Apologies to you both that we are running a little late, but if you were listening to the last session you will realise what excellent witnesses we had, so it seemed only fair to take first-hand testimony from them. I will start by asking you both to introduce yourselves.

Thank you very much for having me. My name is May Thazin Aung. I have been working at the International Institute for Environment and Development for about five years. I work on promoting the locally led adaptation agenda and am fortunate enough to work with a lot of the organisations in the previous panel, like Uttaran. I am originally from Myanmar, so I very much care about the perspectives of LDCs and the voices of communities. IIED is an institution that puts people at the centre. We care about fairness, human-centred approaches and sustainability, and we work very much in partnership with partners from the Global South to generate evidence that can influence policy.

Hi, my name is Avinash Persaud. Please call me Avinash or Avi. I am currently in Washington DC as the special adviser to the president of the Inter-American Development Bank, one of the largest regional development banks. As you know, our region—Latin America and the Caribbean—is the most vulnerable region to climate shocks. Before that I was working for the Barbados Government and was the architect of the Bridgetown Initiative, negotiator of the IMF programme and debt restructuring World Bank loans and IDB loans, which gave me a fair bit of experience relevant to this space. Before that, I grew up in London in the United Kingdom, as you can hear from my accent. I was in international finance, and for my sins I ended up in financial regulation where I was one of the architects of Basel III banking regulation.

Avi, in The Guardian today there was a powerful article suggesting quite strongly that the Government were looking to drop their commitment to climate finance. You will know that over the last Government and this Government £11.6 billion for climate finance has been committed to, and apparently we are now looking at cutting £2.6 billion off that. If that cut were made, what would be the consequence?

The financing gaps for resilience and development that are climate sensitive are enormous; the independent high-level expert group led by Lord Stern, Amar Bhattacharya and Vera Songwe has estimated them at $2.4 trillion a year, of which $1.3 trillion needs to come from international finance. The total amount of international finance ODA dedicated to climate—UK and others included—was around $100 billion if you include what they did through the multilateral development banks. That is one twelfth of what is needed. These climate finance gaps are big and we really need to have more climate finance rather than less. Given that this is a battle of scarce resources, it is very important how we strategically structure this finance. It is possible that the UK can have greater impact than it did in the past, even with a less aggregate figure, if it fully utilises London as a green hub for those things that can be funded by the private sector, as it is trying to do. I am no blind private-sector zealot who believes they can do everything, but there are some things they can do, now that renewable energies are the cheapest form of energy for 90% of the world. The UK could use its leadership position in the multilateral development banks without putting in much new money where it could leverage its dollars by up to tenfold. If it encouraged the MDBs to be focused on public infrastructure resilience, that is where the big multiples are—a dollar spent on a new seawall saves you $10—and then focused its remaining cash on responding to climate-related loss and damage, it could be a leader in international climate loss and damage. It could remain a leader on resilience and on loss and damage, but it requires a more structured, strategic approach. Spreading a thinner and thinner amount of money across more and more things is going to have an exponentially worse impact.

Loss and damage is one of those phrases that seems to make people’s hackles rise. Can you give us an example of what that would look like in practice?

Yes. I came late to climate finance. I was very much focused on development and international business before, and then I was asked to help support Dominica after Hurricane Maria during the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season, when it lost 226% of GDP in four hours. I had to do a crash course in learning. People combine all these terms together on climate, but they mean very different things and they are financed very differently. Mitigation is about reducing the emissions; renewable energy and sustainable agriculture will do that. We have not done enough mitigation, so now we need to adapt and build resilience. Adaptation is dealing with the climate change that is already here. Then finally, we have not done enough adaptation and resilience, so we need to respond to loss and damage. In our region we have had the recent horrific Hurricane Melissa that destroyed almost $10 billion of Jamaican GDP. We have had enormous flooding in Brazil, which has also cost a lot of lives. Responding to loss and damage is responding to the disasters that we have not adapted for and have not mitigated for.

May, there is a principle of polluter pays. Thinking specifically about low-income countries, many with quite heavy, dirty colonial boots on them, what message will it send if we step back from our commitments?

