right?

The MOD is not a “make recommendation” Department. If it is useful to the Committee, it might be worth explaining some of the history of UK Security Vetting. This goes back to the post-war period when national security vetting was professionalised in the formation of the Ministry of Defence. The current vetting service was formed within the Ministry of Defence many decades ago. In 2017, the Government undertook to start centralising and standardising vetting procedures across Government. At this point, the MOD is overseeing vetting services, and this is transferred into the Cabinet Office as a centralised service. That is part of a number of reforms to centralise services to Departments at the time. As part of that centralisation, there was clearly a need to make sure that the services provided to Departments were fit for purpose. Because the Foreign Office is almost a “DV by default” Department—it is very exceptional for it not to require DV—it was granted this “make recommendation” status, and that was both a practical and sensible way to deal with the volume of security vetting required. To go back to the process itself, that is the context. Once UKSV complete the services that they provide to make the recommendation, they undertake a risk assessment and they provide two overall conclusions. One sets out the level of concern and the other sets out the overall recommendation on whether to grant developed vetting. That is non-binding. It is meant to be helpful information for the ultimate decision maker, in this case the Foreign Office, to make a final decision.

What volume of material would have been given by the vetting body to the Foreign Office?

At the time of the appointment and since, the Foreign Office has access and can request access to any of the inputs that go into the vetting process. Forgive me—there might be moments when I am not able to describe precise inputs in order to protect the system. But it is a very comprehensive process. It is thorough and requires a significant amount of information. What I can confirm is that at any stage the Foreign Office, as the ultimate decision maker, can request access to any of that information.

Without at this stage telling us what is in those documents, what sorts of documents were put before the Foreign Office when it came to Peter Mandelson and his direct vetting?

There are two separate points where I can see audit trails of what information was passed to the Foreign Office. At the time of the appointment at the end of January, on 28 January, the UKSV summary document that I have described was sent to the Foreign Office. That is a summary of the considerations of the case officer in reaching those two overall recommendations.

How many pages is that?

It is around 10 pages. Forgive me—I cannot remember the precise number.

So about 10 pages are sent. Is anything else sent?

That is it. What happens—this is the case for all vetting processes—is that the decision-making body then returns the decision taken by the decision-making body. There is also a page that sets that out. I should confirm that those documents are currently being processed in accordance with the Humble Address. There is a second point that I can see an audit trail for. On 15 September last year, the Foreign Office security team request access to a number of documents relating to the vetting file, and on the same day the documents requested are sent to the Foreign Office. I do not know who, beyond the individual requesting that information, saw those documents. But my point is that anyone within the security chain can request to see information if they feel it is necessary, because they are ultimately one of the owners of that document.

I am going to leave it to others to go through what the form that we have all seen online means—it is the sort of traffic light form. I know that people will want to ask about that. I am just trying to get things so that we get our heads around the general narrative. You are now talking about mid-September. We did hear from Olly Robbins. I believe he said in the middle of his evidence that in September he had considered getting access to the DV file and had contacted the Cabinet Office, and he had been told he could not get access to that without there being national security reasons why. I hope I have said that correctly, from everybody’s memory. Do you see any evidence of that?

The only information that I have is the information that I have gathered as part of our fact finding, which is the information that I have just described to you. I have obviously looked at what Sir Olly has said. I cannot at this stage see the audit trail for that request, and I do not know who Sir Olly made that request to. All I can see is that the personnel security team at the Foreign Office requested information relating to vetting on the 15th, and that that was granted.

Right. Since we are on audit trails, would you have expected, when looking at the paperwork, to have been able to see an audit trail on what discussions there may have been or the reasons for a particular decision being made over and above anything that could have been filled in on this form?

At the time I informed the Prime Minister of this document and its overall conclusion, I could not see any information—I had not been able to obtain information that might have shed light on the decision-making process. Since I informed the Prime Minister, the email that Sir Olly referred to in his evidence to you has been provided to my team discharging the Humble Address. That record sets out the decision to grant DV and some mitigations. It doesn’t set out or detail the risks. Now, I can totally understand—

I am sorry to cut across you. Who is this email to?

It is from the director of security, Ian Collard, and it is sent to his line manager, the chief operating officer of the Foreign Office. It is copied to the PPS to Sir Olly. I will just finish the context, which I think is important. As I said earlier, it is a very serious consideration to document at any point the contents of a vetting file. I can entirely understand why there was reticence to document that on an open system outside the UKSV portal. I don’t think it is for me to provide a judgment on the adequacy of that email. That is why Sir Adrian Fulford will now independently review this process.

Have you seen other times when the UKSV have given a document to a Department that then needs to make a decision about whether or not DV should be passed? Have you seen a pattern of the amount of documentation around it, or records of decision making? If you have, how does that compare to what Sir Olly was doing on this occasion?

I have only ever worked in Departments that have binding requirements to accept the UKSV recommendation. I have not worked in a “make recommendation” Department, so I have only really seen the process that is undertaken by security officials within that context.

Okay. I want to take you to February ’26, when the Humble Address was granted. We have touched on this a little bit, but before I pass over to other Members I want to make sure we are all clear about it. You take charge, and you have to get the documents together. Under the Humble Address, you are having to give access to a very large number of documents around the appointment and security position of Peter Mandelson, but you obviously have to protect the security, and there is a lot of responsibility in relation to that. Presumably, your first port of call would be to go to Olly Robbins and talk to him about the vetting document.

If I may, it might be useful context to set out the Humble Address process and the information gathering that has been undertaken. This is a highly unique situation. We have a Humble Address with a fairly broad scope, which is running alongside a criminal investigation. I think that is unprecedented. Teams across Government—hard-working, dedicated civil servants—are working around the clock to process large amounts of information. This Committee will know better than any Committee that, in the national security and international relations context, the judgments required are highly significant and painstaking. As part of my information-gathering process, there have been four formal requests to all permanent secretaries, including Sir Olly. Naturally, because the Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office are the two Departments that are most significantly impacted, given the decision-making context and background, Sir Olly and I have had multiple discussions about how best to comply and obtain information. The one specific meeting that I had with Sir Olly about vetting—I should say that there is lots of debate and discussion about how to treat vetting information, for all the reasons I have said to you. I should clearly say that there was no disagreement, but there was certainly a discussion taking place, given the complexity of the framework and the guidance. In the middle of March, I had a meeting with Sir Olly and a senior member of his team. That was after the point that I had been told that this summary document exists. I specifically asked to see that document and any decision-making audit trail around those judgments at the time. It was made clear to me that that information would not be forthcoming.

Who made that clear to you?

Sir Olly.

Why?

In the actual meeting, the specific reasons were not discussed, but I go back to the context at the time. There was a lot of back-and-forth discussion about the status of how we would treat vetting information. I advised the Prime Minister that I would give him detailed advice once I had seen the relevant documentation.

Physically, where is it? Is it in the Foreign Office or the Cabinet Office or what?

The UKSV has a secure portal of the highest security standards. That is the main way within which information is passed relating to vetting between both individual subjects and Departments receiving the service. As I said, on 15 September last year documents requested were emailed to the Foreign Office.

Is there a note of this meeting?

Yes.

Who took that?

There were three private secretaries in attendance at the meeting and I personally took a record of it.

As a result of his refusal to hand over these documents, what happened?

I took the very unusual judgment that I should directly request the information from UK Security Vetting. I did that because of my responsibilities to discharge the Humble Address, which is a responsibility that is unique to me, and that I take very seriously. I felt that I needed to see some relevant documentation so that I could advise the Prime Minister as to whether we had fully complied and gathered the information that was available and within scope.

What were Sir Olly’s reasons for not handing it over?

I think his evidence to you on Tuesday very much reflects the nature of the conversations that we were having at the time. He would prioritise, I believe— I cannot talk about his judgments and decisions; I can talk only about my judgments and decisions. But I think he has set out his view to this Committee.

Is it about the legal position, among other things?

Would it be helpful if I set out the judgments that I took in reaching my decision?

Okay, let’s do it that way.

I feel that I can only really represent my own judgments.

Yes, that is fine.

Once I had read the document at the end of March and I had seen the recommendation that it made, clearly that information was significant and pertinent to my role in discharging the Humble Address. I did a number of things at that time. I commissioned legal advice on the treatment of that document and its relevance to the scope of the Humble Address. I think that is an important thing to stress, because the wording of the Humble Address is both broad and specific at the same time and I felt it was important that I received expert advice on the handling of that sensitive personal information and how it applied. I asked security policy experts to give me advice on the legal framework, but also their policy framework for how I should handle that information. I spoke to—

Had there been a challenge from Sir Olly about the legal framework?

Not specifically at the time. I do not remember Sir Olly specifically mentioning the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.

He does not seem to be talking about that very much, actually. It seems to have been friends of his speaking to the media more than him, it sounds like.

Yes. I do not want to in any way misrepresent Olly’s views. That is on the record to this Committee. The third thing I did was speak to the senior official who was liaising with the criminal investigation, because I wanted to ensure that the handling of this document would not prejudice that criminal investigation. I also took expert advice from my propriety and ethics team as to any other considerations that I should take into account. The earliest opportunity where I was able to receive that advice and ask questions of experts was on 13 April and I told the Prime Minister on 14 April. I personally reached the conclusion that, having seen all of that expert advice, this information was within the scope of the Humble Address. My responsibility is to the Prime Minister in advising him as to whether I had fully complied —and the Government have fully complied—in both the letter and the spirit of the Humble Address, and I felt that this was pertinent information to discharge my responsibilities.

Did you go to the Cabinet Secretary?

Yes.

At what stage did you go to her?

I told the Cabinet Secretary once I had read the document and I explained the actions that I was going to undertake.

You did not go to the Cabinet Secretary at the stage when you and Sir Olly were having a disagreement about whether you should get access to the document?

I do not recall specifically going into that level of detail. The Cabinet Secretary is obviously my line manager and is the principal adviser to the Prime Minister. She would have been aware that I was having regular discussions with all Government Departments about obtaining information.

Thank you. Before I go to Sir John, I think that Edward has a follow-up question.

I just want to clarify the timelines. You said that you read the report on Tuesday. You also said that there was an audit trail that included an email from the security department to the chief operating officer of the FCDO which outlined the mitigations that their security department was recommending. When did you see that email?

That was after I had spoken to the Prime Minister on Tuesday the 14th. You will see from the read-out that the Government have published that the Prime Minister instructed further fact finding immediately and urgently with the specific intent that I could advise him on how to inform Parliament.

And what is your professional judgment on whether or not the mitigations that the FCDO security department was recommending were adequate to manage the risk that you read in the UKSV report?

As I said to the Chair, I think my responsibility and role here is to gather the information and not to pass judgment. That is exactly why Sir Adrian Fulford has been asked to undertake an independent review.

Before making the decision to sack Olly Robbins, had the Prime Minister also seen the mitigations that would have been put in place? Was it his judgment on whether or not those mitigations were appropriate?

I cannot comment on a decision-making process that I am not directly involved in.

But the Prime Minister had been briefed by you on the UKSV.

Yes.

And had he seen the email of the mitigations that were being put in place?

I do not want to get into exactly who has seen what information; I hope you respect that that is to protect national security. I can confirm that the Prime Minister has seen relevant information.

I want to look at three aspects. First, we now know that the then Cabinet Secretary sent a note saying that Peter Mandelson should complete his developed vetting procedure before an announcement was made. We also know that Philip Barton essentially expressed the same view and Sir Olly Robbins also told us that it was strongly his view that that should have been the case. Can you tell us whether that is the official Cabinet Office view and what you have discovered about the fact that it was not followed through?

My view is that due process was followed, and if I might explain why I believe that, it is because the process, as I have outlined to the Committee, is that UKSV makes a recommendation and the Foreign Office makes a decision as to whether to grant DV. That is the process, and that is the process that is agreed with the Foreign Office.

But what I am talking about is before UKSV had made any recommendation. It is the fact that the Cabinet Office has said that the appointment should not be announced and made until DV had been completed, and yet that was what happened, against the strong advice of the Cabinet Office.

If you will forgive me, I cannot comment on events or processes that took place ahead of me becoming the senior official responsible for the Humble Address. I wasn’t involved.

You weren’t involved, but you represent the Cabinet Office and that was the Cabinet Office view at the time.

It was the former Cabinet Secretary’s view and he has provided evidence to this Committee.

And the former permanent secretary’s view.

Yes, and he has provided evidence to this Committee.

Okay. Is that part of what you are examining?

It is part of what Sir Adrian Fulford will now independently review. My job is to gather information in order to comply with the Humble Address.

Okay. Can I then come to the actual outcome of the DV process? I think you said that UKSV sent a 10-page document, essentially setting out their findings. One assumes that that must have included the traffic lights. I mean, a 10-page document cannot exclude the final recommendation, which is not to give clearance.

That is correct, and the Government have published an excerpt from a template, which would have been included in that document.

Which is the one that I put to Sir Olly and he said that even until the moment of publication he had not been aware of it. Does that surprise you?