If we set the commitment that the polluter pays, it is a principle that should be followed. I would take a step back and think about the polluter pays principle as a whole. Within the UNFCCC it is based on the polluter pays principle: historical emissions from the past are why developed countries are now responsible for supporting developing countries in achieving their climate goals. This principle has already been agreed on at the global level by both developed and developing countries; it would not be a signal in another direction, or a mis-signal, if you choose the principle of polluter pays as being foundational to climate action in the future. If we look at impact from the community level and what this inquiry is about, is it effective at the community level? A lot of communities are suffering from very tangible everyday things: polluted rivers, not being able to fetch water because waterways are polluted, and their land being filled with rubbish from other countries. Those communities would be happy to hear about the polluter pays principle and its implementation.

Coming to Avinash first, what are the common challenges facing climate-vulnerable countries such as SIDS and LDCs?

SIDS are dealing with rising sea levels. The ice caps do not melt at the poles; that water ends up at the equator. Tropical small island developing states are facing increased sea levels, and the coast is often where their GDP is, so it has a big impact. Storms and hydrological disasters have massive impacts on flooding. We are not seeing more category five hurricanes, but we are seeing more disastrous hurricanes because they carry more water as they come over the Atlantic through warmer seas, so they end up being more destructive. We have learned that we can build resilience to these disasters. As I said before, a dollar spent on heavy, unglamorous public infrastructure—better seawalls, stronger seawalls, more resilient flood defences, drainage systems—can save $10 for every dollar that it costs. I believe one of the key priorities of multilateral development banks is to lend low-cost long-term for countries to become resilient today.

In addition to the impacts of climate change, the SIDS and LDCs are consistently facing the lack of recognition and a voice at the negotiating table to have their perspectives heard in UNFCCC and other global negotiation spaces, and actually being able to push their positions forward against corporations that are still consistently emitting and contributing to climate change. At the same time they are dealing with the very real day-to-day impacts of climate change in people’s lives. They are also facing issues around rising debt in trying to meet the development needs of their countries: basic things such as having 100% electrification, food security, and education for all citizens, but also being in debt and taking on more and more debt in order to meet the basic needs of society.

Do you have anything to add to the points you raised in answer to my first question about the climate-related impacts on such countries?

Without developed industry there are threats to basic livelihoods for people who are very dependent on ecosystems and ecosystem services. In Myanmar there are a lot of agrarian livelihoods, for example, and agriculture is very susceptible to the impacts of climate change. Compounded with that is the ongoing conflict, and people are unable to make ends meet. With ecosystem decline, being able to forage for food does not even become an option any more. These are the kinds of things that countries are facing. Going back to an earlier conversation, coral reefs are essential for fisheries and particularly for the livelihoods of women who are gleaners and collect mussels; they are unable to meet their livelihood needs because of the decline of the ecosystem of coral reefs. Yes, there are everyday impacts that people are unable to adapt to.

May and others have touched on this but the intersectionality of all these things—debt, development and climate—means they compound each other. They are not separate issues. SIDS are highly vulnerable; they are the canaries in the mine. When I was helping to lead the Bridgetown Initiative we used to say, “We are the canaries in the mine, but our conclusion is not that we need an air supply for ourselves, but to fix the mine.” We need to think about vulnerability across the board. One of the things that SIDS suffer from is that they have become very fragile. Their GDP per capita—their national income per head—still looks quite high but they suffer wipe-out risk and it can be wiped away in four hours. The current international financial architecture does not take that into account and does not make them eligible for concessional funding because their national income is high. They then spend; the evidence is that countries that suffer from climate impacts—not just SIDS, across Latin America and the Caribbean, mountainous and landlocked states—suffer increased debt as they are using debt to absorb these losses. They have now become fiscally unsustainable, or at least they have less fiscal space to respond, and so we need new instruments to help the fiscally challenged build up resilience straightaway.

To Avinash first, what does UK climate finance do least and most effectively, relative to its international counterparts?

The UK has intentionally played a very important role in the multilateral system. It has political challenges; you could imagine local and national Governments quite like bilateral funding. Supporting the multilateral system where money goes into a system and other people decide how it is spent is not always politically popular but it is very powerful and has the greatest leverage. I hope the UK continues to be a leader in the multilateral system and that means continuing to invest in but also reforming that system. Bridgetown and others helped to increase the lending headroom by multilateral banks by about $700 billion, but that is only halfway there. We need to double that. We have to make a distinction between climate loss and damage money and humanitarian assistance. The UK and other donors have quite a good system of humanitarian assistance. It can always do with more money, but when a disaster hits the humanitarian sector is pretty good in terms of its organisation: food and water are being flown in within 24 hours. What we are very bad at is what happens afterwards. It is fine when you have your communities under blue tarpaulin—I do not know why it is always blue—and you have them sheltering, fed, and watered, but who is going to rebuild the homes? Who is going to rebuild the communities? That is where the international system is poor and that should be the focus of the new fund for responding to loss and damage. I am not sure it is, but it could do with more money and more focus.

You say that that is an area that the UK could lead but you seem to be also saying that it is something we are bad at. Are we starting from a low base, but could make great strides because there is nobody else doing it? What is the thinking behind that?

The UK supported the creation of the fund for responding to loss and damage, which has around $800 million, but just remember that loss and damage is about $250 billion every year. It would not take a lot to make that fund bigger and more responsive and it would not take a big proportion of UK funding to do so. The sad reality is the UK could lead in that area partly because there is not enough action there. It would be wrong to say the UK is poor in that area; it is just that it could do a lot more, and a lot more is needed.

Compared with other countries on that loss and damage, where does the UK sit? Are you seeing it in terms of multilateral assistance that the UK could lead?

That is a good question. Germany, France and Italy put in around $100 million each and the UK committed to up to £60 million. We do not really know what “up to” means but it certainly puts money into the fund and you can see how it would not require a significant chunk of the climate finance in the UK to be a leader in loss and damage financing.

I understand. May, we have already heard from Avinash about the implications of the suggested cuts in climate finance allocation. Given the UK’s constrained resources, how can it maximise the impact, quality and effectiveness of its climate finance in climate-vulnerable country settings?

It would be great if there was more financing available, of course, so that more money can go to SIDS, LDCs, groups of women, children, indigenous people, and LGBTQI+ individuals. But we all know that this is a resource-constrained world, and it is important to focus on a couple of effective and transformative changes that can be implemented with the lesser amount of money that we are going to have. First is investing in transformative, not just gender-responsive but gender-just initiatives. What I mean by that is putting money into gender justice, which is addressing the root causes of inequality faced by marginalised people, recognising the different groups that are at risk because of climate change, and making sure that they have direct access to funding that they can reach and decide on their own terms: “This is important for us. These are the initiatives that we want to see in adapting to climate change.” Those kinds of initiatives are important, transformative and have a long-term impact beyond just a programme itself. It is important to invest in nature-based solutions as well because ecosystems are foundational to our survival. There was an investment in forest and in nature under ICF3. We want to see some ringfenced funding going forward to make sure that this is protected because local communities—especially indigenous people—really rely on ecosystem services. As Elizabeth—the previous speaker—mentioned, they are vital to communities to maintain their livelihoods. Secondly, even with a limited budget there can be greater efforts made towards enhancing transparency in financing. One of the things is around making sure that trust is maintained in relationships with partners. As Avi was saying before, the UK has been very effective in working in partnerships with a lot of different types of intermediaries, sitting on boards of the GCF, and promoting initiatives such as locally led adaptation. Those are important, but it is also important to make sure there is transparency about where the money is going and who it is going to. For example, there was recently a change in the accounting around international climate finance—which made it a little interesting in accounting—to double-count ODA and international climate finance together. The UK could be better at making sure that the accounting is transparent so that we can understand how much is going to international climate finance and how much to ODA. This makes us accountable to the UK taxpayers who are interested in seeing where the UK is spending money now that there is limited financing. We also need to take a different approach to accountability to make sure that transparency is open for the communities that we work with. It is impossible for local communities to see how much UK financing is currently reaching them because there are so many streams of finance. As Zahid mentioned previously, “How can I say that this money was funding the water pump, as we have so many different projects working in this community?” There could be improved transparency around climate finance and a greater focus on adaptation to align with the Paris agreement. The Paris agreement said there should be equal attention paid to mitigation and adaptation, with a particular focus on SIDS and LDCs. The UK has not been committing 50% equally to adaptation over time. It is important to make sure that we step that up because adaptation deals with the impacts of climate change that affect people’s lives. We would need to see at least 50% more commitment to adaptation, maybe even setting a floor of how much of the limited climate finance we have is going to it. That would make a very strong signal to the world that this is how much the UK cares about adaptation.