I can’t comment on what Sir Olly has precisely seen. He has given evidence to you directly. All I know is my audit trail is entirely between the security team in the Foreign Office and security officials within UKSV, and that is normal practice. I can’t confirm what information was briefed to Sir Olly as part of his decisions.

But the fundamental difference—the discrepancy that we heard about when Sir Olly gave us evidence—was that, as you have confirmed just now, the summary briefing document from UKSV would have said that the recommendation was to deny clearance, and Sir Olly has told us that he was told it was leaning towards denial, but it was at the borderline. Those two things just don’t equate.

I can only confirm what I have seen. I don’t know what briefing Sir Olly received. It is an event that I obviously wasn’t party to.

Isn’t that pretty fundamental to the exercise you are conducting?

What is fundamental and relevant to my exercise is whether I’ve been able to see and gather all of the relevant information to fulfil the Humble Address, and discharging our responsibilities and the Government’s responsibilities to Parliament.

Could you just clarify the summary document and the template that has now been published by the Government, setting out the process? Can you just say what the two red boxes are, and whether they were the ones ticked?

I would not normally reveal any content of any vetting document. If you look at what the Government have put on gov.uk, we do not set out what the document says. Because of the public discourse and commentary on this very sensitive document, it is now in the public domain, not through the Government’s issuance of this information but through a leak that took place last Thursday. Please forgive me; I do not want to put myself or the Government in a position where I am sharing information that is within the vetting file.

No, but the Government did take the decision to publish the template.

Yes, and it is an excerpt. Forgive me again; I do not want to provide information of a personal nature that is within the vetting document.

But if people were to read The Guardian, they would see two red boxes that had been ticked in Peter Mandelson’s file, and the two red boxes would be that he was a person of high concern, and that the overall decision, or recommendation, was that clearance be denied or withdrawn. For the sake of argument, let’s just say that is what was in those papers, and we can perhaps move on from that.

Yes; I should not comment on what The Guardian has said.

Before moving on to my final area, can I confirm that the Foreign Office has the 10-page summary, but Sir Olly Robbins did not see the 10-page summary? He was briefed on its contents by the director of security, and therefore, in seeking to try to explain the two different views, is it possible that it was simply a failure of full communication in the briefing of Sir Olly Robbins that took place?

I can’t comment on a briefing that I was not party to. As Sir Olly said, his professional security team briefed him, and there is a record of the decision that was taken off the back of that briefing. Those are the facts, as I can see them.

We are hoping to have other evidence that will cover that.

We will wait and see. Can I finally move on to one other part of this process? When exactly did the Cabinet Office and yourself discover that the UKSV recommendation had not been complied with by the Foreign Office?

I would not quite use those words myself, but I became aware of that information when I read the document on 25 March.

On 25 March. And when did you discuss it with the Cabinet Secretary?

Very shortly afterwards.

And when did you tell the Prime Minister?

On 14 April.

So why was there such a long gap between you and the Cabinet Secretary discovering this, and your going to tell the Prime Minister?

I do not want to be unhelpful in repeating what I said to you earlier, but I immediately sought legal, policy and propriety advice, because this is such an unusual thing for a Government official to do, and to handle that sort of security information. I believe that I have a responsibility to handle that sensitive information within the framework of both the law and the guidance that I am subject to. I did not feel that I could share that information until I understood the consequences and the authority that I had to share the information. As I say, yes, it did take some time to get that expert advice and to ask questions. I firmly believe that that is the professional and appropriate thing to do when dealing with such sensitive information that is so important to be protected as part of our overall national security framework. And yes, that did take some time.

It took three weeks.

It took the time between 25 March and telling the Prime Minister on 14 April, and I truly believe that I acted as swiftly, effectively and appropriately as I could.

Would it not be the position that up to about a dozen lawyers and officials, by the time you got to tell the Prime Minister, already knew, and that the more it was being discussed, the wider the circle was becoming, but the person who did not seem to know was the PM?

I was able to obtain advice without experts seeing the vetting information or seeing any of the information contained within it, or describing the information contained within it. I think that is a really important point to make: a very, very small number of people have actually seen the document. I felt able to get that expert advice by describing the process and the sort of information that was contained within it.

Narrowing it down to the point that, let’s say, the red boxes had been ticked and yet the Foreign Office had given clearance, that narrow point, without divulging any further details, was known by quite a wide number of people, wasn’t it, before the PM was told?

I think it is a small number of people that was proportionate and necessary in obtaining expert advice.

Would that be up to a dozen?

I think I would need to confirm the precise numbers, but I kept a named, confidential list of the reasons why people knew that information.

Okay. Dan, you have two questions to ask, and then I am moving on to Alex.

Just to follow up on this document, is it the case that a Minister would ever have been shown one of these documents? Do you have an idea?

It is highly unusual, but at the point at which I told the Prime Minister, I only shared with him the very minimal information that this document existed, and I did share with him the overall recommendation and explained the process under which final DV should have been granted.

In relation to your responsibility overseeing the Government response to the Humble Address, we have seen Simon Case’s advice that developed vetting should have been sought before the announcement of the appointment. Have you seen any notes of meetings or notes in response to why that wasn’t followed? Was a decision taken not to follow that advice?

I have seen a lot of information. All of that information relating to the appointment that we had at the time of the publication of the first volume has been published. Obviously, this is an iterative process. We are now in the final stages of information gathering, and I have just not seen further audit trails relevant to it. There may be final things that I have not yet had the opportunity to read.

We don’t know why that wasn’t followed through.

You have rightly talked about the importance of keeping this highly classified information in the vetting system away from the Committee and away from the public generally, but there appear to be at least two occasions where this information was leaked to the press. Two days after you informed the Prime Minister, there was a Guardian article on 16 April. But about six months before, there was an article in The Independent where it was suggested that Peter Mandelson had failed his vetting, although erroneously applied to MI6 rather than the UK vetting service. In September last year, which organisations might have had access to that information and might be able to share that with the press?

I will be very clear. There are four distinct processes that would have been relevant to the appointment process: there is the due diligence undertaken by the propriety and ethics team in the Cabinet Office; there is the conflict of interest process, which is undertaken by the Foreign Office; there is the UKSV developed vetting process, which is, as I have described, entirely within a box between the UKSV and the Foreign Office; and then there is STRAP clearance. I am not able in this public forum to talk about the details of the last two processes, I hope you understand, for good reason.

When the information was shared with the Prime Minister, the whole of No. 10 would have been able to know that information. Or how many individuals, roughly, in that circle might have known about it?

I told the chief of staff to the Prime Minister and the PPS to the Prime Minister of the information that I needed to share with the Prime Minister directly, and I formally set out the basis on which the information I have divulged should be handled, in a formal note to the PPS, to the Prime Minister, to make clear that this could not be shared beyond a named list.

What is the penalty under the Official Secrets Act for sharing such information?

I am afraid I am not a lawyer; I do not know. I probably would need to come to come back to you, and I suspect that that would need expert legal advice.

Finally, Sir Olly Robbins said to the Committee this week that he felt there should be “prosecutions” for the leaking of this information. Do you share that view?

I will not comment on other people’s judgment. As I said to you, I am not an expert in this matter, and I have not come here to opine on it.

Returning to the UKSV security vetting system, and respecting your comments on the sanctity of the system, just to be clear, have you ever seen any UKSV form—this type of form, or of any nature—prior to this process?

No.

Would it be right to say that, broadly, most senior civil servants never, ever see a form of this nature?

Yes.

Is it also right to say that information about UKSV is only verbally communicated Department to Department?

No, it is on a secure system, so it is normal for an overall summary of their recommendations and the risks identified to be shared on a highly secure portal, and it is written down. That is shared in a written form, on the portal, with the body that the UKSV is providing a service to.

In this case, for this particular appointment, this body is the FCDO.

Yes.

Sir Olly, as we heard in his evidence, told us that he had “never seen” this form until it was leaked or published. He says that the recommendation that was verbally briefed to him—we cannot see any notes of that meeting—was briefed to him as “leaning” to or “borderline”. I showed him said document, and I understand that you do not want to comment about this, but an excerpt of this has also been published officially now by the Cabinet Office, so that is why I am pointing to this. It is a “make recommendation” body, so this is not binding, as you said, but the form very clearly shows “High Concern” and “Clearance Denied or Withdrawn”. We are being told, or we have been led to believe, that both these boxes were marked, in the red. How, in your opinion, would that be verbally communicated as “borderline” to Sir Olly?

We have very, very experienced security professionals who provide briefings. Obviously, they have to take a judgment as to how to share information up the chain. I believe it is quite unusual for a permanent secretary to be directly involved in this sort of decision making. I am afraid you would have to ask the individual who took the decision on how to brief Sir Olly.

Would you expect, as part of the procedures of how the civil service operates, that there would be a meeting note of these decisions, or how these decisions are verbally briefed, without disclosing the contents of the security vetting?

All civil servants are great administrators. We are famous for our record keeping, and the civil service code requires us to take accurate notes and to handle information within the legal framework. I do believe it is possible, without revealing the information within this sort of file, to set out a high-level conclusion, but that must be a judgment for the individuals making the decision.

I would like to go on to the judgment point, because a lot seems to rest on judgment, when there seem to be clear processes. Where this is not quite matching the version of events we are hearing from multiple people is where the judgment part comes in.

Before you move on, can I just ask this? There is a certain amount of debate in the media this morning about whether or not Olly Robbins provided No. 10 with an account of the decision-making process last week, before he was sacked. I just wondered if there was an account—there was a record—of his decision-making process that you were given and, if so, if it will be published?

Any information that pertains to the Prime Minister’s decision, I do not think is within the scope of the Humble Address; that would be a decision for the owner of that information.

That is the questions I have on judgment, to follow up.

Okay, I am so sorry.

That is okay.

I will come to you Ed, after Uma has finished. Sorry to crash into you. Q755 Uma Kumaran: Related to the Chair’s question, on the judgment issue, Sir Chris Wormald told us in his answer to our session that the due diligence is in two parts: identification of information and then judgment. The first part seems very clear, and there is a clear process that seems quite straightforward. But on the judgment, everything gets murky because it is down to individuals applying their own judgment. You have set out clearly today how you sought extra advice in your decision and your judgment process. How, without someone telling the Prime Minister that developed vetting had in essence failed or that the recommendation was to not proceed, could the appointing Minister, who is in this case the Prime Minister, make a judgment on any of this?

I think that is the very heart and the substance of the debate, and the Prime Minister has set out his views on how he feels he could and should have been told this information. I am not here to add, in my role; I think the Prime Minister has been very clear in the statements he has made to the House.

Thank you. This is my final question. Looking at the civil service code of conduct, which we went through as a Committee recently, do you think the Prime Minister was adequately served by either the permanent secretary of the FCDO or indeed the FCDO by being kept in the dark even when those Bloomberg emails came to light? He was being made to stand at the Dispatch Box and speak to a system where some people in the civil service knew that there was more to it. He was still being sent out without all the information to hand. Do you think he was properly served by the civil service code of conduct and by those briefing him?

That is not for me to opine on. As I say, I think the Prime Minister has set out his views as to the answer to your question.

When you sought the legal policy and PIT advice, did you speak to anyone in the Foreign Office in the decision-making chain—Olly, or any of the people below Olly—who may have seen the documentation, to try and get an understanding of what they did?

If I can refer you back to my remarks earlier, I had a specific conversation, once I was aware that such a document might exist, directly with Sir Olly, and it was made clear to me that that information would not be forthcoming. So it was not until I told the Prime Minister, who instructed me to undertake formal fact finding that further inquiries were made immediately of the Foreign Office.

As much as you can tell us about those inquiries, did you pick up concerns from the Foreign Office system about how this had come about? Were people worried about the way the decision had been taken or the information had been conveyed? Can you share any of that with us?

At this point, the audit trails are documented. I think the summary of that is, of course, yes. In terms of your question about concerns, I think Sir Olly has made clear in his evidence to you that he was concerned and he remains concerned about that information being treated now in the way it is. It is so unusual to be talking about this in the public domain like this.

In particular, I was wondering about this discrepancy between what he says he was briefed at and what the form said. Did you pick up within your Foreign Office conversations any other evidence about concerns in the system about that?

No.

Thank you.

I just want to clarify: you obviously had a conversation with Sir Oliver about accessing the information, but prior to that had there been a conversation with Sir Olly about the advice that he received, and did his answers to your questions around that match the evidence that he gave to the Committee on Tuesday?

No, because I didn’t know anything about the decision making or the process that had been undertaken within the Foreign Office.

Because there weren’t any records.

Because there weren’t any records, and when I asked to understand it, and for information in line with my role on the Humble Address, I was told that information would not be forthcoming.

Subsequent to you gaining access to the UKSV, was there a conversation with Sir Olly about the advice that he received and the decision that he made?

No, because I did not know that he had received advice at that stage.

Subsequent to your receiving access to the UKSV report, did you have a conversation with Ian Collard, who was the head of security at the time, to establish what advice or information had been shared with Sir Oliver?