To segue this question back to Avinash, it seems that there is some agreement that our very immediate focus and immediate use of resources should be on adaptation and response, as you mentioned earlier, Avinash, just to check that that is agreed on. Are you then saying that actually for that longer-term mitigation work, ultimately it is large-scale and private capital that is needed? Could you perhaps just talk a bit more about some of the barriers to that? You mentioned a lot of the issue comes from debt and presumably debt capacity, both publicly and in the private sector, in some of the countries that we are focused on. What efforts are you seeing towards unlocking more capacity for that financing to go in? It seems that debt is a pretty hard limit on some of that.

This is a really important question and drives at the issue of managing the scarcity of resources. Too often I see Ministers thinking of this as a stack of financing, with a bit of public finance, a bit of multilateral—the World Bank and development banks—lending, and the private sector. As the public finance bit is shrinking they are going to expand these other things in this horizontal way. Unfortunately that does not work because the private sector cannot do everything. It cannot do things that generate no revenues. There is a tremendous amount of public infrastructure that is hugely impactful for adaptation, which does not generate a revenue. You cannot charge for a seawall because everyone benefits from it; it is a classic public good. Equally, debt does not work for everybody. You cannot tell a country to borrow for loss and damage because every time it gets hit, its debt goes up to the point it becomes completely unsustainable. We need a vertical approach where the different financing goes to the things most suited; that is a way we can hit the $1.3 trillion international finance number. Renewable energy is today the cheapest form of energy in most countries, and there is $3 trillion of investment in energy every year. Some $2 trillion is now in renewables but it is not going to developing countries because developing countries do not have micro problems but macro issues: exchange rate volatility, credit ratings, and the credit ceilings which people lend to. The multilateral development banks and others need to manage the macro issues such as FX and credit issues, which private sector companies cannot do, to unblock the flow of private money. There is a lot of work to be done, and the UK and London could be a hub in which that work gets done, but the private sector is not funding adaptation. There is lots of talk of it doing it but because there are no revenues only 3% of adaptation is being funded by them. That is where the MDBs need to fit in; they have the capacity to address the entire adaptation problem if the shareholders—led by the UK and others—want it to be so. If they make it a priority and make these MDBs expand their lending headroom using reforms such as more guarantees, more special drawing rights, and more callable capital. I know these are technical terms but the point is they can do so without hard dollars. They can expand lending headroom, and if they focus on it, the UK can capture adaptation, which is when you would put the rest of your money into loss and damage. In summary: private sector to mitigation and MDBs to adaptation but it has to be low-cost, long-term instruments including debt swaps, which is another technical term I am happy to unpack. The UK is supporting the expansion of debt swaps, where basically a country gets released some money that it can use for resilience. The IDB is leading something called the first multi-guarantor debt for resilience swap facility. That is where a country has the same amount of debt and the same amount of interest payments but because it has a guarantee from a multilateral development bank, money is released that they can devote to resilience because, as May was saying, it does not have the fiscal space for that. It then frees up resources to spend on things that cannot be funded any other way except by grants. If something can be funded in any other way than grants we need to fund it in that other way because we do not have enough grants.

Thank you, Avinash, you have answered one of the questions I was going to ask you, which was about the risks and challenges associated with private finance. What more could the Government do to leverage in private finance and particularly to identify new and additional sources of climate finance?

The UK Government are funding the development of something called ReInvest+, which will hopefully launch its first initiative and security of, say, $500 million in London at the end of the year. This is to answer the problem of institutional investors. Who has all the money? People talk about the private sector having trillions of dollars of money but where is that? It is actually held in pension funds and insurance companies; it is institutional money. We teach in finance that if something makes money, people will finance it but that is not so. Pension funds and insurance companies cannot invest in everything. They have external regulation, but they ought to have internal regulation familiarity with things they do. Only 2% of institutional money goes to developing countries at the moment. That is a weird number: 2% of institutional money goes to where there is 60% of the world’s growth. We have looked into what the obstacle is. It is that they want things that have the same credit rating as they invest in at home and in the same currency. At ReInvest+ we are buying existing and performing assets in developing countries and converting them into sterling or euros at the credit rating institutional investors want. When the institutional investors buy that and give us the cash, we do it again and again. But when we buy these assets from the developing countries we do so on the condition that they reinvest the money in those sectors aligned to the national development priorities, including the nationally determined contribution of each nation’s reduction and national adaptation plans. It is a way of converting the trillions into projects they do not invest in. For the people who have the experience on the ground, we give them cash to go and do it again. For the people who only want safe assets, we give them the safe assets. In this way the UK can play a catalytic role in supporting these kinds of initiatives without hard dollars but potentially unleashing billions and billions of dollars.