I didn’t personally, because I asked my director general leading on the fact finding that was commissioned by the Prime Minister to have that conversation.

Did the information that was provided by Ian Collard differ from the evidence that Sir Oliver gave to the Committee on Tuesday?

That is not for me to share. I would advise that you should talk to the director of security directly. I understand he is coming to give you evidence.

We are hoping so.

The fact finding that the Prime Minister commissioned has not yet formally concluded, although I should make clear that the vast majority of the investigation, all of the information, has been confirmed by the Foreign Office as being divulged to us, and I have read all of that information.

When you briefed the Prime Minister on the limited amount of information you were able to share with the UKSV—I don’t know if you briefed or provided, so please clarify, the risk mitigations that were outlined in the email—did you also provide information to the Prime Minister in any form about what the advice of the head of the Foreign Office security department was proposing, and whether or not Sir Oliver acted on that information?

No, because at the time I briefed the Prime Minister, on 14 April, I did not have, and I had not seen, that email.

So in terms of the Prime Minister’s decision to fire Sir Oliver, he was not in receipt at that point of all of the information—only the limited information that you provided relating to the UKSV.

That is correct, and that is why the Prime Minister immediately tasked further fact finding directly with the Foreign Office—to ascertain as much information that could be within scope of the Humble Address, and the judgments that were taken.

But he had already fired Sir Oliver, without all of the additional information pertaining to the mitigations and the advice of Foreign Office security officials.

Sorry, would you mind repeating that question?

I am just trying to work out the timeline in terms of what information the Prime Minister had when he made the decision to fire Sir Oliver, and what information was provided to the Prime Minister subsequent to that. I am especially thinking about the email with the mitigations in it or the advice of the security officials within the FCDO or Sir Oliver’s memory of the advice that he was provided.

I can confirm that the Prime Minister would have had relevant information. Whilst I must make very clear that I am not involved in the Prime Minister’s decision here—

Understood.

—I do know that there were conversations directly between the Prime Minister and Sir Olly. Q768 Aphra Brandreth: I want to just go back through some of the questions about the process, and then also ask about security vetting more broadly. Sir John mentioned this before, but Simon Case had made it clear that security vetting should have occurred before Mandelson’s appointment was announced. It was only in September 2025, following the concerns about Mandelson’s appointment, that the PM then asked Chris Wormald to look into the process for vetting. Why do you think that he needed to ask for another opinion when he already had the view of the former Cabinet Secretary on that issue?

I cannot comment on a process that I was not involved in. My absolute role here is to make sure that I gather information in relation to the Humble Address, and I have not been privy to any of the events or processes prior to me taking on this role.

As part of the Humble Address information, will there be any information that UKSV might have provided to Chris Wormald as part of his review into the vetting process?

The Humble Address will disclose all of the information that is relevant, in line with the terms of the Humble Address. If it is in scope, it will be processed for publication.

Okay. As we have talked about quite extensively, the FCDO is a “make recommendation” Department. In this instance, as we have now discovered, on the form UKSV essentially recommended against granting security clearance. The PM said when he found that out, he felt he should have been told. Is it your view that generally Ministers or the Prime Minister should be involved in that final decision on whether to grant security clearance?

I think it is a judgment for the individual decision-making authority. In this instance, that is the Foreign Office.

Thank you. Sir Oliver Robbins, in the evidence that he gave to this Committee, said that there was a feeling of “constant pressure” in the Foreign Office around the need to get Peter Mandelson into his position. Do you have any views on that? Were you aware—I appreciate that you were in the Cabinet Office—of this pressure that was happening at the time?

Was there any evidence, in fact, that was found—things like call logs or emails—in her doing her job? Did she come across anything?

I can’t comment on events that I wasn’t privy to. I wasn’t involved at all, as I stated up front. As part of the Humble Address information-gathering process, I have not seen any documentation that would formally confirm that level of pressure, but I must repeat that I am only looking at information in the audit trail and the documentation that I have been given in relation to the Humble Address. I cannot comment on the atmosphere at the time; I wasn’t involved.

Thank you. You shared some information around the claim that the Cabinet Office questioned the need for vetting, and you set out how you think that occurred and the correct, as you see it, interpretation of that. Are you aware of any special advisers who were suggesting that Mandelson might not have needed vetting? Has that come up in any of the paperwork that you have seen?

I have shared with you the information that I have gathered as part of the Humble Address and the document trail I have seen.

Would you, though—given that we have talked about the level of note taking that is required, and where there might be notes and minutes—have expected to see notes in relation to that from a special adviser or PPS?

I should make it clear that I really do agree with Sir Olly that it is our job to keep an audit trail and to record information, particularly of key decisions, but the civil service does not record every single interaction and every single conversation. That would be highly inefficient. Of course, there is a judgment that needs to be taken about record keeping. Ultimately, if there were discussions, it is not unusual for either No. 10 or other private offices to call to ask for a process update, but again, I can’t really comment, because I have not seen any audit trail.

Obviously we have now heard in this case that Peter Mandelson was granted security clearance despite the recommendation of UKSV, and that he obviously had risks or mitigations that were managed. Are you aware of any other individuals who might be in a similar position, where the ultimate granting of security clearance is different from the recommendation by UKSV?

This is exactly why the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister last week paused the ability for a “make recommendation” Department to take a different view to UKSV, and the Government security team within the Cabinet Office has undertaken an urgent review to answer your question.

Sir Oliver Robbins, in his evidence to the Committee, told us that Peter Mandelson was given access to classified documents before he was granted security vetting. Would you say that is unusual?

My understanding, which is based on discussions I have had with Foreign Office officials, and I should confirm that both Foreign Office officials and I gave evidence to your sister Committee, the ISC, earlier this week on this matter, is that—and this is entirely for the judgment of a Department—Peter Mandelson would have been granted an interim clearance. Ultimately, I believe that an exception was made for him to see certain information, and that that is within the framework that the Foreign Office has. Again, I am not the expert. It is their protocol and policies, and I am sure you will want to ask the experts on this matter that question.

Obviously, we have talked a bit about how accurate notes are required to be kept, although obviously not for every single conversation that happens. Will the Humble Address include notes or a minute on the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Lord Mandelson to the position?

In the Humble Address Volume 1, which has already been published, we have shared all the documentation relating to the Prime Minister’s decision. That is already published and publicly available.

As part of that? Or do you know why his appointment appears to have been made without saying that it was subject to security clearance?

I can’t comment on a process I wasn’t party to at the time.

Thinking through where there might have been other political appointments into roles, it is quite unusual, obviously, to have political appointments, especially to such senior roles. We know, however, that for example Jonathan Powell is a political appointment as National Security Adviser, but he was also special envoy for the British Indian Ocean Territory; he was given that appointment on 6 September 2024. But I understand that in August he also held meetings, like Mandelson did, with FCDO officials and was given access to classified information. The Prime Minister was asked about this at Prime Minister’s questions yesterday, but actually did not answer the question. Are you able to provide information on what kind of security clearance he had prior to taking up the role in September?

I hope you will forgive me: I can’t comment on individuals’ security clearances. That would be inappropriate in this formal public setting. In fact, it is a critical part of the protections in place for the national security vetting system.

Okay, thank you. Q780 Fleur Anderson: I am going to ask you some questions about your document gathering, going back to the documents referring to the very early stages of the process, before the vetting and before the appointment. First, about the pre-appointment conversations that Morgan McSweeney may have held, would there normally be documents held of the Prime Minister’s chief of staff discussions about the potential of an appointment and the merits of that appointment? Should there be documents on that?

I am not here to opine on the judgments that would have been taken by private secretaries and individuals in those meetings. As I have said, it is a civil service requirement for us to take records and to make sure there is a formal record. I can’t give an opinion on things that relate to before my time being responsible for the Humble Address.

I suppose I am really asking this because I was a Minister. Every single conversation I had felt like it was definitely being documented very, very well, but I don’t know about chiefs of staff to Prime Ministers. Are all of their meetings documented in the same way that Ministers’ are?

There is always a thorough assessment of whether a record is needed. That would have been a judgment undertaken by the individuals in a meeting. The same sort of expectations for special advisers, civil servants and Ministers apply. It is set within the various codes that relate to the terms of employment.

That is helpful, because we are seeing him next week, we hope. As you are gathering the documents, and you get them in and look at them, are you able to go back and say, “There seem to be some missing documents,” and investigate a little bit more in your document gathering?

Yes.

So do you think there are any missing documents around those decisions? Have you asked any questions about more evidence of meetings by Morgan McSweeney before he even said to the Prime Minister that he should consider going forward with even the due diligence and even the security vetting—so, the early stages? Do you think there are some missing documents there?

I think I have undertaken an incredibly thorough and robust approach to identifying all information across Government that could be in scope of the Humble Address.

Thank you. The next question is about the letter to Sir Clive Alderton, who is the private secretary to the King, from Philip Barton, recommending the political appointment of HM Ambassador. I know you have read so many documents. You can’t be expected to know the details of all of them, but in this document, it says: “The Prime Minister has indicated his intention to recommend, during this Parliament, a small number of political appointments to serve as His Majesty's Ambassadors overseas.” He then goes on to recommend that Peter Mandelson be adopted as the first one of those political appointments. Do you know if you asked about whether there were other political appointments in scope at that time, or was it just a general catch-all paragraph to say, “There may be some; here’s the first”? Or is it more specifically that there were other political appointments being considered at the same time, and therefore it is relevant to the Humble Address because it is looking at the Prime Minister’s decision making around the appointments of ambassadors?

The Humble Address wording is very specifically in relation to Peter Mandelson. I haven’t asked that question because I do not believe that that would be within the scope of my responsibilities in relation to this Humble Address.

Okay, that is clear. Thank you. My third area is around the due diligence itself. The document is there. Before publishing that, did you have to seek the same kind of legal advice, policy expert advice and propriety and ethics team advice that you had to about the security vetting? Was there any discussion about whether you would release that due diligence report? As you know very well, it contains information about the concerns about reputational risk of previous departures of Mandelson from office, of Epstein and of China relations. It has all of those things. Did you receive advice before that or was it very clear that you could publish it?

I have sought independent legal advice on a number of documents which were published. I continue to retain counsel advice to help me in questions I might have. You will appreciate that there is a very, very large number of documents. On anything that might be contentious, contain personal information or prejudice the criminal investigation, I would obviously seek expert advice.

In the due diligence, there are obviously issues that were then taken up in the security vetting, but there also issues about reputational risk. Would they have been part of the security vetting or would there have been another process to look further into the reputational risk, which is more a political decision than a security decision? Or do the two processes go together to the UKSV?

I think this is part of what we should ask Sir Adrian Fulford to look at because, as I described, there are four distinct processes. Ideally, you want those processes and the information to come together. In this instance, they are conducted at different times, and there are good reasons for why that is the case. It is perfectly normal for these processes to be undertaken by the individual authorities responsible for overseeing them and the people who have to make decisions about them. I think it is fair to say that there are some overlaps in the risks and the information, but they are used to assess for different things.

In this case, in your role as chief operating officer going forward, and in looking at how we operate on this in the future—and that Ministers and the Prime Minister are given all the advice they need—this may be an area that is looked at. Unusual appointments like this are where it really comes to the crux, and there should be more of a reputational risk assessment, as well as a security risk assessment.

Well, in many ways, the reputational risk is covered within the due diligence, and I hope the record that is in the public domain indicates some of that assessment. But in my role, both as chief operating officer for the Civil Service and in overseeing the Humble Address, we are learning a lot of lessons, and I am determined, as is the Prime Minister, to make sure that lessons are learned.

Just as a quick follow-up to the questions that Fleur has been asking, you have said that all the documentation around the appointment itself has now been included in the first batch of published documents, and that you have been very rigorous to make sure that it covers that. Why is there no formal record of the actual meeting at which the Prime Minister decided to go ahead and make the appointment?

Two things. I want to be really clear about what I have said, in case there is any misunderstanding. I have undertaken an information-gathering process, which I am confident has now received all the information that is within the scope of the Humble Address. I have done everything I can to identify information. There is never going to be a moment where I can say that every single possible document has been identified—I hope you will appreciate that. I am confident that I have undertaken a process that allows me to be confident that I have run the right sort of thorough process. I hope that distinction is clear. There is some information, given this conversation about vetting, that I believe is relevant to the appointment of Peter Mandelson. That information is still being processed, so it hasn’t all been published. It is being processed as part of the information gathering for the Humble Address. Sorry; I have forgotten the second part of your question.

It is about the actual minute of the meeting at which the Prime Minister said, “Right, here’s the due diligence,” and he is advised about all the various other aspects, and he said, “Yes, I want it to be Peter Mandelson. Set that in motion.”

As I said to you, it is normal to keep a record of those sorts of decisions.

But there isn’t one of this.

I have shared with you the information that we have.

Are you asking why there isn’t a further document setting out a record of that meeting?