When you say we, are you referring to your Inter-American Development Bank?

We are playing a convening and co-ordinating role with other partners. One of the things about finance and private finance is there is a real lack of trust, so there is a role for public institutions to play not necessarily a subsidised but a trusting role: a neutral platform, an independent buyer and seller of assets.

What would the UK Government do? We have an institution called BII, for example, which is our development finance organisation, or would there have to be some other entity? How would we actually do it?

The interesting aspect is that it is about co-ordinating and convening something that would not happen otherwise. It is about aligning institutional investors and their regulations with the national development plans of Governments and local banks that have assets: bringing these three groups together that do not normally work together and then issuing the security in a place that understands it. The UK is playing a critical role in developing that and convening these three parties. It does not involve continuing money; it involves being the catalyst to start it and pulling it together in a trusted way. I hope that makes sense.

It makes sense. Colleagues, we have 10 minutes, six questions, two witnesses, and most of you want to come in. So, to both the witnesses and the Members, please make it short, tight and snappy going forwards.

To both of you: taking stock of what you have said about the UK’s current climate finance approach, how well aligned is it to the needs and priorities of climate-vulnerable countries?

I know it is a big focus of the UK Government. The three things the UK could do more of are having a greater focus on loss and damage, greater support of multilateral development banks to make sure they are giving these vulnerable countries access and instruments that are appropriate to them, and then focusing on breaking down the barriers of getting private finance to those countries.

Improving access to climate finance by promoting institutional reform is necessary. It is very difficult for national Governments, and even more so for local community organisations, to access finance through some of these institutions, such as the GCF and the Adaptation Fund. The UK can play an instrumental role in streamlining some of the criteria in due diligence and the different standards imposed to access climate finance. Many of these institutions have signed up to the locally led adaptation principles that call for institutional reform, so they are already on the right side; they just need this convening power and a push.

I guess that also links to the capacity building needs that we heard about in our earlier session. Avinash, very briefly, do you have anything to add on the barriers to accessing the UK’s climate finance currently?

Having been a borrower, it sometimes feels like there are hoops and loops to stop us getting any cash. May is absolutely correct: we need to streamline and ease, although I would be wary of too much standardisation. We do not want a monolithic multilateral system, which either lends to you or does not lend to you. Different institutions such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, and the MDBs have different areas of focus, but there must be greater streamlining and a greater commitment to getting money out the door quickly.

May, do you have anything to add on how the UK can better adapt its policies to support climate-vulnerable countries to access finance?

There could be a greater emphasis on ringfencing money for particular target groups such as women, children, and some of the more vulnerable groups, and making sure that there is funding towards SIDS and LDCs. Going back to transparency, if you look at the markers it is actually very difficult to tell how much money is going to gender and how much to particular disaggregated groups within these target groups. Having ringfenced funding, maybe with criteria that are easier for different groups of organisations to access, would be an approach. In addition to working with MDBs and the funds, working with good intermediary organisations is needed. There are majority world philanthropies and organisations such as IIED and many others that work in partnership with grassroots organisations that know how to manage risk but also be credible. Making sure that there is funding set aside that can reach good intermediaries is important.

Very briefly, would you describe the ringfencing concept you have just described as a top-down approach?

It does not need to be a top-down approach. Ringfencing just makes sure that there is funding that can be accessed by certain target groups. But whichever institution manages this fund would be responsible for making it flexible. For example, maybe that fund can ensure that there is a local committee or governance structure that includes different marginalised groups so that the decision can be made based on the needs of communities. Ringfencing does not translate to top-down.

The UK is increasingly using multilaterals to deliver its climate finance. Avinash, could you first comment on the benefits and risks of this approach, and on any opportunities for the UK to influence reforms to the global climate finance architecture?