There are a number of examples where we have had to undertake further investigation, based on the information that we have. Wherever you would expect to see more information, we have undertaken follow-up inquiries.

Wouldn’t you expect to see further information around this?

I would.

So you are continuing to push.

We have undertaken further investigation.

Apologies for requesting a clarification—so many people have been fired that it is sometimes difficult to keep up. Peter Mandelson was fired because the release of the Epstein files showed that his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein had continued for a lot longer than he had disclosed, prior to being appointed. Sir Olly Robbins was fired because he granted security access to Peter Mandelson, and the Prime Minister took the view that the security vetting report indicated that Mandelson shouldn’t have been, and that he would not have appointed Peter Mandelson in the first place had he had that information. You have seen the security vetting report—to be clear, I am under no circumstances asking you to disclose anything in that. As is now a matter of public record, you have also seen the due diligence report and the information that the Prime Minister was shown. Olly Robbins was fired for granting security clearance and not providing the information to the Prime Minister earlier. Can you tell us whether there is anything materially different in terms of the risk—not the types of risk, not the individual risk, but the risk—shown in the security vetting report and the due diligence report, which the Prime Minister was shown. Was the Prime Minister aware of all the risks associated with Peter Mandelson, prior to making the appointment?

By the nature of the Prime Minister not seeing or being told that there were risks identified in the UKSV document, I cannot answer that question, because ultimately I don’t think I can answer that question without revealing what might be different within the UKSV report. I would just go back to this: the Prime Minister did not know about the UKSV conclusion, and he did not know which specific risks were identified at the time of appointment.

Without disclosing what may or may not have been in the report, the leaked document to Bloomberg at the time contained information that Peter Mandelson had passed on market-sensitive information about high-level discussions happening at Cabinet at a time of grave crisis in Britain. Would information of that nature come up during UKSV? I am not asking if it did. If Bloomberg got hold of it, surely our security services could in theory find information of that nature.

It could do.

Thank you.

Thank you for your time today. You said earlier in this session that on 15 September 2025—four days after Peter Mandelson was sacked—Foreign Office officials asked for and received the UKSV documents relating to him. Did they say why they wanted to see these documents in the wake of his sacking? What documents did they ask for?

I cannot go into the detail of the precise documents that they asked for. In the audit trail that I have seen—there may very well have been further verbal conversations at the time—I don’t recall there being a reason given.

Would they have needed to give a reason to see the file?

Not necessarily. That is my understanding of the process.

Can I pick up on something? I have just checked the transcript. I asked Olly Robbins this question, and I think it has been asked of you as well. It is an important aspect of this. So much was known about Peter Mandelson. As far as I can see—without meaning to be disrespectful—due diligence is essentially giving some fast streamers the job of looking at what is in the public realm, and they put together a bundle; it is not a security briefing in the same way. I always wondered, given that so much was known about Peter Mandelson, whether there was anything—without telling us what it was—in the security vetting that was not in the due diligence report?

Could I talk hypothetically?

No, because I asked Olly Robbins this and he said he wouldn’t tell me. I just want to know if you are going to tell me.

I don’t think I can without revealing what was in—

Can’t you say yes or no?

I can say—

Can’t you say, “There was something in the direct vetting that was different, more worrying or of more impact than the due diligence”?

Forgive me; I am going to pause before I fully answer this question, because it is important that I get this right.

Please—have a think.

I do not want to make this any harder than it already is for our national security system.

I understand that. We are in a bind.

I would prefer to answer your question by saying that it could contain more information, by the nature of this being an exercise to assess different information for a different purpose.

Okay. If that is all I am going to get, I will not push it any further. I have tried.

Did Cabinet Office officials at any stage consider withholding Mandelson’s UKSV summary file from the ISC?

We have undertaken expert advice, and I think there has been reasonable debate and discussion about this. I hope the Committee will understand that that is because of all the reasons I have shared with you about the importance of protecting our national security. I won’t go into the detail, but I had a version of the discussion and the sorts of issues being debated with the ISC in the evidence that I gave to them earlier this week. I think it is right that I set out in more detail to the ISC, under the security conditions that we have for conducting that hearing, more information. I understand why you are asking the question.

Sir Olly told this Committee this week that he was briefed that officials in the Cabinet Office were very worried about releasing Peter Mandelson’s UKSV file to Parliament. Would that be correct?

Yes—and when we talk about vetting files, I think it is important to recognise that the inputs to the file are comprehensive, very detailed and very sensitive confidential inputs. I have always felt strongly that until I had seen the full trail of information or understood the full trail of information available, I would take all necessary actions to protect those inputs, because I genuinely believe that that is at the heart of our national security process. So I think it is accurate for Sir Olly to describe the discussions we had had in that way.

The Committee is seeing Morgan McSweeney next week. Is there any Cabinet Office advice in relation to the decision to use him and others to have follow-up questions to Peter Mandelson about the Epstein issues?

Forgive me—as you have pointed out, Chair, I have seen a lot of documentation in the last couple of weeks. I cannot recall seeing anything, but forgive me if at a later date it turns out that I have.

Would you mind checking ahead of our session?

I am content to check that ahead of your session and confirm to the Clerks.

Thank you. On the dismissal of Sir Olly, did you provide any advice to the Prime Minister about the decision to dismiss him?

No.

Can you tell us who did or what sort of advice he received in advance of that? Do you know?

I cannot comment on a decision or a judgment process that I was not involved in.

I have Aphra, Edward and Dan, and then we will draw this process to a close—just to give you the good news. Aphra is next.

Thank you for giving us so much of your time. I want to clarify what you have said about the information that has already come through in the Humble Address and is expected still to come through. My understanding was that initially it was supposed to be provided by 10 April, but there is still further information to come. From some of your answers, I have been given the impression that you believe there is still information missing that you might want to look for. I just wondered if you could clarify that, clarify when you expect all this information to be provided by, and perhaps let me know whether, as part of this information gathering, any Ministers have been asked to provide records from their mobile phones and if they have all complied with that.

There are a number of questions there. I will try to break that down.

Sorry. I tried to cheat—I got one question and asked three.

We are trying to finish by 11, but we can go over a little.

That is understandable. The first thing I should say on the record is that I am sincerely grateful to the ISC for the significant amount of time that they have dedicated to working through the information we have passed to them. I am very conscious, having done it, that this is a very, very painstaking and complex exercise that must be undertaken thoroughly. It has taken many, many hours of their time that they had not expected to be undertaken. We launched this dedicated fact-finding process—to be really clear with this Committee and the House, we are now reaching the very, very final stages, and final checks are being done. We have had over the last 24 hours further conversations to double-check and follow up the information we have seen with the Foreign Office. All that information is now being processed. One of the first things I do when I return to the office is to go back and read everything else that now needs to be processed with the ISC. We had hoped to provide much more of this information by 10 April, and clearly that was not possible given the complexity of this exercise.

What date do you expect to have it by? Do you think information is missing? And were Ministers asked to hand over information from their mobile phones?

I described earlier the process that I have undertaken to be as thorough and robust as possible in the information-gathering process. I will never be able to say to you that I have definitely got everything, but I will be able to assure the House that we have undertaken robust processes to gather all information relevant to the Humble Address. To answer your question about electronic communications, there has been a distinct formal request for all Ministers, senior officials and special advisers to provide us with direct communications with Peter Mandelson. We are doing final checks on all the information we have received by any form of electronic communication, in line with the scope of the Humble Address.

Have all Ministers complied with that?

All Ministers have undertaken the processes we have requested of them and complied with the Information Commission.

Edward?

Sorry—I probably should have formed the question better in my head before I put my hand up.

For the sake of time, I will go to Dan first and then come to you.

I want to return to the timeline around December and January. Anyone can correct me if this is wrong, but I think it is right that the decision to appoint Mandelson was on 18 December. The announcement was made on the 20th. Vetting began on the 23rd. Olly Robbins became the permanent under-secretary on 20 January. In terms of what you have decided is in scope for the Humble Address, will we be seeing any papers relating to the early departure of Sir Philip Barton?

Again, forgive me; I am recalling all the information that I have seen. If it is deemed within scope of the Humble Address because of either the spirit or the letter of the Humble Address, we will process the information that we have received. Sorry not to be more specific. If there is a specific thing you are looking for, I am content to take that away and confirm with the Clerks once I have had an opportunity to confirm precisely what it is that you are looking for.

I suppose I am looking for the reason why Sir Philip Barton’s departure from the FCDO came at such a critical time in this process.

I am afraid I just cannot comment on that. That is not a decision or an event that I was involved in.

I don’t want you to comment on it; I want to know if we are going to see notes and minutes of discussions and decisions that were made when it comes to the reason why he left the FCDO before he was meant to.

If there is information relevant to the scope of the Humble Address, it will be processed.

I think you have accepted today that due process was followed throughout the vetting process. I just want to clarify that that means the decision maker for passing vetting was Olly Robbins.

I refer back to the evidence that Sir Olly has given you. I think this is an important point to draw out. Sir Olly would have been responsible at the time and accountable for the decision-making process. It is not entirely clear to me where the formal final decision was made. I have a document back from the UKSV that records on the portal the decision that has been made, and I have an email from the director of security to the individuals I described earlier.

But would one not expect a document that reflected the thought process: the discussion or the, “Well, we’ve been told this, but if we mitigate this, so and so said it would”—you know? Please tell me if I am wrong, but I understand that these civil service notes are quite often, “So and so said this and so and so said that.” I appreciate that only two people were there, but there was an important discussion going on: “We have had this recommendation from the vetting people. We want to proceed with appointing him with mitigations”—an actual detailed discussion as to why those mitigations would be relevant and would deal with the concerns raised. Would it not be reasonable to expect some kind of proper note of the back-and-forth, the give-and-take: “If we do this, that will work, although we have got to be worried about that.” Do you see what I mean?

In my personal view, what you have described would be a reasonable expectation, but I must repeat what I said earlier. I entirely understand why security officials involved in this were trying to avoid documenting information within the vetting file. But I have to agree with you; what you have described, in my personal view, would have been a reasonable document to record.

Would that be recorded within the FCDO or UKSV?

The FCDO are the decision maker.

I would not ask you to opine on this anyway, but let us put aside for a moment whether or not Sir Olly Robbins was the decision maker, although ultimately accountable for the decision to grant security access to Peter Mandelson, and whether or not that was the right decision. Given your understanding of the FCDO’s process and powers, its position of “DV by default” while also only taking advice from UKSV and its power to make the ultimate decision, and your understanding of everything that happened subsequently in terms of the decision to withhold information from the Prime Minister or otherwise, did Sir Oliver do anything wrong? Or did he operate entirely within his rights and powers and responsibilities as the permanent secretary of the FCDO?

I am not here to opine on that, and I do not think that it is appropriate to give a judgment.

You can tell us if he stepped outside of the ideal process.

I am very sorry. I am not going to be drawn into giving an opinion on the actions of one of my former colleagues. I do not think that is within the scope of my responsibilities in discharging the will of Parliament and the Humble Address.

Can you tell us if he is a good civil servant?

I would repeat what I just said to you.

Is there FCDO guidance on how it takes vetting decisions? If so, have you seen that?

I assume so; I have not seen it personally.

Would it be possible for us to see that and to come to our own conclusions about whether the actions of Sir Olly were in line with that guidance, if it were to exist?

I can ask my Government security team to take that request away and report back to the Clerks based on our responsibilities in the Cabinet Office.

I would be very grateful if you did that.

Sir Olly did say to the Committee that there is internal guidance on this, which says: “Where we do find a risk, we always try to manage it through our aftercare programme or risk mitigation.”

I am going to give Uma the final question.

This entire conversation, our inquiry and the way this has been playing out in public, is mostly down to a series of very high-level leaks to very well-known news outlets. We have all talked about the security of the vetting process—the sanctity of the vetting process. Here in Parliament, we have tried our very best to respect that and in all the questions that we have asked we have come against the buffers, rightly, of that system. However, there is a very serious question about the leaks coming from either or both the Cabinet Office and the FCDO. What is the Cabinet Office doing to ensure that leaks of this sensitive nature never happen again?

I absolutely share your concerns. I cannot emphasise enough how concerned I am. As the CSPM, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, has set out, a leak investigation is under way. I cannot comment further.

We are a little later than we promised we would be, but I want to express our thanks to you for coming in. It is not easy appearing in front of Select Committees, and we appreciate your agreeing to do so. You have said that you may be able to provide us with a couple of documents. We are moving at quite a fast pace, and it would be really helpful if we were able to have them tomorrow, if possible, because other witnesses are coming in on Tuesday. That would be very helpful. Catherine Little indicated assent.

I ought to put something else on the record. On Tuesday, it was put in terms that Sam Coates had reported a conversation, the contents of a phone call, but it seems that he had not actually reported that. However, the two parties to that conversation—we hope—are going to be giving evidence before us, so we should be able to get a little more clarity, rather than it being third-hand hearsay. I think that draws our proceedings to an end. Thank you very much everybody.