Let me try to be brief and answer that in two ways. First, the huge benefit is leverage. A limited amount of existing capital put in a long time ago or guarantees to these multilateral development banks can lead to a multiple of dollars lent at the lowest borrowing cost. Multilateral development banks are AAA-rated, they borrow the cheapest rate possible and because they are not-for-profit, they can on-lend that. The benefit is leverage. If you have fewer dollars you can multiply it by seven, eight, nine, or 10 times, but that only applies for things such as adaptation and resilience, which is where they should be. Finally on the architecture, the UK has championed something that is really quite transformative but not very glamorous and very hard for the public to understand called pause clauses. The vast amount of the debt that developing countries have is private creditor debt, not official debt lent by countries or by multilateral development banks. They issued a bond, and private investors borrowed, resulting in a vast amount of debt. Cancelling or restructuring that debt is very difficult, especially if you need to borrow again. The small island states champion pause clauses. Whenever a disaster hits, debt service, interest, and principal are suspended for two years, but are then added back on to the end of the term, which means the creditor is no worse off. But what the borrower hit by a disaster has is essential breathing space. For example, in the small island states it instantly frees up 20% of national income as a disaster hits. No other instrument comes close. The development banks lend 1%, 2% in a disaster; no one lends 20%, and that 20% is coming at non-emergency rates. Expanding pause clauses to all debt instruments would transform the debt architecture and make the world much more shock-absorbing. Sam Rushworth: Thank you. That was a great answer.

Very briefly, Avinash, what do you think of the work of the London Coalition? How looped into that are you, and does it address some of these points that you have raised?

Is this the London Coalition on regulatory matters? There are a few coalitions.

Debt reform. I believe there are some climate aspects to those discussions.

They are making some headway. I would focus on the regulatory changes that stop investors from investing in developing countries. The UK has a committee on that, which is doing some good work that will hopefully come to a conclusion shortly. There is more work to be done to standardise the pause clauses.

May, what does localisation mean when it comes to climate finance?

Localisation is going back to gender justice and making sure that the systemic barriers of inequality are addressed: making sure that marginalised people have a seat at the decision-making table and that they have the agency to make decisions around making sure that they are able to adapt to climate change on their own terms. But localisation is also complex because it can be national Government if we are thinking from the perspective of MDBs, but if you go to a slum community, localisation could be the community within which the slum resides. Localisation means different things to different people depending on the scale at which we are all operating, so I cannot give an easy answer to what localisation means.

Perhaps that is part of the problem—that if you cannot give an easy answer, it does not get funded.

Is gender given enough consideration in the UK climate finance programme design planning and implementation? You have touched on this already but it would be helpful if there is anything more you can say on it.

One of the things I mentioned is there could be more concerted monitoring of gender initiatives. The UK is doing great partnerships. FCDO partners with—I always get the name wrong—GAGGA, Global Alliance for Green and Gender Action, which is a group of good intermediaries that makes sure funding is channelled to the local level. It works with grassroots activists and is not just a funder that channels to the local level but an advocate for women’s groups, feminist organisations and different groups that it works with. These kinds of partnerships should be explored and encouraged more. Going back to the example of good intermediaries, there needs to be more flexible funding in the budget to make sure that the UK can explore more of these partnerships.

Avinash, throughout this session I keep getting frustrated because it does not seem as though anybody actually asks the people on the ground what the problems are, what the solutions are, and what they need to achieve them. Can you see any way that we could shift either on a country or a multilateral level to get to that point?

I do not think that the perspective of local communities is ignored or unheard. The institutional structure is focused top-down rather than bottom-up, and your Committee’s hearings have been important in emphasising that we need to consider bottom-up. It would not be new to any institution that we need to consider that, but how you do that is not that easy. At COP30, the Brazilians had one of the biggest exercises in bringing the indigenous peoples of the Amazon into the process and yet we still had protests by the indigenous people saying that they were left out. Voice, whose voice matters and how we incorporate the voice of the local community are easy to say and hard to do. The other important thing is that it is very important to listen to the community, as the effectiveness of anything we do is undermined if the community is against it and it does not make sense for the community. But these are big issues that require a national plan and national public infrastructure. We need a combination of listening, engaging and understanding, and thinking at a national level about what we are doing. Adaptation and resilience are systemic.

That is a great point to end on, and that is probably what our inquiry is going to pick away at and try to come up with some solutions. Thank you both very much. We really appreciate your engagement with us today. It has been a great session and we may well need to come back to you for further guidance and clarification.